Copyright ©
by Csaba Dezső 2004

Part I

Introduction

Chapter 1

Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's life

Although several details of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's life are lost for us, his personality takes a more distinct shape than that of many classical Indian poets and philosophers. His son, Abhinanda introduces his epitome of the *Kādambarī* with a short genealogy:[1]

> ***śakti****nāmābhavad gauḍo bhāradvājakule dvijaḥ|*
> *dārvābhisāram āsādya kṛtadāraparigrahaḥ ||5||*
> *tasya* ***mitrā****bhidhāno 'bhūd ātmajas tejasāṃ nidhiḥ|*
> *janena doṣoparamaprabuddhenārcitodayaḥ ||6||*
> *sa* ***śaktisvāminaṃ*** *putram avāpa śrutaśālinam|*
> *rājñaḥ karkoṭavaṃśasya* ***muktāpīḍasya*** *mantriṇam ||7||*
> ***kalyāṇasvāmi****nāmāsya yājñavalkya ivābhavat|*
> *tanayaḥ śuddhayogarddhinirdhūtabhavakalmaṣaḥ ||8||*
> *agādhahṛdayāt tasmāt parameśvaramaṇḍanam|*
> *ajāyata sutaḥ kāntaś* ***candro*** *dugdhodadher iva ||9||*
> *putraṃ kṛtajanānandaṃ sa* ***jayantam*** *ajījanat|*
> *āsīt kavitvavaktṛtvaphalā yasya sarasvatī ||10||*
> *vṛttikāra iti vyaktaṃ dvitīyaṃ nāma bibhrataḥ|*
> *vedavedāṅgaviduṣaḥ sarvaśāstrārthavādinaḥ ||11||*
> ***jayanta****nāmnaḥ sudhiyaḥ sādhusāhityatattvavit|*
> *sūnuḥ samudabhūt tasmād* ***abhinanda*** *iti śrutaḥ ||12||*
>
> There was a *gauḍa* Brahman by the name Śakti, [born] in the Bhāradvāja family, who moved to Dārvābhisāra and married [there]. He had a son called Mitra, a treasury of majestic luster, whose rise was hailed by the people, roused due to the cessation of dangers, *like the sun [Mitra] whose rising is worshipped by the people who have woken at the end of the night.* He obtained a son, Śaktisvāmin,

[1] *Kādambarīkathāsara*, pp. 1f. Cf. Bühler 1873, pp. 103ff. Bühler identified this Abhinanda with the author of the *Rāmacarita-mahākāvya*. The latter poet, however, calls himself the son of Śatānanda (see *Rāmacarita*, p. 39.)

> versed in the Vedas, the minister of king Muktāpīḍa of the Karkoṭa dynasty. He had a son called Kalyāṇasvāmin, who shook off the dirt of existence with wealth acquired by pure means, like Yājñavalkya, *who destroyed the stains of existence with the accomplishment of pure Yoga.* From that man of profound heart a beautiful son was born: Candra, an ornament of the Supreme Lord, *as the lovely moon* [Candra], *Śiva's ornament, was produced* from the milk-ocean *of unfathomable depth.* He begot a son, Jayanta, who made people happy, and who became poet and teacher as a result of his eloquence. Then to that wise man named Jayanta, who had a well-known second name 'The Commentator', was learned in the Vedas and the ancillary Vedic sciences, and expounded the meaning of all *śāstra*s, a son was born, known as Abhinanda, conversant with the true nature of good literature.

From these verses it appears that Jayanta's ancestors were Gauḍa (Bengali) Brahmans who traced their descent back to the sage Bharadvāja. One of them, called Śakti, settled in Dārvābhisāra, a territory at the frontiers of Kashmir, which, as Stein pointed out, "comprised the whole tract of the lower and middle hills lying between the Vitastā and Candrabhāgā."[2] In the mid-ninth century a rich merchant, called Nara, set up his own throne there;[3] a few decades later, as Kalhaṇa reports,[4] the lord of Dārvābhisāra fled from king Śaṅkaravarman (883–902), who was leading a campaign against Gūrjara. Later the same Kashmirian king assassinated Naravāhana, the king of Dārvābhisāra.[5]

Reverting to Jayanta's ancestors, Śakti's son, Mitra, was held in great esteem by his contemporaries, while his grandson, Śaktisvāmin, gained influence on the political life of Kashmir: he became the minister of king Lalitāditya-Muktāpīḍa of the Karkoṭa dynasty (c. 724–761).[6]

Jayanta himself gives us valuable information about his grandfather in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. I, p. 653):[7]

> *asmatpitāmaha eva grāmakāmaḥ sāṃgrahaṇīṃ kṛtavān| sa iṣṭisamāptisamanantaram eva gauramūlakaṃ grāmam avāpa|*

[2] RT(S), vol. I, p.32 (note ad *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 1.180).

[3] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 4.712.

[4] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.141.

[5] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.209. Nara and his son Naravāhana figure in the pedigree of the Kashmirian Lohara dynasty (see *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 7.1282).

[6] On the chronology of the Karkoṭa dynasty see RT(S), vol. I, pp. 66ff. Kalhaṇa does not mention Śaktisvāmin. He does however mention a minister of Lalitāditya called Mitraśarman (*Rājataraṅgiṇī* 4.137f.).

[7] It is remarkable how stubbornly some mistakes endure. Stein in his note to *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 8.1861 wrongly attributed the *Nyāyamañjarī* to Abhinanda (RT(S), vol. I, p. 144), but he corrected his mistake in the *Corrigenda et Addenda* (RT(S), vol. II, p. 555). One might think that after several publications of the *Nyāyamañjarī* its authorship is public knowledge, still Majumdar writes the following in his *Concise History of Ancient India* (New Delhi, 1983 [!], vol. III, p. 764): 'However, Abhinanda the author of the *Nyāyamañjarī* has quoted Vācaspati several times, and Abhinanda's son [!] Jayanta declares himself to have been Rājaśekhara's contemporary.' (This is all the more surprising since on pp. 695, 731, and 811 Majumdar refers to 'Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*'.)

> 'My own grandfather, desiring a village, performed the *sāṃgrahaṇī* sacrifice. Immediately after the completion of the sacrifice he obtained the village of Gauramūlaka.'

Gauramūlaka, as Cakradhara, the commentator of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, remarks, was Jayanta's ancestral village.[8] According to Stein,[9] Gauramūlaka or Ghoramūlaka was situated to the north of Rājapurī (Rajaurī), in the direction of the Rattan Pīr range. On the other hand, the state of Rājapurī was included in Dārvābhisāra.[10] If my interpretation is sound, Abhinanda might refer to this improvement of Kalyāṇasvāmin's financial position in verse eight above.

Jayanta also mentions his father, Candra, in the *Nyāyamañjarī* with highly appreciative words: 'he filled the quarters with [his] fame, brilliant as the moon'.[11] Raghavan suggests that Candra was a devotee of Śiva;[12] on the other hand, the expression *parameśvaramaṇḍanam* might refer to the fact that Candra rendered valuable services to the monarch.

From the information we have gleaned above it appears that Jayanta was born in a wealthy and respected orthodox Brahman family. He soon turned out to be a child genius: at a tender age he composed a commentary to Pāṇini's grammar and earned the name "(New) Commentator", (Nava-)Vṛttikāra.[13] Later he made himself master of various *śāstra*s and *āgama*s,[14] distinguished himself in scholarly debates,[15] and passed on his knowledge to a circle of students.[16]

Jayanta seems to have written three works on Nyāya, of which only two are extant: his *magnum opus*, the *Nyāyamañjarī* ("A Cluster of Flowers of [the] Nyāya[-tree]"), and the *Nyāyakalikā* ("A Bud of [the] Nyāya[-tree]").[17] A Third work called *Pallava* (possibly *Nyāyapallava*, "A Twig of [the] Nyāya[-

[8] *Granthibhaṅga*, p. 35: *gauramūlakākhyo granthakṛdabhijanagrāmaḥ*|

[9] RT(S), vol. II, pp. 144f. (note to verse 8.1861)

[10] RT(S), vol. I, p. 33 (note to verse 1.180), vol. II, pp. 144f. (note to verse 8.1861); see also *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 8.1531.

[11] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 718: ... *vyāptadigantarasya yaśasā candrasya candratviṣā* ...

[12] *Āgamaḍambara (ed. pr.)*, p. i.

[13] See *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, verse 52: *bālakaver ... jayantasya*; *Āgamaḍambara*, Prologue: *śaiśava eva vyākaraṇavivaraṇakaraṇād vṛttikāra iti prathitāparanāmno bhaṭṭajayantasya*. Also *Kādambarīkathāsāra*, verse 11 (quoted above), *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 718: *anvartho navavṛttikāra iti yaṃ śaṃsanti nāmnā budhāḥ*|

[14] See *Kādambarīkathāsāra*, verse 11 (quoted above), *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, verse 52: *avalokitasakalaśāstrasārasya ... tattvavido bhraṣṭabhrānter jayantasya*, *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Two, ll. 405f.: *aśeṣabhavāgamapārage bhaṭṭajayante*.

[15] See *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 718: *vādeṣv āttajayo jayanta iti yaḥ khyātaḥ satām agraṇīḥ*.

[16] Jayanta's play was staged by his *śiṣyapariṣad*.

[17] According to Steinkellner (1961, p. 159), '[d]ie verffentlichte Nyāyakalikā ist kein Jayantawerk, sondern eine späte Kompilation von Jayanta-Sätzen' (note 16: 'Nach Angaben von V. Raghavan, Madras.') Marui, however, after careful consideration, is inclined to accept Jayanta's authorship (see Marui). A cursory glance at a manuscript of the *Nyāyakalikā* (Banaras Hindu University, 328405) made it clear to me that a critical edition of the text is a desideratum. According to Marui (p. 97; unfortunately the edition of Ganganath Jha, Allahabad, 1925, was not at my disposal) the *Nyāyamañjarī* and the *Nyāyakalikā* share the opening verse starting *namaḥ śāśvatikānanda*.... The BHU ms, however, does not contain this verse, and the text begins with the verse *surāsuraśiroratnamarīcikhacitāṅghraye*..., which is the third verse at the beginning of the *Nyāyamañjarī*. Marui also quotes the closing sentences

tree]") is quoted in the *Syādvādaratnākara*;[18] Raghavan assumed that it was a 'moderately sized metrical gloss on Gautama'.[19] From the opening and closing benedictory verses of the *Nyāyamañjarī* we can presume that Jayanta was a devotee of Śiva,[20] while the fact that he thinks very highly of the Atharvaveda[21] might indicate, as Raghavan pointed out, 'that Jayanta belonged to the Atharvaveda'.[22]

As we have seen Abhinanda admires his father's poetic talent,[23] and in one of the *maṅgala*-verses, instead of praising Bāṇa (the author whose work he epitomizes), he extols Jayanta's eloquence:[24]

> *sarasāḥ sadalaṃkārāḥ prasādamadhurā giraḥ|*
> *kāntās tātajayantasya jayanti jagatīguroḥ||*
>
> 'Victorious are the pleasing words of my father Jayanta, the teacher of the world, which are full of *rasa*s, endowed with proper *alaṅkāra*s, and sweet with lucidity, *like beloved women who are full of feeling, wear beautiful ornaments, and are charming with graciousness.*'

Though the style of the *Nyāyamañjarī* amply confirms Abhinanda's above quoted words, only one *kāvya* work of Jayanta is extant: the *Āgamaḍambara*, a play in four acts. Since a verse that is quoted in the play (Act Four, verse 53) as Jayanta's wise saying (*sūktam*) is also found in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. I, p. 640), it seems probable that Jayanta wrote the *Āgamaḍambara* following his major work on Nyāya.[25]

The *Āgamaḍambara* provides valuable details about Jayanta's political career. We learn that he was the adviser (*amātya*) of king Śaṅkaravarman (883–902), and played a great part in banishing the heterodox sect of the Black-Blankets from Kashmir.[26] The *nīlāmbara*s and their sad fate are also mentioned

of the *Nyāyakalikā*, which contain a lacuna in the edition. With the help of the BHU MS we can complete and improve the text: **ity etad aprabhāvitasvamatabhedam akṛtaparamatākṣepaṃ* (conj. : *ity apramāvita*° MS, *ity etad* +++++ ed.) *ṣodaśapadārtha*tattvaṃ* (ed. : °*tattvāṃ* MS) **bālavyutpattaye* (ed. : *vālavyupattaye* MS) **kathitam|* (MS : om. MARUI, ed.?) **ajāta*(ed. : *ajñāta*° MS)*rasaniṣyandam anabhivyaktasaurabham| nyāyasya kalikāmātraṃ jayantaḥ paryadīdṛśat||*

[18] See STEINKELLNER 1961, p. 159; *Āgamaḍambara (ed. pr.)*, p. v, note 8; MARUI, p. 93.

[19] *Āgamaḍambara (ed. pr.)*, p. v.

[20] The first verse in the *Nyāyamañjarī* is addressed to Śambhu, the second to Bhavānī, the third to Gaṇapati. In the penultimate verse of his work Jayanta says that he composed the *Nyāyamañjarī* 'meditating on the feet of [Śiva] whose diadem is the crescent' (*candrakalārdhacūḍacaraṇadhyāyī*), and in the closing verse he again pays reverence to Śambhu.

[21] Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 5: *tatra vedāś catvāraḥ| prathamo 'tharvavedaḥ...*; in the section on *vedaprāmāṇya* Jayanta spares no pains to prove the Veda-status of the Atharvaveda, and he even asserts that it is actually the foremost of all the four Vedas (*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 626: *atharvaveda eva prathamaḥ*).

[22] *Āgamaḍambara (ed. pr.)*, p. iii.

[23] *Kādambarīkathāsāra*, verse 10, quoted above.

[24] *Kādambarīkathāsāra*, verse 2.

[25] Actually there are many more parallel passages in the two texts (without the indication of the source in the play), as the register of *testimonia* in the edition will show.

[26] See Act Two, ll. 405ff.: *nanv asau rājā śrīśaṅkaradevaḥ| sa hi varṇāśramadharmamaryādācāryas tribhuvanarakṣādīkṣito devaḥ svata eva pratikriyām atra jānāti, viśeṣato 'śeṣabha-*

in the *Nyāyamañjarī*[27]:

> *asitaikapaṭanivītāviyutastrīpuṃsavihitabahuceṣṭam|*
> *nīlāmbaravratam idaṃ kila kalpitam āsīt viṭaiḥ kaiścit||*
> *tad apūrvam iti viditvā nivārayām āsa dharmatattvajñaḥ|*
> *rājā śaṅkaravarmā na punar jainādimatam evam||*
>
> *asitaika°* em. Isaacson : *amitaika°* ed; *°āviyuta°* Pāṭhāntaras and Śodhanas, at the end of vol. II. : *°āniyata°* ed. ('unrestrained')
>
> 'Some rakes, as we are told, invented this Black Blanket Observance, in which men and women wrapped together in a single black veil make various movements. King Śaṅkaravarman, who was conversant with the true nature of Dharma, suppressed this practice, because he knew that it was unprecedented, but he did not [suppress] the religions of Jains and others in the same way.'[28]

vāgamapārage pārśvavartini tatrabhavati bhaṭṭajayante|; Act Three, ll. 34ff.: *dāluṇe khu lāe śaṃkalavamme| tado vi viśame śe bamhaṇe taśśa amacce dulāālajayaṃte, jehiṃ te tavaśśiṇo ṇīlambalā vaḍia piṭṭiya vedavāhila tti laṭṭhādo ṇivvāśidā|*; ibid. verse 8: *rājāsau bhuvaneṣu viśrutaguṇo dharmaikatānāśayo, mantrī śāstramahāṭavīviharaṇāśrānto jayanto 'py asau|*

[27] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 649

[28] This verse started an avalanche of misinterpretations. First Jacob made the following observation (Jacob 1911, p. 511): 'From the concluding words it would appear that the king was a Jain.' Then M. R. Kavi deleted Yaśovarman of Kanauj from the pages of history (Kavi, pp. 45ff), and identified the Kashmirian Śaṅkaravarman, who is called Yaśovarman in the Āgamaḍambara, with the patron king of Bhavabhūti and Vākpatirāja (ibid. p. 50). The fact that 'Kalhaṇa devotes a vague and dark page in depicting this sovereign's [Śaṅkaravarman's] conquests and political career' induces Kavi to think that 'pages in Kalhaṇa's transcript were misplaced and several lines referring to Lalitāditya should come in the history of Śaṅkaravarman' (p. 47). To quote some more of Kavi's utterly unfounded assertions: 'All these characters [in the *Āgamaḍambara*] are real persons and may be assumed as contemporaries of Jayanta and Śaṅkaravarman' (p. 48); 'Viśvarūpa is spoken of in high terms in the drama and as a great mīmāmsaka' (ibid.); Viśvarūpa is the same as the commentator of the Yājñavalkya Smṛti, who is also called Bhavabhūti; Umbeka is also called Bhavabhūti: therefore 'Umbeka, Bhavabhūti, Viśvarūpa [...] are the different names of the same person' (ibid.); 'Viśvarūpa of the drama can be suggested as his [Śaṅkaravarman / Yaśovarman's] court poet Bhavabhūti' (p. 49); 'Sāhaṭa, also called Dhairyarāśi is described as the guru of Jayanta' (ibid.); 'Mañjīra, an officer of the king, was a poet representing one of the three schools of poetic composition as detailed by Kuntaka in his Vakroktijīvita' (p. 50), etc. etc.

Now Hegde in his article about Bhaṭṭa Jayanta ingeniously combined Jacob's and Kavi's guesswork in the following way (Hegde, pp. 5f): 'The king Śaṅkaravarman, according to Mr. Ramakrishna Kavi who dates it on the basis of the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* of Kalhaṇa, lived about 850 A.D. (...) A certain prince of the name of Śaṅkaravarman is mentioned in the *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, who was a Jaina by religious practice. Mm. Gopinath Kaviraj notices that the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* has fixed the time of this prince in between 883 A.D. and 902 A.D. and also that he was worthless. Śaṅkaravarman alias Yaśovarman also was a Jaina. It is not possible to find out the relation between these two Śaṅkaravarmans, because that part of the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* is missing, or to think otherwise, not properly descriptive in nature. But the time gap between these two persons is only 30 to 50 years. Hence Śaṅkaravarman who lived between 883 and 902 A.D. might have been an immediate or the next successor of the king Śaṅkaravarman otherwise called Yaśovarman who lived in 850 A.D. Due to some failures in the statesmanship of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, Śaṅkaravarman, the prince, might have put him to jail. But as we do not observe even a single word of censure of the king Śaṅkaravarman from the pen of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, we can easily assume that the king was controlled by the prince Śaṅkaravarman who

We know from Abhinanda that Jayanta's great-grandfather, Śaktisvāmin was a minister of the Kashmirian king Muktāpīḍa-Lalitāditya, who reigned between c. 724–761.[29] This information makes it probable that Jayanta was in his fifties-sixties at the end of the ninth century.[30]

Kalhaṇa does not give a favourable account of the king whom Jayanta served as adviser. Having secured the throne for himself by defeating a rival *yuvarāja*, king Śaṅkaravarman embarked on a campaign against Gūrjara.[31] Naravāhana, the king of Dārvābhisāra fled from the advancing army to the mountains[32] Śaṅkaravarman uprooted the king of Gūrjara, who handed over the Ṭakka-land to save his own country[33] After his successful *digvijaya* the king of Kashmir founded Śaṅkarapura, and together with his wife, Sugandhā, the daughter of Svāmirāja, 'the ruler of the northern region' (*udakpathaprabhoḥ*), they built two Śiva-temples there: Śaṅkaragaurīśa and Sugandheśa.[34] As Kalhaṇa remarks with his usual malice: 'Poets and kings of these modern times augment their own work by plundering the poems or the property of others. Thus this ruler, who possessed but little character, had whatever was of value at Parihāsapura [the town built by Lalitāditya], carried off in order to raise the fame of his own city.'[35]

Later Śaṅkaravarman came more and more under the sway of avarice and became 'master in exploiting his people'.[36] Since his campaigns had probably emptied the treasury, the king introduced fines, taxes, systematic forced labour, and established two new revenue offices.[37] He also deprived the temples from the profits they had from the sale of various articles of worship, simply 'plundered', as Kalhaṇa puts it, sixty-four temples through special "supervising" officers,[38] resumed under direct state management villages held as *agrahāra*s by

brought the circumstantial force on the king to put Jayanta in an isolated dungeon. The verse in the *NM*: *rājñā tu gahvare 'sminn aśabdake* ... etc. supports the above argument positively.'

[29] On the chronology of the Kārkoṭa dynasty see RT(S), vol. I, pp. 66ff.

[30] Cf. Hacker 1951, pp. 110ff.

[31] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.136 seqq. 'The name *Gūrjara* is preserved in that of the modern town of *Gujrāt*, situated in the Panjāb plain about five miles from the W. bank of the Cināb [...] The name of the modern town is also used in an extended sense for the designation of the neighbouring territory, comprising the upper portion of the Doāb between the Jhelam and Cināb rivers to the foot of the Bhimbhar hills. [...] It appears that the older name *Gūrjara* had, at the time of the events here related, a much wider territorial application.' (RT(S), vol. I, p. 204, note ad vv. 143–144.)

[32] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.141; a few years later Śaṅkaravarman assassinated him, see *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.209.

[33] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.150.

[34] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.156–158. The ruins of Śaṅkarapura can bee seen at the modern town of Paṭan (RT(S), vol. I, pp. 206f, note ad v. 156). 'Svāmirāja may be supposed to have been a ruler in the Dard territory, or in some neighbouring tract.' (RT(S), vol. I, p. 207, note ad v. 157.)

[35] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.160–161, tr. Stein in RT(S), vol. I, p. 207.

[36] *prajāpīḍanapaṇḍitaḥ*, *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.165.

[37] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.167ff.

[38] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.168–169: *dhūpacandanatailādivikriyotthaṃ samādade| draviṇaṃ devaveśmabhyaḥ krayamūlyakalācchalāt|| pratyavekṣāṃ mukhe dattvā vibhaktair adhikāribhiḥ| catuḥṣaṣṭiṃ suragṛhān mumoṣetarad añjasā||*

the temples, and manipulating the weight in the scales he cheated the temple-corporations (*parṣad*s), reducing the allotment assigned as compensation for the villages.[39] The villages gradually sank into poverty under the fiscal oppression, while clerks, secretaries, and tax-collectors (*kāyastha*s, *divira*s) ruled.[40]

Unlike his father Avantivarman, who showered honours and fortunes on scholars and poets,[41] Śaṅkaravarman was not a liberal patron of arts: as Kalhaṇa says, it was due to him that the learned were not respected.[42] The king was so afraid of spending money that he turned his back on the worthy, and as a result such eminent poets as Bhallaṭa had to live in penury,[43] while the low-born Lavaṭa, who was made treasurer (*gañjavara*), thrived.[44] Śaṅkaravarman himself, giving proof of his boorishness, refused to speak Sanskrit, and used *apabhraṃśa* instead, a language fit for drunkards in Kalhaṇa's esteem.[45]

Jayanta gives a more favourable account of king Śaṅkaravarman in his *Āgamaḍambara*. He is said to be 'supremely devoted to Śiva', and 'merciful to all religious schools'.[46] The Śaiva Abbot also holds a high opinion of the king: 'The merits of this king are celebrated all over the world, and his attention is solely devoted to social and religious order';[47] 'As long as His Majesty Śaṅkaravarman righteously rules the country which has fallen to him, the kingdom belongs to the virtuous alone, but he supports it.'[48] In the fourth act the hero of the play, looking at the assembly of scholars, exclaims as follows: 'How wonderful! Now the kingdom looks exactly like Brahmā's heaven—the kingdom of His Majesty Yaśovarmadeva[49] of holy fame, whose heart is with the Destroyer of the Cities [of the demons, i.e. Śiva], an ocean of enviable virtues, who adorns his ear by listening to the valuable [advices] of the learned, and fulfils the wishes of every honest man.'[50]

The two *sādhaka*s in the play, however, who represent a more antisocial form of Śaivism, are not satisfied either with the king,[51] or with the present state of the kingdom, because 'in every region, every single town, every village, everywhere the sound of Veda-recitation grates on the ear, the smell of ghee stings

[39] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.170–170, see also Stein's notes in RT(S), vol. I, pp. 208f.

[40] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.175ff.

[41] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.33f. Kalhaṇa mentions Muktākaṇa, Śivasvāmin (the author of the *Kapphinābhyudaya*), Ānandavardhana, and Ratnākara (who composed the *Haravijaya*) as members of Avantivarman's *sabhā*.

[42] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.179: *nimittaṃ sarvavidyānām anādare.*

[43] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.204: *tyāgabhīrutayā tasmin guṇisaṅgaparāṅmukhe| āsevantāvarā vṛttīḥ kavayo bhallaṭādayaḥ||*

[44] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.177, 205.

[45] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.206.

[46] *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Three, ll. 159f.: *paramamāheśvaro hi rājā śaṅkaravarmadevaḥ, sarvāśrameṣu ca dayāluḥ|*

[47] Ibid. verse 8a: *rājāsau bhuvaneṣu viśrutaguṇo dharmaikatānāśayo.*

[48] Ibid. ll. 219f.: *śrīśaṅkaravarmaṇi dharmeṇa medinīṃ samāgatāṃ śāsati sādhūnām eva rājyam, tasya paraṃ bhṛtiḥ|*

[49] Śaṅkaravarman used the same name on his Karkoṭa-style coins (see Ray).

