Notes

1.1. **at the very start of whose ‘descent’ to level of consciousness** *ex conj.* Dezső-Isaacson.

1.4. **before the people** *ex conj.* Isaacson.

1.23. **nearby** Dr. Isaacson’s conjecture (*nātidūra* *nirvānahārya* *deśa* *śini*), which is supported by the awkward position of *nātigad pró* would mean: ‘which shows a relatively short path to final release’ (cf. Act One, l. 48: *ayam eva nirvānahāyagad pró nyayān*). On the other hand, as Prof. Sanderson has also pointed out to me, *nātigad pró* fits the context well: the Director, seeing the monastery nearby, decides to start his life as a wandering pilgrim there. Another argument defending the word ‘*nātigad pró*’ might be that it helps the transition to the first act the beginning of which is actually set in the vicinity of a Buddhist monastery.

1.25 A detailed interpretation of the Prologue can be found in the Introduction, Chapter 3.

1.26ff. The First Act of Jayanta’s play begins with an introductory scene (*vishambhaka*), which is set in the garden of a *vihāra*, most probably in or near Śrīnagar. The characters are: a Buddhist Monk, who is a distinguished scholar (his name, Dharmottara, echoes the name of the great logician of the 8th century, cf. *Āgamaḍambara* (ed. pr.), p. xxiv; *Rājatarāṣṭrī 4.498.*), well versed in the Teaching of the Buddha, confident in his knowledge, and his Disciple, who is ready to learn, although perhaps not blessed with great acumen. The Disciple speaks Śauraseni.

1.28 Jayanta used the same verse in the *Nyāyamaṇjarī* (II 424.9–12) to conclude his comments on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.19: *punarutpattiḥ pretyahāvah*, ‘The state after death is rebirth’.

1.31 *ex conj.* The sentence as it stands in the manuscripts (*kim uṇa te catāri ajjasaccā*) is completely ungrammatical.

The conjunct consonants *jja* in the word *ajja*° are written in the manuscripts with a letter which looks like *dya*. On the reading of this sign see the Introduction. In other cases our manuscripts write the Prakrit
word ayya with the standard Devanāgarī ligature yya (cf. Steiner 1997, pp. 173ff.).

1.36 the Self appā occurs in Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī, and Jaina-Saurasenī. The Śaurasenī (and Māgadhī) form of Sanskrit ātmā should be attā (Pischel §401, cf. Act Two, l. 39: attaparammaḥo).

1.36 leave behind mottūya is a Māhārāṣṭrī (and Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī) form of the absolute, (Pischel §586). In Śaurasenī (and Māgadhī) the prevalent absolute ending is -ya (Pischel §590).

1.38 The Buddhist opponent in the Nyāyamaṉjarī (vol.II, p. 298) calls the attachment to a Self ‘the anointed, principal delusion’ (mārūḥhabhisīktaḥ prathamo mohah), the termination of which entails that the attachment to anything belonging to a Self (ātmīyagraha) also ceases. The realisation of having no self (nairātmīyadarśana) is said to be the door to Nirvāṇa, and the way leading to it is to establish that all things are momentary, which helps one to realise that cognition, too, has no permanent substratum (āśraya) such as a Self.

The Monk’s thoughts on sthīrātmagraha have interesting parallels in the Pramāṇavārttika. Dharmakīrti held that satkāyadyrṣṭi or satkāyadarśana (‘the [false] notion that the five constituents] form a Self or belong to a Self’: ātmādyrṣṭī ātmīyadyrṣṭī vā: Abhidharmakośabhāṣya p. 281), which is nothing else but delusion or ignorance (moha, avidyā), is the fundamental condition behind all false mental attitudes (kleśas), all flaws (doṣas), and all stains of consciousness (malas). Cf. Pramāṇavārttika with svavṛtti (Gnoli) p. 111, v. 222:
sarvāsāṃ doṣajātānāṁ jātiḥ satkāyadarśanāt|
sāvīḍyā tatra tatsnehas tasmād deveśādisambhavah||
omahāvirodhān maitṛiyāder nātyantaṁ doṣanigrāhah|
tanmūlāḥ ca mañḥ sarve sa ca satkāyadārasanam||

(In the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (loc. cit.) satkāyadyrṣṭi is only one among many other doṣas; see Vetter 1990, p. 42, n.1.) As Dharmakīrti explains, the [false] notion of a Self results in the attachment to things belonging to this Self. These two notions generate affection towards ātmā and ātmīya, which in turn produces hatred and all the other flaws (Pramāṇavārttika with svavṛtti (Gnoli) p. 111.18–19: ātmadarśanam ātmīyagraham praśūte| tava ca tatsneham sa ca deveśādīn iti satkāyadarśanajñāḥ sarvadosāḥ). Dharmakīrti summarises his views on this issue in the following verses (Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi 219–221, Vetter 1990, pp. 117–119, vv. 217–219):
yāḥ paśyaty ātmānāṁ tatrāsāyaḥam iti śāśvataḥ snehaiḥ|
sneḥat sukheṣu trṣyati trṣṇā doṣāṇus tirukuruśe||
guṇadarśa pariṣṭyān manetī tatśāḥhanāy upādattē|
tenātmaḥbhinvēśo yāvat tavat saṃsāre||
ātmani sati parasamijñaṃ svaparavibhāgaḥ pariṣṭrahadeśau|
anayoh sanpratibuddhaḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante
dhākhabhāvanyaḥ syāc ced ahidasaṁghānāyeval
ātmīyabuddhiḥānyātra tyāgo na tu viparyayey
upabhogānyatvena ghireṣv indriyadish
svatvedhit kena vāryeta vairāgyaṁ tat tatah

1.42 in fact According to Pischel (§§ 95, 336), eva becomes jeva, jevva in Sauraseni (yeva, yevva in Māgadhi), and its initial j (y) is doubled after short vowels, -e, and -o. Hemacandra (4.280) and Purusottama (9.28) teach that Sanskrit eva becomes yyeva in Sauraseni (Pseudo-Vararuci 12.23 prescribes jevva (v.l. jjevva), and Rāmasāman 2.1.37 jjevva or jevva). Our manuscripts know only yyeva (both in Sauraseni and in Māgadhi), similarly to the old Nepalese manuscript of the Nāgānanda, in which the form yyeva prevails (Steiner 1997, p. 200). Steiner draws our attention to the following facts: ‘Nun findet sich yyeva aber u.a. auch in den beiden nepalesischen Palmblatt-Mss A und C der Coulsonischen Mālatīm.-Ausgabe, von denen letzteres—wie das Nāg.-Ms A—auf das Jahr 1156 n. Chr. datiert ist. Das läßt vermuten, daß die Form y(y)ev(v)a auch noch im 7./8. Jh. in den Schauspielen gebräucht worden ist oder zumindest gebräucht werden konnte. (…) Das Nāg.-Ms A macht nach dem Gesagten jedenfalls wahrscheinlich, daß Harṣa die Form yyeva (oder yeva) gebrauchte, wobei noch offen bleibt, ob es sich hier um eine lokale oder gar individuelle Besonderheit—etwa die Vorliebe für altermüdierte Formen—handelt, oder ob wir mit y(y)evva die im Schauspiel-Prakrit auch noch des 7. Jh.s gebräuchliche Form vor uns haben. Die genannten Mālatīm.-Mss scheinen letzteres zu bestätigen. Ein weiteres Indiz für die Authentizität dieser Form könnte darin gesehen werden, daß das Nāg.-Ms A ausnahmslos das wohl jüngere yyeva, nicht aber das ältere yeva überliefert hat. Dazu stimmt wiederum, daß auch Pu[ruśottama], Namisādhū und Hc. [= Hemacandra] nur die Form yyeva lehren.’ (Steiner 1997, pp. 205–207.)
1.42 arrives at Śāurasenī paḍivājjadi suggests pratīvrajati as its Sanskrit chāya (see PISCHEL §197), but pratīpadyate might also be possible (PISCHEL §280: Sanskrit dya > Śāurasenī jja).

1.43 Therefore this world . . . Cf. Pramāṇaviniścayā I p. 70.9–11, ≃ Nyāgamanjari 1.196.1–2: ekam evedaṁ saṁviddrpaṁ harṣaviśāddhyānekapakāra-vivartam paśyāmaḥ, tatra yathesṭaṁ samajñāḥ kriyantām ‘We see that this [i.e. everything one directly experiences] is one, it has the nature of consciousness, it has many [illusory] modifications, such as joy, dejection, and the like: it can be labelled as one wishes.’ The Vijnānavādin’s position as it is presented in the Śunyavāda section of Kumārila’s Ślokavārttikā also offers interesting parallels: Ślokavārttikā (with Tatparyatikā) śunyavāda 15–17b: matpakṣe yady api svaccho jñānātmā paramārthatah| tathāpy anadau saṁsāre pārvajñānaprasūtibhiḥ|| citrābhīṣ citrahetutvād vāsanābhīr upaplavāt| svānurūpyeṇa nilādīrghāvyāgraḥakarūṣitaṁ (v.l. -dūṣitaṇ))|| pravibhaktam ivotpannam nānyam artham apekṣate| ‘We see that this world, in one’s direct experience, is one, has the nature of consciousness, has many illusory modifications, such as joy, dejection, and the like: it can be labelled as one wishes.’

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1.43 having removed . . . Cf. Pramāṇavārttikā, pramāṇasiddhi 207cd (VETTER 1990, p. 105, v. 205ab): ukto mārgas tadabhyāsād āśrayaḥ parivartate| ‘The path has been stated. Through its practice the basis transforms.’

According to Manorathanandin, the ‘path’ has been defined as ‘the insight that there is no self’ (comm. ad loc.: nairūtmyadarsāvanta laṣaṇaḥ), cf. Pramāṇavārttikā, pramāṇasiddhi 137c–138b (VETTER 1990, p. 42, v. 135). Prajñākaragupta explains the ‘transformation of the basis’ as follows (Pramāṇavārttikābhāṣyam, p. 142,30–31): āśrayasya cittasāntānāsyālayasya vā pariśuddhatvaṁ bhavati| ‘The stream of cognitions or the substratum consciousness becomes pure.’ In Manorathanandin’s interpretation (comm. ad loc.): tasyābhyyasād āśrayaḥ klesāvāsanabhātām alayā-vijñānaṁ parivartate, kliṣṭadānīnirodhāt klesāvāsanabhātāṁ pariṣamacchāntavandhā-tmanā pariṣamantam| ‘Through its [i.e. the path’s] practice the basis, [i.e.] the substratum consciousness, which is basically the impressions of defilements, transforms, [i.e.] since the defiled state has been destroyed, it changes into a stream of cognitions which is disconnected from defilements.’ Dharmakīrti’s statement and its various possible interpretations are discussed in FRANCO 1997, pp. 82ff; VETTER 1990, p. 105, n.1; both referring to Schmithausen’s studies. As Franco observes (FRANCO 1997, p. 85), ‘in view of v. 208ab it seems that Dharmakīrti understood the transformation of the basis as the complete elimination of all the defiled dhar-
mas which are not the own nature of cognition, but which are accidental to it; the cognition itself is pure and luminous'. Cf. Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi 210cd (Vetter 1990, p. 108, v. 208ab):

\[\text{prabhāsvaram idaṁ cittāṁ prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ}\]

‘This consciousness is luminous by nature, the defilements are adventitious.’

Cf. also Paññikā ad Tattvasaṅgraha 544: \[\text{teṣāṁ cāvidyādināṁ tattvajñānād vīgatau satyāṁ yā nirnālataḥ dhiyaḥ sā nirnuktim ity ucyate| yathoktaṁ, \text{cittāṁ eva hi saṁsāraḥ rāgadiklesavāsitaṁ| tadh eva tair vinirnuktaṁ bha-vānta iti kathyaṁ ‘itī} ‘And when, after the disappearance of ignorance and the other [bonds] due to the knowledge of reality, the cognition becomes pure: this [purity] is called “liberation”. As it has been stated, “The world of transmigration is nothing but consciousness infused by defilements such as passion. And it is that same [consciousness], when free of those, which is said to be the end of existence”’. The same verse is alluded to in Ālokamāla v. 4 (Lindtner p. 122):

\[\text{rāgadimālāṁ cittāṁ saṁsāras tadviviktataḥ| saṁskṛpāḥ kathito mokṣaḥ prahānavāraṇair jinaḥ}||\]

‘The world of transmigration is [nothing but] consciousness dirtied by such [defilements] as passion. The Buddhas who have cast away the obstructions have taught in brief that liberation is the state of being separated from those [defilements].’ Lindtner (p. 123) also mentions other texts which quote the verse found in in the Paññikā.