[50] *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, ll. 76ff.: *aho bata puraharahṛdayasya spṛhaṇīyaguṇodadher vibudhaguṇākarṇanakarṇālaṅkārasya pūritasakalasādhujanamanorathasya puṇyayaśasaḥ śrīyaśovarmadevasya brahmalokanirviśeṣam evedaṃ dṛśyate rāṣṭram|*

[51] *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Three, l. 34: *dāluṇe khu lāe śaṃkalavamme.*

the nose, the smoke of sacrifice brings tears to the eyes'.[52] They are particularly upset because the king, shoulder to shoulder with his 'rough' (*viṣama*) adviser, Jayanta, has 'nabbed the mendicant Nīlāmbaras, beat them to jelly, and expelled them from the kingdom, on the grounds that they were outside Vedic religion. And if any other mendicant is caught, who is outside Vedic religion, he'll be beaten up, killed, thrown in jail, [or] slain.'[53] And indeed a herald comes and proclaims the order of the king:[54]

> *ye 'trānādijagatpravāhapatitā nānāgamāḥ sādhavas*
> *te tiṣṭhantu yathāsthitāḥ svasamayādiṣṭāś carantaḥ kriyāḥ|*
> *ye tu prastutadharmaviplavakṛtaḥ pāpās tapopāyinas*
> *te ced āśu na yānti ghātayati tān dasyūn iva kṣmāpatiḥ|*
>
> Those virtuous people who have fallen into the beginningless stream of the world and belong to various religions—they should remain as they are, performing practices prescribed by their own religious discipline. Those criminal false ascetics, however, who devastate the established social and religious order—if they don't leave immediately, the king will strike them like thieves.

On the basis of the information gathered from Jayanta's play and the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* we can sketch the portrait of a king who kept a fast hold on his country. Śaṅkaravarman appears to have exercised tight central control over both fiscal and religious matters in Kashmir, and preferred his subjects to be dutiful and conformist. He certainly disliked the squandering of money, and a nobleman who organized lavish dinners for mendicants instead of offering his wealth and services to the king could surely expect the confiscation of his property.[55]

In a verse in the *Nyāyamañjarī* Jayanta gives curious details about the circumstances among which he wrote his *magnum opus*:[56]

> *rājñā tu gahvare 'sminn aśabdake bandhane vinihito 'ham|*
> *grantharacanāvinodād iha hi mayā vāsarā gamitāḥ||*
>
> 'I had been transferred by the king to this forest, a wordless place of confinement. I have spent the years here with the pastime of writing a book.'

Cakradhara, the commentator of the *Nyāyamañjarī* supplements this rather enigmatic verse with the following information:[57]

[52] Ibid. ll. 81ff.: *viśae viśae ṇaale ṇaale gāme gāme thale thale vedajjhayaṇaśaddeṇa tuṭṭaṃti kaṇṇā, ajjagaṃdheṇa tuṭṭadi ghāṇe, jaṇṇadhūmeṇa galaṃti aṣkū|*

[53] Ibid. ll. 34ff.: *jehiṃ te tavaśśiṇo ṇīlambalā vaḍia piṭṭiya vedavahila tti laṭṭhādo ṇivvāśidā| aṇṇe ya je vedavāhile tavaśśī labbhadi, śe piṭṭīyadi mālīadi baṃdhīadi ghallīadi|*

[54] *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Three, verse 1.

[55] Cf. *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Two, ll. 315ff. Śaṅkaravarman's policy in religious matters was revived by Yaśaskara (939–948), who restored order in Kashmir after the chaotic reigns of various debauched kings following the death of Śaṅkaravarman. Yaśaskara, himself a Brahman and elected as king by an assembly of Brahmans, was a champion of orthodoxy, and, similarly to Śaṅkaravarman, he was not favourably disposed towards anti-dharmic religious practices (cf. *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 6.108ff).

[56] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 199.

[57] *Granthibhaṅga*, p. 167.

> *kaśmīre kvacit khasadeśe cirakālam *aṭavyām asau* (conj., or possibly *āraṇye 'sau* : *āraṇyā[nyā]m asau* ed.) *śrīśaṅkaravarmaṇo rājña ājñayā sthitavān iti vārtā*|
>
> 'The report runs that he spent a long time by His Majesty king Śaṅkara|varman's order in the forest, somewhere in Khasa-land in Kashmir.'

As Wezler has already pointed out,[58] it is unlikely that Jayanta wrote the *Nyāyamañjarī* as a political prisoner like Gandhi or Nehru. The territory of the *khasa*s or *khaśa*s was, according to Stein, 'restricted to a comparatively limited region, which may be roughly described as comprising the valleys lying immediately to the S[outh] and W[est] of the Pīr Pan<u>ts</u>āl range, between the middle course of the Vitastā in the W[est] and Kāṣṭavāta (Kiṣṭvār) in the E[ast].'[59] We also gather from the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* that the rulers of Rājapurī (Rajaurī) were *khaśa*s, just like their troops.[60] On the other hand, the hill-state of Rājapurī was included in Dārvābhisāra,[61] where Jayanta's forefathers had settled, and Ghoramūlaka or Gauramūlaka, Jayanta's ancestral village was, as Stein writes, 'probably situated to the north of Rajaurī in the direction of the Rattan Pīr range'.[62] It appears that Jayanta was sent by the king to this hill-region of the *khaśa*s, not very far from his homeland.[63] Since Śaṅkaravarman led his campaign through territories lying to the southwest from Kashmir, one might think that Jayanta was sent there with some kind of political commission.[64] The word *bandhana*, however, suggests that this may not have been a promotion, but it was not a life-long exile either since he seems to have returned to the circle of his students as their professor.

[58] Wezler 1976, p. 344.

[59] RT(S), vol. I, p. 47, note *ad* verse 1.317.

[60] Cf. e.g. *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 7.979, 1271, 1276 seqq., and Stein's note quoted above.

[61] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 8.1531, RT(S), vol. I, p. 33, note *ad* verse 1.180.

[62] RT(S), vol. II, p. 144, note *ad* verse 8.1861.

[63] To the east from Rājapurī lies the valley of the upper Āns River, which was called *Pañcagahvara* and was inhabited by *khaśa*s (see RT(S) vol. I, p. 47, note *ad* verse 1.317). Could the word *gahvare* in Jayanta's verse refer to this territory?

[64] In fact Kalhaṇa makes mention of the son of a minister whom Śaṅkaravarman made 'lord of the Gate' (*dvārādhipa*), and who was killed at a place called Vīrānaka (*Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.214). As Stein has shown, '[t]he term *dvārādhipa* [...] along with its equivalents, *dvārapati, dvāreśa, dvārādhīśvara, dvāranāyaka, dvārādhikārin* [...] designated the high officer who held charge of the passes leading into Kaśmir' (RT(S) vol. I, p. 213, note *ad* verse 214). In *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 7.217 we read about a *dvārādhikārin* who fell in a battle with the *khaśa*s, while in 7.576 seqq. Kalhaṇa writes about another 'lord of the Gate' who led expeditions against Rājapurī.

Chapter 2

A champion of orthodoxy

The leading character of Jayanta's play is a young and dynamic Mīmāṃsaka who has just finished his Vedic studies and so become a 'graduate', *snātaka*. His ardour knows no bounds: he is eager to find someone who dares to be an 'enemy of the Veda' (*vedadviṣ*), in order to stamp him flat with the ram of reasoning:[1]

> *svādhyāyaḥ paṭhito yathāvidhi parāmṛṣṭāni cāṅgāni ṣaṇ*
> *mīmāṃsāpi nirūpiteti vihitaṃ karma dvijanmocitam|*
> *nityādhūtakutarkadhūsaragirāṃ yāvat tu vedadviṣāṃ*
> *nyakkāro na kṛtaḥ kṛtārtha iva me tāvan na vidyāśramaḥ||*

> 'I have duly studied the Veda, mastered the six auxiliary sciences, and examined Mīmāṃsā as well. Thus I have performed the duties appropriate for a twice-born person. But until I humiliate the enemies of the Veda, who dirty their speech with incessantly brandished pernicious [or: faulty] argumentation, the efforts I made in my studies will be as if fruitless.'

The *raison d'être* of Nyāya, as delineated by Jayanta in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, appears to be remarkably similar to the Graduate's mission. According to Jayanta, the primary task of Nyāya is to protect the authority of the Veda (*vedaprāmāṇyarakṣā*).[2] However, as Kataoka pointed out,[3] this *prayojana* does not tally with the statements of older Naiyāyikas, who proclaim that Nyāya provides us with the knowledge of the real nature of the objects of cognition (*prameyatattvajñāna*, and above all *ātmajñāna*), which results in liberation (*apavarga*), independently of the Veda.[4] Vātsyāyana includes Nyāya in the traditional list

[1] *Āgamaḍambara*, Act One, verse 11.

[2] Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 7: *nyāyavistaras tu mūlastambhabhūtaḥ sarvavidyānāṃ vedaprāmāṇyarakṣāhetutvāt|*; ibid. p. 11: *yasya hi vedaprāmāṇye saṃśayānā viparyastā vā matiḥ, taṃ prati śāstrārambhaḥ|*

[3] Kataoka, pp. 5ff.

[4] Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.1: *tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ*; *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad loc., p. 2: *ātmādeḥ khalu prameyasya tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ|*, ibid. p. 6: *iha*

of four sciences, identifying it with *ānvīkṣikī*.[5] Each of the four sciences provides us with the true knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) of its own subject, and leads us to the appropriate benefit (*niḥśreyasa*). Accordingly Nyāya reveals the true nature of the Self, and thus it liberates us from transmigration.[6]

Beside fulfilling its particular purpose (*prayojana*), Nyāya also contributes to the other sciences, furnishing them with a valid method of argumentation. Says Vātsyāyana:[7]

> *seyam ānvīkṣikī pramāṇādibhir vibhajyamānā—*
> *pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇāṃ|*
> *āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ vidyoddeśe prakīrtitā||*
>
> 'This *ānvīkṣikī*, which is divided into such categories as *pramāṇa*s etc., is proclaimed in the treatment of sciences to be the light of all sciences, the means of all actions, and the substratum of all *dharma*s.'

We find the same verse in the *Arthaśāstra*, in the section describing the four sciences:[8]

> *ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍanītiś ceti vidyāḥ|*
> (...)
> *tābhir dharmārthau yad vidyāt tad vidyānāṃ vidyātvam|*
> *sāṃkhyaṃ yogo lokāyataṃ cety ānvīkṣikī|*
> *dharmādharmau trayyām arthānarthau vārttāyāṃ nayānayau daṇḍanītyāṃ balābale caitāsāṃ hetubhir anvīkṣamāṇā lokasya upakaroti vyasane abhyudaye ca buddhim avasthāpayati prajñāvākyakriyāvaiśāradyaṃ ca karoti|*
> *pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām|*
> *āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ śaśvad ānvīkṣikī matā||*
>
> '*Ānvīkṣikī*, the three Vedas, economics, and politics: these are the sciences. (...) The sciences are called *vidyā*s since one can know (*vidyāt*) *dharma* and *artha* with their help. Sāṁkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata: these [come under the heading] *ānvīkṣikī*. *Ānvīkṣikī*, inasmuch as it investigates with logical reasons [what is] religious merit and demerit in the three Vedas, profit and loss in economics, good and bad conduct in politics, and the strong and weak points of these [sciences], is of service to mankind, steadies the mind in bad and

tv adhyātmavidyāyām ātmavijñānaṃ tattvajñānam, niḥśreyasādhigamo 'pavargaprāptir iti| *Nyāyavārtika*, p. 10: *paraṃ tu niḥśreyasam* [= *apavarga*] *ātmādeḥ prameyasya tattvajñānād bhavati|* On the differences among Naiyāyikas regarding *apavarga*, see Slaje, 'Niḥśreyasam...'.

[5] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, p. 2: *imās tu catasro vidyāḥ pṛthakprasthānāḥ prāṇabhṛtām anugrahāyopadiśyante, yāsāṃ caturthīyam ānvīkṣikī nyāyavidyā|*

[6] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, p. 6: *tad idaṃ tattvajñānaṃ niḥśreyasādhigamaś ca yathāvidyaṃ veditavyam| iha tv adhyātmavidyāyām ātmavijñānaṃ tattvajñānam, niḥśreyasādhigamo 'pavargaprāptir iti||*

[7] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, p. 5.

[8] *Arthaśāstra* 1.2.1; 1.2.9–12.

> good luck, and makes one skillful in thinking, speaking, and acting. *Ānvīkṣikī* has always been accepted as the light of all sciences, the means of all actions, and the substratum of all *dharma*s.'

From Kauṭilya's description it appears that the category of "investigative science" includes several schools of learning which are not necessarily rooted in Vedic orthodoxy. For Vātsyāyana, Nyāya fulfills the role of *ānvīkṣikī* inasmuch as it establishes and employs the method of logical inquiry; the results of this inquiry, however, must be in conformity with the information received from sense perception and scripture:[9]

> *kaḥ punar ayaṃ nyāyaḥ? pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇam| pratyakṣāgamāśritaṃ cānumānam| sānvīkṣā| pratyakṣāgamābhyām īkṣitasyārthasyānvīkṣaṇam anvīkṣā| tayā pravartata ity ānvīkṣikī nyāyavidyā nyāyaśāstram| yat punar anumānaṃ pratyakṣāgamaviruddhaṃ nyāyābhāsaḥ sa iti|*
>
> 'But what is this Nyāya? The examination of things with the help of means of valid cognition. As for inference, it is based on sense perception and verbal testimony. It is the same as *anvīkṣā*. *Anvīkṣā* is a subsequent examination of something that has been examined by sense perception and verbal testimony. That [science] which operates with this [*anvīkṣā*] is *ānvīkṣikī*, alias the science of Nyāya, or the doctrine of Nyāya. That inference, however, which contradicts sense perception or verbal testimony is an illusive reasoning.'

Orthodox writers on *dharmaśāstra* also expressed the view that not every kind of reasoning is commendable. *Manusmṛti* 7.43 mentions *ānvīkṣikī* among the sciences a king should study. Medhātithi (ninth century) comments on this verse as follows:[10]

> *ātmane yā hitānvīkṣikī sā tarkāśrayā, tāṃ śikṣeta (...) yā tu bauddhacārvākāditarkavidyā sā nātīva kṛtvā kvacid upayujyate| pratyutāstikyam upahanti *tasya* (conj. : om. ed.) *yo nātinipuṇamatiḥ|*
>
> 'That *ānvīkṣikī* which is beneficial for himself is based on reasoning: he should study that. (...) That [*ānvīkṣikī*], however, which is the science of reasoning of Buddhists, Cārvākas, and other [heretics], is not useful anywhere at all, on the contrary, it destroys conviction in orthodox Vedic values[11] if one is not very intelligent.'[12]

[9] *Nyāyabhāṣya*, p. 3.

[10] Jha, vol. 2, p. 14. Medhātithi takes *ānvīkṣikīṃ cātmavidyāṃ* belonging together, and interprets *ātmavidyāṃ* in a slightly forced way.

[11] Cf. Medhātithi ad *Manusmṛti* 4.30 (Jha, vol. 1, p. 342): *haitukāḥ nāstikāḥ| nāsti paralokaḥ, nāsti dattaṃ, nāsti hutam ity evaṃ sthitaprajñāḥ|*

[12] Cf. Medhātithi ad *Manusmṛti* 2.11 (Jha, vol. 1, p. 72): *hetuśāstraṃ nāstikatarkaśāstraṃ bauddhacārvākādiśāstraṃ yatra vedo 'dharmāyeti punaḥ punar udghuṣyate|*; Medhātithi ad *Manusmṛti* 12.106 (Jha, vol. 2, p. 485): *tarkeṇeti tarkapradhānā granthā laukikapramāṇanirūpaṇaparā nyāyavaiśeṣikalokāyatikā ucyante| tatra vedaviruddhāni bauddhalokāyatikanairgranthādīni paryudasyante|*

According to Jayanta, Nyāya is not only in conformity with scripture but it is also "the main supporting-pillar of all sciences, because it is the means of the protection of the Veda's authority".[13] It is Akṣapāda's Nyāya which is referred to as *tarka* and *nyāyavistara* in the list of the fourteen sciences,[14] and not any other doctrine:[15]

> *yataḥ, sāṃkhyārhatānāṃ tāvat kṣapaṇakānāṃ kīdṛśam anumānopadeśakauśalaṃ| kiyad eva tattarkeṇa vedaprāmāṇyaṃ rakṣyate, iti nāsāv iha gaṇanārhaḥ| bauddhās tu yady api anumānamārgāvagāhananaipuṇoddhurāṃ kandharām udvahanti, tathāpi vedaviruddhatvāt tattarkasya kathaṃ vedādividyāsthānamadhye pāṭhaḥ| anumānakauśalam api kīdṛśaṃ śākyānām iti pade pade darśayiṣyāmaḥ| cārvākās tu varākāḥ pratikṣeptavyā eva| kaḥ kṣudratarkasya tadīyasyeha gaṇanāvasaraḥ| vaiśeṣikāḥ punar asmadanuyāyina evety evam asyāṃ janatāsu prasiddhāyām api ṣaṭtarkyāṃ idam eva tarkanyāyavistaraśabdābhyāṃ śāstram uktam|*
>
> For, what sort of skill do the mendicant Sāṃkhyas and Jains, to begin with, have in teaching reasoning? To what extent is the authority of the Veda protected by their *tarka*? Thus it does not qualify to take it into account here. As for the Buddhists, although they walk with their head high in the air because of their dexterity in delving deep into the ways of reasoning, nevertheless, because their *tarka* is opposed to the Veda, how could it be mentioned among the sciences headed by the Veda? And we shall also demonstrate at every step what the Buddhists' skill in reasoning is like. As for the wretched Cārvākas, they must simply be discarded. What scope is there for counting their trifling *tarka* among [the fourteen sciences]? The Vaiśeṣikas, on the other hand, just follow us [Naiyāyikas]. Thus, even if this group of six *tarka*s is well-known among the people, it is this *śāstra* [of Akṣapāda] alone which is referred to with the words "*tarka*" and "*nyāyavistara*".'

Jayanta's rigour with which he separates Veda-protecting Nyāya from heterodox *tarka*s will appear even more marked in the light of the works of some earlier Naiyāyikas. Bhāvivikta, who appears to have written a commentary on

Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* (Third Adhyāya, p. 4) divides *ānvīkṣikī* or *tarka* into two main categories: *pūrvapakṣa* (*prima facie* view) and *uttarapakṣa* (the established view). To the former type belong the heterodox schools of the Buddhists, Cārvākas, and Jainas, while the latter comprises Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika. Jayanta in the *sarvāgamaprāmāṇya* section of his *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. I, p. 648) also rejects the teaching of Lokāyata on the ground that it is based on *pūrvapakṣa* arguments.

[13] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 7: *nyāyavistaras tu mūlastambhabhūtaḥ sarvavidyānāṃ vedaprāmāṇyarakṣāhetutvāt|*

[14] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 8, quoting *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* 1.3 and another verse of unknown source. As Kataoka pointed out (Kataoka, pp. 17ff.), this fourteen-fold list enables Jayanta to limit the scope of all sciences to the transcendental (*adṛṣṭa*), and to place the *four* Vedas (and not *trayī*) headed by Atharvaveda on the top of the hierarchy of *vidyā*s.

[15] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, pp. 8f.

the *Nyāyabhāṣya* probably in the period between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti,[16] was, according to Cakradhara, one of the "old Cārvākas" (*cirantanacārvākāḥ*)[17] mentioned by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī*.[18] Similarly Aviddhakarṇa, who also wrote a *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* before the time of Dharmakīrti, seems to have composed a Cārvāka *Tattvaṭīkā* as well.[19] As Wezler observes,[20]

> 'Beide, Aviddhakarṇa wie Bhāvivikta, scheinen mir gute Zeugen dafür zu sein, daß sich das Nyāya-System nicht nur das Wort *ānvīkṣikī* als Selbstbezeichnung angeeignet hat, sondern daß sich seine Vertreter, zumindest in einer bestimmten Epoche, auch nicht der—gestellten oder selbst gewählten—Aufgabe entzogen haben, ein fremdes, aber ebenfalls *ānvīkṣikī* enthaltendes System mitzubehandeln, eine Aufgabe, die zu erledigen für sie vielleicht nicht wissenschaftlich interessant war, sich ihnen aber doch als gewinnbringend oder politisch ratsam empfohlen haben mag.'

Jayanta, far from making excursions to the field of heterodox *tarka*s, takes a strong line against "depraved logicians" (*duṣṭatārkikāḥ*) and their destructive speculations:[21]

> *vedeṣu hi *tārkika*(Śāradā MSS as reported by Dr. Isaacson in an email of 2. vii. 2003. : *dustārkika°* ed.)*racitakutarkaviplāvitaprāmāṇyeṣu śithilitāsthāḥ katham iva bahuvittavyayāyāsādisādhyaṃ vedārthānuṣṭhānam ādriyeran sādhavaḥ| kiṃ vā *tadānīṃ* (Śāradā MSS as reported by Dr. Isaacson in the above cited email : om. ed.) *svāmini parimlāne tadanuyāyinā mīmāṃsādividyāsthānaparijanena kṛtyam iti| tasmād aśeṣaduṣṭatārkikopamardadvārakadṛḍhataravedaprāmāṇyapratyayādhāyinyāyopadeśakṣamam akṣapādopadiṣṭam idaṃ nyāyavistarākhyaṃ śāstraṃ śāstrapratiṣṭhānanibandhanam iti dhuryaṃ vidyāsthānam|*
>
> For why would the pious take the trouble to perform what the Vedas teach, which can be accomplished [only] by spending a lot of money and [by exerting] a lot of effort etc., if their confidence in the Vedas, the authority of which has been ruined by the vile *tarka* invented by logicians, is shaken? Or, once the master has withered, what should then the attendants, Mīmāṃsā and the other sciences, do, who follow him? Therefore this *śāstra*, taught by Akṣapāda and called Nyāyavistara, which is able to teach reasoning that inspires a firmer confidence in the authority of the Veda through erasing all depraved logicians, is the support of the foundation of the *śāstra*s, and thus it is the principle science.'

[16] Cf. Steinkellner 1961, p. 153; Wezler 1975, p. 143.
[17] *Granthibhaṅga*, p. 197.
[18] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 249.
[19] Cf. Steinkellner 1961, pp. 153ff.
[20] Wezler 1975, p. 145.
[21] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 7.

According to Jayanta, Mīmāṃsā, the science which could be regarded as the primary Veda-protector, has a different, more important task: the examination of the meaning of Vedic texts (*arthavicāra*).[22] On the other hand, Mīmāṃsakas are "rambling on an illusive path on which progress is blocked by the multitude of thorns of faulty speculation" (*kutarkakaṇṭakanikaraniruddhasañcāramārgābhāsaparibhrāntāḥ*),[23] and thus their theories of *svataḥprāmāṇya* ("all means of cognition are valid by themselves") and *apauruṣeyatva* ("the Veda has no author") are inadequate to protect the Veda. It is only the Nyāya theory of *āptoktatva* ("verbal testimony is valid because it has been pronounced by a reliable person", who is God himself in the case of the Veda) that is able to establish and defend the authority of the Veda,[24] which is, in Jayanta's view, Nyāya's principal mission.[25]

Considering all this it may seem surprising that the leading character of Jayanta's play, the crusader of Vedic orthodoxy, is a Mīmāṃsaka. In the first act Saṃkarṣaṇa systematically refutes in front of distinguished and 'unbiased' umpires[26] the *bhikṣu*'s arguments about "Universal Momentariness" (*kṣaṇikatva*) and "Consciousness as the Only Reality" (*vijñānavāda*). Thus he scores his first victory against the depraved logicians who try to undermine Vedic order,[27] and summons the Buddhists to stop deceiving themselves and others with the promise of a better afterlife for those who follow the Buddha's doctrine. In the second act the Mīmāṃsaka lets another heterodox teacher, a Jain monk, slip, not considering him a significant threat to the established socio-religious order.[28] The debauched behaviour of the Black-Blankets, however, requires instant measures, as do the shady practices of the Śaiva adepts.

Problems start to emerge for our hero in the third act of the play, when he has to refine the circle of those sects whose presence in the kingdom is unwanted. In fact, the Mīmāṃsaka is ready to form an alliance with the Saiddhāntika Śaiva professor against the irreligious Cārvākas, represented by the arrogant Vṛddhāmbhi who outlines a clear program: 'I am going to take this opportunity to do away with God, set aside the world-to-come, demolish the validity of the

[22] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 10.

[23] *Nyāyamañjarī*, ibid. Cf. Kataoka, pp. 26ff.

[24] Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 10, pp. 430ff, Kataoka, pp. 27ff.

[25] As for the true knowledge of *ātman* and the other *prameya*s provided by Nyāya, Jayanta certainly does not deny that it leads to liberation, but he adds that the *fact* that it leads to liberation is understood on the basis of scripture alone (*tasya tu prameyasyātmāder apavargasādhanatvādhigama āgamaikanibandhanaḥ*, *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 22). See Kataoka, pp. 23ff.

[26] One of them is called Viśvarūpa, whose name might echo that of a commentator of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (cf. Steinkellner 1961, p. 158; Wezler 1975, pp. 139ff.)

[27] The *bhikṣu* whom the Mīmāṃsaka defeats is called Dharmottara, just as one of Dharmakīrti's most prominent followers, who, according to the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* (4.498), settled in Kashmir. His arguments are similar to those of Dharmakīrti on the one hand, and to the views of *vijñānavāda* as presented by Kumārila. The Mīmāṃsaka in his refutation (just as Jayanta in the *Nyāyamañjarī*) draws upon Kumārila's *Ślokavārtika*.

[28] As Jayanta reports, king Śaṅkaravarman also gave quarter to the Jains (*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. 649). On the other hand, the Jain theory of *anekāntavāda* is not far removed from certain ideas expounded by Kumārila (cf. Uno).

Vedas, and thereby turn this king back from this wrong path and establish him on the right track, so that he, concentrating on worldly prosperity, can enjoy his kingship for a long time.'[29] Now the question may arise whether the Cārvākas or Cārvāka ideas had a real influence on the Kashmirian monarch. According to Kalhaṇa's account, Śaṅkaravarman was a king who 'concentrated on *artha*' above all, and he had no scruples about fleecing the temples in order to fill the treasury. On the other hand, as Jayanta shows in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, Lokāyata was not a long-forgotten philosophy in the ninth century. Apart from such "old Cārvākas" (*cirantanacārvākāḥ*) as Bhāvivikta,[30] Jayanta also had to deal with "well-educated Cārvākas" (*suśikṣitacārvākāḥ*), such innovators as Udbhaṭa,[31] whom he simply calls "the shrewd Cārvāka" (*cārvākadhūrtaḥ*).[32] It is certainly tempting to identify this Udbhaṭa with the *sabhāpati* of king Jayāpīḍa (*Rājataraṅgiṇī*, 4.495, 7.482, 8.2227) and / or with the *ālaṃkārika* author of the *Kāvyālaṅkārasārasaṅgraha*. The former would also indicate that a Cārvāka could occupy an influential post in the royal court at the end of the eighth century. Whatever may be the truth about the identity of these Udbhaṭas, the fact that Jayanta took the trouble to refute the ideas of the Cārvāka Udbhaṭa on several pages of the *Nyāyamañjarī* shows that this tradition was very much alive in his time, and a king like Śaṅkaravarman may well have been responsive to its anti-religionist ideas.

The Mīmāṃsaka and the Śaiva professor defeat their Cārvāka opponent with an exemplary division of labour. Dharmaśiva proves the existence of the soul, transmigration, and God, while Saṃkarṣaṇa keeps his own counsel: it would indeed be strange if a Mīmāṃsaka brought up arguments in support of the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent Creator. But he immediately hurls himself into the fray when the authority of the Veda is to be established, while the Śaiva *ācārya* keeps in the background, perhaps because Śiva's scriptures are nearer to his heart, or because, as he himself points out to the Mīmāṃsaka, he would use the *parataḥprāmāṇya* argument instead of *svataḥprāmāṇya* to prove the validity of scripture. The moral is that, notwithstanding a few doctrinal differences, Mīmāṃsakas and Saiddhāntika Śaivas should join their forces to defeat the *nāstika*s and thereby prevent the king from ruling in an inordinately materialistic way.

The *viṣkambhaka* preceding the final act makes it clear that Saṅkarṣaṇa has lost the trust of Vedic Brahmans:[33]

> *śaivapāśupatapāñcarātrikāḥ sāṅkhyasaugatadigambarādayaḥ|*
> *sarva eva hi yathāsthitā ime snātakasya dhig apārthakaṃ śrutam ||*

[29] *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Three, ll. 232ff. As Raghavan suggested, 'Vṛddhāmbhi is likely to be an echo of the ancient school of Arthaśāstra, cited by Kauṭilya as the Āmbhīyas' (*Āgamaḍambara (ed. pr.)*, pp. xxiv f.). According to these Āmbhīyas, the prince should be tempted, in order to prove him, with hunting, gambling, alcohol, women, and suggesting him to seize power from his father. Kauṭilya rejects this theory (*Arthaśāstra*, 1.13).

[30] Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 349, *Granthibhaṅga*, p. 197.

[31] Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, pp. 94, 326, 451; vol. II, pp. 8, 348, 687; *Granthibhaṅga*, pp. 19, 197, 198.

[32] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 168; *Granthibhaṅga*, p. 43.

[33] *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, ll. 5ff.

> Śaivas, Pāśupatas, Pāñcarātrikas, Sāṅkhyas, Buddhists, Sky-Clad Jains and other [heretics]: all of them have remained as they were. Shame on the useless learning of the Graduate!

This lamentation of the *ṛtvij* makes a sharp contrast to the entrance verse of the Mīmāṃsaka in the first act, in which he took an oath to humiliate all the enemies of the Veda, and thereby to make his learning fruitful. 'But, my friend,' explains the (perhaps older and more experienced) *upādhyāya* to the *ṛtvij*, 'he has become the king's man by now. And the king is supremely devoted to Śiva, so Saṃkarṣaṇa has to be completely focussed on propitiating Him. For in a monarch's vicinity [his] men keep repeating his words, but, eager to increase their own influence, they do not distinguish between good or bad, like echoes.'[34]

Saṅkarṣaṇa is indeed in a great dilemma: either he should enter into a debate and prove the falsity of the teachings of the Bhāgavatas, an *āgama* supported by the queen and another member of the court, just as he did in the case of the *nāstika*s, or he should defend them, in which case he would completely lose his face before the Vaidikas. That the Bhāgavatas were indeed striving to achieve Vedic status for their *āgama* in Jayanta's time is also indicated by Cakradhara's following remark:[35] 'Bhagavat Puṣkarākṣa, the principal mendicant, who wrote a commentary to the *sūtra*s of Bhagavat Bādarāyaṇa, accepted the view that the Pañcarātra and other [*āgama*s] are based of the Veda.' Saṅkarṣaṇa cannot resolve the tension between his devotion to Viṣṇu and his duty to reject all non-Vedic scriptures as a Mīmāṃsaka. It is the great *naiyāyika* scholar, Dhairyarāśi, who smoothes all differences away as the arbitrator appointed by the court in the debate between Vaiṣṇavas and Vaidikas. Saṅkarṣaṇa's only task is to give tacit support, which he happily accepts.

Dhairyarāśi's mission is not to enter into a controversy or to defeat anybody in a debate; on the contrary, he comes to pour oil on troubled waters. Accordingly he delivers a long lecture instead of discussing things, and his overwhelming authority gives even more emphasis to his words. He proves to be a real *sarvāgamaprāmāṇyavādin* ("one who holds the validity of all religious scriptures"), and his argumentation mirrors exactly the views presented by Jayanta in his *Nyāyamañjarī*.[36] In his *magnum opus* Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, the orthodox Brahman and *naiyāyika* philosopher, concludes the first part of his comments on the validity of scriptures with the following words: 'Any religion which is outside the Veda is nothing but deception.'[37] The circle of acceptable religions, however, is wider for Jayanta than for a Mīmāṃsaka such as Kumārila, since he also includes the Pañcarātra and the Śaiva *āgama*s, on the grounds that, firstly, their author, just as the author of the Veda, is a "reliable person", namely God,

[34] *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, ll. 11ff.: *bho vayasya, nanu rājapuruṣo 'sāv adya saṃvṛttaḥ| rājā ca paramamāheśvara iti tadārādhanaikatānabuddhinā tena bhavitavyam. yataḥ, samīpato bhūmibhṛtāṃ hi pūruṣās taduktam evānuvadanta āsate| svavṛddhilubdhās tu na sādhv asādhu vā vivecayanti pratiśabdakā iva||*

[35] *Granthibhaṅga*, p. 112: *bhagavadbādarāyaṇasūtravṛttikṛtā bhagavatpuṣkarākṣeṇa parivrājakamukhyena pañcarātrāder vedamūlatvam aṅgīkṛtam|*

[36] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, pp. 640ff.

[37] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 639: *vedabāhyas tu yaḥ kaścid āgamo vañcanaiva sā|*

and, secondly, they are not incompatible with the Veda.[38] On the other hand the Buddhists and the so called "liberators from transmigration" *saṃsāramocaka*s, are still considered as *vedabāhya* and therefore not authoritative.

At this point Jayanta's exposition about the validity of scriptures takes a surprising turn: 'Others have accepted the validity of *all* scriptures because cognition without supersession [by a subsequent cognition] or uncertainty has arisen from all of them.'[39] He does not tell us explicitly who hold this peculiar view, nor if he supports or rejects *sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*. Still it is significant that he presents it as the concluding *pakṣa* in the context of the validity of religions, and he takes pains to enumerate arguments supporting this position. One has the impression that Jayanta must have suffered real pain, especially when he tries to find excuses even for Buddhism. He manages to show that the doctrine of *nairātmya* serves only 'to induce the relaxation of the Self',[40] and that the Knowledge that Buddhists strive after is 'very similar to the Self because of its freedom and independence'.[41] He also demonstrates that the Buddha is just as omniscient as Kapila and the other sages, and finally 'as for the refutation of the doctrine of caste in Buddhist scriptures, its purpose is [only] to laud the high degree of [the Buddha's] compassion that seeks to help all [creatures], and it should not be taken literally'.[42] If one holds the view that God is the author of all valid scriptures, says Jayanta, then we may argue that only the body of the Buddha was the son of Śuddhodana, his soul was Lord Viṣṇu personally.[43] If one says that all valid *āgama*s must be based on the Veda, then assiduous experts are ready to find some Vedic grounds even for wearing red robes, or for smearing oneself with ashes and carrying a skull.[44]

The key to Jayanta's turnaround is given at the end of the section dealing with *āgamaprāmāṇya* in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (pp. 648–649). First Jayanta enumerates those criteria on the basis of which an *āgama* can be regarded as valid: it must have obtained celebrity with which nobody finds fault, many learned people should accept it, it should not appear to be unprecedented, its *raison d'être* must not be greed, etc., and finally it should not cause abhorrence among people.[45] Then Jayanta gives an example how these liberal principles can be put into practice: king Śaṅkaravarman suppressed the practice of the Black-

[38] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 637: *ataḥ āptapraṇītatvād vedāviruddhatvāc ca na tayor* [i.e. *śaivapañcarātrayor*] *aprāmāṇyam*|

[39] Ibid. p. 640: *anye sarvāgamānāṃ tu prāmāṇyaṃ pratipedire*| *sarvatra bādhasandeharahitapratyayodayāt*||

[40] Ibid. p. 641: *nairātmyavādinas tv ātmaśaithilyajananāya tathopadiśanti*|

[41] Ibid.: *svacchaṃ tu jñānatattvaṃ yat tair iṣyate, tat svātantryāt anāśritatvāt ātmakalpam eva*|

[42] Ibid. p. 643: *yad api bauddhāgame jātivādanirākaraṇaṃ tad api sarvānugrahapravaṇakaruṇātiśayapraśaṃsāparaṃ na ca yathāśrutam avagantavyam*|

[43] Ibid. p. 644: *śarīram eva śuddhodanasyāpatyaṃ nātmā. ataḥ pratiyugaṃ viṣṇur eva bhagavān dharmarūpeṇāvataratīty āgamavidaḥ pratipannāḥ.*

[44] Ibid. p. 647: *evaṃ raktapaṭaparigrahabhasmakapāladhāraṇādimūlam apy abhiyuktā labhanta eva*|

[45] Ibid. p. 648: *naitad asty avigītāṃ ye prasiddhiṃ prāpur āgamāḥ*| *kṛtaś ca bahubhir yeṣāṃ śiṣṭair iha parigrahaḥ*|| *adya pravartamānāś ca nāpurvā iva bhānti ye*| *yeṣāṃ na mūlaṃ lobhādi yebhyo nodvijate janaḥ*|| *teṣām eva pramāṇatvaṃ āgamānām iheṣyate*|

Blankets, but he spared for instance the Jains.[46] Thus the criterion of validity is not so much the veracity of propositions in a given scripture, but rather the degree of its recognition and its inherent possibilities of overthrowing social order.[47] This was probably fitting in the broader 'Religionspolitik' of the king, which, as Wezler pointed out, could motivate Jayanta's whole exposition of the *sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*-theory in his *Nyāyamañjarī*.[48] That this was really the case is clearly demonstrated in the *Āgamaḍambara*, which, as Wezler observes, 'hat es im wesentlichen den Charakter eines, wie wir sagen würden, Dokumentarspiels, das jene religionspolitische Maßname König Śaṅkaravarmans, ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Folgen zum Gegenstand hat'.[49]

We should keep in mind that, while Dhairyarāśi is delivering his lecture, the Mīmāṃsaka sits in the audience and is supposed to agree fully to such ideas as 'Śiva, Paśupati, Kapila and Viṣṇu, Saṃkarṣaṇa, the Sage Jina, the Buddha, or Manu are one',[50] 'let all these sacred scriptures have no beginning, similarly to the Veda',[51] etc. Dhairyarāśi declares that infatuation cannot be regarded as the cause of acceptance in the case of old-established religions, and 'if someone objects that we cannot know that there were Buddhists in former times, then the same suspicion may be raised concerning the Brahmans'.[52] 'Or if you say,' continues Dhairyarāśi, 'that greed and the like are the visible source in this case, the heterodox will retort that the Veda is also a means of livelihood.'[53] And the Mīmāṃsaka applauds with enthusiasm.

When Dhairyarāśi makes the peroration of his most elaborate speech, Saṅkarṣaṇa bursts out in jubilation: 'Honourable Dhairyarāśi, be sure that, in a manner of speaking, we have been revived, beatified, purified, nourished, made to experience the goal of this worldly existence by this novel river of erudition which has risen from Your Honour. How wonderful!'[54] Then he manages to collect the remains of his former adamance and declares that the various religious traditions should remain clearly separated from each other, while those who spoil *śāstra* and *dharma* with their ill-conduct must be banished.[55]

And the right person to decide such delicate issues as 'which conduct is wicked enough to be suppressed', and 'what are the criteria of this wickedness',

[46] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 649, quoted above.

[47] On the ground of *sarvāgamaprāmāṇya* only anti-social sects and Lokāyata are rejected, the latter because its statements are based merely on *pūrvapakṣa* statements in Vedic texts (cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, pp. 647f).

[48] See Wezler 1976, p. 340.

[49] Ibid.

[50] *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, ll. 330f.: *ekaḥ śivaḥ paśupatiḥ kapilo 'tha viṣṇuḥ saṅkarṣaṇo jinamuniḥ sugato manur vā*; cf. how the hungry ascetic blurs the distinction between the Buddha and the Jina in Act Two.

[51] Ibid. l. 405: *tenānādaya eva vedavad ime bhavantv āgamāḥ*

[52] Ibid. ll. 442ff.: *vyāmohāc ca hi vartante kāmaṃ katipayair dinaiḥ| so 'yaṃ yugapadasthāyī vyāmoha iti vismayaḥ|| purāpi saugatā āsann iti kenāvagamyate| purāpi śrotriyā āsann iti kenāvagamyate||*

[53] Ibid. l. 446f.: *lobhādi dṛśyamānaṃ vā yadi mūlam ihocyate| vedo 'pi jīvikopāya iti jalpanti nāstikāḥ||*

[54] Ibid. ll. 488ff.: *ārya dhairyarāśe, vayaṃ tāvad ucchvāsitā iva, śālitā iva, pavitrīkṛtā ivāpyāyitā jīvalokaphalam anubhāvitā iva bhavatprabhavayābhinavayā sarasvatyā| aho āścaryam!*

[55] Ibid. ll. 508ff.

is the king himself, and those people in his service who put his orders into effect. Saṅkarṣaṇa's position in these questions, just as his career and livelihood as a married householder, depends on the will of his superiors, as Jayanta, who served king Śaṅkaravarman as his adviser, knew very well.

Chapter 3

A curious play (*kimapi rūpakam*)

Considering the fact that fate was not merciful to such celebrated and outstanding plays as Viśākhadeva's *Devīcandragupta*, and that whole dramatic genres such as the *vīthī* survive only in meagre quotations (apart from its late 'reincarnation' in an altered form),[1] we should be grateful to the Jains of Gujarat who preserved, thanks to their commendable diligence and curiosity, a unique college-drama written by a Kashmirian philosopher. The dramatic qualities of the *Āgamaḍambara* leave much to be desired by classical Indian standards of dramaturgy. As Raghavan remarks in his introduction, 'when he [Jayanta] made his debut on the stage with this new play of his, he knew he was making the pandits of Nāṭya Śāstra prick their ears.'[2] In this chapter we shall examine what makes Jayanta's play so unique and unorthodox. First we shall deal with the Prologue, which already reads as a parody of a traditional *prastāvanā*. A closer look will, however, reveal that although Jayanta was using the standard introductory devices in a novel way, his Prologue, in spite of all its strangeness, alludes elegantly both to the plot and the leading aesthetic relish of the play. Then we shall consider the phenomenon of 'philosophical plays' in the light of the discussions on the nature and relation of poetry and *śāstra*, doctrinal or scientific literature. Finally we shall study the predominant *rasa* of the *Āgamaḍambara*.

3.1

Indian dramatists had an excellent means with which they could gently introduce the spectators to the world of the play. The prologue (*prastāvanā, sthāpanā* or *āmukha*) of a classical Indian play provides information about the author, the

[1] Cf. Raghavan 1978, pp. 872ff.
[2] *Āgamaḍambara (ed. pr.)*, p.viii.

story, the characters, and the main sentiment or savour the audience is going to relish during the performance. In usual practice the Director (*sūtradhāra*) enters the stage after the preliminaries (*pūrvaraṅga*) are over and the initial benediction (*nāndī*) has been recited. In the Bhāsa-plays he is just about to make an announcement when a sound coming from off-stage interrupts him and at the same time introduces the first character who is about to enter the stage. In other plays the Director has a chat with an actress (*naṭī*), who is also his wife, or the comic actor (*vidūṣaka*), or an assistant (*pāripārśvika*) about the actual occasion of the performance, the qualities of the sponsor, the author, and the audience, then sometimes about domestic matters, which turn out to be similar to the story of the play. The end of the prologue is always linked in a more or less direct way to the plot: the Director infers from some noise that one of the characters is about to enter, sometimes because he has overheard (and misunderstood, as in the *Mudrārākṣasa*) the words of the *sūtradhāra*.

The prologue can be defined in semiotical terms as one of the 'rhetorical' or 'presentational' devices that draw the attention of the audience to the theatrical and dramatic realities, to the fact that what is going on is actually a performance. Although they appear outside the theatrical frame, in fact they confirm it 'by pointing out the pure facticity of the representation'.[3] To employ another method of analysis,[4] the prologue with the actor talking to another actor about the play to be performed and about (or to) the audience whose favour is to be gained, appears to belong to the actual world, as opposed to the world of the drama. At the end of the Sanskrit *prastāvanā*, the two worlds almost seem to merge: the action happening off-stage and already inside the drama-world, e.g. the crying of the *apsaras*es because the demons have kidnapped Urvaśī, is *audible* for the Director, just as the words said by the *sūtradhāra*, e.g. reciting a verse about the eclipse of the moon (*candrasya grahaṇam*), can be *overheard* by a character belonging to the world of the play. This proximity of the two worlds ensures the smooth transition of the audience between the actual and the fictitious worlds, but in a way that the two worlds are kept separate: the Director exits before the *apsaras*es or Cāṇakya enter.

'But surely', one might object, 'the Director, the Actress, and the Assistant all say the words contained in their script, they also play rôles, how could they belong to the actual world?' The objection is correct: the *prastāvanā* is certainly part of the play. In it the drama-world is disguised as the actual world. The *sūtradhāra* is a character just like Cāṇakya; he is never the actual referent but only a possible surrogate, even if he is played by the actual director.[5] Abhinavagupta has already observed this with his usual acumen in his commentary to the Nāṭyaśāstra. He observes that one of the obstacles to aesthetic experience is 'one's emotional response to pleasure and pain even if it is restricted to another person' (*paragatatvaniyamabhājām api sukhaduḥkhānāṃ saṃvedane*). The solution is the blurring of the actual identity of that 'other person': the costume and

[3] Elam, p. 90. Other 'presentational' devices are e.g. the epilogue, the induction, the play-within-the-play, the aside directed to the audience, etc.

[4] Elam, pp. 99ff.

[5] Cf. Elam, pp. 109f.

other theatrical conventions hide the 'actor-ness' of the actors, which has, however, been revealed in the preliminaries and the prologue (*pūrvaraṅgānigūhanena prastāvanāvalokanena ca ... naṭarūpatādhigamas*).[6]

So far so good. But why does Bharata describe the *prastāvanā* twice in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*: once as part of the *pūrvaraṅga*, and for the second time as part of the *bhāratī vṛtti* (the dramatic style in which the verbal aspect is predominant)? Abhinavagupta has the following answer:[7]

> *dvividhā prastāvanā bhavati—pūrvaraṅgasyāṅgabhūtā anyasya vā| tatra pūrvaraṅgāṅge *'syāṃ* (GOS : *'syāḥ* Parimal) *kavir udāsīnaḥ| sthāpaka eva svatantro nirmā*tāstv* (conj. : °*tā tv* eds.) *anyo vā kavir dhruvāgānādāv api|* (...) *sā dvitīyā yā vṛttibhedamadhye paṭhitā| evaṃ prarocanādāv api mantavyam| yad āha—"tatra *kadācit* (conj. : *kācit* eds.) *kāvyābhimukhaṃ nīyate pūrvaraṅgavidhiḥ tadabhimukhaṃ vā kāvyārambhas, tad bhavati sā dvividhā" *ityādi* (GOS : *ityādiḥ* Parimal)|
>
> The prologue is of two kinds: that which is part of the preliminaries, and [that which is part] of something else. Of these two, the poet is not involved in that one which is part of the preliminaries. The *sthāpaka* may be its independent composer, or another poet, as well as in the case of the *dhruvā*-songs. (...) The second kind [of prologue] is that which is mentioned among the varieties of dramatic style. The same should be held about the exciting of the spectators' interest, etc. As [someone] said: "There [in the prologue] sometimes the performance of the preliminaries is directed towards the play [i.e. the drama written by the playwright], or the beginning of the play [is directed] towards that [i.e. the preliminaries]. Therefore it [the *prastāvanā*] is of two kinds.", and so forth.

Commenting on the second occurrence of the prologue in the Nāṭyaśāstra, Abhinava says:[8]

> *evaṃ ca yadā sthāpako 'pi sūtradhāratulyaguṇākāro rāmādivad eva prayujyate tad *eva* (conj. : *evaṃ* eds.) *kavikṛtam āmukhaṃ bhavati|*
>
> And thus, when the *sthāpaka*, having similar qualities and bearing as the *sūtradhāra*, is also presented on the stage like Rāma and other [characters], that alone is the prologue written by the poet.

[6] *Abhinavabhāratī* (Parimal), vol. I, p. 279; *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 274; Gnoli 1968, pp. 15f., cf. also *Abhinavabhāratī* (Parimal), vol. I, p. 251; *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, pp. 244f.

[7] *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, pp. 247f., *Abhinavabhāratī* (Parimal), vol. I, p. 254.

[8] *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. III, p. 93, *Abhinavabhāratī* (Parimal), vol. III, p. 89; cf. *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*, p. 136: *kadācit tu sanāndīkaṃ raṅgam anuṣṭhāya viśrānte sūtradhāre tattulyaguṇākṛtiḥ sthāpaka āmukham anutiṣṭhati| tathā cānaṅgavatyāṃ nāṭikāyāṃ dṛśyate—pūrvaraṅgānte sthāpakaḥ| atra ca pakṣe āmukhānuṣṭhāne 'pi kaver vyāpāraḥ, sthāpakasya sūtradhārānukāriṇo rāmānukāriṇo naṭasyeva kavinaiva praveśāt|*

What we have in practice is essentially the latter kind of prologue. All the existing Sanskrit (and Prakrit) plays begin with a *prastāvanā, āmukha,* or *sthāpanā*, and it is unlikely that any of these these prologues preserve the impromptu (or precomposed) introduction by a director. But precisely because the actors appear *as actors* in the prologue, the audience perceives their performance *as if* it were part of the actual world. This enables the poet to address the audience through the Director: he can introduce (or even praise) himself and the merits of his play, or he can defend his work against its critics. Since the prologue has metadramatic functions, that is, it focuses the attention of the audience on the theatrical and dramatic realities, it also provides an excellent opportunity for the playwright to 'talk shop': he can define his position on dramaturgical questions, on the justification of dramatic art, or on the relation between the actual world and the drama-world. The *prastāvanā* of the Āgamaḍambara, however unusual it may seem at first sight, fulfills these functions of the prologue of a classical Indian play.

3.2

But at first sight it *is* a very strange prologue. At the beginning of an ordinary Sanskrit play, the Director usually enters the stage in high spirits. He feels happy and honoured to put on the most excellent play of the most excellent poet to the most excellent audience, not to mention the most distinguished sponsor. Certainly there are individual differences among the playwrights: Rājaśekhara has a particular weakness for self-admiration (*yad vā kiṃ vinayoktibhiḥ?*),[9] while Kālidāsa vindicates a place for himself with proper pride by the side of his glorious predecessors. The criticisms against his art seem to cut Bhavabhūti to the quick, but he is confident that the merits of his plays are conceded by some people, or at least will be acknowledged in the future. The Director in Śyāmilaka's *bhāṇa* summons the wet blankets and hypocrites to leave, because the wags want to enjoy the performance. A typical example of the *sūtradhāra*'s efforts to kindle the interest of the spectators in the poet and his work is found in the plays of king Harṣa:[10]

> *śrīharṣo nipuṇaḥ kaviḥ pariṣad apy eṣā guṇagrāhiṇī*
> *loke hāri ca vatsarājacaritaṃ nāṭye ca dakṣā vayam|*
> *vastv ekaikam apīha vāñcitaphalaprāpteḥ padaṃ kiṃ punar*
> *madbhāgyopacayād ayaṃ samuditaḥ sarvo guṇānāṃ gaṇaḥ||*
>
> The illustrious Harṣa is a clever poet, and this audience can appreciate the merits [of one's art]. The story of King Vatsa has a grip on people, and we are experts in theatrical art. Each one [of the above] facts could be the cause of obtaining the desired result on the present occasion, how much more this whole group of merits which has arisen due to the accumulation of my good fortune?

[9] *Bālabhārata*, verse 5.
[10] *Ratnāvalī*, p. 327, also found in *Priyadarśikā* and *Nāgānanda*.

In glaring contrast with the confidence of an average *prastāvanā*, Jayanta's play promises to be a dead frost right in the beginning. The Director does not beam on the audience as usual, on the contrary, he is utterly fed up with his profession and tired of life in general. Moreover, he is supposed to stage a trashy play of a dilettante poet (Jayanta), and it is insufficient solace for him that the audience is equally dilettante (students of philosophy).