1.44 in the present According to Pischel (§144), īhyṁ is used in Mūhāraṣṭrī, while it is ‘quite foreign to Śaurasenī and Māgadhī’.

1.44 The Disciple’s question alludes to a well-known objection against the Buddhist position: if there is no permanent substratum, i.e. no Self, functioning as the basis of the stream of cognitions, the one who performs an action and the one who experiences its result cannot be the same person. This would entail the impossibility of karmic retribution and all other activities (e.g. memory) which require the permanence of the agent’s self-identity. Says Kumārila (Ślokavārttika (with Nyāyaratnākara) ātmavāda 32–33ab):

\[\text{nairātmyavānapakṣe tu pūrvam evāvabuddhyate| madvināāt半月 na syāṁ matto ‘nyasyātha vā bhavet}||\]

\[\text{iti naiva pravṛttiḥ syāṁ na ca vedaprāmāṇyata}||\]

‘But if the position of the doctrine of having no Self [were accepted], then one would think before [setting about something]: “Since I shall perish, there can be no fruit [of my action for me], or [the fruit] will fall to someone other than me”, so there would be no activity, and the Veda would have no authority.’ (See also Ślokavārttika (with Nyāyaratnākara) ātmavāda 3–4.)

But, as Jayanta remarks, even rich Buddhist devotees, for whom vedaprāṃyāya is not of crucial importance, would not see the point of giving donations and thereby increasing their own merit (Nyāyamañjarī II. p. 296).
Šabara already pointed out that remembrance is impossible if only the momentary constituent of consciousness exists (Śabarabhāṣya(F) ad māmāṁ-sāsūtra 1.1.5, p. 54: kṣaṇīke vijnānaskandhamārete smṛtir anupapanneti). But, as the Buddhist opponent holds in the Ślokavārttika (Ślokavārttika (with Nyāyaśāstra) ātmavāda 103 seq.), memory, just as desire, can be explained with the help of impressions (vāsanās) existing in the same continuum.

Kṛṣṇaṁśra puts similar questions in the mouth of the Jain monk, who represents the digambarasiddhānta in the Third Act of Prabodhacandrodaya (a refreshing farcical interlude in an allegorical play, satirising the ‘heretical’ sects of Buddhist, Jainism, and Somasiddhānta), in order to demonstrate that Buddhist philosophy comes off second best even when compared with a practical way of thinking. ‘Tell me now,’ the kṣapanaṅka asks the bhikṣu, ‘for whose sake do you observe any vow if you perish in each moment?’ (Prabodhacandrodaya p. 188: bhaṇa dāva khaṇaviniśāṇā tue kassa kae vadaṃ dhauliṭi?) The bhikṣu’s answer is in conformity with Buddhist doctrine: ‘Listen: someone who is characterised by consciousness, and is included in my continuum, will attain liberation, after the impressions (of his past perceptions) have been completely uprooted.’ (Ibid.: are śṛṣṭatāṃ. asmrtaṁtātipatitaḥ kaścid vijnānalakṣaṇaḥ saṃcchinchana-vāsanaṁ mokṣgate.) ‘O you fool,’ bursts out the Jain monk, ‘if someone will attain liberation in some age, what could he do for you who perish right now?’ (Ibid. p. 190: ake mukka, kassim pi maṇṇantale ko vi mukko bhavissadi, tado de sampadam naṭṭhassa kīrīsaṁ uvaālaṁ kalisadi?) Even a Jain monk can notice how ‘deeply illogical’ Buddhism is—at least, that is what Vedantist propaganda insinuates.

Similar subjects are dealt with in Tattvasaṅgraha 476–545, the section on karmaphalasambandha (involving the refutation of the objections of kṛtanāśa and akytrapraṇi). According to the Buddhist position, the connection between actions and their results is established on the basis of causality alone, without any need for a stable Self (Tattvasaṅgraha 501). In fact, causality is possible only in the case of momentary entities, and this is precisely what the Monk is going to demonstrate.

1.46 The Monk’s exposition of the doctrine of momentariness is based on two well-known arguments: vināśitvānumāna (‘the inference [of momentariness] from the perishing nature [of produced entities]’) and sattvānumāna (‘the inference [of momentariness] from the existence [of things]’). (These two terms were used by Frauwallner in Frauwallner 1935, p. 217, and attested by Mimaki in the works of Karnakagomin and Ratnakirti (MIMAKI 1976, p. 233, n.110).) Modern scholars agree that sattvānumāna was established by Dharakirti in his Pramāṇavinioṣaya (cf. STEINKELLER 1968–69, YOSHIMIZU 1999, p. 231, n.4); it was already attributed to him by Arcata in his commentary to the Hetubindu (quoted in Mimaki 1976, pp. 235f, n.114).

In order to prove that existence and momentariness are invariably con-
comitant properties, Dharmakirti uses the so-called *sādhavyaparyayabādhakapramāṇa*, (‘a means of valid cognition which refutes the possibility of the opposite of the property to be proven [co-occurring with the proving property, i.e. the logical reason (*hetu*)]’ (cf. YOSHIMIZU 1999, pp. 233ff.), that is he proves that whatever is not momentary cannot really exist. Cf. *Hetubindu* p. 4*, 6f.: *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva, aksaṇikatve ʾrthakriyāvirodhet tallakaṇḍaṁ vastutaṁ hiyate* ‘Whatever is existent must be momentary. If it were not momentary, because [non-momentariness] contradicts causal efficacy, it would be deprived of the condition of being a real thing, which [=since this condition] has that [i.e. causal efficacy] as its defining mark.’ More explicitly in *Hetubindu* p. 19*,10–13: *saktir hi bhāvalakṣaṇaṁ, sarvaśaktivirahaḥ bhāvalakṣaṇaṁ na ca kāsaṇikasya kva cid kācic chaktiḥ, kramayaugapadyābhyaṁ arthakriyāvirohaḥ* tasnād *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eveti vyāptisiddhiḥ* ‘For capacity is the defining mark of an entity, [and] the absence of all capacity is the defining mark of a non-entity. And a non-momentary thing does not have any capacity with regard to anything, since [such a thing does] not [have] causal efficacy either gradually, or simultaneously. Therefore the invariable concomitance, namely “whatever exists is momentary”, is established.’ *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II p. 29*,15–24 spells out the two alternatives of *krama* and *yaugapādyya* (tr. of the Tibetan text in STEINKELLNER 1979, p. 93: ‘Dieses Nichtaugenblickliche ist (nämlich) nicht instande, einen Zweck zu erfüllen (*arthakriyā*), weil sowohl bei Allmählichkeit (*krama*) als auch bei Gleichzeitigkeit (*yaugapādyya*) [seines Wirkens] ein Widerspruch besteht. Es ist (zumächst) nicht (instande), allmählich (*krameṇa*) (einen Zweck zu erfüllen), weil bei einem (Ding), wenn es (von Mitursachen) unabhängig bloß durch sein Vorhandensein Wirkendes ist, eine Verzögerung (*kṣepa*) (seines Wirkens) nicht am Platz ist. Ein (Ding), das früher nicht Wirkendes ist, könnte es nämlich auch später nicht sein, weil (sein) Wesen nicht veränderlich ist (*avikāra*). Wenn es aber (von Mitursachen) abhängt, (so) haben wir (diesen Fall schon oben) besprochen. (note 336: Der Verweis bezieht sich auf die obige Wiederlegung der Möglichkeit, daß die ewigen vedischen Wörter von Mitursachen abhängen könnten (18,24ff.).) Es ist auch nicht gleichzeitig (*yaugapadycena*) wirkend, weil sein (in der einen Phase gegebenes, fähiges) Wesen auch später nicht nichtwirkend sein kann. Daher hat dieses jedwede Fähigkeit bare (Ding) das Merkmal eines Seienden überschritten.’)

As Yoshimizu pointed out (pp. 237f, 246ff.), in *Pramāṇavārttika, svārthānusāravārto* Dharmakirti refutes the causal efficacy of permanent things in the larger context of establishing the non-eternity of Vedic words (cf. *Pramāṇavārttika with svārītī* (GNOLI) p. 131, vv. 251–252 and comm., p. 113,20ff., 116,15ff., p. 130,3ff., p. 131,7ff.) which is a serious challenge for all mīmāṃsasakas. Cf. also *Tattvasaṅgraha* 385–427, and Dharmottara’s *Kṣaṇabhāni-gasiddhi* (FRAUWALLNER 1935), p. 242, 256.

1. 47 “Only that which has causal efficacy can be ultimately real.” Cf.

1.48ff. In the following verses the Monk puts forward vināśītvānumāṇa (‘the inference [of momentariness] from the perishing nature [of things]’). As an example of this argument we can quote the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (353–355):

\[ \text{vināśaṃ prati sarveṣam anapekṣatasyāḥ sthiteḥ|} \]
\[ \text{yadbhāvanāḥ prati yan naiva hetvaṃ taram apestate|} \]
\[ \text{tat tatra nityataṃ jñeyam svahetubhyāḥ tathodayat|} \]
\[ \text{vināśaṃ prati sarve pī nirapekṣāḥ ca jāminah|} \]

‘Among those [entities] the ones which are made are all momentary, since none of them depends on [any other external cause] with regard to its perishing. If A does not depend at all on another cause to be B, then A must be regarded as necessarily [being] B, since it arises as such due to its own causes. For just as the aggregate [of causal factors] does not require any other cause to produce its effect, [in the same way] all things that have once arisen do not require [any other external cause] with regard to their perishing.’

We find a similar argument already in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (p. 193):

\[ \text{ākasmiśo hi bhāvāṅgāḥ vināśaḥ|} \]
\[ \text{kiṃkāraṇaḥ? kāryasya hi kāraṇo bhavati, vināśaḥ cābhāvas|} \]
\[ \text{yaś cābhāvas tasya kiṃ kartavyaṃ? so śāv ākasmiśo vināśo yadi bhāvasyotpannamātrasya na syāt paścād api na syād bhāvasya tulyatvādā|} \]

‘For the perishing of things is spontaneous. Why? Because an effect has a cause, but perishing is non-existence. And what can be done with something that is non-existence? If a thing did not perish spontaneously as soon as it had arisen, it would not perish later either, since the thing would be the same [later as it was before, when it did not perish].’

If one postulated a cause for perishing, such a cause would not be able to achieve anything. As we read in the *Pañjikā* (ad *Tattvasaṅgraha* 383–384):

\[ \text{bhāvaḥ svahetaḥ utpadyamānāḥ kadācit prakṛtya svayaṃ naśvarūṇaiva-} \]
\[ \text{tpadyate, anāśvārūṇaḥ vai yadi naśvaras tasya na kiṃcīd vināśahetūnā,} \]
\[ \text{svayaṃ tatvabhāvahetūyaṁ naśaḥ (…) athānaśvarūṇam āpakaśa tadāpi naśahetur akiṃcitkara eva|} \]
\[ \text{tasya kenacīt svabhāvanyathābhāvasya kartum aśavatvādā|} \]
\[ \text{tathā hi, yadi svabhāva utpādānantarṇaḥ na vinaśyet, tadā paścād api sa eva sthitidharmā svabhāvas tadavastha iti kiṃ naśahetunā} \]
When an entity is arising due to its own cause, is it perhaps produced as perishable by itself, or as not perishable? If it [arises as] perishable [by nature], then no cause of destruction could do anything to it, since it perishes by itself because it has that [i.e. perish-ishing] as its inherent nature. (…) If [one holds] the [other] position, namely that [the entity arises] with a nature which is not perishable [by itself], in that case, too, the cause of destruction could not do anything, since nothing can make it [i.e. the entity] to have a nature other than its own inherent nature. To explain, if the inherent nature [of the entity] did not perish immediately after its coming into being, then later, too, the same inherent nature, whose characteristic is stability, would be in the same state, so what can be done to it by the cause of destruction so that it may be destroyed?

Dharmakṛśṭi also employed vināsītvānamāna in his works (see Pramāṇavārtika with svavrtti (GNOLI) p.98,4–100,24; ibid. p.141,17–150,5; Pramāṇaviniścaya II pp.26°–32° (together with sattvānumāna); Hetubhūdu pp.7°–19° (together with sattvānumāna). See also Steinkellner’s analysis in STEINKELLNER 1968–69.) He also pointed out that if a pot had to wait for a hammer to be destroyed it might wait for eternity (Pramāṇavārtika with svavrtti (GNOLI) 98,14–17, cf. Pramāṇaviniścaya II p.27°): yady api bahulaṃ vināsakāraṇāṇi santi, teśāṃ api svapratyayādhīnasañnidhitvān nāvasyaṃ saatmyād hitvān phalavanto vaikalyapratibandhasambhavāḥ। ‘Even if there are many causes of perishing, they do not necessarily appear [together] in proximity [with the object], because they appear [together] in proximity [with the object] depending on their own causes. Therefore some thing might not even perish [at all], for causes do not necessarily have a result, because the [complex of causal factors] may be defective or an impediment might occur.’