However if we examine the prologue of the *Āgamaḍambara* closely we shall discover that Jayanta achieved his highly unconventional *prastāvanā* by utilising entirely conventional techniques. The *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* mentions several established methods of transition from the (pseudo-real) world of the prologue to that of the drama. One of these methods is the *avalagita*, which is defined by some theoreticians as follows: 'doing something else having entrusted one's own occupation to another character'.[11] The example which is cited to illustrate this dramatic device is strikingly similar to what happens in the prologue of Jayanta's play:

> *yathā kṛtyārāvaṇasyāmukhe—*
> *sūtradhāraḥ (niḥśvasya)—ārye, nanu bravīmi,*
> *vākprapañcaikasāreṇa nirviśeṣālpavṛttinā|*
> *svāmineva naṭatvena nirviṇṇāḥ sarvathā vayam||*
> *tad gacchatu bhavatī putraṃ mitraṃ vā kamapi puraskṛtya kramāgatām imāṃ kujīvikām anuvartayitum|*
> *tataḥ kramād āha—*
> *parigrahorugrāhaughād gṛhasaṃsārasāgarāt|*
> *bandhusnehamahāvartād idam uttīrya gamyate||*
> *atra svajīvikāṃ dāreṣu nikṣipya paralokahetukāryakaraṇaṃ svayam āśritam|*
>
> As in the prologue of the *Kṛtyārāvaṇa*:
> 'Director (*sighing*). Why, I'll tell you, my lady.
> I have become completely disillusioned with [my profession of] being an actor, which only consists of verbosity and the moods of which are wishy-washy and trivial, as if with a boss *whose tongue is always wagging and who gives a small salary without any discrimination [among his employees].*
> So, my lady, please carry on with this wretched profession I inherited, and put at the head [of the troupe] anyone, [either] a son or a friend.'
> Later on he says:
> 'Here I go ashore from the ocean of secular life in the household, which abounds in large crocodiles: the members of my family, and has great whirlpools: the affections for one's relatives.'
> Here [in this prologue the director] entrusts his own profession on his wife and becomes himself engaged in an activity which is a means of [attaining a better] afterlife.

[11] *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*, p. 132: *kecit tu pātrāntare svavyāpāraṃ nikṣipya yat kāryāntarakaraṇaṃ tad avalagitam ity āhuḥ|*

Judging from its fragments surviving in quotations, the *Kṛtyārāvaṇa* must have been a remarkable play. It was well-known in Kashmir, and Śaṅkuka quoted from its sixth act, which means that Jayanta might also have been familiar with it.[12] But already the prologue of king Harṣa's play, the *Nāgānanda*, contains a very similar scene. The director's wife tells her husband that his parents have renounced this world and left for the forest. The Director is deeply moved by this news and is ready to give up his inherited wealth (*tyaktvaiśvaryaṃ kramāgatam*) and follow his parents, just as Jīmūtavāhana, the hero of the play, relinquishes his kingdom to serve his parents in the forest. We can trace this motif back as far as the *Lokānanda*, a Buddhist play by Candragomin surviving only in Tibetan translation.[13] The *Nāgānanda* is a play in which quietude (*śānta*) is the leading aesthetic relish, which is well suggested by the resigned, disillusioned attitude of the Director. The *Lokānanda*, apart from being also a *śāntarasa*-play, is called '*nāṭaka-śāstra*' (*zlos gar gyi bstan bcos*) in its colophon,[14] that is a play in which a doctrinal subject (the Buddha's teaching in this case) is introduced. The *Āgamaḍambara* was perhaps the first classical Indian play which had *śānta* as its dominant *rasa* and which presented the teachings of various religions, but definitely not from the Buddhist perspective.

Apart from such introductory devices as the *avalagita*, the entire behaviour of the actors conversing in the Prologue foretells in many ways the story of the actual play. Sometimes the actors tell us explicitly which role they are going to take, and the Director often becomes the protagonist, as for instance in the *Priyadarśikā*,[15] or one of the first characters who enter the stage.[16] Therefore it is very tempting to imagine that in the *Āgamaḍambara* the Director re-enters after the Prologue as the Vedic graduate and the Assistant as the Boy, his sidekick. The Director gives up his profession with the resolution to 'strive to reach the highest goal of man' and to 'acquaint himself with holy places', starting with a Buddhist monastery. And this is more or less the agenda of the Graduate, with the exception that he already knows how worthless most teachings are and he is 'testing' them for the sake of demolishing their false doctrines. We might say that the Graduate is as uncompromising in doctrinal truths as the Director is in questions of dramaturgy. On the other hand, both the Assistant and the Boy represent a more conformist attitude: they also observe the rule of falsity in the world, but they do not consider it as their duty to lead a crusade against *māyā*, Universal Delusion. Everyone has to make a living somehow, either as an actor, or as a Jain monk. Are we entitled to ruin their

[12] *Abhinavabhāratī* ad *Nāṭyaśāstra* 19.88 (ed. Parimal, vol. III, p. 52), pointed out by Raghavan (Some lost Rāma plays, p.30). On Śaṅkuka's date see p. xxxviii.

[13] According to Hahn he is probably identical with the grammarian Candragomin, and can be dated to the fifth century A.D. (*Candragomins Lokānandanāṭaka. Nach dem tibetischen Tanjur herausgegeben und übersetzt von Michael Hahn.* Wiesbaden, 1974.) See also Steiner, pp. 23ff.

[14] Hahn's edition, pp. 196f; he translates it as 'lehrreiche Schauspiel'.

[15] In the *Karpūramañjarī*, the Director and his wife are said to have taken the roles of the king and the queen.

[16] E.g. in the *Mālatīmādhava* and the *Viddhaśālabhañjikā*. In the *Uttararāmacarita*, the Director turns into a resident of Ayodhyā already in the Prologue.

existence in the name of some Ultimate Reality? The Graduate permits the Buddhists to go on with their hypocritical conduct as a way of livelihood, but he asserts roundly that Buddhism is actually harmful for someone who hopes for a better afterlife. But what about the Jains, Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas? Does one have the right to upset their beliefs? And what of the depraved practices of the *nīlāmbara*s? Should we persecute them, or should we just wave our hand in resignation and refer to general tendencies in the Age of Decadence? And what happens if our sponsor, may he be a king or the producer of a play, requires us to act against our principles?

We shall return to these questions, but first let us see what is exactly that makes this play so despicable for an actor who has turned grey in the honourable service of dramatic art.

3.3

According to Indian authorities on aesthetics, certain types of man are simply incapable of appreciating the beauties of poetry. It is pointless to test the veracity of poems, says Ānandavardhana, and if somebody had the impudence to employ for instance the methods of logic to prove that a piece of art is true or false, he would only make himself ridiculous.[17] Such a person, as Abhinavagupta remarks in his commentary, is certainly not a connoisseur, but only 'a fellow who is hard-hearted because of the application of dry logic, and who is therefore unable to feel [aesthetic] delight'.[18] Ritualists were considered perhaps the most hopeless cases in this respect. Uttuṅgodaya at least, who wrote a commentary on Abhinavagupta's *Dhvanyālokalocana*, has a poor opinion of them: he mentions the *mīmāṃsaka*s and the *śrotriya*s as the typical representatives of those who are quite incapable of art and honeyed phrases.[19]

The cobbler should stick to his last, and one should not apply *mīmāṃsaka* exegesis in the interpretation of poetry.[20] And what's more, one should not write a poem in the style of a scientific treatise. *Kāvya*, poetry, and *śāstra*, doctrinal or scientific literature,[21] have always been regarded in Indian aesthetics as two distinct worlds. Bhāmaha, the ancient Kashmirian *ālaṅkārika*, holds a much

[17] *Dhvanyāloka* 3.33+ (Krishnamoorthy, p. 222; Masson-Patwardhan 1970, vol. II, p. 179): *kāvyaviṣaye ca vyaṅgyapratītīnāṃ satyāsatyanirūpaṇasyāprayojakatvam eveti tatra pramāṇāntaravyāpāraparīkṣopahāsāyaiva sampadyate*|

[18] *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 3.33 (quoted in Masson-Patwardhan 1970, vol. II, p. 143): *nāyaṃ saḥrdayaḥ kevalaṃ śuṣkatarkopakramakarkaśahṛdayaḥ pratītiṃ parāmarṣṭuṃ nālam ity eṣa upahāsaḥ*|

[19] Uttuṅgodaya's *Kaumudī ad Locana* (quoted in Masson-Patwardhan 1970, vol. II, note 144): *adhikārī ca kāṣṭhāprāptasaḥṛdayabhāvaḥ kaścid eva na sarvaḥ, mīmāṃsakaśrotriyādes tatprakārādarśanāt*|; *anye tv iti*| *mīmāṃsakaśrotriyādīnām īdṛśī cāṭūktiḥ durlabheti saḥṛdayānām ity uktam*|

[20] This is why Abhinavagupta criticizes Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's way of analysing a poem (*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.1, ed. *Kāvyamālā*, p. 77): *jaiminīyasūtre hy evaṃ yojyate na kāvye 'pi*|

[21] This category includes technical literature, law-books, and any kind of specialist book, but also manuals on ritual and philosophy, and even the Vedas themselves. We may say that *śāstra* is a treatise which contains teaching about the real nature of things.

higher opinion of a poet's work than pure scientific knowledge:[22]

> *adhanasyeva dātṛtvaṃ klībasyevāstrakauśalam|*
> *ajñasyeva pragalbhatvam akaveḥ śāstravedanam||*
> *vinayena vinā kā śrīḥ kā niśā śaśinā vinā|*
> *rahitā satkavitvena kīdṛśī vāgvidagdhatā||*
> *gurūpadeśād adhyetuṃ śāstraṃ jaḍadhiyo 'py alam|*
> *kāvyaṃ tu jāyate jātu kasyacit pratibhāvataḥ||*
>
> If someone who is not a poet knows the *śāstra*s, it is just as the munificence of a pauper, the dexterity of an effeminate in handling weapons, or the pretentiousness of a fool. What is wealth without self-control? What is night without the moon? What skill in speech can there be if one is not a true poet? Even a thick-headed person can learn *śāstra* following the teaching of his master, but poetry is born rarely and only for a few people who have inspiration.

Rājaśekhara also distinguishes these two genres, but he thinks that there are some channels of contact:

> *iha hi vāṅmayam ubhayathā śāstraṃ kāvyaṃ ca| śāstrapūrvakatvāt kāvyānāṃ pūrvaṃ śāstreṣv abhiniviśet| na hy apravartitapradīpās tamasi tattvārthasārtham adhyakṣayanti|* (...)
> *bhavati prathayann arthaṃ līnaṃ samabhiplutaṃ sphuṭīkurvan|*
> *alpam analpaṃ racayann analpam alpaṃ ca śāstrakaviḥ||*[23]
>
> For here [in our system] literature is of two kinds: *śāstra* and *kāvya*. Because [the study of] *śāstra* must precede [the writing of] poetry, first one should delve into scientific works, for those who do not use a lamp cannot observe the multitude of real things. (...) The *śāstrakavi* is someone who exposes hidden things, makes obscure things clear, composes an extensive [treatise] out of a small [subject], and a concise one out of a vast [subject].
>
> *pratibhāvyutpattimāṃś ca kaviḥ kavir ity ucyate| sa hi tridhā| śāstrakaviḥ, kāvyakavir, ubhayakaviś ca| 'teṣām uttarottarīyo garīyān' iti śyāmadevaḥ| 'na' iti yāyāvarīyaḥ| yathāsvaviṣaye sarvo garīyān| na hi rājahaṃsaś candrikāpānāya prabhavati, nāpi cakoro 'dbhyaḥ kṣīroddharaṇāya| yac chāstrakaviḥ kāvye rasasampadaṃ vicchinatti, yat kāvyakaviḥ śāstre tarkakarkaśam apy artham uktivaicitryeṇa ślathayati| ubhayakavis tūbhayor api varīyān yady ubhayatra paraṃ pravīṇaḥ syāt| tasmāt tulyaprabhāvāv eva śāstrakāvyakavī| upakāryopakārakabhāvaṃ tu mithaḥ śāstrakāvyakavayor anumanyāmahe| yac chāstrasaṃskāraḥ kāvyam anugṛhṇāti śāstraikapravaṇatā tu nigrhṇāti| kāvyasaṃskāro 'pi śāstravākyapākam anuruṇaddhi kāvyaikapravaṇatā tu viruṇaddhi| tatra tridhā śāstrakaviḥ| yaḥ śāstraṃ vidhatte, yaś ca śāstre kāvyaṃ saṃvidhatte, yo 'pi kāvye śāstrārthaṃ nidhatte|*[24]

[22] *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 1.3–5.
[23] *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, Second Adhyāya, pp. 2f., 5.
[24] Ibid. Fifth Adhyāya, p. 17.

> That poet is called [real] poet who has imagination and learning. And he is of three kinds: the poet who writes *śāstra*, the poet who writes *kāvya*, and the poet who writes both. According to Śyāmadeva, the above order is also the order of their excellence. Rājaśekhara disagrees. Each of them exceeds [the other two] in his own field. For the swan is not able to drink moonlight, nor the Cakora bird to separate milk from water. As for the poet who writes *śāstra*, he ruins the harmony of aesthetic flavours in a poem; as for the poet who writes *kāvya*, he makes flaccid with the variety of diction in a technical work even a subject which is tough because of logical arguments. But the poet who can write both [*śāstra* and *kāvya*] is better than either of the other two if he is skillful in both fields in the highest degree. Therefore the poet who writes *śāstra* and the one who writes *kāvya* are of equal rank. We admit, however, that the poet who writes *śāstra* and the one who writes *kāvya* can mutually benefit each other. For education in *śāstra* benefits poetry, but exclusive proficiency in *śāstra* suppresses it. Education in *kāvya*, too, aids the perfection of sentences in a scientific work, but exclusive proficiency in *kāvya* suppresses it.
> Of these two, the poet who writes *śāstra* is of three kinds: the one who composes a doctrinal or scientific treatise, the one who introduces poetry in a *śāstra*, and the one who puts a doctrinal or scientific subject into poetry.

This passage makes it clear that the word *kavi* could also be applied to writers of doctrinal and scientific works.[25] There also seems to have been a view, represented here by Śyāmadeva, which placed the writers of *kāvya* before the authors of *śāstra*, and preferred those who could stand the test in both fields. If we have a look at the history of Sanskrit literature, we do find examples of such 'crossbreeds' of a swan and a *cakora*-bird. Ānandavardhana is just one of these geniuses, who is not far removed from Jayanta's time and who was also his compatriot. Today he is best known for his highly influential work on aesthetics, but he composed several poems as well. Of these only a *citrakāvya*, the *Devīśataka* survives, but he also refers to his *mahākāvya*, the *Arjunacarita* (*Dhvanyāloka*, 3.10–14+) and a Prakrit poem called *Viṣamabāṇalīlā* (*Dhvanyāloka*, 3.15+). He must have had great confidence in his erudition in philosophy, which is proved by the fact that he ventured to interpret Dharmakīrtian ideas in a commentary on Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (mentioned in *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 3.47).

[25] When Bhāmaha classifies poetry according to its subject matter, he does mention *śāstra* as a possible subject (*Kāvyālaṅkāra* 1.17):

> *vṛttadevādicaritaśaṃsi cotpādyavastu ca|*
> *kalāśāstrāśrayaṃ ceti caturdhā bhidyate punaḥ||*
>
> Then [*kāvya*] is [also] divided into the following four categories: that which relates the past feats of gods and other [heroes], that which has a fictitious story, that which is about art and that which is about doctrine or science.

Being such a versatile writer, it is natural that Ānandavardhana also took interest in the nature of relation between *śāstra* and *kāvya*. His work on this topic, the *Tattvāloka*, is unfortunately lost for us, but the following passage from the *Dhvanyāloka* and Abhinavagupta's commentary thereon throws some light on it:[26]

> Ānandavardhana: *tad evam anukramaṇīnirdiṣṭena vākyena bhagavadvyatirekiṇaḥ sarvasyānyasyānityatāṃ prakāśayatā mokṣalakṣaṇa evaikaḥ paraḥ puruṣārthaḥ śāstranaye, kāvyanaye ca tṛṣṇākṣayaparipoṣalakṣaṇaḥ śānto raso mahābhāratasyāṅgitvena vivakṣita iti supratipāditam*|
>
> So thus it has been well established that the sentence announced in the chapter of contents, which reveals that nothing is permanent except for the Lord, wishes to express that with regard to the *śāstra* aspect it is the single supreme goal of man, namely *mokṣa*, which is predominant in the *Mahābhārata*, and with regard to the *kāvya* aspect it is the aesthetic relish of quietude, which is characterised by the full development of the dying away of desires.
>
> Abhinavagupta: *śāstranaya iti*| *tatrāsvādayogābhāve puruṣeṇārthyata ity ayam eva vyapadeśaḥ sādaraḥ, camatkārayoge tu rasavyapadeśa iti bhāvaḥ*| *etac ca granthakāreṇa tattvāloke vitatyoktam iha tv asya na mukhyo 'vasara iti nāsmābhir darśitam*|
>
> 'With regard to the *śāstra* aspect.' Since it [i.e. the *śāstra* aspect] has no connection with aesthetic relishing, it is this term alone [i.e. "goal of man"] which is appropriate, inasmuch as "man strives to obtain it"; but when [in the *kāvya* aspect] there is a connection with aesthetic wonder, then the designation of *rasa* [is appropriate]: this is what he means. And the author has set this forth in detail in the *Tattvāloka*, but in the present context is not the best occasion for [discussing] it, so I have not expounded it.

Some works could be regarded both as *śāstra* and as *kāvya*, depending on the way of approach. This was especially true in the case of literary pieces that also had a religious importance, such as, for instance, the *Mahābhārata*. Bhoja lists both *kāvyaśāstra* and *śāstrakāvya* among the varieties of *śravyakāvya*.[27] He mentions the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* and (extending the category to *dṛśyakāvya*) the *Mudrārākṣasa* as examples of *kāvyaśāstra*, that is a poetic composition in which a scientific or doctrinal subject is introduced (*yatrārthaḥ śāstrāṇāṃ kāvye niveśyate*). *Śāstrakāvya*, on the other hand, is apparently a scientific composition written in the manner of poetry, e.g. the *Kāmandakīya-nītisāra*, and the *Rativilāsa*.[28] Put differently, *kāvyaśāstra* is essentially a piece of poetry which also teaches us some *śāstraic* subject, while *śāstrakāvya* is essentially a *śāstra*-treatise 'dressed up' as a poem. As Raghavan observed, among Rājaśekhara's

[26] *Dhvanyāloka ad* 4.5 (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 278); *Locana ad loc.*, Kashi ed. p. 533.
[27] Raghavan 1978, p. 593.
[28] Ibid. pp. 607f.

*śāstrakavi*s, the second type writes *śāstrakāvya*, and the third type writes *kāvyaśāstra*.[29]

Nevertheless there are clear differences between poetic and scientific dictions, and if a Fachidiot *śāstrakavi* ventures to write pure poetry, the consequences, as Rājaśekhara pointed out, can be disastrous.[30] We have already met the view that the source of poetry is the poet's imagination or inspiration (*pratibhā*) rather than his erudition. In the opinion of Udbhaṭa, the 8th century Kashmirian rhetorician, poetry and science also differ in their domains:[31]

> *astu nāma niḥsīmārthasārthaḥ| kiṃtu dvirūpa evāsau, vicāritasusthaḥ, avicāritaramaṇīyaś ca| tayoḥ pūrvam āśritāni śāstrāṇi, tad uttaraṃ kāvyāni|*
>
> Let there be a limitless multitude of subjects, but this [multitude] is only twofold: [either] well-established [even] after they have been analysed, or pleasing [only] as long as they are not analysed.[32] Of these two, scientific works are concerned with the former, poems with the latter.

According to a certain Āparājiti, who is probably the same as Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, another Kashmirian living perhaps in the ninth century, only those things are worth including in a poetic composition which are 'tasty' in an aesthetic sense.[33]

Rājaśekhara, however, considers the expressions of the poet more important in this respect than the chosen subject:[34]

> *ām iti yāyāvarīyaḥ| asti cānubhūyamāno rasasyānuguṇo viguṇaś cārthaḥ, kāvye tu kavivacanāni rasayanti virasayanti ca nārthāḥ, anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ cedam upalabhyate|*

[29] Ibid.: *yaś ca śāstre kāvyaṃ saṃvidhatte, yo 'pi kāvye śāstrārthaṃ nidhatte*, cf. above.

[30] Bhāmaha put it clearly (*Kāvyālaṅkāra* 1.12):

> *nākavitvam adharmāya vyādhaye daṇḍanāya ca|*
> *kukavitvaṃ punaḥ sākṣānmṛtim āhur manīṣiṇaḥ||*
>
> If someone is not a poet, this fact is not a sin, it does not result in disease or punishment. The wise say, however, that being a bad poet equals incarnate death.

[31] Quoted in *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, p. 44. On Udbhaṭa see p. xx above.

[32] The concept of *avicāritaramaṇīyatā* appears in Cārvāka context as well, e.g. in the conclusion of Jayarāśi's *Tattvopaplavasiṃha* (TUS (GOS), p. 125): *upapluteṣv eva tattveṣv avicāritaramaṇīyās sarve vyavahārā ghaṭanta iti.* Jayanta also quotes this Cārvāka view both in his *magnum opus*, and in his play: *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 317: *avicāritaramaṇīyataiva tattvaṃ na tu lakṣaṇaniyamaḥ śakyakriyas tasyeti*; *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Three, ll. 324f.: *tad ayaṃ avicārita eva ramaṇīyo vyavahāraḥ, etad eva ca tattvam iti tattvavidaḥ.* As we have seen above (p. xx) Cakradhara, the commentator of the *Nyāyamañjarī* identifies the 'well-trained *Cārvākas* (*suṣikṣitacārvākāḥ*)' with Udbhaṭa and co. (*udbhaṭādayaḥ*), and the 'cunning Cārvāka (*cārvākadhūrtaḥ*)' with Udbhaṭa himself.

[33] Quoted in *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* (Ninth Adhyāya, p. 45): *astu nāma niḥsīmārthasārthaḥ, kiṃ tu rasavata eva nibandho yukto na nīrasasya iti āparājitiḥ|* Āparājiti is probably another name of Lollaṭa, since the second one of the two verses following this sentence, also written by Āparājiti according to Rājaśekhara, is attributed to Lollaṭa by Hemacandra in the *Kāvyānuśāsana*, p. 307.

[34] *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, ibid.

> 'Amen', says Rājaśekhara. Certain things that we perceive are congenial to aesthetic relish, others are uncongenial. In poetry, however, it is the expressions of the poet which do or do not possess aesthetic relish, and not the subject, and we ascertain this fact through positive and negative concomitance.

Perhaps the most important difference between *śāstra* and *kāvya* lies in their function. While we study the *śāstra*s in order to receive instruction about the true nature of things, this does not seem to be enough reason to read poetry. Bhāmaha named proficiency (*vaicakṣaṇya*) in the four goals of man and the arts, pleasure (*prīti*), and fame (*kīrti*), as the threefold gift of poetry.[35] Later aestheticians, however, disagreed. Dhanañjaya and Dhanika felt strongly on this point:[36]

> *ānandaniṣyandiṣu rūpakeṣu*
> *vyutpattimātraṃ phalam alpabuddhiḥ|*
> *yo 'pītihāsādivad āha sādhus*
> *tasmai namaḥ svāduparāṅmukhāya||*
>
> Homage to that holy fool, who has turned his back on charm, and who says that the only fruit in plays that drip bliss is learning, similarly to legends and the like.
>
> *Avaloka ad loc.*:
> *tatra kecit—dharmārthakāmamokṣeṣu vaicakṣaṇyaṃ kalāsu ca| karoti kīrtiṃ prītiṃ ca sādhukāvyaniṣevaṇam|| ityādinā trivargādivyutpattiṃ kāvyaphalatvenecchanti tannirāsena svasaṃvedyaḥ paramānandarūpo rasāsvādo daśarūpāṇāṃ phalaṃ na punar itihāsādivat trivargādivyutpattimātram iti darśitam| nama iti solluṇṭham|*
>
> In this context some people assert with verses such as the following that the fruit of poetry is learning the three goals of man, etc.: 'Adherence to [i.e. reading and composing] good poetry bestows proficiency in *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, *mokṣa*, and the arts, and it also gives fame and pleasure.' In order to refute this it has been shown that the fruit of the ten kinds of plays is the tasting of aesthetic relish, which everyone experiences in himself, and which is of the nature of the highest bliss, and [this fruit is] not just education in the three goals of man, etc., like in the case of legends, etc. The word "homage" is used ironically.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka expressed a similar opinion on this subject. He held that the major effect of poetry is the enjoyment (*bhoga*) of aesthetic relish, which enjoyment is similar to the Brahman-experience (*brahmāsvāda*). Any instruction a poem may give us is secondary (*vyutpattir nāma apradhānam eva*).[37]

[35] *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 1.2.
[36] *Daśarūpaka* 1.6.
[37] Quoted by Abhinavagupta in *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.4.

Abhinavagupta also quotes Bhāmaha's verse to show that the audience can derive both instruction and pleasure from poetry, but then he remarks that of these two pleasure is the predominant result.[38] Then he relates one of his favourite allegories to illustrate that different literary genres teach us in different ways: the Veda (= *śāstra*) instructs in the manner of a master, we learn from the legends in the way we learn from our friends, and poetry teaches us after the fashion of a loving wife.[39] Abhinavagupta takes the view (following his teacher) that it is pointless to separate pleasure and instruction in poetry, since without delight coming from the tasting of *rasa* no lesson can enter the hearts of the connoisseur audience.[40] Accordingly drama, too, does not instruct us as a rigorous professor, but rather it 'increases our understanding.'[41] Certainly the conduct of the hero is set as a good example to the spectators, but still before that their imagination is expanded through the savoring of *rasa*, which is an (at least) equally important side of instruction.[42]

Poetic diction can facilitate the mastering of any kind of teaching. Princes, for instance, must be educated to become righteous kings. But, given their natural inclinations, they would be bored to tears while listening to the *śāstra*s. Poetry, however, is an excellent way to engage their interest: 'entering into the hearts [of the princes, etc.]', says Abhinavagupta, 'is accomplished by the tasting of aesthetic relish alone.'[43] Reading a scientific treatise can be a painful experience for a *sahṛdaya*. It is like swallowing a bitter medicine, to use this ancient allegory, while reading poetry is almost equivalent to drinking ambrosia, which is sweet *and* healthy at the same time.[44] It is an ancient wisdom that if you don't want to frighten people away from your *śāstra*, the trick is to drip some poetic honey into bitter science.[45] 'How great is the weight put on the poet's shoulders!', sighs Bhāmaha. No wonder: all words and meanings, all arguments and arts, if they deserve their name, become the components of poetry.[46]

[38] The poet's happiness is provided by his fame (*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 1.1.)

[39] *Locana* ibid. (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 17): *tathāpi tatra prītir eva pradhānam| anyathā prabhusammitebhyo vedādibhyo mitrasammitebhyaś cetihāsādibhyo vyutpattihetubhyaḥ ko 'sya kāvyarūpasya vyutpattihetor jāyāsammitatvalakṣaṇo viśeṣa iti pradhānyenānanda evoktaḥ|* Cf. also *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 3.10–14.

[40] *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 3.10–14.

[41] *Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.115. (ed. GOS, vol. I, p. 41): : *dharmyaṃ yaśasyam āyuṣyaṃ hitaṃ buddhivivardhanam| lokopadeśajananaṃ nāṭyam etad bhaviṣyati||* Abhinavagupta *ad loc.*: *nanu kiṃ guruvad upadeśaṃ karoti? nety āha| kintu buddhiṃ vivardhayati|*

[42] *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.4.

[43] *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 3.10–14 (ed. *Kāvyamālā*, p.183): *hṛdayānupraveśaś ca rasāsvādamaya eva.* Cf. *Vakroktijīvita*, prose after 1.3 (ed. p. 10): *abhijātāḥ khalu rājaputrādayo dharmādyupeyārthino vijigīṣavaḥ kleśabhīravaś ca, sukumārāśayatvāt teṣām| tathā saty api tadāhlādakatve kāvyabandhasya krīḍanakādiprakhyatā prāpnotīty abhidhatte—dharmādisādhanopāyaḥ|*

[44] Cf. *Vakroktijīvita*, prose after 1.5 (ed. p. 15): *duḥśravadurbhaṇaduradhigamatvādidoṣaduṣṭo 'dhyayanāvasara eva duḥsahaduḥkhadāyī śāstrasandarbhas tatkālakalpitakamanīyacamatkṛteḥ kāvyasya na kathañcid api spardhām adhirohatīty etad apy arthato 'bhihitaṃ bhavati| kaṭukauṣadhavac chāstram avidyāvyādhināśanam| āhlādy amṛtavat kāvyam avivekagadāpaham||*

[45] Cf. *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 5.3: *svādukāvyarasonmiśraṃ śāstram apy upayuñjate| prathamālīḍhamadhavaḥ pibanti kaṭu bheṣajam||*

[46] Ibid. 5.4: *na sa śabdo na tad vācyaṃ na sa nyāyo na sā kalā| jāyate yan na kāvyāṅgam*

3.4

We can ascertain from the foregoing that, according to the standards of classical Indian aesthetics, it was not completely impossible to write a play introducing philosophical subjects, but it was apparently a daring enterprise, and the poet must have reckoned with the scathing criticism of the *sahṛdaya*s.

When Jayanta composed his unique play, probably at the very end of the ninth century, studies in poetics and poetry itself had achieved a high standard in the kingdom of Kashmir. We have already met the name of Bhāmaha, the ancient *ālaṅkārika* (eight century or earlier). Udbhaṭa, who wrote a commentary on Bhāmaha's work, may be identical with the *sabhāpati* of king Jayāpīḍa (779–813) mentioned in the *Rājataraṅgiṇī*. This king sponsored a remarkable circle of intellectuals: Kalhaṇa mentions the poet Dāmodaragupta and Vāmana (possibly the author of the *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra*), who were also his ministers, and several other poets; the grammarian Kṣīra was the king's teacher, and the Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara also entered his kingdom.[47] About half a century later king Avantivarman (855–883) was a similar patron of literature. Kalhaṇa names four illustrious members of his *sabhā*: Ānandavardhana, Muktākaṇa, Śivasvāmin (the author of the *Kapphiṇābhyudaya*), and Ratnākara (who wrote the *Haravijaya*).[48] As we have seen, Avantivarman's successor and the king of Jayanta's play, Śaṅkaravarman (883–902), was more interested in military conquests than in literature: Bhallaṭa and other poets led a miserable existence during his reign, and *horribile dictu* the king himself spoke *apabhraṃśa* instead of Sanskrit.[49] According to Kalhaṇa, Śaṅkaravarman put a certain Nāyaka in charge of the two new Śiva-temples.[50] It is very tempting to identify this Nāyaka with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, the famous aesthetician, who wrote his *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* in order to demolish the *dhvani*-theory.[51] Another important source of aesthetic theory was certainly the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Its most famous commentary was written by Abhinavagupta, but his work was not unprecedented. He quotes among others three Kashmirian commentators: Udbhaṭa, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, and Śaṅkuka. We know from Abhinavagupta that Śaṅkuka contested the views of Lollaṭa.[52] Kalhaṇa mentions a poet called Śaṅkuka, who composed a *kāvya* about the battle between the mighty Mamma and Utpalaka, which took place around 851.[53] On the other hand, we know about a Lollaṭa who commented on the

aho bhāro mahān kaveḥ||

[47] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 4.495 seqq.

[48] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.34.

[49] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.204 seqq.

[50] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.159.

[51] On Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka see Kane, pp. 221ff. Abhinavagupta refers to him as one who uses *mīmāṃsaka* ideas in literary criticism (*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.1, ed. *Kāvyamālā*, p. 77: *jaiminīyasūtre hy evaṃ yojyate na kāvye 'pi*|); and judging from a verse of invocation also quoted by Abhinavagupta he seems to have been a devotee of Śiva (*namas trailokyanirmāṇakavaye śambhave yataḥ*| *pratikṣaṇaṃ jagannāṭyaprayogarasiko janaḥ*||, *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 6). Now the Nāyaka who was placed in charge of the two Śiva-temples is called both *caturvidyaḥ* and *vāgdevīkulamandiram* in the *Rājataraṅgiṇī*.

[52] *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 266.

[53] *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 4.703 seqq.

Spandakārikā of Vasugupta,[54] who was the teacher of Kallaṭa, who lived under Avantivarman (855/6–883).[55] Now certainly everything depends on the identity of the above Śaṅkukas and Lollaṭas, but it is at least not impossible that both were roughly of the same age and lived under the reign of Avantivarman. In that case Jayanta might have known their works.

That Jayanta was familiar with the *dhvani*-theory becomes clear from the *Nyāyamañjarī*:[56]

> *etena śabdasāmarthyamahimnā so 'pi vāritaḥ|*
> *yam anyaḥ paṇḍitaṃmanyaḥ prapede kaṃcana dhvanim||*
> *vidher niṣedhāvagatir vidhibuddhir niṣedhataḥ|*
> *yathā*
> *'bhama*[57] *dhammiya vīsattho', 'mā sma pāntha gṛhaṃ viśa'||*
> *mānāntaraparicchedyavasturūpopadeśinām|*
> *śabdānām eva sāmarthyaṃ tatra tatra tathā tathā||*
> *athavā nedṛśī carcā kavibhiḥ saha śobhate|*
> *vidvāṃso 'pi vimuhyanti vākyārthagahane 'dhvani||*
> *tad alam anayā goṣṭhyā vidvajjanocitayā ciraṃ*
> *paramagahanas tarkajñānām abhūmir ayaṃ nayaḥ|*
> *prakṛtam adhunā tasmāt brūmo na bhāty anumānataḥ*
> *tanur api satām arthāpatter viśeṣa iti sthitam||*
>
> By this greatness of the word's signifying power that so-called '*dhvani*' is also refuted to which another self-appointed scholar resorted. [When there is] the understanding of a prohibition from [hearing] an injunction, [and] the comprehension of an injunction from [hearing] a prohibition, as for example [in the verses beginning with the following words]: 'Walk confidently, pious man...', [and] 'Don't enter the house, traveler...', it is nothing but the signifying power of words [which operates] in all such cases in various [appropriate] ways—words that refer to the real nature [of things] which can be precisely determined with the help of other means of valid knowledge. Or rather it is not right [to open] such a discussion with poets. Even the wise go astray on the path which is hardly passable due to [the difficulties in explaining] the sentence-meanings. So let's finish at last this discourse which is suitable [only] for the wise. This highly impenetrable issue is beyond the reach of logicians. Therefore now I shall speak about the subject in hand: it is proved that sensible people do not see the slightest difference between inference and presumption.

It appears that Jayanta was not only acquainted with the *dhvani*-theory, but he probably knew the *Dhvanyāloka* as well, since the two verses he refers to

[54] Gnoli 1968, p. xvii, note 2.
[55] Cf. *Rājataraṅgiṇī* 5.66.
[56] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 129f.
[57] *bhama*] em. following *Dhvanyāloka* 1.4+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 8.) : *bhava* ed.

are the first two examples of *dhvani* cited by Ānandavardhana.[58] In this case the 'self-appointed scholar' may well have been Ānandavardhana himself,[59] and this attribute also betrays that Jayanta did not have a high opinion of him. On the other hand Jayanta probably knew that the refined aesthetes shuddered at the views of the 'dry logicians', so while he modestly (?) declines to deal with the impervious subject of words and their meanings, he also suggests that poets or literary critics are even less competent to handle the problem.

This does not mean, however, that Jayanta did not speak about poets with the greatest respect, provided that they stick to their last. 'Kālidāsa's beautiful expressions', he says, 'are, so to say, sprinkled with ambrosia, smeared with sandal, [and] washed by moon-beams. Bāṇa's words bedazzle crowds of poets with the formidable / spacious arrangement of their letters, which is congenial to the aesthetic relish manifested [in the text].'[60] He was probably familiar with the poetry of his native land as well, and he does mention one famous Kashmirian *kāvya*: the *Kuṭṭanīmata* (cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 649).

But Jayanta was not just an appreciative reader of poetry. We find ample evidence in the *Nyāyamañjarī* of his poetic vein and gift for satire. He took care to mix the right quantity of honey into his *śāstra*, although in his opinion the *sūtras* of Gautama are already 'the most excellent juice (*rasa*) extracted from the cluster of the medical plants of *nyāya*'.[61] If we did not know the *Āgamaḍambara* and were to speculate which Indian philosopher might have endeavoured to write a play, Jayanta would be perhaps the most likely guess.

3.5

'My friend,' complains the Director to his Assistant in the Prologue of the *Āgamaḍambara*, 'as is well known, I have exerted myself in the staging of the

[58] *Dhvanyāloka* 1.4+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 8). The second verse quoted by Ānandavardhana is actually a Prakrit poem which seems to be slightly different from the verse Jayanta refers to, but both illustrate the phenomenon of '*vidhibuddhir niṣedhataḥ*'. Perhaps Jayanta relied on his memory and recalled a verse very similar to the one in the *Dhvanyāloka*. It is interesting to note that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka also commented on these two verses. According to him it is not the *arthasāmarthya*, that is the suggesting power of the content expressed by the words, which brings about the apprehension of the hidden intention, but the words themselves, when applied in a skillful way (*Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 1.4, ed. Krishnamoorthy, pp. 29, 31).

[59] Cf. *Granthibhaṅga*, p. 32: *etena paṇḍitaṃmanya ity ānandavardhanācāryaṃ dhvanikāraṃ parāmṛśati*|

[60] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 582: *amṛteneva saṃsiktāḥ candaneneva carcitāḥ*| *candrāṃśubhir ivonmṛṣṭāḥ kālidāsasya sūktayaḥ*|| *prakaṭarasānuguṇavikaṭākṣararacanācamatkāritasakalakavikulāḥ bāṇasya vācaḥ*| The invocatory verses of the *Nyāyamañjarī* and the *Harṣacarita* resemble each other in many respects.

[61] *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 3: *nyāyauṣadhivanebhyo 'yam āhṛtaḥ paramo rasaḥ*. Jayanta placed a high value on correct and clear usage, and he could not refrain from mocking the wise Dharmakīrti who 'could not put together correctly even a pair of words when he wanted to formulate a definition' (*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 259: *iti sunipuṇabuddhir lakṣaṇaṃ vaktukāmaḥ padayugalam apīdaṃ nirmame nānavadyam*|). Both Cakradhara, the commentator of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, and Abhinanda, Jayanta's son, praised the poetic qualities of Jayanta's writings.

ten dramatic styles as taught by Bharatamuni. But today the circle of pupils of this honourable Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, who is also well known as the Writer of the Commentary because he wrote an exegetical work on grammar when he was just a child, has ordered me to put on the work of their teacher, a new, extraordinary play called Much Ado About Religion. So how shall I stage it, since it is not worldly, does not follow the dramatic rules, and has never been performed before? Therefore it is better just to give up this wretched livelihood.'

His last objection against the play, namely that there is no tradition of its performance the director could rely upon, is a well-known complaint since the time of Kālidāsa, although in the *Mālavikāgnimitra* the Director shows more solidarity with the author and actually defends the play against this charge. The first two objections deserve closer attention.

To begin with, why is it a problem if a play is 'not worldly'? Well, a refined connoisseur might say that if a play is riddled with disputes on utterly abstract topics such as, 'Can this pot be destroyed by a hammer, or are there only pot-phases perishing in every moment?', it might prove to be a trifle boring for the average audience (not to speak about the spoiled princes). After all the main purpose of drama is entertainment. Already the gods addressed Brahmā with the following words: 'we want something to play with, which has to be pleasing both to our eyes and our ears.'[62] This 'plaything', says Abhinavagupta, 'is similar to a bitter medicine coated in sugar', a familiar concept, but 'the sole effect of which is the distraction of the mind'.[63] One should find pleasure in watching a play and in listening to it: it is not a means to generate religious merit (*na dharmasādhanam*, *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.11). The diction of a play should be straightforward and agreeable (*śakyam*), and not for the most part ugly and harsh (*durbhagaparuṣaprāyam*, *Abhinavabhāratī* ibid.).[64] As Dhanañjaya observed with a sharp eye: 'The spectators amusing themselves with characters such as Arjuna are just like children playing with clay elephants: they relish their own zeal.'[65] A good performance holds the audience, diverts their mind from everyday miseries:[66]

> *duḥkhārtānāṃ śramārtānāṃ śokārtānāṃ tapasvinām|*
> *viśrāntijananaṃ kāle nāṭyam etad bhaviṣyati||*
>
> This [thing called] drama will be the production of repose in the appropriate time for those who are tormented by suffering, fatigue, or grief, [and also] for ascetics.

[62] *Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.11 (GOS, vol. I, p. 10): *krīḍanīyakam icchāmo dṛśyaṃ śravyaṃ ca yad bhavet|*

[63] *Abhinavabhāratī* on *loc. cit.* (GOS ibid.): *guḍapracchannakaṭukauṣadhakalpaṃ cittavikṣepamātraphalam.*

[64] Another interpretation of *dṛśyaṃ śravyaṃ ca* given by Abhinavagupta (GOS p. 11): *dṛśyam iti hṛdyaṃ śravyam iti vyutpattipradam iti prītivyutpattidam ity arthaḥ.*

[65] *Daśarūpaka* 4.41b–42a: *krīḍatāṃ mṛnmayair yadvad bālānāṃ dviradādibhiḥ| svotsāhaḥ svadate tadvac chrotṛṇām arjunādibhiḥ||*; cf. *Nāṭyaśāstra* verses between 1.119 and 120 (GOS vol. I, p. 44, Abhinavagupta does not comment on them): *vinodakaraṇaṃ loke nāṭyam etad bhaviṣyati|*

[66] *Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.114 (GOS vol. I, p. 40).

So even ascetics, who might be inclined to contemplate the ultimate questions of existence, would prefer to be entertained while watching a play and to forget about their self-afflicted tortures[67] (including the mental tortures of thinking about hammers approaching pots from various angles, our man of taste might add). As for those fortunate ones who are not familiar with suffering, for instance the spoiled princes, drama gives them useful instructions about the way of the world (*lokavṛtte*).[68]

The objection that they do not please the general audience was brought up against *śāntarasa*-plays in general (and, as we are going to see, the *Āgamaḍambara* is such a play, if we can label it in any way at all). 'Even if it is not within everyone's range of experience,' says Ānandavardhana in defence of *śāntarasa* occurring in plays such as the *Nāgānanda*, 'just because of that it cannot be rejected as a special state of mind of illustrious persons who are different from the plebs.'[69] So even a philosophical play can be a hit, one just has to find the right audience. And that's the conclusive argument of the Assistant in reply to the hesitation of the Director: what could be a better audience than the devoted philosophy-students of professor Bhaṭṭa Jayanta? They'll just love the play.

But there are other problems, too, with the *Āgamaḍambara*. Some critics would say that actually it is too *laukika* in the sense that it is very closely linked with the time and place of the author. Abhinavagupta was an eminent promoter of the thesis that aesthetic experience is essentially supramundane, *alaukika*.[70] In his view, 'the heart [of the spectator] becomes similar to a spotless mirror because he forgets about his everyday life in the world due to the relishing of the appropriate songs and music'.[71] 'Due to listening to the recitation [of the actors] and [watching] the entering of other characters', says Abhinavagupta, 'an apprehension arises [in the mind of the spectator]. [This apprehension] has as its object such [characters] as Rāma and Rāvaṇa, it is not embraced by the influence of any particular place or time, [and] it is not the domain of [any] reflection on whether it is to be regarded as a cognition which is correct, or false, or which is a doubt, or a supposition.'[72]

Already Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka had pointed out that when we watch a Rāma-play, we do not regard Sītā as our own beloved, so the erotic *rasa* we relish cannot

[67] Cf. *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.114 (GOS vol. I, p.39): *tapasvināṃ anavaratakṛcchracāndrāyaṇādyācaraṇakalitadaurbalyātiśayaparikhinnahṛdayāṇāṃ viśrāntijananaṃ duḥkhaprasaraṇavighātakam|*

[68] Abhinavagupta commenting on *Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.115 (*lokopadeśajananaṃ nāṭyam*) (*Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, pp. 40f): *ye na duḥkhitāḥ sukhabhūyiṣṭhavṛttaya eva rājaputrādyās teṣāṃ lokavṛtte dharmādyupāyavarge upadeśakāry etan nāṭyam| lokaśabdena lokavṛttam| nanu kiṃ guruvad upadeśaṃ karoti? nety āha| kintu buddhiṃ vivardhayati|*

[69] *Dhvanyāloka* 3.26+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 182): *yadi nāma sarvajanānubhavagocaratā tasya nāsti naitāvatāsāv alokasāmānyamahānubhāvacittavṛttiviśeṣaḥ pratikṣeptuṃ śakyaḥ|*

[70] Most of Abhinavagupta's predecessors did not consider *rasāsvāda* as something essentially different from our everyday experiences.

[71] *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.107 (GOS vol. I, p. 36): *ucitagītātodyacarvaṇāvismṛtasāṃsārikabhāvatayā vimalamukurakalpībhūtanijahṛdayaḥ.*

[72] *Abhinavabhāratī* ibid.: *pāṭhyākarṇanapātrāntarapraveśavaśāt samutpanne deśakālaviśeṣāveśānāliṅgite samyaṅmithyāsaṃśayasambhāvanādijñānavijñeyatvaparāmarśānāspade rāmarāvaṇādiviṣayādhyavasāye...*

be awakened by the actual Sītā. To say that each spectator remembers his own beloved during the performance might be correct (especially if the performance is boring), but it does not explain how the *play* contributes to our aesthetic experience. As for Rāma, we cannot actually recall his heroism since we have never witnessed his heroic deeds. If we learn them from some written testimony, this knowledge still does not guarantee that we can relish *vīrarasa*.[73] One of the key concepts of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's aesthetic theory is 'generalisation', *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*.[74] Words in poetry have a special function called *bhāvakatva* ("bringing into being") by Nāyaka, which gives rise to the aesthetic experience of *rasa* in the audience. This special operation must necessarily comprise the generalisation (or universalisation, depersonalisation) of the various factors which contribute to the arising of *rasa*, that is to say the *vibhāva*s, *anubhāva*s, and *vyabhicārībhāva*s (eliciting factors, indicatory symptoms, and ancillary mental states).[75] Now if we see king Udayana and Ratnāvalī on the stage, we can easily be convinced that they are not our personal acquaintances, the lovely garden in which they sit is not one particular garden in our city, and the heroin's oblique glances or blushing do not have any personal relationship with us, since they are more than the amorous gestures of just one particular girl. But what happens if the scene of the plot is the city we live in, the time is the reign of our king, and the events happening on the stage give us the strange feeling of *dejà vu*?

The factors that produce the *rasa* are also capable of shielding our aesthetic relish from various obstacles,[76] so if the *vibhāva*s, *anubhāva*s, and *vyabhicārin*s do not function properly, we might expect that the "wonder" *camatkāra* of our aesthetic perception will be blocked. One of the major obstacles occurs when the spectators regard these factors as real, actual, and personal. The right way to counteract this obstacle is to employ the theatrical conventions (*nāṭyadharmin*s), which include various dances, makeups, the stage, costumes, and other *alaukika* accessories. These conventions hide the identity of the actor (which was, however, revealed in the preliminaries of the play), and distance the performance from all actualities.[77] To sum up, they contribute to the aesthetic experience through the accomplishment of the state of generality, *sādhāraṇībhāva*.[78]

Ānandavardhna held that Vālmīki's grief (*śoka*) felt upon the lamentation of the *krauñca*-bird was transformed into verse (*śloka*).[79] But Abhinavagupta

[73] See *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.4.

[74] It was accepted by Abhinavagupta, and probably already by Tauta (Abhinavagupta follows his teacher when he writes: *nartakāntare 'pi ca rāmo 'yam iti pratipattir asti| tataś ca rāmatvaṃ sāmānyarūpam ity āyātam|*, *Abhinavabhāratī ad rasasūtra*, GOS, vol. I, p. 269; Gnoli 1968, p. 7).

[75] *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.4. See also *Kāvyaprakāśa*, vol. I, p. 216ff; Gerow-Aklujkar, p. 86.

[76] *Abhinavabhāratī ad rasasūtra* (GOS, vol. I, p. 274): *tatra vighnāpasārakā vibhāvaprabhṛtayaḥ|*

[77] *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS) ibid. The spectator's cognition cannot rest either in the actuality of the actor, or in the reality of the character.

[78] *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 275.: *eṣa sarvo muninā sādhāraṇībhāvasiddhyā rasacarvaṇopayogitvena parikarabandhaḥ samāśritaḥ|*

[79] *Dhvanyāloka* 1.5+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 12): *tathā cādikaver vālmīkes sannihitasa-*

hastens to remark that it was rather *karuṇarasa* that was felt by the first poet and not actual grief, since in the latter case the poet would merely suffer, and he could in no way experience aesthetic pleasure which is indispensable for composing a poem.[80] The same observation holds good with regard to the audience of *kāvya*. According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, if a performance produced sorrow in the spectators, they would never return to the theatre to watch a play in which *karuṇa* is the dominant *rasa*.[81]

It is easy to see that if, for instance, the Rāma-story had been presented to an average Indian audience, no spectator would have had any difficulty in distancing what was happening on the stage from the realities of his own life. But what would have happened if Rāvaṇa himself had been among the audience? This is precisely what occurs in the third act of Rājaśekhara's play, the *Bālarāmāyaṇa*, when the king of the *rākṣasa*s, who is pining for Sītā, sends for the troupe of Kohala to perform Bharata's brand-new play, called *Sītāsvayaṃvara*, in order to distract his mind. He could not have opted for a worse kind of entertainment. First he seems to enjoy the show, gloating over the princes' fiasco as they try to bend Śiva's bow in vain. He becomes a bit annoyed with the playwright when one of the characters remarks that even Rāvaṇa's arms would fail to accomplish this great deed. When king Śatruñjaya is introduced as a great hero who wishes to defeat Indrajit, Rāvaṇa draws his sword to protect his dearest son, and Prahasta, his general, has to remind him that they are just watching a play. But Rāvaṇa has entered too far into the dramatic world. When one of the contestants tries to carry away Sītā forcefully, his anger makes him spring up, just to realise within seconds that he has made a fool of himself again.

When all the other kings have failed to bend Śiva's bow, and the door-keeper is still musing if he should announce finally the young prince of the *sūryavaṃśa*, Rāvaṇa suddenly decides to act and rises to enter into the contest. 'My lord', says Prahasta, 'this is not Janaka's daughter, and this is not the bow of the moon-crested god.' 'What is it then?' asks Rāvaṇa at a loss. And Prahasta benignly informs him: 'It is a play.'[82] Then Rāma enters and vows that either he will string the bow or the bow will break. 'This is indeed the thunder of an actor',[83] laughs Rāvaṇa, and when Rāma does start bending the bow he says, 'This is how an actor shows off'.[84] When the bow miraculously bursts in Rāma's hands, Rāvaṇa accuses the poet that he has given the reins to his imagination: 'This is the wish-granting speech-cow of poets, which gives birth

hacarīvirahakātarakrauñcākrandajanitaḥ śoka eva ślokatayā pariṇataḥ|

[80] *Locana ad loc.* (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 39): *na tu muneḥ śoka iti mantavyam| evaṃ hi sati tadduḥkhena so 'pi duḥkhita iti kṛtvā rasasyātmateti niravakāśaṃ bhavet| na ca duḥkhasantaptasyaiṣā daśeti|*

[81] Quoted in *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.4. We might add that while Abhinavagupta would have no objection against the arising of *karuṇarasa* in the spectators, he would definitely oppose the arising of actual *śoka* in them.