The Buddhist concludes that things perish as soon as they have arisen, and their permanence is just an illusion. As Dharmakṛśṭi says (Pramāṇavārtika with svavrtti (GNOLI) 100,3–7): uktaṃ cātra na vināśo nāma anya eva kaścid bhāvāv, svabhāvāva eva hi nāśaḥ, sa eva hy ekāśaṇasthāyi jātā iti tam asya manāḥ svabhāvam ārdhvaṃ vyavasyanti, na prāk, darśānāṃ ‘pi pātaḥbhāvāvāv iti tādāvāna paścād vyavasthāyate, vikāradarśānāna eva viṣam aṣṭāvāḥ। ‘And it has been stated with regard to this that there is no such thing called ‘perishing’, completely different from the entity, for the inherent nature itself [of that entity] is perishing, for it itself arises as existing for a single moment. The slow-witted ascertain this inherent nature of that [entity] later, not earlier, because, although they see it, [their sight] lacks sharpness. Therefore, thanks to this [imperfect vision] [the perishing nature of the entity] is ascertained later, just as ignorant people [ascertain] poison only having noticed the disease [caused by it].’

All kinds of causal relations can be explained with the help of santāna. Says Śāntarakṣita (Tattvasaṅgraha 543):

keśancid eva cittānām viśisṭā kāryakāryitā
iyātā tena nirbādhāḥ sarvatva smaraṇādayāḥ||
The distinctive condition of being an effect or a cause is restricted only to particular cognitions [in the continuum]. For this reason remembrance and [enjoyment, recognition, etc. can take place] in all cases without any impediment.’ See also Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi 271c–272b (Vetter 1990, p. 161, v. 269):

\[\text{anyasmaranabhogādiprasāṅga cā na bādhakāḥ asmṛteḥ kasyacit tene hy anubhūteḥ smṛtodbhavāḥ}||\]

‘Such unwanted consequences as “someone else will remember [the thing that another person experienced]”, or “someone else will enjoy [the results of actions made by another person]” do not oppose [our position], for [there is] no ‘person’ [who] remembers. Therefore a memory arises from an experience.’

Therefore there is no need to postulate a ‘person’ as an agent (Tattvasaṅgraha 504):

\[\text{kartṛteśvādīvyavasthā tu santānaikyarāvivakṣāyā| kalpanāropitavātśā nāni smṛtaḥ sā tattvasaṅśṭhīteḥ}||\]

‘But the condition of being an agent and [enjoyer, etc.] is accepted as a purely mental construction with the intention to refer to the unity of the continuum; it is not a component of the real nature of things.’ The same is pointed out by Kumārila’s Buddhist opponent (Ślokavārttika (with Nyāyaratnākara) ātmavāda 35ab):

\[\text{kartā ya eva santāno nanu bhoktā sa eva naḥ}||\]

‘Surely, for us the same continuum [of cognitions] which is the agent [of actions that bear fruits] is also the enjoyer [of the results of these actions].’

1.49 One might find the compound kartṛbhoktrsmyādikāryaghāṭañā strained. As Dr. Isaacson points out in a letter of 5. xi. 2002, ‘what we expect is really karmabhogasmṛtyādikāryaghāṭañā, especially since he is summing up the answer to the upāsaka’s question: ‘kassa kammabhoo ... kassa sumaraṇanibāṃdhana hoṃti vavahārā.’

1.50 revealed pakāśijjade is a strange, one might even say impossible formation. In Śaurasenī one would expect something like pakāśādi, while in Māhārāṣṭrī pakāśijjai, and in Jaina-Śaurasenī pakāśijjadī (see Pischel §535).

1.50 produces ex conj. jiṃinto or rather jiṃaṃto would suggest jayan as its Sanskrit equivalent (cf. Pischel §473), but the sense requires rather janaṃto (janayan).

1.50 confined ex conj. ISAACSON.

1.50 The translation of the last two sentences in this paragraph is based on a reading that contains several tentative conjectures. The Disciple’s question is a well-known objection against the theory of momentariness. We find it e.g. in Tattvasaṅgraha (490): ksāṇasthāyi ghaṭādiś cen nopalabhīteta cakṣuṣā] na hi naṣṭāḥ pratiyante cirātīnapadārthavaḥ||’ If the pot exists only for a moment then it cannot be perceived by the sense
of sight, for [things] that have perished, just as things that vanished long ago, cannot be perceived.’

Dharmakīrti first establishes that the object must exist before its cognition (Pramāṇavārttika, pratyakṣa 246): asatah prāg asāmarthyaḥ paścāc cāṇupayogataḥ prāgbhāvah sarvahetunāṃ nāto ‘ṛthaḥ svadhiyā sabaḥ’ ‘Since that [thing] which does not exist before [its effect] is not capable [to produce the effect], and [that thing which exists] after [an effect] is of no use [for bringing about that effect], all causes exist before [their effects]. Therefore the object does not [exist] simultaneously with its cognition.’ Then he answers the above objection (ibid. v. 247, = Pramāṇavinnāścaya I p. 60, v. 20): bhinnakālaṁ kathāṁ grāhyam iti ced grāhyatām viduḥ het-utvam eva yuktiṁ jñāna-kārārpanakṣamamami | ‘If [the opponent objects:] “how can the object of cognition exist at a different time [from the subject]”, [then we answer that] Logicians mean by the condition of being the object nothing but the condition of being the cause which is able to imprint its form on cognition.’ It is this ‘imprint’ which is grasped by cognition and not the actual object: this is the theory of sākāravijnāna, ‘form-possessing cognition’. This position does not exclude the existence of an external object (accepted by the sautrāntikas), but it can easily be adopted by those who believe that nothing actually exists outside this multiformal cognition (vijnānavādins).

1.51 if you see clearly ex conj. ISAACSON. Instead of this conjecture one might consider yadi tattvaṁ prakṛtiḥ (see Nyāyaṁjñājīri II 156.18).

1.51 and other forms ex conj. ISAACSON, supported by the frequency of expressions such as nilādi in the same context.

1.52ff. It is again the Vijnānavādin in the Ślokavārttika whose arguments are remarkably similar to those of the Monk in Jayanta’s play. According to Kumārila’s Buddhist opponent, we do not ascertain two separate forms: one belonging to cognition and the other to its object (Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyaṭikā) śvyavāda 6ab): na cāpy ākārābhedena jñāna-jācyaye vadhāraṇā]. Kumārila expounds the Mīmāṁsaka position as follows (Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyaṭikā) śvyavāda 10cd–12):

ekam ākāravatād vastu grāhyam ity adhyagisthah |

tad yady ākāravān artho bhāyata kalpyeta tasya ca |
grāhyatvam anyathā na syād iti grāhaka kalpanī |
tenakāravataḥ kṛptād grāhyād ākāravarjitaṁ |
vastvantaraṁ prthuk kalpyam (v.l. prakalpyāṁ syād) grāhakaṁ nispramāṇakam |

‘We hold that a single form-possessing thing is cognised. If that thing were postulated to be an external form-possessing object, then we should postulate a subject of cognition, since its [i.e. the external thing’s] condition of being an object of cognition would not be otherwise possible. Therefore one should postulate another thing as the subject of cognition, which would be separate from the postulated form-possessing object of cogni-
tion, [and which would also be] devoid of form, and lacking any proof [of its existence]."

After showing that it is more ‘economical’ to postulate a single, form-possessing cognition which has the aspects of both subject and object, the Buddhist advances another argument (Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyaṭikā) śūnyavāda 21–22):

\[\text{itāś cākāraṇav jñānam, yasmāt tad vaḥ (v.l. tadvat) prakāśakam|}
\[\text{sevaṃprakāśaḥśinasya bāhyasyopāyasamamātam||}
\[\text{na cāyṛhīte jñānākhyaṇapraṇāśe (v.l. jñānākhyaḥ prakāśya) ’ṛtho ’vadhāryate|}
\[\text{tadadhiṇapraṇaśatvād dīpābhāse yathā ghaṭaḥ]|}
\[\text{(. . .) 31–32:}
\[\text{tasmāt pūrvagṛhitāsū buddhisv arthopalbhānām|}
\[\text{na copalabdhir astīha nirākāraṇa buddhiṣu||}
\[\text{vivekabuddhyabhāvaḥ ca sākāraṣya ca dārsanāḥ|}
\[\text{ākāravaṇṭaye (v.l. sākāravaṇṭaye) bodho jñānasyaiva prasajye]|}

‘Cognition is form-possessing for the following reason as well: since you [also] accept that it [i.e. cognition], being an illuminator, is a means of [illuminating] the external object, which is not luminous by itself. But if the light called ‘cognition’ is not grasped, the object will not be ascertained, since its illumination depends on that [cognition], just as a pot [is cognised] after the shining forth of the light. (…) Therefore objects are apprehended after [their] cognitions have been grasped. And no apprehension is possible in this case if the cognitions are formless. Since we do not cognise any distinctness [i.e. two distinct forms], and since we see something which has form, it follows that it is cognition alone which is apprehended as the form-possessing entity.’

1.52 People do not have a simultaneous, biform perception of the cognition and its object. Cf. Śābarabhāṣya(F) p. 28,14–16 (bauddhapaksā):

\[\text{arthajñānyayor ākāravartnem nopaḷabhāmahe|}
\[\text{pratyakṣa ca no buddhiḥ| atas tadbhinnam artharūpaṃ nāma na kimcid astiti paśyāmah|}
\[\text{‘We do not perceive [two] separate forms: one belonging to the object and the other to the cognition. On the other hand, cognition is directly perceptible for us. Therefore we realise that there is no object-form separate from that.’}

1.52 grasping would be grasped first Cf. Śābarabhāṣya(F) p. 28,20–30,1:

\[\text{utpadyamānaivāvamājñāyate jñāpayati cārthāntaraṃ pradīpavaḍ iti yady ucyeta, tan na.}
\[\text{‘If [the Buddhist] were to say that [cognition], precisely when it is coming about, is cognised and makes the object cognised, similarly to a lamp, then [our answer would be that] this is wrong.’}

See also Nyāyāgamaṇījāri II 490.10 (≃ Pramāṇaviniścaya I p.96, v.55cd):

\[\text{apratyakṣapalambhaśa nārthāḥṣṛṣṭih prasiddhyati|}
\[\text{‘For [a cognition] whose perceiving is [itself] not [directly] perceived, cannot cognise the object.’}

Cf. Śābarabhāṣya(F) p. 30,3–5 (bauddhapaksā): namu utpannyayāṃ eva buddhāḥ ortho ’jñāta’ ity ucyate, nāṃputpannāyāṃ atāḥ pūrvaṃ buddhir utpadyate, paścātyāṃ ’ṛthaḥ| ‘Surely the object is said to be ‘known’ only
after the cognition has arisen, [but] not when it has not yet arisen. Therefore first the cognition arises, and after that the object is cognised.

1.52 How could there be any other objective entity? Cf. Nyāyamañjara II 495.15–16 (≃ Pramāṇaviniścaya I p. 86, v. 38; cf. Pramāṇavārttika, pratyakṣa 327):

nānyo 'nubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasya nānubhavo 'parah
grāhyagrāhakavādhirūgīt svayam saha prakāśate

‘There is nothing else [than cognition itself] to be ascertained by cognition. [On the other hand] it [i.e. cognition] is not ascertained by another [cognition], because [in that case, too] the object and subject of cognition [each having distinctive features] would be wanting. [Therefore] it shines forth by itself [both as subject and object].’

Also Pramāṇavārttika, pratyakṣa 354 (= Pramāṇaviniścaya I p. 90, v. 45):

avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmā ( reading in Vetter 1966, p. 90, n. 6, see also Mimaki 1976, p. 288, n. 308 about other readings; the Pandeya-edition has buddhyātma- viparyāsitadarśanaĩ)

grāhyagrāhakasonavitthāhavān iva laksyate

‘Although the nature of cognition is undivided, those whose vision is faulty see it as being divided into object, subject, and consciousness.’

Also Pramāṇavārttika, pratyakṣa 328:

nālādirūpas tasyāsau svabhāvo 'nubhavaś ca sah
nālādyanubhavāt khyātāh svarūpānubhavo 'pi saṁ

‘Forms such as blue are its [i.e. cognitions] inherent nature, and this [nature] is ascertaining. Although it is the ascertaining of its own form, still, because forms such as blue are ascertained, it is called [‘the cognition of blue’ etc.].’

1.55 marks The word piśuna also means ‘betraying, treacherous’, or as a noun, ‘informant’.

1.56 In that case let’s make sure that we are not late. ‘Delicious meals served in the vihāra’ were one of the main attractions of Buddhism according to satirical literature. In the Bhagavadajjukīya (probably the oldest Sanskrit comedy still extant), Śāṇḍilya, the pupil who pokes his nose into everything, relates how he tried out various religions just to find out where he could eat his fill. Buddhism seemed to be promising in this respect because monks get breakfast every morning, but Śāṇḍilya realised soon that he could not appease his hunger in the vihāra, because ‘these sons of slaves eat only once a day’ (Bhagavadajjukīya, p. 8). The commentary, which gives a philosophical / allegorical interpretation of the whole prahāsana, takes the expression dāsyāḥ putrāḥ as referring to the unacceptable tenets of the Buddhists like vedaprāmāṇya, nairūmya, etc., and ekakālabhaktatva as referring to ksāyakatva (ibid. p. 13). Buddhism, as we are often told, equals dolce far niente, but is it possible to stop on a slope as slippery as this? The satirist’s answer is clear: when human weakness has once tasted pleasures, it asks for more. The Buddhist
monk in king Mahendravarman’s comedy, the Mattavilāsa, first praises the wise solicitude of buddha’s asana, which teaches living in palace-like buildings, sleeping in well-made beds, enjoying brunch in the morning, tasty juices in the afternoon, pān of the finest quality, and dressing in soft clothes (Mattavilāsaprahasana, p. 12: bhōh paramakāravatya bhavodā tahāpana pāśadesu vāso, suvikhasayyesu pujjarikesu saanaṃ, puvaṃhe bhoanaṃ, avaraṇhe surasaṇi pāṇāṇi, paṇcasugandhovaḥaṇiṃ (em. Shastri, also supported by the mss. used by Unni in his edition (Mattavilāsa Prahasana of Mahendravikramavarman, ed. and tr. by Dr. N.P. Unni, Trivandrum, 1974, p.49.)) tamboḷaṃ, saṇhavasaṇaparīdhānapaṇaḥ ti edehi uva-deshei bhikkhusaṅghassā aṇuggahāṃ karanteṇa...). But if the Lord is so provident, and especially if he is omniscient (that is, omniscient in the matters of both mokṣa and sukha), why has he omitted booze and women from his Teaching? (Ibid.: ...kīṣoḥu itthiāparīgyo surāvānakāravāṇo ca na ṅīṭṭhaṇo? ahava khaṇaṃ savvaṇjño edaṃ nā pekkhadi?) Or is it possible that something went wrong in the course of the transmission of the text? Or rather the surly old monks envy the younger brethren these pleasures? As a conclusion the bhikṣu draws up a programme, which reminds us of contemporary debates about the original teaching of the Buddha (and even the efforts of modern philologists to find their own ideas reflected in ancient texts): ‘Let’s find the codex archetypus and let’s prepare a complete critical edition!’ (Ibid.: kahim ṇu hu avināthamūlapāṭhaṇaṃ samāśādeam.)

1.56 with a bamboo staff in his hand Cf. Manu-smṛti 4.35–36.

1.57 standing here According to Pischel (§266), iha is a false form in Sauraseni, although Hemacandra (4.268) permits it beside idha.

1.62 The Mīmāṁsaka’s career starts as a glorious campaign against heretics, but by the fourth act it will prove to be a complete failure for the representatives of Vedic orthodoxy (verse 1): sarvā eva hi yathāśātīta ime snātakaśya dhig apārthaḥkam śrutam [OFFICIANT.] ‘For all of these [heretic sects] have remained as they were. Shame on the useless learning of the Graduate!’

1.63 Shuddhodana’s son The Mīmāṁsaka looks upon the Buddha as simply the mortal son of a human king; cf. Nyāyamañjarī I 644.8: nanu buddhah śuddhanayasa rājīṇo ‘patyam, sa katham īśvaro bhavet?

1.70 O what a charming monastery! The following description of a gorgeous Buddhist monastery might seem exaggerated, but we know from Kalhana that several Kashmirian vihāras were very rich indeed owing to generous donations, e.g. the Rājavihāra, the foundation of Lalitāditya (Rājatarangini 4.200), who also presented a glorious copper statue of the ‘Great Buddha’ (ibid. 4.203); his minister Caṅkuṇa also supported the building of a vihāra and a stūpa, and had golden Buddha-images made as well (ibid. 4.211). Another telling example is the beginning of the
last chapter of Kṣemendra’s *Avadānakalpalatā*, which was actually written by his son, Somendra (*Avadānakalpalatā*, 108: Jivitavāhanāvadāna). In the first verse Somendra muses upon the beautiful paintings depicting the Buddha’s glorious deeds. These paintings used to decorate ‘cavities (cells?, niches?) shining with gold’ (*kanakacitraghāgṛhaṇa*) in a courtyard belonging to the Great Vihāra (*uruvihāra*). But in the following stanza Somendra tells us that his father composed the *Avadānakalpalatā* as a kind of substitute for these pictures, ‘lest mankind be agitated because of their loss’ (*mā bhūt tadvirahākulaṃ jagad iti*). The treasures of the Buddhist monasteries often aroused the interest of Kashmirian kings, who plundered and sometimes, just for good measure, even burnt down some of the vihāras. These atrocities became more frequent from the end of the 10th century according to the *Rājataraṅginī*, e.g. in the reign of Kṣemagupta (6.171 seqq.), and especially that of king Harṣa (7.1097 seqq.). King Śaṅkaravarman, whom Jayanta served as an advisor (*amātya*), often resorted to confiscations in order to fill his treasury (*Rājataraṅginī* 5.165 seqq.), and vihāras like the one described by the *snātaka* and his pupil could easily become a choice morsel for the king. On the other hand, the high taxes introduced during his reign were probably very effective in holding back the rich from further donations.

1.71 full of grass As Dr Isaacson pointed out to me, Vallabhadeva glosses *kaśavanti* in his commentary ad *Raghuvaṃśa* 14.28 as *śadvalacitāni*. The description suggests a place that is ideal for assignations.

1.73 This verse (very appropriate from the mouth of a Vedic graduate) must have brought to the audience’s mind the well-known description of the Cosmic Tree (*Ṛgveda* 1.24.7, *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 6.1, *Bhagavadgītā* 15.1 seqq.), and the other famous Vedic image of the two birds nestling on the same tree (*Ṛgveda* 1.164.20, *Mundaka Upaniṣad* 3.1 seqq.).

1.74 gentle *maīa* is a Māhārāṣṭrī form, Śauraseni has *miu* for Sanskrit *mṛdu* (Pischel §52).

1.76 futile *Ex conj.*, cf. 1.140 where we have almost certainly a corruption in the manuscripts: ° *vandyaśitmanah* for ° *vandyāśitmanah*. As Prof. Sanders has pointed out to me, confusing unaspirated and aspirated voiced consonants is a common error of the Kashmirian manuscript transmission. If we accept the reading of the manuscripts, we should take *vandye* ‘commendable’ in an ironical sense. Or, as Dr Isaacson suggests in a letter of 5. xi. 2002, ‘it might be possible to interpret the idea as being that the rich people are actually trying to follow a praise-worthy path, not that of Buddhism, but that of religion überhaupt, or of charity, donating to the religious. But despite this commendable intention they are led astray by the Buddhist *viṣas*.’
1.77 Even if this religion is a sham... On the use of the particle *kila* at the head of a sentence, see Goodall 1998, p.169, n.26, mentioning other occurrences, e.g. *Nyāyamañjarī* I 631.16–17: *kila dvividho vedah śrūyaṁañah anumīyaṁañaṁ ca*.

1.77 cultivation of meditation On *samādhibhāvanā* see *Abhidharmakośa* 8.27 and *bhāṣya* *ad loc.* (ed. Pradhan, p. 451).

1.78 seem According to Pischel (§143, §336, see also Vararuci 12.24, Purusottama 9.29), ‘*via* is the single prevailing form in Śauraseni and Māgadhi’ for Sanskrit *iva*, while Māhārāṣṭri, Ardhamāgadhi, and Jaina-Māhārāṣṭri have *va*, *vva* (*Pischel* §92, §143). In Hemacandra’s grammar we find the following general rule (2.182): *miva piva viva va via ivārthe vāj*

1.79 if they noticed us Brahmanical invective against Buddhism insinuates that as soon as Buddhist monks think they are out of the range of the pious Adībrāhmīns’ severe sight, they fling themselves wholeheartedly into pleasures. Public censure is the only retarding force: the *bhikṣu* in the *Mattavilāsaprāhasana* (who has already expressed his will to reform Buddhism in order to include more pleasure) is afraid to drink boozes because ‘many people / great, exemplary people will see’, *mahājano pekkhisadi* (p.16).

1.81ff. The following denigrating description of life in a Buddhist monastery has many parallels in Sanskrit literature. A popular anonymous quatrain gives a kind of distillate of the stereotypical slurs directed against Buddhist monks: *bhikṣo kanṭhā ślathā te nanu śaparavadhe jālikaisātsi matsyāṁs te ‘mi madhyavadaṁśaḥ pibasi madhu sāmanu veśyāya yāsi veśyāṁ| dattvārāṁ gale ‘āṅgriṁ kimu tava rippavo bhittibhṛttarsi yasyaṁ cauras tvam dyātahetoh katham asi kitavo yena dāsīsuto ‘smy|| ‘Monk, your rags are loose!’ ‘Surely it serves as a net for killing carp.’ ‘You eat fish?’ ‘It is a side-dish to go along with wine.’ ‘You drink wine?’ ‘Together with whores.’ ‘You go to whores?’ ‘After putting my foot on the throat of my enemies.’ ‘You have foes?’ ‘Those in whose wall I’ve made a breach.’ ‘You are a burglar?’ ‘Because of gambling.’ ‘What? You are a gamester?’ ‘Since I am the son of a servant-maid!’

We find this verse in two Kashmirian texts, and in Haribhadrasūri’s *vṛtti* to the *Dasaveyāliya-sutta* (8th century). This latter commentary by a Jain author enframes the poem in a story about a false ascetic (see Bollée 1974:39, n.65. Unfortunately the text was not at my disposal.). The *Lokaprakāśa*, which was attributed to the Kashmirian polygraph Kṣemendra, but which is rather a ‘guide book for everyday transactions for people during the 17th century in Kashmir’ (*Lokaprakāśa*, p.1), places the stanza at the end of a section listing various kinds of rascals (ibid. p.57). An earlier Kashmirian text in which we find this verse denouncing a certain monk is
the hāsyā-section of Vallabhadeva’s Subhāṣītāvalī (No. 2402, I was quoting the quatrain according to this source).

The hero of the poem declares, somewhat proudly, or at least as if speaking about the most natural way of life, that he has actually broken all the fundamental moral precepts (pañcaśīlāni; since he is a gambler, we can be quite sure that he often cheats and lies as well) that are compulsory even for upāsakas, not to speak of bhikṣus. And the way this ‘confession’ blossoms out is also very Buddhistic: the necessary concatenation of ‘meat—wine—sex—poker—villainy’ forms a mock-causal sequence parroting one of the pillars of Buddhist philosophy: the pratītya-samutpāda (as Siegel has already observed in Siegel 1989:211). Just as we arrive at avidyā as the ‘basic root’ of all other nidānas, in the same way, after peeling off the outer layers to get to the kernel, our bhikṣu finally announces the fundamental cause of all his vices: ‘I am the son of a slave’. The audience (naturally anti-Buddhist, and accepting the orthodox Brahmanical values such as cāturvarṇya) laughs at the bhikṣu: ‘Of course he is a rogue, what else can you expect from a lowborn?’ And what else could you expect from a religion that admits such lowborn rascals?

1.81 *ex conj.* Isaacson.