[82] *Bālarāmāyaṇa*, Act Three, verse 67+: PRAHASTAḤ: *deva! neyaṃ jānakī, na cedam aindusekharaṃ dhanuḥ|* RĀVAṆAḤ: *tat kim idam?* PRAHASTAḤ: *prekṣaṇakam idam|*

[83] Ibid., verse 74+: *idaṃ tan naṭagarjitaṃ nāma|*

[84] Ibid.: *iyam api sā naṭavibhīṣikā|*

[i.e. makes real] even to unreal things'.[85] But when king Janaka places Sītā's hand on Rāma's, Rāvaṇa looses his self-control, and exclaims: 'Ah, what?! This falsely and vainly sophisticated bug of a *kṣatriya*-boy is clutching Sītā's hand, although I, the lord of Laṅkā, am present! So he is as good as dead.'[86] Prahasta cannot help laughing to himself, and remarks somewhat ironically: 'Lord of the *rākṣasa*s! The performance is almost over. So please, Sire, consider the actors' talent in clever acting and the way they intensify the aesthetic relish.' Rāvaṇa pulls himself together and feels like an idiot: 'Why, this is a play. I've become enraged for no reason.'[87] Needless to say, his aesthetic pleasure is completely ruined, and the only thing he feels is fury.[88]

The third act of the *Bālarāmāyaṇa* is an excellent study of the complete failure of a dramatic performance.[89] Rāvaṇa's is a typical example of a gross error in theatrical framing. 'The theatrical frame', writes Elam, 'is in effect the product of a set of transactional [actor-spectator] conventions governing the participants' expectations and their understanding of the kinds of reality involved in the performance. The theatregoer will accept that, at least in dramatic representations, an alternative and fictional reality is to be presented by individuals designated as the performers, and that his own role with respect to that represented reality is to be that of a privileged "onlooker".'[90] But there are cases when the operation of the dramatic and theatrical conventions (*nāṭyadharmin*s) fails, the spectators mistake the performance for real-life activity, and they start collecting money for the liberation of a poor slave-girl they have seen in a soap-opera.[91] But apart from such gross mistakes as running up to the stage and trying to change the course of events, the collapse of boundaries between real and fictional worlds in the mind of the spectator results in the failure of any kind of aesthetic experience, since the adequate emotional answer for something we perceive as actual can only be actual itself, that is, it cannot be *rasa*, only a *sthāyibhāva*.

There was a view current among Sanskrit aestheticians that if the aim of the poet is to satisfy his king, he may present the deeds of the latter in a play.[92] Abhinavagupta, however, did not share this opinion, precisely because

[85] Ibid., verse 77+: *seyaṃ kavīnāṃ vacanakāmadhenuḥ, yad asadbhūtam api sūte*|

[86] Ibid., verse 84+: *āḥ, katham ayam alīkadurvidagdhaḥ kṣatriyabaṭukīṭo mamāpi laṅkeśvarasya purataḥ sītāyāḥ pāṇiṃ pāṇinā pīḍayati! tad eṣa na bhavati*|

[87] Ibid., verse 85+: Prahastaḥ: *rākṣasapate! paryavasitaprāyaḥ prekṣāvidhiḥ*| *tad bhāvayatu caturābhinayāṃ buddhiṃ rasavṛddhiṃ ca nartakānāṃ devaḥ*| Rāvaṇa (*sasmaraṇalajjam ātmagatam*): *kathaṃ prekṣaṇakam etat*| *mudhā saṃrabdham asmābhiḥ*|

[88] Ibid., verse 90: *yātaḥ padaṃ mama ruṣāṃ ca mṛṣaiva rāmaḥ*|

[89] Other examples from Sanskrit literature are the third act of Harṣa's *Priyadarśikā*, and the seventh act of Bhavabhūti's *Uttararāmacarita*. See also Bansat-Boudon p. 148ff.

[90] Elam, p. 88.

[91] As it actually happened in Hungary. 'Gross errors in framing,' observes Elam (pp. 89f.), '[...] are less common in the theatre than with popular mass-media drama [...], since the conventionalized markers are much clearer. The legend of the cowboy spectator who shoots the stage villain is fairly apocryphal (although Goffman [...] reports an actual case of a drunken Virginian spectator shooting a "devil" represented by a mere puppet).'

[92] This view is also represented in the *Nāṭakalakṣaṇaratnakośa* (p. 3): *vartamānam api nṛpater mahābhūtasya kavibuddhiprakarṣād āsāditabījabindvādikaṃ yadi bhavati, bhavaty eva nāṭakaviṣayam*|. But cf. *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*, p. 25: *vartamāne ca netari tatkālaprasiddhibādhayā*

he reckoned the spectators should maintain a certain emotional distance from the performance:[93]

> *'prabhuparitoṣāya prabhucaritaṃ kadācin nāṭye varṇanīyam' iti 'yathā daityāḥ surair jitā'* (*Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.57) *ity etasmāl labhyata iti kecid āhuḥ| tad asat, daśarūpakalakṣaṇayuktivirodhāt| tatra hi kiñcit prasiddhacaritaṃ kiñcid utpādyacaritam iti vakṣyate| na ca vartamānacaritānukāro yuktaḥ, vineyānāṃ tatra rāgadveṣamadhyasthatādinā tanmayībhāvābhāve prīter abhāvena vyutpatter apy abhāvāt|*
>
> Some people assert that the view, according to which sometimes the deeds of a ruler may be presented in a play in order to satisfy the ruler, follows from the verse '[at the end of the *nāndī*, a representation was made of] how the gods defeated the demons'. That [assertion] is not correct, because it contradicts the definition of the ten dramatic genres. For, as it will be shown [in the following], in [these dramatic genres] sometimes the deeds of a well-known [hero], and sometimes the deeds of an invented [hero] [are presented]. But the imitation [in a dramatic representation] of the deeds of a contemporary person is not appropriate, since in this case the disciples [i.e. the spectators] could not identify themselves [with the presentation] because of their [various emotions] such as lust, hatred, or indifference; thus they would not feel pleasure, and therefore no instruction could take place either.

If an individual of the real world appears as a character in the dramatic world, their 'trans-world identity' can be the source of problems. Rolf Hochhuth's play *Soldiers* 'was banned in England because the central figure, "Churchill", was seen at once to refer to and to defame (through inventive elaboration) the W_o [real world] original. Arguments in favour of the autonomy of the dramatic world in this case were not persuasive.'[94] The main criterion in determining the 'trans-world identity' of a character in a play and a historical figure is, as Elam pointed out, 'to consider the culturally determined *essential properties* of the figure in question and to judge whether they are preserved in the world of drama'.[95] This question appears in the context of *prasiddhatva* in Sanskrit dramatic theory. Classical Indian plays can be divided into two broad categories on the basis of their plot. On the one hand there are those plays the story of which is the invention of the poet (*utpādyavastu*). Among the classical genres of Indian drama, *prakaraṇa*s are the typical representatives of this group.[96] On the other hand the story of several plays can be traced back

rasahāniḥ syāt|

[93] *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.58 (*tato brahmādayo devāḥ prayogaparitoṣitāḥ*) (GOS, vol. I, p. 27). Cf. Gnoli 1968, p. 64, note 1; Bansat-Boudon, p. 128, note 212.

[94] Elam, p.106.

[95] Elam, ibid.

[96] *Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.45 (GOS, vol. II, p. 430): *yatra kavir ātmaśaktyā vastu śarīraṃ ca nāyakaṃ caiva| autpattikaṃ prakurute prakaraṇam iti tad buddhair jñeyam||*

to some well-known (*prakhyāta*) source, such as the *purāṇa*s or the epics. The *nāṭaka* belongs to this category. As Bharata teaches in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*:[97]

> *prakhyātavastuviṣayaṃ prakhyātodāttanāyakaṃ caiva|*
> *rājarṣivaṃśyacaritaṃ tathaiva divyāśrayopetam||*
>
> [That play is called a *nāṭaka*] the subject of which is a well-known plot, which also has a well-known, illustrious hero, which presents the deeds of those who belong to the families of sage-like kings, and which is endowed with [the motif of] divine assistance as well.

The above interpretation of *prakhyātavastuviṣayaṃ* is roughly the same as that of Śaṅkuka.[98] Abhinavagupta (following his teacher, Bhaṭṭa Tauta) preferred a more precise definition of *prasiddhatva* (renown, celebrity), consisting of three factors: 'A certain person acted in a certain way in a certain place' (*amuka evaṃkārī amutra deśe*).[99] For example, everybody knows that the scene of king Udayana's adventures is mainly Kauśāmbī, and if a poet continuously presented him as residing in some other place, without mentioning that he has some reason to be there, such a description would not be plausible and therefore it would ruin the aesthetic relish of the play.[100]

This does not mean, however, that a poet cannot modify a traditional story in any way, or cannot expand it with freshly invented episodes. Since the dramatic world is always conceived as a 'hypothetical variation' of the actual reality, even when the two worlds are brought into contact, the characters in a play are only the possible varieties of their real counterparts, who serve as a model or a point of departure for the poet.[101] In fact, sometimes he has to make some modifications in order to preserve the aesthetic unity of the play. Ānandavardhana put great emphasis on the autonomy of the poet in fashioning his own world of poetry.[102] He lists several means which can assist a poetic work in the suggestion of *rasa*s and the like. One of these means is as follows:[103]

> *itivṛttavaśāyātāṃ kathañcid rasānanuguṇāṃ sthitiṃ tyaktvā punar utprekṣyāpy antarābhīṣṭarasocitakathonnayo vidheyaḥ|*
>
> Having left out a situation he met in the context of a narrative, which is in some way not in harmony with the *rasa* [of the poem or play], [the poet] should further introduce a story, even if he has invented it, which is appropriate to the *rasa* he has in mind.

[97] *Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.10 (GOS, vol. II, p. 412).

[98] *Abhinavabhāratī ad loc.* (GOS, vol. II, p. 411): *prakhyāte bhāratādau yad vastu tad viṣayo 'sya . . . iti śrīśaṅkukaḥ|* ' "Its subject is a story [which is found] in a well-known [source] such as the Mahābhārata", says Śrīśaṅkukaḥ.'

[99] *Abhinavabhāratī*, ibid.

[100] *Abhinavabhāratī*, ibid.: *cakravartino 'pi hi vatsarājasya kauśambīvyatirikte viṣaye kāryāntaropakṣepeṇa vinā yan nirantaraṃ nirvarṇanaṃ tad vairasyāya bhavati, tatra prasiddhikhaṇḍanena pratītivighātāt, kā kathā rasacarvaṇāyāḥ|*

[101] Cf. Elam, p. 109.

[102] Cf. *Dhvanyāloka* 3.42+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 250): *apāre kāvyasaṃsāre kavir ekaḥ prajāpatiḥ| yathāsmai rocate viśvaṃ tathedaṃ parivartate||*

[103] *Dhvanyāloka* 3.11+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, pp. 142f.)

But, as Abhinavagupta points out, some stories require too drastic modifications to become fit for dramatic representation. First of all, if a poet presents a deity as the main character of his *nāṭaka*, he has two options to choose from. He can invest his divine hero with human emotions, such as longing for the beloved, fear, or astonishment, but then his hero would become nothing more than a human being. On the other hand, if he stuck to the divinity of his hero, the attribution of mental anguishes to a god would contradict our knowledge about the nature of divine beings. The poet's other option would be to present his hero as a real god, free from all the painful and interesting human emotions, but then the play would lack any variety and therefore it would lose its attraction for the spectators' heart. And since the gods never suffer, how could we learn from their stories the means of obviating our painful experiences?[104]

Roughly the same train of thought can be applied to the presentation of contemporary figures in *nāṭaka*s. Although Ānandavardhana encourages the poets to get rid of any motif which could hinder the aesthetic experience and to insert freely invented stories, since after all their task is to write *kāvya* and not *itihāsa*,[105] still the more recent events are described in a story, the more difficult it becomes to alter any incident without running up against the incredulous indignation of the audience. And if we cling to the bare facts, what's the point in writing poetry? Says Abhinavagupta:[106]

> *ata eva pratītivighātasya vairasyadāyinaḥ sambhavo yatra, tan nāṭake nopanibaddhavyam| tena vartamānacaritaṃ cāvarṇanīyam eva, tatra viparītaprasiddhibādhayādhyāropasyākiñcitkaratvāt|*
>
> For this very reason, if with regard to [some story or other motif in a play] there is a possibility of contradicting common knowledge, which could cause the lack of aesthetic relish, that [sort of story, etc.] should not be written in a *nāṭaka*. Therefore the deeds of a contemporary character should definitely not be related, since in such a case the attribution [of invented qualities to the character] could not succeed because of the opposition of the contradictory common knowledge.

Certainly it would not be fair to accuse Jayanta of crude naturalism. His play is rather a curious mélange of the real and the fictional. One could call it a *Dokumentarspiel*[107] inasmuch as its plot is based on the events of the

[104] *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.10 (GOS, vol. II, p. 412): *yadi tu mukhyatvenaiva devacaritaṃ varṇyate, tat tāvad vipralambhakaruṇādbhutabhayānakarasocitaṃ cen nibadhyate, tan mānuṣacaritam eva sampadyate, pratyuta devānām *ādhyādhānaṃ* (conj. : *adhiyādhānaṃ* ed.) *prasiddhivighātakam| tatra cokto doṣaḥ| vipralambhādyabhāve tu kā tatra vicitratā, rañjanāyā etat*prāṇatvāt|* (conj. Raghavan : °*pramāṇatvāt* ed.) *ata eva hṛdayasaṃvādo 'pi devacarite durlabhaḥ| na ca teṣāṃ duḥkham asti, yatpratīkāropāye vyutpādanaṃ syāt|*

[105] *Dhvanyāloka* 3.11+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy p. 144): *kavinā kāvyam upanibadhnatā sarvātmanā rasaparatantreṇa bhavitavyam| tatretivṛtte yadi rasānanuguṇāṃ sthitiṃ paśyet tāṃ bhaṅktvāpi svatantratayā rasānuguṇaṃ kathāntaram utpādayet| na hi kaver itivṛttamātranirvahaṇena kiñcit prayojanam, itihāsād eva tatsiddheḥ|*

[106] *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.10 (GOS, vol. II, p. 413).

[107] Wezler 1976, p. 340.

playwright's recent past: Śaṅkaravarman and Sugandhā were a real royal couple ruling in the last decades of the ninth century, most probably the king did ban the sect of the *nīlāmbara*s, and the concept of *sarvāgamaprāmāṇya* seems to have been an important issue of that period. But we can be sure that for instance the two Śaiva *sādhaka*s in the cremation-ground, or the servant who dupes the Jaina monk, were invented by Jayanta on the basis of his experiences, or rather his prejudices. The same is true about the Buddhist monk, whose name Dharmottara echoes that of the famous Buddhist philosopher, or the hero of the play, the Mīmāṃsaka Saṅkarṣaṇa, who might represent a portion of Jayanta's own character.

The elusiveness of the *Āgamaḍambara* could be very disturbing for an expert in *nāṭyaśāstra*. Should one classify it as a *nāṭaka*, with the king as its real hero? This solution is not very plausible, since the king, apart from being *vartamāna*, does not even appear on the stage, even if his interests stand clearly behind the course of events. Is it then a *prakaraṇa*? Not quite, since its story is not entirely invented, and even if Bharata allows the poet to derive the plot and the characters of his *prakaraṇa* from a text which was 'not handed down by the ancient sages' (*anārṣa*), provided that he endows the events and characters with new qualities,[108] this only means, in Abhinavagupta's interpretation, that the playwright may borrow the plot from such collections as the *Bṛhatkathā* (e.g. the story of Mūladeva), or from the works of some earlier poet (e.g. the deeds of Samudradatta). He certainly cannot pick up a story from just anywhere he pleases (*tatra yo 'nutpādyo 'ṃśo na kutrastho grāhyaḥ*), and I doubt that Abhinavagupta would have rejoiced in a *prakaraṇa* which had a contemporary setting.[109]

On the other hand, a *prakaraṇa* is taught to be a play which presents the stories of Brahmins, merchants, ministers, priests, officials, and travelling tradesmen, and such stories should be 'of various kinds' (*naikavidham*), which in Abhinavagupta's interpretation means, 'connected with various *rasas*' (*anekarasayutam*).[110] And Jayanta does introduce such characters: the hero of the play is a 'twice-born', who becomes later the subordinate of *amātya* Jayanta; we witness the complaints of two Vedic priests in the prelude before the last act, and even a rich merchant, who sponsors a huge feast for the ascetics, gets an important role in the second act (although he does not actually enter the stage). But are there servants, rakes, and courtesans appearing in the play?[111] Well, one could possibly say yes. The *ceṭa* in the prelude of the second act

[108] *Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.46 (GOS, vol. II, p. 430): *yad anārṣam athāhāryaṃ kāvyaṃ prakaroty abhūtaguṇayuktam| utpannabījavastu prakaraṇam iti tad api vijñeyam||*

[109] *Abhinavabhāratī ad loc.* (GOS, vol. II, pp. 429f): *yatra samutpādyaṃ na bhavati tatra yo 'nutpādyo 'ṃśaḥ na kutrastho grāhya iti darśayitum āha 'yad anārṣam' ityādi| 'anārṣam' iti purāṇādivyatiriktabṛhatkathādyupanibaddhaṃ mūladevacaritādi| 'āhāryam' iti pūrvakavikāvyād vāharaṇīyaṃ samudradattaceṣṭitādi|* Cf. Srinivasan, p. 73, which contains Schmithausen's emendations proposed for the rest of the passage.

[110] Cf. *Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.48 (GOS, vol. II, p. 431): *vipravaṇiksacivānāṃ purohitānām amātyasārthavāhānām| caritaṃ yan naikavidhaṃ jñeyaṃ tat prakaraṇaṃ nāma||*, and Abhinavagupta's comm. *ad loc.*

[111] *Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.50 (GOS, ibid.): *dāsaviṭaśreṣṭhiyutaṃ veśastryupacārakāraṇopetam|*

does not require further comment. The decadent life of the Buddhist monks is pretty close to a *viṭa*'s, and both the maidservants and the Jain nun (and the *ceṭa* disguised as a Jain nun) are all for amorous entertainment. But can, for instance, the lengthy lecture of the Naiyāyika professor at the end of the play be fitted into a *prakaraṇa*, or indeed into any kind of play?

The Director simply calls the *Āgamaḍambara* 'an extraordinary / strange play' (*kimapi rūpakam*), without any further specification, and I think we should reconcile ourself to the fact that this play is truly *aśāstrīyam*. Still, no Sanskrit drama can oppose the classical tradition to such an extent as not to have a predominant aesthetic flavour, and the nature of this *rasa* is well worth examining.

3.6

Already Raghavan observed that the *Āgamaḍambara* can be fitted in the tradition of 'philosophical plays' in classical Indian literature, other examples of which include the *Śārīputraprakaraṇa* of Aśvaghoṣa, and the *Prabodhacandrodaya* of Kṛṣṇamiśra.[112] He also pointed out that the dominant *rasa* of these plays is *śānta*, the aesthetic relish of quietude.[113] *Śānta* is a relatively new arrival in the system of *rasas*, and its very existence was the subject of serious debate among Indian aestheticians.[114] Nevertheless if we examine two early definitions of *śāntarasa*, the interpolated passage in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*[115] and the verses of Rudraṭa,[116] we find that several of its characteristics are found in Jayanta's play. True knowledge is essential to attain final liberation from the world of eternal rebirth: the Mīmāṃsaka hero of the play is convinced that he possesses this knowledge, and he is ready to defend it against deluded heretics who are completely mistaken about the real nature of things. The quest for liberation

[112] *Āgamaḍambara (ed. pr.)*, p. viii.

[113] Raghavan 1975, p. 40.

[114] Cf. Masson-Patwardhan 1969, *passim*. The verses dealing with *śāntarasa* are clearly interpolations in the text of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, and already Abhinavagupta mentioned that they could not be found in all manuscripts (Abhinavahupta's comm. on these verses (*Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 333:) *cirantanapustakeṣu 'sthāyibhāvān rasatvam upaneṣyāma' ity anantaraṃ 'śānto nāma śamathāyibhāvātmaka' ityādi śāntalakṣaṇaṃ paṭhyate*|). Cf. Srinivasan, pp. 51ff.

[115] *Nāṭyaśāstra* after 6.82 (GOS, vol. I, pp. 326ff): *atha śānto nāma śamasthāyibhāvātmako mokṣapravartakaḥ*| *sa tu tattvajñānavairāgyāśayaśuddhyādibhir vibhāvaiḥ samutpadyate*| *tasya yamaniyamādhyātmadhyānadhāraṇopāsanasarvabhūtadayāliṅgagrahaṇādibhir anubhāvair abhinayaḥ prayoktavyaḥ*| *vyabhicāriṇaś cāsya nirvedasmṛtidhṛtisarvāśramaśaucastambharomāñcādayaḥ*| *atrāryāḥ ślokāś ca bhavanti—mokṣādhyātma*samutthas* (v.l. °*nimittas*) *tattvajñānārthahetusaṃyuktaḥ*| **naiḥśreyasopadiṣṭaḥ* (v.l. *niḥśreyasasaṃyuktaḥ*) *śāntaraso nāma *sambhavati* (v.l. *vijñeyaḥ*)|| *buddhīndriyakarmendriya*saṃrodhādhyātmasaṃsthitopetaḥ* (v.l. °*nirodhato 'dhyātmasaṃjñitaś caiva*|) *sarvaprāṇi*sukhahitaḥ* (v.l. °*hitaḥ khalu*) *śāntaraso nāma vijñeyaḥ*|| *na yatra duḥkhaṃ na sukhaṃ na dveṣo nāpi matsaraḥ*| *samaḥ sarveṣu bhūteṣu sa śāntaḥ prathito rasaḥ*||

[116] *Kāvyālaṅkāra* 15.15–16 (quoted in Raghavan 1975, p. 48): *samyagjñānaprakṛtiḥ śānto vigatecchanāyako bhavati*| *samyagjñānaṃ viṣaye tamaso rāgasya cāpagamāt*|| *janmajarāmaraṇāditrāso vairāgyavāsanā viṣaye*| *sukhaduḥkhayor anicchādveṣāv iti tatra jāyante*|| Rudraṭa flourished between 825 and 850 according to Kane 1971, p. 155), and was probably Kashmirian.

is incompatible with plunging into mundane pleasures, so no wonder that our hero is deeply shocked and disgusted when he witnesses the depraved practices of the Buddhists and the *nīlāmbara*s, but praises the asceticism of the Jains and the *śaiva*s. He also betrays great compassion when he lets the Jain teacher beat a retreat. The sole obstacle for him in realising complete dispassion is his ambitious nature, but his initial zeal will much abate towards the end of the play.

But already the *nāndī* and the *prastāvanā* indicate clearly the *rasa* of the play. The opening benediction invokes Brahman 'by which beginningless ignorance is gradually destroyed', and 'at the very start of whose "descent" to the level of consciousness desires for the enjoyment of other pleasing objects cease (*śāmyanti*)'. Then in comes the Director whose disillusion with his profession and life in general does not seem to be completely out of place if we consider that *nirveda* was held by many to be the permanent mental state behind *śāntarasa*.[117] Abhinavagupta attributed this view to Ānandavardhana,[118] who actually preferred to use the expression 'bliss of the destruction of desires', *tṛṣṇākṣayasukha*.[119]

As we have already seen, Ānandavardhana believed that Vyāsa had a double objective in view with the *Mahābhārata*: on the level of *śāstra* he wanted to direct our attention towards *mokṣa*, and on the level of poetry he intended to compose an epic with quietude as its predominant *rasa*, and he achieved his goal by evoking dispassion in the reader. This becomes clear from the rather pessimistic conclusion of the *Mahābhārata*, 'which produces sadness by the cruel end of the Vṛṣṇis and the Pāṇḍavas'.[120] The great Bhīṣma's admonishing words are part of this concept:[121]

> *yathā yathā viparyeti lokatantram asāravat|*
> *tathā tathā virāgo 'tra jāyate nātra saṃśayaḥ||*
>
> As the unsubstantial course of worldly things goes gradually amiss, so does disaffection arise with it by degrees, there is no doubt about this.

But the predominance of *mokṣa* and *śāntarasa* has already been suggested in the Contents (*anukramaṇī*) of the epic, namely in the following sentence: 'And the eternal Blessed Vāsudeva is glorified here' (*bhagavān vāsudevaś ca kīrtyate 'tra sanātanaḥ*, *Mahābhārata* 1.1.193). Says Ānandavardhana:[122]

> *anena hy ayam artho vyaṅgyatvena vivakṣito, yad atra mahābhārate pāṇḍavādicaritaṃ yat kīrtyate, tat sarvam avasānavirasam avidyāprapañcarūpaṃ ca| paramārthasatyasvarūpas tu bhagavān vāsudevo*

[117] Cf. *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 327: *tattvajñānotthito nirveda [śāntasya sthāyī] iti kecit|*

[118] *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 3.26, 4.5.

[119] *Dhvanyāloka* 3.26+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 182): *śāntaś ca tṛṣṇākṣayasukhasya yaḥ paripoṣas tallakṣaṇo rasaḥ pratīyata eva|*

[120] *Dhvanyāloka* 4.5+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 274): *vṛṣṇipāṇḍavavirasāvasānavaimanasyadāyinīṃ...*

[121] *Dhvanyāloka* ibid., cf. *Mahābhārata* 12.168.4.

[122] *Dhvanyāloka* 4.5+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 276).

> *'tra kīrtyate| tasmāt tasminn eva parameśvare bhagavati bhavata bhāvitacetaso, mā bhūta vibhūtiṣu niḥsārāsu rāgiṇo, guṇeṣu vā nayavinayaparākramādiṣv amīṣu kevaleṣu keṣucit sarvātmanā pratiniviṣṭadhiyaḥ| tathā cāgre paśyata niḥsāratāṃ saṃsārasyeti| amum evārthātiśayaṃ dyotayan sphuṭam evāvabhāsate vyañjakaśaktyanugṛhītaś caśabdaḥ| evaṃvidham evārthaṃ garbhīkṛtaṃ sandarśayanto 'nantaraślokā lakṣyante 'sa hi satyam' ityādayaḥ|*
>
> For by this [sentence] the following meaning is intended as the suggested one: 'Here, in the *Mahābhārata*, the deeds of the Pāṇḍavas and others, which are sung, are all tragic in their conclusion and are essentially the manifold manifestation of ignorance. But [in fact] the Blessed Vāsudeva, whose true nature is the ultimate reality, is glorified here. Therefore concentrate your thoughts only on that blessed Greatest God, do not hanker after unsubstantial riches, and do not focus wholeheartedly just on these few good qualities such as righteous conduct, discipline, valour, and the like. And thus behold in what follows the insubstantiality of the world.' The word "and", which is endowed with the power of suggestion, shines forth clearly, illuminating the same superior sense. The immediately following verses, beginning with 'for he is reality', are seen to reveal the same meaning, which is hidden within them.