1.83 It is the same ‘lack of restraint’ which horrifies the son of a Buddhist merchant in a story of the Kashmirian Somadeva’s *Kathāsaritsāgara*. The son despises his father and calls him ‘criminal’ (pāpa) for short, and when his father asks him why, the son launches an invective which is a typical example of orthodox Brahmanical aversion towards Buddhism (*Kathāsaritsāgara*, 6.1.18–20):

\[
\begin{align*}
tātu, \text{ tyaktatrayidharmas tvam adharmaṇ apnēvase} & \\
yad brāhmaṇān paritvāya śramaṇān śaśvad arci & \\
svāmādhiṣṭānair vikalasātanalapāḥ & \\
apastasāśikhaśeṣakeṣakaupināsusthitāḥ & \\
vihārābpalaḥāya sarve ‘py adhamajātayaḥ & \\
yam āśrayanti kim tena saunatena nayena te? &
\end{align*}
\]

‘My father, in that you disregard the brāhmaṇas and always honour Buddhist mendicants, you have abandoned the religion of the three Vedas and follow anti-religion. What has that doctrine of Sugata got to do with you, to which all kinds of low-caste men attach themselves, in order to fulfil their desire to live in a vihāra (or: in a place of pleasure), men who are devoid of restraints like bathing and the rest, who long to eat whenever they please, who feel content having discarded their loin-cloth and all their hair including the lock of hair [on the crown of the head]?’

Brahmanical criticism accused Buddhists of denying caste distinctions only to justify their illicit relations with low-caste women. The Jain mendicant in the *Laṭākamela*aka, a prahasana from the 11th century, tries to keep away from the bhikṣu who is ‘polluted by the touch of people belonging to improper castes’ (asadisajādīphamsadūsido, p. 25). ‘O, you fool, there is no caste at all!’ replies the bhikṣu, so how could his favourite
washerwoman sweetheart pollute him, especially if there is no permanent Self?

1.84 **buxom** *thora* is Māhārāṣṭri for Sanskrit *sthūla*, in Śaurasenī one would expect *sthūla* (Pischel §127).

1.86 **masquerading as “fruit juice”** One might consider accepting the reading of the manuscripts (*pakvarasaśabdanihnuta-madyapadesām*, ‘which is concealed behind the word “fruit-juice”, [but] the [real] name of which is booze’.

Satire insinuates not just that Buddhist monks run after women and drink wine, but also (what is even worse) that they pretend the opposite. Hypocrisy is one of the most important targets of satire, and especially that of the Sanskrit satirical monologue, the *bhāṇa*. When the *vīṇa* in the *Padmaprābhṛṭaka* notices a *bhikṣu* hurrying out of the courtyard of a courtesan, it is not Buddhism that he attacks in the first place, but the depraved behaviour of the monk: ‘O, how excellent is the Buddha’s teaching, which is being honoured day by day, even if such false, uselessly shaved monks spoil it! Or rather, the water of a sacred place is not spoiled because crows have drunk from it.’ (*Padmaprābhṛṭaka*, p. 36 (23.5ff.): *aho sāriṣṭhatā buddhaśāsanaṣya, yad evamvidhāraḥ api vythāmanādair asad-bhikṣubhir upahanyamānaṁ pratyanah ābhipsyajyata eva. athavā na vā-yasocchitāṁ tirthajalam upahatam bhavati. Although we might suspect a slight irony in the background, the real target here is the individual, and not religion as such.) The monk perceives him and tries to beat it, but the *vīṇa* does not want to miss his chance: ‘He will not get off unhurt from the range of my word-arrows!’ (Ibid. 23.10: *mama vākṣaragocarāḥ aksato na yasyati.*) So he addresses the *bhikṣu*: ‘Hey, monastery-zombie, where are you going now, alarmed like an owl by daylight?’ (Ibid. 23.13: *aho vihāravetālā kvedānīm udhiḥ ieva divā śāṅkitaś carasi?) The monk gives the worst possible answer: ‘I am just coming from the vihāra.’ (Ibid. 23.14: *sāmpraṭaḥ vihārād āgacchāmite.*) This is just fuel to the *vīṇa*’s fire: ‘I know that your reverence’s frequenting the monastery (or: your addiction to pleasures, vihāraśilatā) is genuine!’ (Ibid. 23.15: *bhūtārtham jāne vihāraśilatāṁ bhadantaśya!) The *bhikṣu* is still in denial: ‘I have come to comfort with the Buddha’s words Saṅghadāsikā, who is afflicted by the death of her mother.’ (Ibid. 23.18–19: *mātrayāpatidīkhitāṁ saṅghadāsikāṁ buddhavacanāṁ paryavasthāpayitur agato ’smīti. Cf. Siegel (1989:212–213): ‘It is insinuatingly ambiguous as to just what “to comfort” means, just as it is ambiguous as to just how the girl “serves” the brotherhood. The equivocality between the incongruous spheres of experience, the religious and the erotic, creates the comic tension.’) ‘A monk who enters the courtyard of a courtesan, either out of [a moment of] delusion or even by accident, is of no account, like the OM. used in the *sūtras* of Dattaka,’ (Ibid. 24: *veṣyāṇiganam praviśta mohād bhikṣur yadṛccayā vāpi na bhrājate prayukto dattakasūtreṣu ivonikārahāṁ|) remarks the *vīṇa* with an edge. But
the bhikṣu still shields himself with the Buddha’s teaching: ‘Forgive me, sir, but surely one should be kindly disposed towards all beings.’ (Ibid. 24.1: ṁarṣayatu bhavān nanu sarvasattvesu prasannacittena bhavitavyam iti.) Finally the viṭa becomes tired of such a great hypocrisy, especially when the monk tries to escape under the well-known pretext that he must not miss breakfast-time, because ‘one should also avoid eating at the inappropriate time’ (ibid. p.37 (24.8): gacchāmy aham akālabbojanam api parihāram iti). ‘Ha, ha! That crowns all!’ explodes the viṭa. ‘That’s all that was wanting: the meal-time of this monk is running out, although he has never transgressed the five precepts! Beat it!’ (Ibid. 24.9: hi hi sarvar maraṇa etad avaśīṣtam askhalitapaṇcaśikṣāpadasya bhikṣoḥ kālabhojanam atikrāmati. dhvaṇasasa.) And the bhikṣu dashes off, perhaps with a sigh of relief.


1.88ff. The following two verses are in Māhārāṣṭri.

1.88 The faces of the maidservants corresponding to the beverage and their blue eyes to the water-lily (this interpretation was suggested by Dr. Benson).

1.97 ex conj. The word te in the manuscripts looks superfluous, and can be explained by dittography.

1.101 ex conj. The Monk will clearly protest against the use of the genitive case.

1.103 The grammatical rule in question is Aṣṭādhyāyī 1.4.29: ākhyātopavyoge. Patañjali’s examples for the use of śra- with the genitive case-ending are (Mahābhāṣya ad loc.): nātasya śrṇoti, granthikasya śrṇoti]
1.104 teaching ex conj. SANDERSON. Adding a word with a similar meaning to the sentence seems to be necessary.

1.108 raving ex conj. ISAACSON.

1.108 cultivating the doctrine that... ex conj. ISAACSON.

1.108 Jayanta remarks in the Nyāyamañjarī that animal sacrifices prescribed in the Veda often deter the tender-hearted who may say, ‘What would impiousness be [in a scripture] in which slaughtering living beings is a meritorious duty?’ (Nyāyamañjarī I 642.11–12: yatra prāṇivadho dharmas tvadharmah tatra kādrśaḥ?)

1.118 with a noisy mass I supply again vacah and take kathādambaraṁ as a bahuvrīhi. Otherwise ervoir dambaraṁ (neuter) does not seem to be in the right gender; on the other hand, its emendation means that we have to emend heyaṁ and reservoir práyaṁ as well.

1.118 Jayanta recommends the use of vāda in the Nyāyamañjarī as follows (Nyāyamañjarī I 27.1–3): vāde tu vicāryamaṇo nyāgaḥ samśayaçchedane-nādhyavasāvabodham adhyavasīlabhyanujñāṇa va vidhadhat tattvapariśuddhim ādadhātiti vītarāgaḥ šiśyasabrahmacāribhis saha vādaḥ prayokta-vyāḥ| ‘In a discussion, however, the way of argumentation, inasmuch as it is examined, produces the realisation of what has been determined and the consensus in what has been determined through removing the uncertainties, and thus it brings about the faultless ascertainment of reality. On these grounds the wise who have subdued their passions should enter into discussion with their disciples and with their fellow-scholars.’ But on certain occasions other kinds of debate may prove to be more useful (ibid. 4–6): jalapavitaṇḍe tu duṣṭatārkgoparacitakapaṭādīśavādādambaraṁ-srūṣyaśānasaranālakṣamāśīśuṣanena taddhīṛdayasthatattvajñāṇasañcrāyakṣa-ṇāya kvacid avasare vītarāgasyāpy uṣpayujyete| ‘On some occasions, however, even the wise who have subdued their passions may find it suitable to use wrangling dispute and destructive criticism in order to protect the knowledge of reality which exists in the heart of the tender-minded, through fortifying them when they are frightened by the noisy arrogance of deceitful objections concocted by a vicious logician.’

1.140 The Graduate’s objection asserts that the Buddhist sattvānumāna is not valid because of the fault of asādhaṁānaśāṅkāntikatā, ‘the impossibility of drawing a conclusion due to exclusiveness [of the logical reason]’. The classical example of this fallacy is the fifth syllogism in Diṅnāga’s hetucakra: ‘śabdo nityāḥ śrūṣyaṇatvāḥ| ‘Sound is eternal because of its audibility.’ The problem with this syllogism is that the hetu (logical reason or middle term: ‘audibility’) belongs exclusively to the paksā (subject or minor term: ‘sound’), and therefore it is impossible to produce an example (dryṣṭānta) which is different from the paksā. In the case of sattvānumāna (‘everything is momentary because of its existence’), we face a similar problem, since
all existing things are part of the *pākṣa*, and nothing else is left to serve as a similar instance (*sapākṣa*). On the other hand, the Buddhist cannot show a counterexample (*vipākṣa*) either, the thing which does not possess the *hetu* being non-existent in this case. (Compare with the standard Indian example of syllogism: ‘this mountain is fire-possessing, because it is smoke-possessing, like a kitchen (*sapākṣa*), unlike a pond (*vipākṣa*)’. Cf. Mimaki 1976, pp. 46ff.

1.141. This means that it is possible to show the concomitance of *sattva* and *kṣaṇikatva* in the following way: ‘something that is not momentary, does not exist’.

1.142 The second half of this verse clearly contains Buddhist arguments, which are based on accepting *vyātirekavyāpti*, therefore Prof. Sanderson’s conjecture seems to be justified.

1.142 The Monk replies to the Graduate’s objection by putting forward the *sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa*, ‘a means of valid cognition which refutes the [possibility of the] opposite of the property to be proven [co-occurring with the proving property, i.e. the logical reason (*hetu*)]’. In the case of *sattvānudāna*, this means to establish that the assertion ‘something that is not momentary, exists’ is not valid. Dharmakīrti formulates the argument in the following way (*Hetubindu* p. 4*-3–7*): anvayaniścayo ’pi svabhāvahetau sādhyadharmanā yastutastabdhaḥjāyā sādhanadharmabhāvanāṁubandhasiddhiḥ| sā sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇavarttiḥ yathā yat tad kṣaṇikam eva, aksaṇikatve ‘ṛṭakriyāvīrodhāt tallakaṣaṇaṁ vastutavam hiyate| ‘As for the determination of the positive concomitance in the case of the inherent nature being the logical reason, it is proving that the [presence of the] property to be established is connected with the mere presence of the proving property, because [the property to be established] is in reality the inherent nature of that [thing which possesses the proving property]. This [proving] is the operation of a valid cognition which refutes [the co-presence of] the logical reason in the case of the opposite of the property to be established. For instance: Anything that exists is momentary without exception. If it were not momentary, since [the condition of being non-momentary] contradicts causal efficacy, it would lack the condition of being an entity, which [condition] is characterised by that [causal efficacy].’ (Cf. Yoshimizu 1999, p. 234.)

1.146 See note ad 1.50. Kumārila highlights the same problem when he claims that the theory of *vāsanās* is incompatible with the postulated momentariness of cognitions (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyaṭīkā*) nirālambanavāda 181cd–185ab):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{kṣaṇikeṣu ca cittese vināše ca nirnaye} & | \\
\text{vāsyavāsakayoś caivam asāhityān na vāsanā} & | \\
\text{pūrvakṣaṇaṁ anutpanno vāsyate nottarāḥ kṣaṇaḥ} & | \\
\text{uttarenā vināṣṭatvān na ca pūrvasya vāsanā} & |
\end{align*}
\]
sahitye ca (v.l. 'pi) tayor naiva sambandho 'stity avasana]
kshanikatvad devashyapi vyaparo na parasparam|
vinasyc ca katha vasu vasyate 'nyena nasyat]
avasthitah hi vasyante bhavah bhavair avasthitaih|

'Since cognitions are momentary and since they perish without a trace, and since the one that receives the imprint and the other that imparts it do not exist simultaneously, there can be no impression. The subsequent [cognition-phase], which has not yet arisen, cannot be imprinted by the preceding [cognition-phases], and the preceding [cognition-phase] cannot receive any impression from the subsequent one, since it has already perished. And even if they existed simultaneously, there could be no connection [of any of the accepted types, e.g. samyoga, samavaya] between them, and thus there can be no impression. Since both [cognition-phases] are momentary, they cannot operate on each other. How could something which is being destroyed be imprinted by another [thing] which is [also] being destroyed? For [only] enduring entities are imprinted by [other] enduring entities.'