It is the same revelation about the shadowy nature of our reality which is the wellspring of the Director's highly unprofessional behaviour. He realised that 'being an actor is indeed an extremely wretched means of supporting one's family, in which one is continuously practicing a display of utterly false behaviour', and he is not consoled by the fact that 'all this multitude of creatures, from Brahmā down to the animals, roams about in worldly existence through Illusion alone'. His disillusion (*nirveda*), which has reached its apex when he was asked to stage an utterly worthless play, turns him towards the highest goal of man, and provides the play the keynote of *śāntarasa*.

Nevertheless there was a significant opposition against the acceptance of *śānta* as the ninth *rasa*, and even those who acquiesced in its existence had serious doubts about the possibilities of its presentation on the stage. The *Daśarūpaka* refers to 'some people' who list *śānta* among the other *rasa*s, but Dhanañjaya hastens to add that 'it cannot thrive in plays'.[123] Dhanika in his commentary mentions the radical view of those who deny *in toto* the possibility of a quietistic *rasa*, 'since it is impossible to destroy desire and hatred which reached [our present age] in a beginningless continuity of time'. Others include it in the heroic, or the repulsive, or other *rasas*.[124] 'However that may be', says Dhanika, 'we do not accept at all that quietude (*śama*) could be the permanent sentiment in *nāṭaka*s and other [kinds of drama] the soul of which is performance,

[123] *Daśarūpaka* 4.35: *śamam api kecit prāhuḥ puṣṭir nāṭyeṣu naitasya||*

[124] *Avaloka ad loc.*, p. 202: *anye tu vastutas tasyābhāvaṃ varṇayanti, anādikālapravāhāyātarāgadveṣayor ucchettum aśakyatvāt| anye tu vīrabībhatsādāv antarbhāvaṃ varṇayanti|*

since it is not suitable for performance because it consists of the cessation of all activities.'[125] Therefore the permanent sentiment of the *Nāgānanda* cannot be *śama*, especially because the hero is in love and becomes the king of the *vidhyādhara*s, neither of which facts goes well with quietude. The permanent sentiment of this play is fortitude (*utsāha*), and its *rasa* is the compassionate kind of heroism (*dayāvīra*).[126]

This kind of criticism was already familiar to Ānandavardhana, who spoke up for the presence of *śānta* even in the dramatic genre. According to him, even if its permanent sentiment, that is the pleasure of the cessation of all desires (*tṛṣṇākṣayasukha*) 'might not be part of everyone's experience, still it cannot be rejected as the special mental operation of exalted persons who are not like the other people'.[127] It is not right to include *śānta* in *vīra*, since heroism necessarily contains some egoism, which runs counter with quietude.[128] Abhinavagupta adds that its equation with repulsion is equally misleading, since *jugupsā* is only the transitory ancillary sentiment of *śānta*. He also observes that even if the culmination of *śānta* cannot be presented because of the absence of indicatory symptoms (*anubhāva*s), its earlier phases can, through such signs as self-control, religious observances, and even bearing the yoke of a kingdom.[129]

But even Ānandavardhana's eloquent justification was not enough to dispel all doubts about the aesthetic relish of quietude. The author of the *Candrikā* commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* remarked that '*śāntarasa* should not be employed as the leading [relish of a poetic work].'[130] Even Abhinavagupta admitted the following:[131]

> *śāntabībhatsarasau tu caramapumarthayogāt, tatra ca sarvasya nādhi*kāre 'pi* (conj. : °*kāro 'pi* ed.) *kasyacid apaścimajanmano 'dhikārāt nāṭake yady api tatphalapradhānatayā prādhānyam avalambeyātāṃ, tathāpi nāsau pracuraprayoga iti tayoḥ puruṣārthapravaraprāṇitayor api vīrādirasāntarādhyāvāpenāvasthāpanam*|
>
> But although the *rasa*s of quietude and repulsion, because they are appropriate to the ultimate goal of man [i.e. liberation], and since some extraordinary people of excellent birth *are* qualified [for *mokṣa*], even if not everyone is qualified for it, could become predominant in a *nāṭaka* inasmuch as that [i.e. liberation] is the principally

[125] *Avaloka*, ibid.: *yathā tathāstu, sarvathā nāṭakādāv abhinayātmani sthāyitvam asmābhiḥ śamasya neṣyate, tasya samastavyāpārapravilayarūpasyābhinayāyogāt*|

[126] *Avaloka*, ibid., p. 203: *yat tu kaiścin nāgānandādau śamasya sthāyitvam upavarṇitam, tan malayavatyanurāgeṇāprabandhapravṛttena, ante vidyādharacakravartitvaprāpteś ca viruddham*| *(...) ato dayāvīrotsāhasya tatra sthāyitvam...*

[127] *Dhvanyāloka* 3.26+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 182): *yadi nāma sarvajanānubhavagocaratā tasya nāsti, naitāvatāsāv alokasāmānyamahānubhāvacittavṛttiviśeṣaḥ pratikṣeptuṃ śakyaḥ*|

[128] *Dhvanyāloka*, ibid.: *na ca vīre tasyāntarbhāvaḥ kartuṃ yuktaḥ, tasyābhimānamayatvena vyavasthāpanāt, asya cāhaṅkāraprasamaikarūpatayā sthiteḥ*|

[129] *Locana ad loc.*

[130] *Locana*, ibid. (Kashi ed., p. 394): *ādhikārikatvena tu śānto raso na nibaddhavya iti candrikākāraḥ*|

[131] *Abhinavabhāratī ad Nāṭyaśāstra* 18.110 (GOS, vol. II, p. 451); cf. J.C. Wright, 'Vṛtti in the *Daśarūpakavidhānādhyāya* of the *Abhinavabhāratī*' in: BSOAS 26 (1963), pp. 92ff.

> intended result, still this is not an extensive practice. Therefore even if these two [i.e. quietude and repulsion] are animated by the best of the human goals, still they are employed with other *rasa*s such as heroism mixed into them.

Before expounding his own ideas, Abhinavagupta refers to several theories about the *sthāyibhāva* of *śāntarasa*. Among those who held the opinion that it was *nirveda*, some made reference to the *Nyāyasūtra*.[132] Others, however, adopted the belief that any of the eight permanent mental states can be the *sthāyī* of *śānta*:[133]

> *anye manyante| ratyādaya evāṣṭau cittavṛttiviśeṣā uktāḥ| tata eva kathitavibhāvaviviktaśrutādyalaukikavibhāvaviśeṣasaṃśrayāḥ vicitrā eva tāvat| tataś ca tanmadhyād evānyatamo 'tra sthāyī| tatra anāhatānandamayasvātmaviṣayā ratir eva mokṣasādhanam iti, saiva śānte sthāyinīti| yathoktaṃ, 'yaś cātmaratir eva syād ātmatṛptaś ca mānavaḥ| ātmany eva ca santuṣṭaḥ tasya kāryaṃ na vidyate||' iti| evaṃ samastaviṣayaṃ vaikṛtaṃ paśyataḥ, viśvaṃ ca śocyaṃ vilokayataḥ, sāṃsārikaṃ ca vṛttāntam apakāritvena paśyataḥ, sātiśayam asammohapradhānaṃ vīryam āśritavataḥ, sarvasmāt viṣayasārthād bibhyataḥ, sarvalokaspṛhaṇīyād api pramadāder jugupsamānasya, apūrvasvātmātiśayalābhād vismayamānasya mokṣasiddhir iti, ratihāsādīnāṃ vismayāntānām anyatamasya sthāyitvaṃ nirūpaṇīyam|*
>
> 'Others embrace the following view: "It is delight etc. which are taught as the eight particular kinds of mental operations. It is they that first of all become very diverse when they are connected with special, supra-mundane eliciting factors (*vibhāva*s) such as the study of Scripture, which are different from the [already] mentioned eliciting factors. And therefore any one among just these [eight *vibhāva*s] [can be] its [i.e. *śāntarasa*'s] permanent [mental basis] *sthāyī*. Of these, delight which has as its object one's own self which is full of unimpaired bliss, is a means of attaining liberation, so it is indeed a permanent mental state of *śānta*. As it is taught, 'That man has nothing left to accomplish whose delight is in his Self alone, who is contented in his Self, and who finds complete satisfaction in his Self.' (*Bhagavadgītā* 3.17) Likewise, that person succeeds in attaining liberation who notices that everything is grotesque, who considers the whole world lamentable, who notices that worldly affairs are harmful, who resorts to great heroism which is based on true insight, who is afraid of all the multitude of sense-objects, who is disgusted by women and the like, even if the whole world lusts after them, and who is astonished when he obtains the unprecedented excellence of

[132] *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 329: *nanu mithyājñānamūlo viṣayagandhas tattvajñānāt praśāmyatīti duḥkhajanmasūtreṇākṣapādapādair vadadbhir mithyājñānāpacayakāraṇaṃ tattvajñānaṃ vairāgyasya doṣāpāyalakṣaṇasya kāraṇam uktam| nanu tataḥ kim? nanu vairāgyaṃ nirvedaḥ|*

[133] *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), ibid. (I am following the reading of Raghavan 1975, p. 109.)

> his self. Therefore any one of [the eight permanent mental states] beginning with delight, laughter, etc. and ending with wonder, can be seen as the permanent [basis of *śānta*].'

This could also explain why the *Āgamaḍambara*, an allegedly *śāntarasa* play, resembles a kaleidoscope of various sentiments. The Mīmāṃsaka hero is fully self-confident in his knowledge, which entitles him to enlighten and humiliate those who stray in darkness. He truly admires himself, but he is also capable of appreciating other people's values, such as asceticism. The *baṭu* calls him 'supremely compassionate' when he refrains from beating up the Jains with a stick. He mocks the hypocrite behaviour of the Buddhists, is utterly disgusted and shocked by the eccentric ritual of the *nīlāmbara* couples, and is even unwilling to enter into a debate with them because of the dangers of their impurity. So is Saṅkarṣaṇa a true *śāntarasa* hero? I cannot help hearing a tone of gentle irony in the way Jayanta presents the Mīmāṃsaka. Saṅkarṣaṇa is too much of an idealist, who believes that it is his sacred duty to turn back to the right track all who deviated from it, even in the service of worldly authorities that (mis)use his zeal for their own purposes. He is too self-conceited, therefore he has to fail and realise that his knowledge was not yet adequate.

If we glance over the *Dhvanyāloka*-passages about the role of *śāntarasa* in the *Mahābhārata*, it appears that although Ānandavardhana did distinguish the doctrinal and the poetic aspects of the epic, he also held that the emotions awakened by the narrative can assist the reader in attaining liberation:[134]

> *pāṇḍavādicaritavarṇanasyāpi vairāgyajananatātparyād vairāgyasya ca mokṣamūlatvān mokṣasya ca bhagavatprāptyupāyatvena mukhyatayā gītādiṣu pradarśitatvāt parabrahmaprāptyupāyatvam eva paramparayā|*
>
> Even the description of the deeds of the Pāṇḍavas and other [heroes], since its aim is to produce disillusion, since disillusion is the basis of liberation, and since liberation had been shown in the *Gītā* and other [sacred texts] to be the most important means of attaining the Lord, [therefore even this description] *is* indirectly a means of attaining the highest Brahman.

But the first theoretician who explicitly stated that there is an intimate relation between Brahman-experience and aesthetic relish in general appears to have been Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, whose ideas are condensed by Abhinavagupta as follows:[135]

> *bhāvite ca rase tasya bhogo yo 'nubhavasmaraṇapratipattibhyo vilakṣaṇa eva drutivistaravikāsātmā rajastamovaicitryānuviddhasattvamayanijacitsvabhāvanirvṛtiviśrāntilakṣaṇaḥ parabrahmāsvādasavidhaḥ|*
>
> 'And after the *rasa* has been produced [through the operation of the words called "*bhāvakatva*, bringing into being"], its enjoyment [becomes possible], which very much differs from [ordinary] cognitions

[134] *Dhvanyāloka* 4.5+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 278).
[135] *Locana ad Dhvanyāloka* 2.4 (ed. *Kāvyamālā*, p. 83, ed. Kashi, p. 183).

> [whether] direct experience or memory, whose nature is melting, intensity, and expansion,[136] which is characterised by the repose in the beatitude of the true form of one's consciousness which is full of purity (*sattva*) blended with the variety of energy (*rajas*) and darkness (*tamas*), and which is similar to the experience of the highest Brahman.

Mammaṭa also summarises the theory of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka:[137]

> *kāvye nāṭye cābhidhāto dvitīyena vibhāvādisādhāraṇīkaraṇātmanā bhāvakatvavyāpāreṇa bhāvyamānaḥ sthāyī sattvodrekaprakāśānandamayasaṃvidviśrāntisatattvena bhogena bhujyate—iti bhaṭṭanāyakaḥ|*
>
> 'In poems and in plays the permanent sentiment is transformed [into *rasa*] by the operation of "bringing into being" which is essentially the generalisation of the eliciting factors and [the indicatory symptoms and the temporary mental states] and which is different from [the word's operation called] denotation, [and then *rasa*] is enjoyed with enjoyment which is the same in its essence as the repose in [one's] consciousness which is full of bliss and radiance due to the abundance of purity (*sattva*)'—this is what Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka says.

If we review the opening benediction of the *Āgamaḍambara*, it might appear less puzzling now in the light of Ānandavardhana's and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's ideas. The invocation of the Brahman at the beginning of a *śāntarasa*-play seems natural. The Brahman's 'descent' to the path of consciousness might signify the prelude to the highest kind of mystical experience which must entail the arising of disillusion (*virāga, nirveda*) and the gradual awakening to the knowledge of reality. That this experience also involves bliss might sound perhaps unusual from the mouth of a Naiyāyika,[138] but we might say that someone who proceeds on the path leading to final liberation will rejoice as this radiant reality dawns upon him. And one station along this path may well be a play with quietude as its predominant *rasa* which distracts the spectator from the everyday world and directs his attention towards higher truths.

The fictitious world of drama offers an excellent analogy with the illusory nature of the world we live in. The world we call 'actual' 'is nevertheless a possible world in itself—that is, a construct deriving from the conceptual and textual constraints on the spectator's understanding.'[139] The poet has an almost divine autonomy in fashioning his poetic world. 'In the boundless world

[136] Ingalls (-Masson-Patwardhan) translate *vistara* as 'expansion', and *vikāsa* as 'radiance' (*Dhvanyāloka*(HOS), p. 222), Gnoli (1968, p. 108) as 'enlargement' and 'expansion', respectively. *vikāsa* might also have the sense of 'cheerfulness'. Raghavan notes (Raghavan 1978, p. 426, note 1) that in the *Daśarūpaka* the mental state of *vikāsa* corresponds to the erotic and the comic *rasas*, while *vistara* to the heroic and the marvellous.

[137] *Kāvyaprakāśa*, vol. I, pp. 217ff.

[138] Jayanta (together with the mainstream *naiyāyikas*) held that the liberated state of the soul is not a blissful state, since it is equally without suffering *and* pleasure (cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, pp. 436ff). Bhāsarvajña represents another view among the *naiyāyikas*, namely that the liberated soul *does* experience beatitude (cf. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, pp. 594ff).

[139] Elam, p. 108.

of poetry', says Ānandavardhana, 'the poet is the only Creator. This whole universe revolves as he pleases. If the poet is amorous, a world full of flavour arises in the poem. If the same [poet] is disenchanted, all that world is without flavour. In a poem a good poet freely makes insentient things behave as sentient and sentient beings as insentient, as he pleases.'[140] A comparable idea is expressed in the words of semiotic analysis as follows: 'It should not be thought that the "accessibility" of dramatic worlds renders them always and necessarily realistically mimetic. On the contrary, it is precisely the constant assumption that W_D [the dramatic world] is defined in relation to W_O [the actual world] as a hypothetical variation which allows any number of invented and even fantastic elements to be introduced into the drama without destroying the audience's ability to recognize what is going on.'[141]

The actor also participates in the creation of the dramatic universe: he infuses life into the characters invented by the playwright or, put differently, he dissembles his real identity. As the Director says in the *Āgamaḍambara*:[142] 'Shame, for shame, being an actor is indeed an extremely wretched means of supporting one's family, in which one is continuously practicing a display of utterly false behaviour. Hara, Viṣṇu, Brahmā, a sage, a king, a brutish fool, a rake, a coward, a hero, a happy man, a sad one: taking all roles the actor plays, feeling no shame before the people—in reality he is [just] resorting to craft to fill his belly.' But his Assistant reminds him that he is no exception: 'Who among gods, humans or animals has ever escaped from deceit and then reached the supreme goal? All this multitude of creatures, from Brahmā down to the animals, roams about in worldly existence through Illusion alone. Is your lot any worse?' Creative illusion rules the whole world.

Theatre and acting are excellent allegories of the world that surrounds us and the activity of the Creator who puts on the masks of worldly phenomena. In fact, Bharata says in the very first verse of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*: 'I shall teach the science of dramaturgy which was related by Brahmā as an illustration (*udāhṛtam*).'[143] Now it is certainly possible to take the word *udāhṛtam* simply to mean 'announced', but Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka understood this sentence as an allusion to the allegorical nature of drama. This is how Abhinavagupta presents Nāyaka's ideas:[144]

[140] *Dhvanyāloka* 3.42+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 250): *apāre kāvyasaṃsāre kavir ekaḥ prajāpatiḥ| yathāsmai rocate viśvaṃ tathedaṃ parivartate|| śṛṅgārī cet kaviḥ kāvye jātaṃ rasamayaṃ jagat| sa eva vītarāgaś cen nīrasaṃ sarvam eva tat|| bhāvān acetanān api cetanavac cetanān acetanavat| vyavahārayati yatheṣṭaṃ sukaviḥ kāvye svatantratayā||* Abhinavagupta hastens to add in his commentary *ad loc.* that an 'amorous' poet is not an actual womaniser (*strīvyasanī*), but someone who is filled with the aesthetic relish of the Erotic.

[141] Elam, p. 107.

[142] *Āgamaḍambara*, Prologue, ll. 6ff.

[143] *Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.1 (ed. GOS, vol. I, p. 1): *nāṭyaśāstraṃ pravakṣyāmi brahmaṇā yad udāhṛtam* (v.l. *udīritam*)|

[144] *Abhinavabhāratī ad loc.* (ed. GOS, vol. I, pp. 5f). It seems likely (as already T. R. Chintamani observed in 'Fragments of Bhaṭṭanāyaka', *Journal of Oriental Research*, Madras, vol. I, p. 268.) that Abhinavagupta does not actually quote Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, but just elaborates an interpretation of what was probably the introductory verse of the *Sahṛdayadarpaṇa*.

*bhaṭṭanāyakas tu 'brahmaṇā paramātmanā yad udāhṛtam, avidyāviracitanissārabhedagrahe yad udāharaṇīkṛtaṃ nāṭyaṃ tad vakṣyāmi| yathā hi kalpanāmātrasāraṃ tata eva anavasthitaikarūpaṃ, kṣaṇena kalpanāśatasahasrasahaṃ, svapnādivilakṣaṇam api suṣṭhutarāṃ hṛdayagrahanidānam, atyaktasvālambanabrahmakalpanaṭoparacitaṃ rāmarāvaṇādiceṣṭitam asatyaṃ kuto 'py adbhutavṛttyā bhāti, tathā bhāsamānam api *caramapumarthopāyatām* (conj. Isaacson : *ca pumarthopāyatām* ed.) *eti, tathā tādṛg eva viśvam idam asatyanāmarūpaprapañcātmakam atha ca śravaṇamananādivaśena paramapumarthaprāpakam, iti lokottaraparamapuruṣārthasūcanena śāntarasopakṣepo 'yaṃ bhaviṣyati, 'svaṃ svaṃ nimittam ādāya śāntād utpadyate rasaḥ' iti| tad anena pāramārthikaṃ prayojanam uktam|' iti vyākhyānaṃ sahṛdayadarpaṇe paryagrahīt| yad āha*
'namas trailokyanirmāṇakavaye śambhave, yataḥ|
pratikṣaṇaṃ jagannāṭyaprayogarasiko janaḥ||' iti|

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, however, embraced the following interpretation [of *Nāṭyaśāstra* 1.1] in his *Sahṛdayadarpaṇa*: 'Drama, that was presented as an example by Brahmā, the Supreme Self, that is to say that was made into an example of the grasping of insubstantial multifariousness created by ignorance—that is what I shall teach. For just as the fictitious story of Rāma, Rāvaṇa, and other [characters], which is essentially just fancy and therefore does not have a single, established form, [but] is accompanied by a vast number of fancies in every moment, which [story], though different from dreams, is the cause of rapture, [when it is] performed by the actors who have not abandoned their own identity and who are similar to Brahmā, appears in an extraordinarily wonderful way; [and] even while appearing as such, it becomes a means of [attaining] the highest goal of man, in the same way this whole world is exactly like that [drama], inasmuch as it consists of the diversity of names and forms, and it also leads us to the highest goal of man through reading the scriptures, reflection, and [meditation]. Thus, through referring to the highest goal of man which transcends this world, this [verse] may be an allusion to the aesthetic relish of quietude, on the basis of the verse "resorting to its respective cause [each] *rasa* arises from *śānta* ".[145] Therefore by this [verse] the ultimate object [of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*] has been declared.' [Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka embraced this interpretation] when / for he said, 'Obeisance to Śiva, the poet who composes the triad of the worlds, thanks to whom people relish the performance of the world-play at every instant'.

So illusion is not that harmful after all, at least if we know how to handle it. It

[145] One of the interpolated verses on *śānta*, *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6. (ed. GOS, vol. I, p. 329). The edition actually reads '*svaṃ svaṃ nimittam āsādya śāntād* ***bhāvaḥ*** *pravartate*', something which for Abhinavagupta, who was very particular about the precise differentiation of *rasa* and *bhāva*, would clearly not have suited.

would be a mistake to look upon the imaginary world of theatre as something real or actual, and when we watch the characters on the stage being engaged in wooing or lamenting, their identity as actors always lurks in the back of our awareness. And as the actor's emotions are not 'real' so our emotional responses are different from our everyday sentiments: we savour these sentiments in a pure form while the fictitious world of the play enraptures us. Moreover, precisely through this rapture we also learn a lot about the real, unobscured nature of our mental attitudes: our understanding is augmented.

One of the various terms used to describe aesthetic experience is *viśrānti*, reposeful awareness, that is the cognition of the fundamental emotions in their pure, universalised form, free from all obstacles.[146] This 'mental repose' entails a higher stage of concentration, and it is also a blissful state[147] akin to the beatitude of mystical experience. To regard *śānta* as the basis of all other *rasa*s seems to have been a logical step.[148] As Gerow observed,[149] 'Since all the dramatic *rasa*s aim at a state of mental repose (*viśrānti*), the reductionist "insight" that all the *rasas* are fundamentally *śānti* is neither very daring nor very unexpected, particularly in the spiritual-devotional climate in which Abhinavagupta lived. *Śānta* was a *rasa* whose time had come—which, if it did not exist, would have had to be invented.' In Abhinavagupta's view the relishing of *śāntarasa* is a more conscious kind of aesthetic experience, since in it any emotion can be savoured in its universalised *rasa*-form as a temporary hue on the surface of the uniquely permanent Self.[150] This kind of aesthetic rapture can teach us the most about the true nature of any experience. But even if we regard *śānta* as essentially the artistic representation of disenchantment born from the realisation of the illusory nature of existence, it can still be regarded as occupying the highest rank among all *rasas* since it directs our attention towards liberation, the supreme goal of man.

The characters and their transactions we see on the stage are merely the products of the poet's and the actors' creative skills; still we are both delighted and taught by the play. According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta, the same is true about the world outside the theatre. God likes to play. He disguises his real identity with a multitude of appearances, but we can cast a glance behind all these masks with the help of His scriptures and practising meditation. And when we have recognised the illusory nature of all worldly phenomena we still have the choice of being entertained by this illusion, as if watching an amusing performance.

The *Āgamaḍambara* begins with the complaints of an artist, who is fed up

[146] *Abhinavabhāratī ad rasasūtra* (ed. GOS, vol. I, p. 274): *tathā hi loke sakalavighnavinirmuktā saṃvittir eva camatkāranirveśarasanāsvādanabhogasamāpattilayaviśrāntyādiśabdair abhidhīyate*|

[147] *Abhinavabhāratī* ibid. (ed. GOS, vol.I, p. 276): *aviśrāntirūpataiva duḥkham*| *tata eva kāpilair duḥkhasya cāñcalyam eva prāṇatvenoktaṃ rajovṛttitāṃ vadadbhir ity ānandarūpatā sarvarasānām*|

[148] *Abhinavabhāratī* on *śāntarasa* (ed. GOS, vol. I, p. 333): *tatra sarvarasānāṃ śāntaprāya evāsvādaḥ, viṣayebhyo viparivṛttyā*|

[149] Gerow-Aklujkar, p. 81, note 6.

[150] Cf. *Abhinavabhāratī* (GOS), vol. I, p. 330.

with deceiving people. He wants Truth instead of Delusion, and he hopes to find it among the teachings of philosophies. But what happens if the venerable masters of various doctrines turn out to be more interested in making a good living than in Truth and Reality? What if being a monk or a Vedic priest is just an occupation, a job like being an actor? Or even if we suppose that the followers of these doctrines are not just cynical opportunists but they really believe in what they teach, what guarantees that all these religions are not just roles in the gigantic play of the Lord? Says Kṣemarāja, 'The positions, i.e. the tenets of all doctrines beginning with [that of] the materialists, are the adopted roles of that Self like [those] of an actor, which it takes on at pleasure.'[151] One possible attitude is to say that God fools the followers of all the *other* religions to a higher or lesser degree, but the world-view that *I* follow allows me to understand His real nature. Or one might arrive at an extremely liberal position and say that God takes on various roles to propound various teachings, and he does so not just for fun but out of compassion towards us, miserable creatures with limited capacities. So in fact all scriptures derive from God, each of them being adjusted to our particular needs and talents.