1.147 The same objection is sprung on Ñantaraksita (Tattvasaṅgraha 500):
etenaiva prakāraṇa sāṃtyādinām asambhavah|
ekādhikārāṇahavat kṣaṇakṣayisu vastuṣu]

'In the same way [as we have shown that 'bondage' and 'liberation' is interpretable only if there is a single substratum: the Self,] remembrance etc. would also be impossible if things were momentary, since there would be no single substratum.' (As Kāmalāśīla points out in his commentary, Mr. Smith would experience something and Mr. Brown would remember it.)

The Buddhist, however, maintains that causality is sufficient to ensure such operations as memory (ibid. 501–503):

atrābhidhīyate sarve (: conj., ed.: sarva-) kāryakārayatāsthitau
satyāṃ avāhata ete sitdhanty eva (: conj., ed.: evam) nirātmasū]
yathā hi niyatā śaktir bijāder aṅkūrādīsu
anvayātmaviyoge 'pi tathaivādhyātmike sthitih]
pāramparyena sākṣād vā kavcit kūcic dhi śaktimati

tataḥ karmaphalādiṇāṁ sambandha upapadyate]

'We answer this objection as follows: if the relation between effect and cause is present, then all these [operations such as memory] are truly established, without any hindrance, [even] if things do not have a Self. For just as the capacity of seeds etc. is restricted to [bringing about] sprouts etc., even if they do not have an [enduring] essence that could be connected [with both seed and sprout], the same is true about mental [operations]. For [only] a particular thing has the capacity [to cause a particular effect] at a particular time, either indirectly or directly. That is why relations such as that of action and result are possible.'

Ibid. 509–510:
atrocyate dvitiye hi kṣaṇe kāryaṃ prajāyate|
prathame kāraṇam jātam avinaṣṭaṁ tadā ca tat∥
ksanikatvā tu tat kāryaṁkaṇākle na vartate
vyttau vā viphalaṁ kāraṇaṁ niṣṭṛtaṁ tad yatās tadā∥

‘We answer [your objections] as follows: the effect follows in the second moment. In the first [moment] the cause arises, and then [i.e. at that moment] it does not perish. But since it is momentary, it does not exist at the moment of the effect. Or if it did exist, it would be useless, since the effect has already been accomplished by then.’

Ibid. 516–517:
na hi tat kāraṇam atmiyaṁ samdaṁśeneva kāraṇam|
ghītva janayaty etad yaugapadyaṁ yato bhavet∥
nāpī gādhaṁ samāśinyga prakṛtiṁ jāyate phalam∥
kāmīva dayitaṁ (; em., ed.: dayita) ye na sakṛdhāvas tayor bhavet∥

‘For this cause does not produce that effect by seizing it as if with a pair of tongs, since this would mean that [cause and effect exist] simultaneously. Nor does the effect arise embracing closely its cause as a lover [embraces] his beloved, as a result of which they would exist at the same moment.’

Ibid. 521:
yā añantarayaniyamah saivāpeksābhidiyaye
kāryodaye sadā bhavo vyāpāraḥ kāraṇasya ca∥

‘It is the necessity of immediate succession that is said to be the ‘dependence’ [of the effect on its cause]. And the ‘operation’ of the cause with respect to the arising of the effect is always its [mere] presence / existence.’

We have already seen (note ad 1.50) that according to Dharmakīrti the condition of being the object of cognition is nothing but the condition of being the cause which imprints its form on cognition. In the Śvaṛṭṭi he provides a detailed analysis (p. 149,21–150,2):

ye kadācita kvaicit kenacīj jñātaṁ santo na jñayante teṣaṁ sattānubandhī nāśa iti brūmāḥ ta eva kṛtakā anityaṇaḥ sādhyaṁ| na hy ayaṁ sambhavo ’sti yat te jñāna-jnanasvabhāvaṁ punar anasta na jañayeyar apekṣeran va param| tajjananasvabhāvasya nispatteha na ca teṣu anapekṣeṣu kṣayacat kadācita kriṣṭa jñānaṁ niṣṭaraṇa| na caivaṁbhūtaṁ kiṁcitaṁ asaṁvekṣāḥ| sarvasya kenacīj kadacīj jñānaṁ| jñānamātrārthakriṣṭaye apiy asamarttiṁ vastu eva na saṁjñāḥ| tathā hi tattākṣaṇam vastu iti vakṣyaṁ| tasya ca vaṁśāvyabhācaḥ sarvaṁ sattānubandhī| ‘We say that the perishing of those things which, having been cognised sometime somewhere by somebody, are not cognised, is attached to [their] existence. It is these things that are produced [and] are proved to be impermanent. For it is not possible that those things, which have the inherent nature of producing cognition, could, while not yet destroyed, not produce [cognition], or that they would require some other [assisting factor], since [their] inherent nature, which is producing that [i.e. cognition], is complete. And, since they do not require [some assisting cause], [theoretically] no cognition would ever cease for anyone. But nothing like that [actually] takes place, for everything is cognised by some particular person at a particular time. [Therefore these cognisable entities must perish.] If [something] were incapable even to perform the action of merely [producing] cogni-
tion, then it would not even be an entity. To explain, we shall teach that an entity is characterised by that [i.e. arthakriyāśaritvā]. And since this [entity] necessarily perishes, it [i.e. perishing] is attached to existence.' (I am following Yoshimizu’s interpretation in Yoshimizu 1999, p. 244f.)

In Ratnakirti’s Sthirasiddhiśāstra we find a detailed illustration of the operation of causality in the stream of consciousness (118,14 in Mimaki 1976, p. 164):

\[tathā hi upādānopādeyabhāvasthitacittasatantim apy āśrītyeyam vyavasthā sustheta katham ātmānān pratvyujīvantān tatra kāryakāraṇa-bhāvaprāptītāh ātma anākulāḥ tathāpi prābhāvavasthunīścayajñānāsya upādeyabhūtena tadārthitaṁ kāryagarbheṇa paścābhbāvavastujñānenaṁ sattidān bhavatītī niścayo janyate \]

‘To explain, the determination [of the ascertainment of causality] is also well-established resorting to the stream of consciousness which consists in the relation between the material cause and its effect, so why should one resuscitate the Self? First of all, the ascertainment of causality in that [stream] presents no problem. Still [, to go into further details,] the determination [of positive concomitance] in the form of ‘when there is A, there is B’ comes about through a cognition of an object that exists subsequently [CB], which [cognition] is the effect (upādeya) of [another] determining cognition [CA], being the material cause, upādāna of CB of an object that existed previously [A], and which [cognition, i.e. CB] contains the impression imprinted by that [i.e. CA].’ (I am following Mimaki’s interpretation.)

1.149 ex conj. Isaacson. If one follows Raghavan and Thakur’s conjecture, the second sentence requires a masculine subject, and bhoga is the only candidate I could think of. One might also consider conjecturing hetu-phantahāvavasās tu ko ’pi.

1.149 Kumārila argues that causality does not work in the way the Buddhist imagines it (Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyaśāstra) śūnyavāda 171cd–172ab):

\[santānāntaravac caisām niśedhyā hetusādhyaśā vāsyāșakabāhavā ca jñānatvād ekasantaravā\]

‘The condition of being cause or effect and the relation between something that receives an imprint and something that imparts it must be rejected between these [cognitions in] the same continuum, since they are cognitions, just as [cognitions in] another continuum.’

Ibid. 176cd–177cd:

\[citrajñānām taduddhātajanāmāṃśagrāhyabodhakam\]
\[jñānatvān na bhaved yadvat tasya dehāntarodbhavam\]

‘The cognition of Smith cannot ascertain an object of cognition which is a section of the cognition that has arisen in him, because it is a cognition, just as [a cognition] that has arisen in another body [cannot ascertain] it [i.e. Smith’s cognition].’

Later he shows that whether one denies or accepts the working of causality in the continuum of cognition- phases, this continuum cannot fulfill the role of a stable entity (Ślokavārttika (with Nyāyaratnākara) ātmavāda 33cd–34):

24
Janmāntare 'bhypete 'pi jīnānamatrātmavādinām||
 jīnānāṁ kṣaṇikatvād dhi kartybhoktrayatā bhavet|
 nīṣkriyatvāvibhutvābhāyāṁ na ca dehāntarāśritāh||
 ‘For even though rebirth is accepted [by the Buddhists], the one who acts
 and the one who experiences [the results of this action] would be different
 for those who hold that the ‘Self’ is merely [a stream of] cognitions, be-
cause of the momentariness of [the individual] cognitions [in this stream],
and, since [the cognition-phases] are inactive and not omnipresent, they
cannot attach themselves to another body.’

Ibid. 36–40:
 kartrtvam eva duḥsadhaṁ dirghakālesu karmasu
 satsu jīnāsahasresu kulakalpomam hi tat||
vyatirikto hi santāno yadi nābhūnapagamyate|
santānāṁ anityatvāt kartā kāscin na labhyate||
bhoktār atyantabhādāc ca prasajyetākṛtāgamaṁ|
 kṛtāsāṁ tu na brūnāṁ kṛtāṁ naiva hi kenaṁ||
santānānanyatāṁyāṁ tu vācyaktyantareṇāṁ te|
tatra coktam, na cāvastu santānāṁ kartṛtṛām vṛajet||
santānāksaṇikate ca tad eva, aksaṇikas tv ataha
 siddhāntahāniḥ, evam ca so 'pi dravyāntaram bhavet||
 ‘In the case of activities which require a long time, it is impossible to estab-
lish that there could be any performer at all. For even though there might
be thousands of cognition-phases, [if you say that they are the agent,] this
would be like a ritual procedure [which is performed in stages over several
generations] of a family. For if you do not accept that there is an [entity
called] ‘stream’ [of consciousness] which is separate [from the individual
cognitions], we find no agent because of the impermanence of the mem-
ers of the stream. And since the one that experiences [the result of the
action] is completely different [from the agent], it would follow that one
would attain [the result of] an act one did not perform. As for the loss
of [the result of one’s] action, we do not [even] mention it, since nobody
has performed any action at all. [If you accept that the continuum is a
real entity], if the continuum is not different [from the individual cogni-
tions], then [you would be talking about] these [cognitions] using another
expression, and I have already set forth the objection against this [posi-
tion]. On the other hand [, if you say that the continuum is separate and
permanent,] the continuum cannot become the agent, inasmuch as it is
a non-entity [since only momentary entities exist in your system]. If the
continuum is momentary, then the same [objection would apply as in the
case of momentary cognitions]. If it is not momentary [and still a real
entity], then you would be giving up your own doctrine, and in this way
it would also be a another substance [i.e. the ātman].

Ibid. 43–50:
 santāno 'yaṁ sa eveti na tv abhedād vinā bhavet|
vāyudīpādisantāne vāyuvādār na bhidyate||
jīnānatvenāpy abhinnavatvāṁ śānyavāde nirākṛtām|
‘[If you say that] it is the same continuum [that performed the action]; it cannot be unless [these two] are not separate. In the case of [other] ‘streams’ such as wind or light, the condition of being ‘wind’ etc. is not different [from moment to moment]. As for [your claim that] it is not unchanging inasmuch as it is cognition: this was refuted in the [chapter on] śūnyatāda. And similarly the impression on consciousness which you postulate accounting for a fruit [produced] by actions [has also been refuted]. Furthermore, no cognition remains as long as the impression [exists, since cognitions are momentary]. And the continuum, since it is not a real entity [for you, inasmuch as it is permanent], actions do not leave their imprint on it in any way. Even if [you say that a cognition-phase] arisen in the same [uninterrupted] series experiences the result of the action [performed by another cognition-phase in the same series], without the identity [of the one who acts and the one who experiences the result, the unwanted consequences of] the result [of the result] of something that has been done and the attainment [of the result] of something that has not been done are evident. Furthermore, it is also impossible to prove [that there is a] causality-based difference [of the cognition-phase that experiences the result] from [cognition-phases] arisen in other streams, and the two [above mentioned unwanted consequences] cannot be avoided. Even if there is no [difference caused by causality], you may say that [the above mentioned unwanted consequences] can be avoided in another way, [but then not just the agent cognition-phase and the experiencing cognition-phase would be connected by common characteristics] because [characteristics] such as being in the same earth, or having the same condition of being cognition can be equally applied [to cognitions in other continuums as well]. And to say that something is the ‘same’ is not possible without accepting [its] ‘oneness’. Therefore you are wrong [when you say] ‘it is the stream of that [awareness] from which awareness [the agent-cognition] has arisen’, since the words ‘that—which’ cannot refer to separate things. Therefore those who hold the theory that the Self is the stream of those [cognition-phases] have to accept that [these cognitions] have a single nature.’
1.153 Note the similarity between the Buddhist sādhyaviparyayabādhhakapramāṇa, ‘a means of valid cognition which refutes the [possibility of the] opposite of the property to be proven [co-occurring with the proving property, i.e. the logical reason (hetu)]’, and the Graduate’s claim that ‘the proving property [inheres in a locus that possesses] the opposite of the property to be proved’, sādhyaviparyayasādhnā. In other words, the Buddhist put forth an argument which refuted that non-momentary entities exist, while the Mīmāṃsāsaka proves that only those things exist which are non-momentary, since only permanent things have causal efficacy which is a defining characteristic of existence.

1.159 the cause of a different continuum The Buddhist certainly denies that perishing is an effect (see Abhidharmakośabhāṣya p.193, quoted in note ad 1.48). Dharmakirti also points out that the so-called ‘causes of destruction’ actually produce a different entity (Pramāṇavārttika with svavrtti (Gnoli) p. 141,25–142,3): agha keśṭhaṃ daṇḍena ghaṭa iti vināśahetavo bhāvānam drṣṭante anuvāgyatirekānvidhānāṃ hetutadvato lakṣaṇāṃ āhuh

na pūrvasya svarasanyodhe 'nyasya viśiṣṭapratyayāśrayena vikṛ-tasotpatteh ‘[Opponent:] We see that things have causes for their perishing, for instance a log is [destroyed] by fire, a pot by a staff. The defining characteristic of cause and effect is said to be [their] conformity in presence and absence [e.g. when fire is present, the log is destroyed, when fire is not present, the log remains]. [Buddhist:] You are wrong. For when the previous [thing-phase] perishes due to its own essence, another [thing-phase] arises which is different because it depends on the particular causes [of its coming into being].’

Also Ślokavārttika (with Nyāyaratnakara) sabdaniyatādhikaraṇa 24cd–29ab (presenting the Buddhist position):
hetur yasya vināśo ’pi taṣṇa dyō ’nikūrādivat||
vinaśasya vināśas tu nāsti tasmād akṛtirnīḥ||
śūkṣmaḥ sadṛśasantānvartttaṃ anupalaksitaḥ||
yadā vilakaṇaḥ hetuḥ patet sadṛśasantatāu||
vilakaṇenā kāryena sthūlo ’bhivyayāyate tadā||
tenāsadṛśasantāno hetoḥ saṇjāyate yataḥ||
tenaivākriyamāṇo ’pi nāsā ’bhivyayāyate sphaṭaḥ||

‘Something that has a cause [of its arising] is also observed to perish, just as a sprout [having a seed as its cause]. But perishing does not perish, therefore it is not produced. For from a log, as a result of contact with fire, a [new] continuum of embers comes into being, and from a pot, too, hit by a hammer for instance, shards come about. Perishing, however, is inherent, established as soon as [the thing] arises, subtle, [and] unnoticed because it takes place in a uniform continuum. When a dissimilar cause affects the uniform continuum, because of the dissimilar effect [that is produced],
then [perishing] shows itself to be gross. Thus it is a dissimilar continuum that is produced by the cause, and for this reason perishing, although it is not being produced, is clearly manifested by that very [cause].'

1.160 Possible reference to the view of the Mîmâṁsakas who hold that when one pronounces the eternal śabda, it is only manifested, and not actually produced, so it is different from other effects. Kumārila first shows that for the Buddhist the perishing of a pot is spontaneous, but since it is very subtle, we notice it only when the hammer operates upon it and produces shards (see note ad 1.159 above). Now this goes against the objection made in Mîmâṁsâsūtra 1.1.6 (see Śabarabhāṣya ad loc. (ŚBh(Y) ad 1.1.6, p. 60): prayatnād uttarakālaṃ dṛṣṭyate yatāh, atah prayatnānāntaryāḥ tena kriyate) ‘Since sound śabda is perceived only after the effort [of its utterance], therefore, because it immediately follows the effort, it is produced by that [effort’), since just as perishing is only manifested (according to the Buddhist) by the so-called ‘causes of destruction’, in the same way the eternal sound (śabda) is only manifested, not produced, by utterance (dhvani) (see Ślokaśārttika (with Nyāyaratnākara) śabdaniyatādhiyakaraṇa 29cd–30ab). As Kumārila says (ibid. 42):

yuṣṭā ghaṭāder dīpādīr abhiyānijaka śiyate
cakṣūṣo ‘nugrahād evaṃ dhvaniṣ syac chrotrasaṃskṛte||

‘Just as a lamp for instance is accepted as the manifesting agent of things such as a pot through affecting the eye, in the same way utterance [manifests śabda] through its impression upon the ear.’ (See also ibid. 394 seqq. on the eternal ‘actions’ (kriya, karma) which are not always perceived due to the lack of manifesting agents, but are nevertheless always present in perceptible objects.)

1.166 because the separation of their constituents etc. must inevitably take place. ex conj. Verse 38 in RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s edition is clearly unmetrical, as the editors have already suspected (p. 105: ‘1.38 and II.1.42 are possibly no verse.’). In fact it seems that when the scribe wrote down the second vināśakāraṇam (after na ca nāsti), he jumped back to the first vināśakāraṇam (after yasya hi nāsti), and continued with repeating ākāśāder iva bhavatv asau nityāḥ| kim jātam? na ca nāsti vināśakāraṇam.

1.177 Ślokaśārttika (with Tātparyaṭikā) sūnyavāda 71:

na cātra karanāṇānānagrāhakāravaṇān]
grāhyatvam yena buddheḥ syād abhinnatve |pi pūrvavat||

‘And in this case [i.e. when a form such as blue is being cognised] there is no ascertaining of the forms belonging to the instrument [of cognition], to the cognition [itself], and to the grasping agent, by which [ascertaining] consciousness could become the object of cognition, even though there was no difference [among the object, the subject, and the instrument of cognition], just as in the previous case [i.e. the case of the Self].’

Umbeka’s comm. ad loc. (p. 258): na tv atra nilānubhave nilam ahāvā ity atmatāyā bhāsante nilādayaḥ, ‘nilam’ ity anātmatatī prabhāsanāt||
nātra nālādau karaṇajñānagrāhakaśārvedanam asti, yena buddhir eva nālādau prakāśeta akāśvedanam iti ca karaṇādiṣu pratyekeṣu sambodhyate yadi nālādaya grāhakatvenāvabhasante grāhako vā nālādi-grāhyatayeavabhasate (: conj., 9 seta: ed.), tadā pratibhāsabaleṇābhinnasyaiva prakāśyapraśakābhāvo bhavet 'But in the case of the perception of [colours] such as blue, [these colours] such as blue do not appear [as if] they were [cognition's] own self, in the form of 'I am blue', because they become manifest as being different from [cognition's] own self, in the form of '[this is] blue'.

The ascertaining of the forms belonging to the instrument [of cognition], to the cognition [itself], and to the grasping agent are not included in [the cognition of forms] such as blue, due to which [ascertaining] consciousness alone would shine forth having the nature of [forms] such as blue. As for 'the perception of [their] form': this is connected one by one with the instrument [, the cognition, and the agent]. If [forms] such as blue appeared as the agent of grasping, or the agent of grasping appeared as the object of grasping such as 'blue', then, because of appearing [in that way], it would be an undivided [object-subject] that would [simultaneously] have the nature of the object that is shone on and the subject that shines on.'

Cf. Śābarabhāṣya(F) p. 28,17–30,13.

1.181 For this is the way lights are. Ślokavārttika (with Tatparyāṭikā) sūryavāda 184–187ab:
vyāpyṛtaṁ cāṇyasasmyātāu jñānām nātmānam rcchati
tenā prakāśakatve 'pi bodharyayat pratiṣkṣate

'idrśam vā prakāśātvaṁ tasyārthābhavātmakaṁ
na cātmāṇubhavo 'sty asety ātmano na prakāśakam
sati prakāśakatve 'pi vyavasthā dhṛṣyate yathā
rūpādau ca kāṣṭhārūḍāṁ tathātrāpi bhavisyati
prakāśakatvam bhave 'rthe śaktyābhavāt tu nātmāṁ

'And when cognition is engaged in ascertaining something else [i.e. the object], it does not reach itself. Therefore, although it is an agent which shines on [other things], it expects another [cognition] for being cognised [itself]. Or rather, such is its condition of being a light: it consists in the ascertaining of the object, but there is no ascertaining of itself, so it does not shine on its own self. Just as [sense organs] such as the faculty of sight, even though they do have the nature of shining on [other things], are seen to be restricted to [their objects] such as colour, it will be in the same way in this case, too [i.e. in the case of cognition]: its condition of being the agent of illuminating [operates] upon the external object, but not upon its own self, because it is not capable [of doing that].'

See also Umbeka's comm. ad loc. (p. 284): anātmavisaśyaṁ caitasya prakāśakatvam, nātmavisaśyam, yato 'nilam idam' iti pratibhāsah, na punar 'nilam abham' iti 'idrśam' iti 'Its [i.e. cognition's] condition of being the agent of illuminating has as its object things that are not [cognition] itself, [and] it does not have [cognition] itself as its object [or freer: its il-
luminating is directed towards what is not itself, not towards itself, since
there is an appearance in the form of ‘this is blue’, and not in the form of
‘I am blue’; that is why [Kumārila] says “[Or rather], such is . . .”.’ (See
also Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyaṭīkā), śūnyavāda 65–67.)

1.181 ‘The three lights illuminate themselves and other things.’ Cf.
Śvapajñāvṛtti ad Vākyapadīya 1.12 (VP(V) 1966, p. 43): 

\[\text{sha triṇī jyotiṃstṛtayāḥ prakāśāḥ svārūpapravṛtayor avadyotakāḥ} \]
\[\text{tad yathā, yo 'yam jātaveda yaś ca puruṣasya āntarāḥ prakāśo yaś ca prakāśāprakāśayoh prakāśayitā śabdākyah prakāśab} \] 

‘In this world there are three lustres, three lights which illuminate their own form and the form of other things: namely, that which is [called] jātavedas [i.e. fire], that which is the inner light inside men [i.e. consciousness], and that which illuminates both shining entities [that is all the three lights] and non-shining ones [e.g. pots], and which light is called ‘word’.

1.181 But it is not really cognition that shines forth then . . . Cf. Ślo-

kavārttika (with Tātparyaṭīkā) śūnyavāda 74:

\[\text{yadā tu grāhyam ākāraṃ niśādi pratipadyate} \]
\[\text{na tadā grāhakākārā samvittir drśyate kvacit} || \]

‘But when [consciousness] ascertains the form that is to be grasped, such as blue, consciousness, which has the form of the grasping agent, is seen nowhere.’

1.181 And forms such as blue . . . ex conj. Similar sentence-structure in Nyā-

yamaniyārī I 611.11–12: nāpy anumānam, anvayaṅyatirekābhyaṃ tṛtipho-

janayor eva svargayāgayaḥ sādhyaśādhanasambandhānavadānātāl Another
possible conjecture was suggested by Isaacson: anvayaṅyatirekābhyaṃ
tasya gotvāvad abodharāpatvāvadānātāl itī

This argument can be compared with the following passage in the Ślo-
kavārttika (Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyaṭīkā) śūnyavāda 130–132):

\[\text{atha saty api bhinnatve grāhyam jānāntaram vade}t \]
\[\text{jānāntve tasya kā yuktih pūrvvoktā yadi sesyate} \]
\[\text{jānānā jānām itityātma tu na dvayor anuvartate} \]
\[\text{vyātiriktaṃ ca sāmānyam tvayaḥ nābhupagamyate} || \]
\[\text{vyātireke tayoś cesta (: this is the reading of three manuscripts as} || \]

Dr Kataoka pointed out to me in an e-mail of 19.x.2001;
Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyaṭīkā) has grāhyagṛāhakayoḥ cesta, while Ślokavārttika (with Kāśikā) reads vyātireke tayo jānānā
na jānāntmakatā bhavet
\[\text{tadṛṣparahitatve ca jānāhāvah prasajyate} || \]
\[\text{If [the opponent] said that, even though [the subject and the object of cognition are] different, [still] the object is another cognition—what is the argument for that [i.e. the object] being cognition? If [the opponent replies that it is] the [reason] mentioned before [namely just a matter of usage], this [ground] is accepted. But we do not have a recurrent cognition [anuvṛtti] of both [object and subject and cognition] in this way:} ||
‘[this one is] cognition [and the other one is also] cognition’; besides you do not assent to a general property which is separate. And [if the Buddhist accepted the existence of the general property of jñānatva, and] if he held that they [i.e. grāhya and grāhaka] are [completely] separate [from jñānatva], then [neither of them] could have the nature of cognition. And since [neither of them] has the character of [cognition], it follows that cognition does not exist [at all].’ (In the following verses Kumārila refutes various attempts of his Buddhist opponent to connect jñāna with both grāhya and grāhaka.)