This latter view seems to be triumphant at the end of the *Āgamaḍambara*, but not with the active participation of the Mīmāṃsaka protagonist. He could not resolve the tension between his religion as a devotee of Viṣṇu and his duty to protect the Veda as a Mīmāṃsaka.[152] Or rather, there was one solution for him: devotion to God and asking for his illuminating favour.[153] He visits the nearby Raṇasvāmī-temple where he sings praises to the Lord who 'shows the right path to liberation' (*vyañjate mokṣasanmārgaṃ*). Unfortunately the manuscripts of the play are fragmentary at this place, but from the auspicious omen of the sound of a conch-shell we may safely infer that Viṣṇu dispelled the doubts of his devotee, as a result of which he was able to rejoice in the ultraliberal lecture delivered by the great Naiyāyika scholar.

At the beginning of the play we saw that art could not make the Director, a determined and uncompromising seeker after Truth, entirely happy. Learned scrutiny of the true nature of things may have given satisfaction to the *snātaka*, especially when he defeated his opponents, but ultimately it could not give him serenity and peace of mind. That direct experience of the Lord's grace is superior to both aesthetic rapture and philosophical investigation was expressed by Ānandavardhana in the following beautiful verse:[154]

> *yā vyāpāravatī rasān rasayituṃ kācit kavīnāṃ navā*
> *dṛṣṭir yā pariniṣṭhitārthaviṣayonmeṣā ca vaipaścitī|*

[151] *Pratyabhijñāhṛdayam* 8+ (ed. p. 16): *sarveṣāṃ cārvākādidarśanānāṃ sthitayaḥ siddhāntās tasyaitasyātmano naṭasyeva *svecchayā gṛhītāḥ* (em. Sanderson : *svecchāvagṛhītāḥ* ed.) *kṛtrimā bhūmikāḥ|*

[152] *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, verse 5: *ye viśvasthitisargasaṃhṛtidaśāparyāyasampādanakrīḍāsaktamater mataṃ bhagavato nārāyaṇasyāśritāḥ| taddṛṣṭeḥ katham anyathātvam anayā brūmo vayaṃ jihvayā śakṣyāmaḥ kṛtināṃ trayīmayadhiyāṃ sthātuṃ kathaṃ vāgrataḥ||*

[153] *Āgamaḍambara*, Act Four, verse 7: *pathi vedavirodhadāruṇe nipuṇenāpi na śakyanirṇaye| kim ahaṃ karavāṇi hanta me śaraṇaṃ śārṅgarathāṅgaśaṅkhabhṛt||*

[154] *Dhvanyāloka* 3.43+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 256.)

te dve apy avalambya viśvam aniśaṃ nirvarṇayanto vayaṃ
śrāntā naiva ca labdham abdhiśayana tvadbhaktitulyaṃ sukham||

That which is the extraordinary, fresh vision of poets, active in making the *rasa*s tasteful, and that which is the [vision] of the wise, opening upon thoroughly ascertained things as its object: resorting to both, while I was ceaselessly observing the world, I became tired and I could not find bliss equal to devotion to you, O God resting on the sea.

Chapter 4

Sources

4.1 The Manuscripts of the Āgamaḍambara

Pā Pāṭan, Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira MS 17472. Paper, Jaina Nāgarī. 18 folios of unknown dimensions (only a photocopy was at my disposal) with 16 lines to a side and approximately 53 *akṣara*s per line. Foliation is at the bottom right-hand corner of the rectos. Each page has a blank space in the centre and two double marginal lines on both sides. Undated.

Pu Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, MS 437 of 1892–95. Paper, Jaina Nāgarī. 37 folios of unknown dimensions (only a photocopy was at my disposal) with 9 lines to a side and about 45 *akṣara*s per line. The title of the text appears as *ṣaṭmatanāṭaka* at the top left-hand corner of f. 1^v, and as *ṣa*° *ma*° *nā*° at the same place on the following folios. The act number is indicated as *aṅka 1* at the top right-hand corner of fols. 1^v and 2^v, and as *aṅka 2* on f. 16^v. There is foliation both at the bottom of the right-hand and at the top of the left-hand margin of the versos. Undated.

The two manuscripts have several common characteristics: *anusvāra* is used throughout in place of the homorganic nasal, the signs for *ca* and *va* are often hardly distinguishable, and *v* is frequently written in the place of *b* (especially in MS Pā). Both contain a few *propria manu* marginal corrections, insertion points are tagged with *kākapāda*s, and *lacunae* are marked with raised dashes. Both manuscripts are written in a kind of Jaina Devanāgarī, but while Pā consistently uses *pṛṣṭhamātrā*s, in Pu *e, ai, o,* and *au* appear mostly as top-strokes.

Both manuscripts show similarities with other Jaina Nāgarī manuscripts dated to the 15th century, e.g. MS A (dated VS 1541) and MS P (dated VS 1521) of the *Paümacariu*, the Pāṭan MS (dated VS 1484) of the *Vijñaptilekhasaṃgraha*, and MS P of the *Kuvalayamālā* (undated, "but according to expert opinion [...] may be assigned to the 15th century A.D.", p. 2).

Since Pā and Pu share the same *lacunae* in Acts Two and Four as well as

several errors, they plainly appear to be closely related. A relatively long passage in the Prologue (ll. 26f.: °*mārthe paryavasitaḥ? sarva evāyaṃ brahmādis tiryakparyanto jantugrāmaḥ saṃsāre māyayaiva parivartate| bhavataḥ kim adhikaṃ jātam?*) which is omitted by Pu alone makes it clear that Pā could not copy from Pu. On the other hand, while Pā often has the correct reading where Pu's reading is erroneous, there are a few instances where the situation is the opposite, e.g. Act One: l. 264: *sarvaṃ* omitted by Pā (haplography); l. 130: *ihāṃtar* Pu, *ihāṃbhar* Pā; l. 275: *apavarga*° Pu, *avarga*° Pā; Act Two: l. 184: *hiṃsā nāsatyam* Pu, *hiṃsā nāmasatyam* Pā; l. 271: *kvedaṃ* Pu, *kṣedaṃ* Pā; l. 290: *kiṃcid* Pu, *kiṃci* Pā; l. 302: *bhos tapo*° Pu, *bhos tvapo*° (?) Pā; Act Three: l. 219: *kāsmākam ākulatā* Pu, *kāsmākarmakulatā* Pā; l. 429: *evopalabhyate* Pu, *evopapalabhyate* Pā; l. 530: *samayaḥ* Pu, *sasamayaḥ* Pā; l. 532: *eva tathā* Pu, *etathā* Pā; Act Four: l. 35: *bruvāṇās* Pu, *dhruvāṇās* Pā; l. 41: °*mātram* Pu, °*māvam* Pā; l. 105: *saharṣam* Pu, *rāhurṣam* Pā; l. 414: *na jana*° Pu, *jana*° Pā.

While it is not impossible that Pu copied from Pā and occasionally corrected its readings, it might be slightly more probable that both Pā and Pu derive (possibly independently) from the same manuscript. The fact that the title *Ṣaṇmatanāṭaka* figures on f. 1^v of Pu but is nowhere found in Pā perhaps also corroborates the above conclusion (though this title might actually have been invented by Pu's scribe). Furthermore in Act Two l. 166, while Pā clearly reads *jhāijjadi*, Pu indicates a *lacuna* and reads ¯ *ijjadi*.

Written by a Kashmirian author, the *Āgamaḍambara* must have had Śāradā manuscripts. In fact some errors in the existing manuscripts point to a Śāradā archetype, e.g. confusing *śu* and *ā* in Act Three, l. 32.

4.1.1 The interpretation of some unusual *akṣara*s

A very similar letter appears in Bühler 1896, Table V. 'Nördliche Alphabete von ca. 800–1200 p. Chr.', XX (Jayaccandra 1175 p. Chr.) / 45, and also in Table VI. 'Alphabete aus nördlichen Handschriften', XVI (Deccan College 1880/1, Ms. no. 57, 1081 p. Chr.) / 49; in both cases it is interpreted as *jya*. The same letter in ms P (BORI No. 154 of 1881-82) of the *Kuvalayamālā* is read as *jja*, and the editors have the following remark about the scribe: "His *jja* looks like *dya* and is read by some as *jya*."[1] In the manuscripts of the *Āgamaḍambara* this *akṣara* occurs only in Prakrit words, and only once in ms Pu (Act One, l. 13: *ajja*° is written with this letter in both manuscripts). In Sanskrit words both Pā and Pu use the usual Devanāgarī form of *jya* and *jja* (e.g. Prologue, l. 55: *niyujyantāṃ*; Act One, l. 347: *salajjam*; Act Three, l. 229: *sāmrājya*°).

When we find this *dy*-like letter in ms Pā,

— in the majority of the cases Pu has the more or less ordinary Devanāgarī ligature *jj*: Act One, l. 72: °*sijjaṃte*; Act Two, l. 36: *ajjo*, l. 161: *pajjaliyaṃ*, l. 166: *jhāijjadi, khavijjaï*, l. 212: *kajjavelā*, l. 308: *caccijjaṃta*, l. 344: *pijjaï*, l. 345: *bhuṃjijjaï, pāvijjaï*, l. 346: *sosijjaï, laṃghijjaï*, l. 348: *parisosijjaï*;

[1] *Kuvalayamālā*, p. 2.

— but sometimes Pu writes the standard Devanāgarī *akṣara jy*: Act One, l. 172: *ujyānesu*; Act Two, l. 7: *pijyadi*, l. 8: *ajya*, l. 65: °*ubbhijya*°, l. 105: *ajya*.

Finally there are instances when both Pā and Pu write the Devanāgarī ligature *jj* in Prakrit words: Act One, l. 41: *vajjadi*; Act Two, l. 7: *khajjadi*, l. 8: *kajjalaā*, l. 43: *nijjiṇe*, l. 56: *lajjā*°, l. 85: *ajja*, l. 267: *ajja*, l. 281: *ajja*, l. 308: °*lakkhijjaṃta*°, l. 312: *ajja*, l. 356: *avijjā*°; Act Three, l. 57: *pajjālide*, l. 71: *laṣkijjaṃtī*, l. 82: *ajja*°, l. 106: °*bhavijjaṃto*; Act Four, l. 134: *ajja*.

This *dy*-like sign is used in MS Pā as an equivalent of Sanskrit *dy* in Śaurasenī (*jy* in MS Pu) and Māgadhī (*jy* and *jj* in MS Pu), of Sanskrit *ry* in Śaurasenī (MS Pu has the same sign) and Māgadhī (*jj* in MS Pu), of Sanskrit *jv* in Mahārāṣṭrī (*jj* in MS Pu), and in passive forms with °*ijja*° in Śaurasenī, Mahārāṣṭrī, Apabhraṃśa (*jj* in MS Pu in these languages), and Māgadhī (*jy* in MS Pu).

We can also observe that when MS Pā writes this *dy*-like sign in Prakrit words other than Māgadhī, MS Pu has *jj*, except in Act One, l. 173 *ujyānesu*,[2] and in Act One, l. 13, where *ajja*° is written with the same *dya*-like sign in both manuscripts. In Māgadhī words, we find either *jj* or *jy* in MS Pu in places where MS Pā has this *dy*-like letter.

In transcribing this *dy*-like *akṣara* I have followed the readings of MS Pu, and indicated its occurrence in the manuscripts with an asterisk in the apparatus.

This *akṣara* occurs in both manuscripts. A very similar letter in Bühler 1896, Table VI. 'Alphabete aus nördlichen Handschriften', XVI (Deccan College 1880/1, Ms. no. 57, 1081 p. Chr.) / 23, is interpreted as *jjha*. In the *Āgamaḍambara* it appears once in a Sanskrit word: Act Two, l. 365: °*ojjhita*°, which makes it probable that it should be read as *jjha* in the Prakrit passages as well. Cf. Act Four, l. 134, where Pā writes °*majjhe* with this *yj*-like letter, while Pu uses the approximately standard-looking Devanāgarī ligature *jjh*. In some cases it is very difficult to distinguish this sign from the ligatures *bbh* and *st*.

This sign also occurs in both manuscripts. It looks like a Devanāgarī *ṣka* ligature, and in fact we find it in the Sanskrit word *āyuṣkāmaṃ* (Act Four, verse 48). It appears very frequently in Māgadhī words as the equivalent of Sanskrit *kṣa* (e.g. *luṣke* = Skt. *vṛkṣe*, Act Three, l. 12).

[2] Cf. von Hinüber, §249: "In der Kompositionsfuge unterbleibt die Palatalisation [...] wegen der Funktionsstärke des anlautenden *y*- [...]; Skt. *udyāna* > Aśoka, P[āli] *uyyāna* [...], Ś[aurasenī] (Bhāsa) *uyyāṇa* [...]."



Figure 4.1: MS Pā, folio 1^v



Figure 4.2: MS Pu, folio 1^v

4.2 The *editio princeps*

The *Āgamaḍambara* was first edited by V. Raghavan and A. Thakur, two eminent Sanskrit scholars, in 1964, and was published as 'Ancient text No. 7' in the Mithila Institute Series. The edition was based on the same manuscript material (MSS Pā and Pu) that was available for myself. The book also contains an Introduction in which Raghavan discusses the life and works of Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, the peculiar style of the play, its plot and characters, the various philosophical schools presented in the play, and its relation with the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

As Raghavan and Thakur point out in the Preface,[3] 'The nature of the manuscript materials at the disposal of the editors did not allow them to prepare a faultless text. Especially the Prākṛt portions were very defective and even after corrections and emendations they could not be made quite satisfactory. Dr. P. L. Vaidya, Dr. H. L. Jain and Dr. A. N. Upadhye very kindly read the Prākṛt passages and suggested many important emendations especially in the prākṛt [sic] dialogues and the Apabhraṃsa [sic] song of the Nīlāmbaras towards the end of Act II.' Despite these difficulties the editors succeeded in repairing the text in many cases, often suggesting plausible emendations both in the Sanskrit and the Prakrit portions. Their apparatus draws attention to parallel passages from the *Nyāyamañjarī* and other philosophical texts, and the various appendices (*ślokasūcī, upayuktāni vṛttāni, grathāntarasaṃvādaḥ, viśiṣṭaśabdasūcī, prākṛtasandarbhacchāyā, śuddhipatram*) also prove to be useful. On the whole we can say that the Sanskritists of today may consider themselves fortunate that the first edition of such a difficult text on the basis of such meager manuscript material was prepared by two most erudite scholars.

Nevertheless the *editio princeps* has its own shortcomings. Its careful collation with the manuscripts shows that the editors often resorted to silent emendations or conjectures (marked as "RT (em.?)" in the apparatus). In the Prakrit passages we can frequently observe an inclination on the part of the editors towards "normalising" the text on the basis of Prakrit grammars, while in other cases they leave "anomalous" Prakrit words unchanged. On the other hand it seemed to be possible to improve upon the text of the *Āgamaḍambara* with the help of further emendations, as the apparatus of my edition will hopefully demonstrate. There still remain a few passages where I could not make any useful amendments to the text of the first edition and had to employ crux marks to indicate my puzzlement. I am confident, however, that competent Sanskritists and Prakritists will suggest plausible solutions for these corrupt readings.

[3] *Āgamaḍambara (ed. pr.)*, pp. (2)–(3).

Chapter 5

A note on the edition and the translation

5.1 Conventions

The apparatus is fully positive. In the bottom register each entry consists of a lemma, followed by a lemma sign (]), followed by the sigla of the manuscript(s) (Pā, Pu) and / or the *editio princeps* (RT) that read the accepted text, followed by the variant readings separated by commas. In case neither the reading of the manuscripts nor the emendation of the *editores principes* are considered to be satisfactory, the lemma sign is followed by *em.* (i.e. "emendation", indicating small repairs in the text) or *conj.* (marking bolder conjectures). The difference is of course subjective. The emendations and conjectures of others that I have accepted are attributed, as well as the emendations of the first editors ("*em.* RT", or "RT *em.?*" when the emendation is silent). Other signs employed in the register of variants: A^{ac} = the reading of A before correction (*ante correctionem*), A^{pc} = the reading of A after correction (*post correctionem*); [[*xy*]] = *xy* written in the manuscript and then canceled ([[ ]] = the effaced *akṣara* is not legible); ⊔ = gap in the manuscript or in the *editio princeps*; ¯ ¯ ¯ = *lacuna* in the manuscript (marked with the same signs in the main text of the edition; in the translation *lacunae* are marked as <...>); †*xy*† = *xy* is not interpretable for me, probably corrupt (marked with the same signs in the *textus receptus*); ⟨*xy*⟩ = *xy* is omitted in the manuscripts, and has been added as a conjecture (marked with the same signs in the main text).

The middle register of the apparatus (when there are three registers on a page, otherwise the one above the bottom register of variants) records *testimonia* and parallels, mainly from the *Nyāyamañjarī*, and only occasionally from other texts (quotations of parallel passages from other Sanskrit works will be found in the Notes to the translation). The topmost register contains the Sanskrit *chāyā* of the Prakrit sentences if there are any on the page.

5.2 Sandhi, punctuation, orthography

Sandhi has been normalised in the Sanskrit passages of the play. All punctuation is mine and I have not reported when I deviated from the manuscripts in this respect. In several cases I have silently changed the *anusvāra*s of the manuscripts to homorganic nasals. Another feature of the manuscripts not reflected in the apparatus is the confusion of *b* and *v*.

5.3 The Prakrit passages

The *Āgamaḍambara*, just as the majority of classical Indian dramas, is multilingual. Śaurasenī is spoken by the Boy, the Disciple in the first act, the Jain Mendicant, the Nun, and the Ascetic in the second. One of the most remarkable features of Jayanta's play is the length of the Māgadhī passages: the words of the Servant in the second act, and the dialogue of the two Adepts in the third. The *nīlāmbara* couples sing in Apabhraṃśa, and a few verses of the play (e.g. verse 4 in Act Two) are written in Māhārāṣṭrī.

Editing the literary and artificial Prakrits of the dramas has many pitfalls. As Steiner pointed out,[1]

> The problem which an editor faces when dealing with the different Prakrits of a play is that, in contrast to Sanskrit, he is usually confronted with a relatively poor Prakrit textual tradition of less strictly normed languages. Moreover, our knowledge of Prakrit is far below the level attained in Sanskrit. With that the question is open whether, and to what degree, the playwrights actually followed the general rules of Prakrit, or, to what extent the original Prakrit of the plays had already been standardized.

Two extreme positions have been taken in this matter: Pischel and Hillebrandt were of the opinion that the texts should be normalised on the basis of the rules laid down by the Prakrit grammarians, even if this means going against the manuscripts, while Hertel and more recently Salomon expressed the view that the readings of the manuscripts are of greater importance than the grammars.[2] 'In order to be able to write a literary Prakrit different from colloquial language', writes Steiner, 'the playwrights themselves needed a Prakrit grammar which furnished them at least with the general rules.'[3] The editor, however, has to face the fact that the available Prakrit grammars on Śaurasenī and Māgadhī often contradict each other. What would be the preferred course of action when, for instance, in Māgadhī Sanskrit *kṣ* is supposed to become *sk* according to Vararuci (11.8), *h̲k* according to Hemacandra (4.296), *śk* according to Rāmaśarman (2.2.15) and Puruṣottama (12.6), while in the manuscripts

[1] Steiner 2001, p. 63.
[2] Cf. ibid., pp. 63f.
[3] Ibid., p. 67.

of the *Āgamaḍambara* we find either *ṣk* or *kkh* (the latter being the Śaurasenī equivalent of *kṣ*)?[4] Gawroński's following observation seems to be appropriate:[5]

> Die Frage also, ob alle Regeln der Grammatiker gegen die Handschriften durchzufüren sind, ist entschieden zu verneinen. Die Grammatiker bilden eine wichtige Quelle unserer Kenntnisse, aber sie stehen nicht über, sondern neben den Handschriften. Sie müssen immer zur Vergleich herangezogen werden, dürfen aber nie als das a priori richtige enthaltend angesehen werden. Und wenn die Regeln der Grammatiker mit unseren, aus den Handschriften deduzierten Regeln nicht übereinstimmen, wohl aber durch ihre Ungenauigkeit Zeugnis davon ablegen, daß die Praxis der MSS. schon zur Zeit jener mittelalterlichen Grammatiker ebenso inkonsequent war, wie sie heute ist, dann müssen wir unbedingt unseren Regeln eben in dem Grade Vorzug geben, wie man einem kritischen Verfahren vor einem kritiklosen Vorzug gibt.

On the other hand, as Steiner rightly points out, the assumption that 'each poet did in fact write (or dictate) Prakrit in an entirely precise and consistent manner is a problematic one. Was there ever a completely regular Prakrit and, especially, a consistent orthography? Is it not imaginable that the Prakrit speaking persons of a drama occasionally used different grammatical or phonetic forms of one and the same word?'[6] Thus both *appā* and *attā* are used in the Śaurasenī and Māgadhī passages of Jayanta's play, and *pace* Pischel who gives *attā* as the correct form in these dialects,[7] it is not inconceivable that the playwright did not bind himself to either of them.[8] Finally one should also take into account the possibility that 'certain forms used by poets in individual cases could in fact be traced back to the grammarians.'[9] Accordingly the Māgadhī word *ṇasti* (= *nāsti*) in the *Āgamaḍambara* can be connected with Hemacandra 4.289: *saṣoḥ saṃyoge so 'grīṣme*|[10]

Steiner examined the oldest available manuscripts of Harṣa's *Nāgānanda* (AD 1155/56) and discovered several Prakrit forms that appear to be irregular according to Pischel's grammar.[11] While editing the *Āgamaḍambara* I found many of these "irregular" forms in the manuscripts, e.g. *jāṇāmi* and *jāṇāvide*

[4] Another example is Sanskrit *tiṣṭhatu*, which in Māgadhī should become *ciṣṭhadu* (v.l. *ciśṭa°*, *ciṭṭa°*) according to Vararuci (11.14), *ciṭṭhadu* according to Puruṣottama (12.33), and *ciṣṭhadu* (v.l. *ciṭṭha°*) according to Hemacandra (4.298). The Manuscripts of the *Āgamaḍambara* have *ciṭṭhadu*.

[5] Gawroński, pp. 280f., quoted (approvingly) in Steiner 1997, p. 163.

[6] Steiner 2001, p. 70.

[7] Pischel §401.

[8] Another example is the occurrence of both *°ijjaï* and *°īadi* as passive forms in Śaurasenī and Māgadhī.

[9] Steiner 2001, p. 70.

[10] Hemacandra is certainly later than Jayanta, but many of his rules may well go back to earlier Prakrit grammars. Cf. Gawroński, p. 280: 'wir haben ja allen Grund, zu vermuten ... daß sie [sc. die Grammatiker] zum großen Teil "Beispile wie die Regeln von ihren Vorgängern" herübernahmen.' (quoted in Steiner 2001, p. 69, note 25.)

[11] See Steiner 1997, chapter 9.

in Māgadhī, *ayya* used universally for Sanskrit *ārya*, *khu* after *e* and *o*, etc. Some of these "irregularities" occur already in the fragments of Aśvaghoṣa's plays. These facts also confirmed that normalisation solely on the basis of Pischel's grammar and the mediaeval Prakrit grammarians may not be the only true method of editing dramatic Prakrits.

To summarise, I have preserved many readings of the manuscripts even if these readings were not in perfect conformity with the rules laid down by the Prakrit grammarians (often contradicting each other) or in Pischel's grammar.[12] On the other hand I emended the text when the reading of the manuscripts (often discrepant) went against the most fundamental rules of the given dialect, e.g. *s, r,* and *o* to *ś, l,* and *e* in the Māgadhī passages.

Finally the following observation of Steiner is well worth taking into consideration for the editors of Sanskrit dramas:[13]

> One of the most important criteria for future critical revisions of play editions is the comparative reading of accurately (or at least more accurately) transmitted texts of the same literary genre as well as texts and manuscripts of the same age and place of origin.

5.4 The translation and the notes

Translating the *Āgamaḍambara* has proved to be a demanding enterprise. On the one hand the translator is supposed to transmit (at least to a certain extent) the literary qualities of the play, including Jayanta's sense of humour and satire. On the other hand the reader expects a clear interpretation of the complicated arguments of the philosophical debates. Since I am not a native speaker of English, I could only make an attempt at producing a readable (and in some cases hopefully enjoyable) translation. As for the second task, I have tried to formulate even the more demanding arguments in a lucid way, using square brackets to add information that helps the understanding. Many excellent Sanskritists helped to polish my translation, all remaining shortcomings are due to my inadequacy.

The reader will find long quotations in the notes from various Sanskrit works. The aim of these quotations is to place Jayanta's ideas in the intellectual context of his age and thereby to make their interpretation more accurate. The notes to the first act contain several extracts from the works of Dharmakīrti and Kumārila, Jayanta's two main sources in presenting and refuting the Buddhist theories of *kṣaṇikatva* and *vijñānavāda*. I have also quoted from satires directed against Buddhism in order to point out various patterns also used by Jayanta. The majority of the notes written to the second act treat the problems of editing the Prakrit passages, but the Jain doctrine of *anekāntavāda* and the mysterious sect of the *nīlāmbara*s are also dealt with. The annotation to the third act has quotations from Naiyāyika-Vaiśeṣika and Saiddhāntika Śaiva

[12] The reader will find references to these rules in the endnotes.
[13] Steiner 2001, pp. 71f.

works, showing their affinity in the questions of proving transmigration and the existence of God. Finally the most frequently cited texts in the notes to Act Four are Yāmuna's *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, which attempts to prove the authority of Pañcarātra, and Kumārila's *Tantravārttika*, which presents a strictly orthodox view of the validity of religious traditions, which is challenged by the more liberal and pragmatic theory of *sarvāgamaprāmāṇya*.

Part II

Sanskrit Text