1.185 As we shall see, the Graduate is going to postpone bathing again, because he cannot help entering into a discussion with potential opponents, which also means that he is postponing lunch, to the great regret of his pupil.
The theme of the following praveśaka is not without parallels in Sanskrit dramatic literature. Among the dramatists preceding Jayanta one might think of two examples: Harṣa’s Nāgānanda and Bhavabhūti’s Mālatīmādhava. In Bhavabhūti’s play Makaranda, in the disguise of Mālati, is wedded to Nandana, and later he rudely repulses his impassioned ‘husband’ on the bridal night (Act 7). The third act of Harṣa’s play provides a closer parallel which may well have served as a model for Jayanta. The drunken viṭā enters the garden to meet his ladylove. Meanwhile the vidūṣaka puts on a red garment to disguise himself as a woman in order to mislead the bees in the same garden. The viṭā naturally mistakes him for his sweetheart, embraces the vidūṣaka and offers him some chewed pān. When the unhappy vidūṣaka tries to get rid of his ‘lover’, the viṭā falls at his feet to conciliate ‘her’. At this moment the viṭā’s real beloved appears and witnesses with astonishment that her man is lying at the feet of another woman. Then she quickly realises that that ‘other woman’ is actually the vidūṣaka, and decides to make fun of both of them. When the unlucky vidūṣaka unveils himself he is insulted by the viṭā’s servant who even breaks his sacred thread. And his tortures have not come to an end yet: the viṭā’s girlfriend demands him to bow at her feet, which the poor vidūṣaka, having lost his sacred thread and not being able to recall any Vedic mantras, cannot refuse to do on the strength of his brahmanhood.

The Servant speaks Māgadhī, the Mendicant and the Nun speak Śauraserenī.

Both the reading of the manuscripts (viśaṃcate) and RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s emendation (viśaṃcaye, post correctionem) is unmetrical. (The verse is in viyogini metre.)

RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. The reading of the manuscripts (vaṃṭhaṇavāsī, sing. gen./instr. fem.?) is unmetrical.

(see Pischel §310, §498, Hemacandra 4.289.)

The correct Māgadhī form of Sanskrit bhaṭṭakah should be bhaṭṭake according to Hemacandra 4.290 (see Pischel §271), bhaṭṭake according to Rāmaśārman 2.2.16, and it may be bhaṭṭake according to Puruṣottama 12.10.

Both Puruṣottama (12.8) and Rāmaśārman (2.2.15) remark that the consonants of Sanskrit kṣa are
reversed in Māgadhī (i.e. it becomes ska). A parallel phenomenon which might be worthy of note is that the name of king Huviśka sometimes appears as Huvakṣa or Huviśka in inscriptions (see Sircar 1991, No. 52, 53).

In our play the most frequent reading is ska in the Māgadhī sections, which may be explained as the transposition of the consonants of Sanskrit kṣa, even if strictly speaking it does not agree with any of the above mentioned Prakrit grammars. On the other hand, sometimes we find kkha in the Māgadhī passages, which is the Śaurasenī form of kṣa.

The word eśu seems to be used in the sense of atra in the Māgadhī passages, on the analogy of which I conjectured yasu > yeśu in this sentence.

2.4 drink The use of pījjadi as a passive form seems to be odd (and perhaps incorrect), especially since piviadi has already been used just a few lines above. Pischel §539 mentions pījai as a Māhārāṣṭrī form.

2.4 Sooty Instead of changing Sanskrit jja into yya in Māgadhī, one might apply the rule that in Māgadhī the palatalisation of the cavarga-consonants is distinct (Puruṣottama 12.13: cuḥ sparśatalavyah; Vararuci 11.5: cavar-gasya sparśatā tathoccaṇāyaḥ; Rāmaśarman 2.2.18cd: cavyagāṇāṁ upari prayojyo yuktēṣu cāntahsthayakārā eva).

2.4 go and see Sanskrit (and Śaurasenī) cca becomes śca in Māgadhī (see Puruṣottama 12.11, Hemacandra 4.295, Rāmaśarman 2.2.18). In Śāradā script, cca and śca look very similar, which may explain the gacca reading of our manuscripts.

pekkha is a Śaurasenī form. One might consider emending to peska, the form prescribed by Hemacandra 4.297 (the way our manuscripts write kkha is hardly distinguishable from ska), or to peška, following the most frequent usage of our manuscripts.

2.4 the monk Jinarākshita jināraskidabhiṣkhyah is a half-Māgadhī half-Śaurasenī form. Later the Servant will refer to the Jain abbot as jinārakkhida-bhiṣkhyah, however the word bhikṣuṇo (not in compound) will also occur once. Cf. Steiner 1997, pp. 16f.: ‘[D]ie stillschweigend zugrunde liegende Prämisse, nach der jeder Dichter tatsächlich in einer ganz genauen und konsistenten Weise Prakrit schrieb (oder diktierte), [ist] problematisch. Hat es jemals ein vollkommene reguliertes Prakrit und insbesondere eine konsequent durchgehaltene Orthographie gegeben? Ist es nicht vorstellbar, daß die Prakrit sprechenden Charaktere gelegentlich verschiedene grammatische und phonetische Formen ein und desselben Wortes gebräucht haben?’

2.4 I’ve no idea The Māgadhī form of Sanskrit jāṇāmi should be yāṇāmi / yāṇāmi according to the grammarians (Hemacandra 4.292, Vararuci 11.4, Pischel §§ 236, 454, 510), but in the old Nepalese manuscript of the Nāgānanda we find jāṇadi in a Māgadhī passage. As Steiner remarks,
‘Vermutlich beruht die Aufteilung der Formen Š. jānādi und Mg. yānādi wiederum nur auf einer Fiktion.’ (Steiner 1997, p. 173.)

2.4 scattered ex conj. Raghavan and Thakur accept the reading of the manuscripts (vistī), but I am not sure that the chāyā they give (vistṛtā) is possible. pāṃśuṇakaṇā is also suspect since, as Prof. Sanderson has pointed out, ‘dust’ is more likely to be strewn with hair than ‘specks of dust’.

2.4 plucked-out, awn-like hair Pulling out the hair in five handfuls is part of the ceremony (dīkṣā) that initiates the aspirant into Jain mendicancy (see Jaini p. 245). Both Buddhist and Brahmanical authors frequently refer to this practice as the most striking example of the various ‘unnecessary’ austerities of the Jains. For example Prajñākaramati glosses the expression sukhenaiva sukhaṃ pravṛddham in his commentary to Bodhicaryāvatāra 1.7 as ‘not with great pain, like pulling out the hair, etc.’, na śīroliṅcanādinā mahatā kaṣṭena (cf. Granoff 1992 p. 39, n. 3). But already Vasubandhu comments on Abhidharmakośa 4.73ab (prāṇātipātāh sānicintya paraśūbhārantmāraṇaṃ, ‘taking away life is to kill another deliberately, not by mistake’) in a slightly satirical way: ‘abuddhipūrvaś api prāṇivadāda kartur adharmah, yathā aṇiṣāṇyoṣpūd dāhah’ iti nirgranthaḥ teṣāṃ ʻparastrādārāsāsamaparāsana (v.l. parastrādārāsāne ‘py) eṣa prasaṅgaḥ, nirgranthāśiśīroliṅcanē ca kaṣṭatapodesēne ca sāstuh, tadvīśīcikāmarane ca dātuh| ‘The Jains teach: one who takes away life is guilty, even if he has not resolved it beforehand, just as one gets burnt because of contact with fire. [But in that case,] when they [unintentionally] see or touch the wife of another, it carries the same consequence for them, and for [their] teacher when the Jains pull out their hair or when he gives instructions to practise hard austerities, and for the donor when they die of cholera (or indigestion, ajīrṇa, according to Yaśomitra) [because of the food he gave them].’

Jayanta also found it a ridiculous idea that extreme tortures can lead to salvation (Nyāyamaṇjarī, vol. II, p. 520.7–14):

‘As for these Jains, they hold that deliverance depends on the procedure of plucking out the hair, wearing the air as garment, and climbing mountains. Now they are indeed deeply knowledgable about the ultimate reality! The bald would attain liberation in a flash since they can never have hair; transmigration would immediately cease for the animals since
they are sky-clad; those who live on the peaks of mountains would be liberated since they always mountaineer. Who showed the creatures such a shortcut to deliverance?

2.4 since here According to the grammarians initial \( \text{\textit{ya}} \) should be retained in Māgadhī (see Hemacandra 4.292, Purusottama 12.5, Rāmaśarman 2.2.14, Pischel §252). The manuscripts of the \textit{Agamadambara}, however, often have relative pronouns with initial \( \text{\textit{j}} \) in their Māgadhī passages. Cf. note ad 2.4.

2.4 harpy According to Hemacandra 4.289, Sanskrit \( \text{\textit{sta}} \) should become \( \text{\textit{sta}} \) in Māgadhī; \( \text{\textit{duṭṭha}} \) is the Sāurasenī form (see Pischel §303). But cf. Lüders, \textit{Bruchstücke}, p. 36, fr. 22a2: \( \text{\textit{[j]}ṭṭhā} \).

2.7 notices Cf. note ad 2.4.

2.7 To be sure... According to Pischel (§94), in Māgadhī and Sāurasenī \( \text{\textit{khu}} \) (and not \( \text{\textit{khu}} \)) should stand after -\( \text{\textit{e}}, -\text{\textit{o}} \) and short vowels. In our manuscripts, however, we find \( \text{\textit{khu}} \) both after -\( \text{\textit{e}} \) and -\( \text{\textit{o}} \). Steiner points out the same phenomenon in the old Nepalese manuscript of the \textit{Nāgānanda}, in the fragments of Aśvaghoṣa’s plays (see Lüders, \textit{Bruchstücke}, p. 51) and in other texts as well (Steiner 1997, pp. 195f.), and draws the following conclusion: ‘Zusammenfassend läßt sich also sagen, daß die Schreibung der Aśvaghoṣa-Fragmente, der „Bhāṣa“-Mss (in der überwiegenden Zahl der Fülle) und des ältesten Nāg.-Textzeugen A (ebenso wie die erwähnten Inschriften, und zumindest teilweise auch die Mālatīm.-Mss und die beiden Mudr.-Mss MN) die ursprüngliche Orthographie der Partikel \( \text{\textit{khu}} \) wiederspiegeln dürften.’ (Steiner 1997, p. 198.)

2.7 all I need According to Hemacandra (4.293), Sanskrit \( \text{\textit{śunyā}} \) should become \( \text{\textit{śunā}} \) in Māgadhī; in the fragments of Aśvaghoṣa’s plays Sanskrit \( \text{\textit{ny}} \) appears as \( \text{\textit{ni}} \) in Sāurasenī (Lüders, \textit{Bruchstücke}, p. 48). Cf. Pischel §282, who also notes that in the manuscripts of the plays we find only \( \text{\textit{ny}} \).

2.7 broom of peacock feathers \( \text{\textit{picchiā}} \) seems to be a Sāurasenī form, one might consider emending it to the more Māgadhī-looking \( \text{\textit{piścīā}} \). Cf. however Lüders, \textit{Bruchstücke}, pp. 35f, fr. 22.a.2: \( \text{\textit{vicchaḍḍa}} \).

2.7 that she had been holding and then left behind ex conj. Raghavan and Thakur. I am uncertain both in the reading and in the interpretation of this sentence. \( \text{\textit{paliccaīa}} \) seems to be an absolutive form (cf. Pischel §590), and the manuscripts suggest \( \text{\textit{ṣā nu khavāṇiā}} \), but I cannot interpret \( \text{\textit{lesāṃdhāyātādāpalicaīa}} \).

2.7 I am According to Pischel (§145, §498) the correct Māgadhī form of \( \text{\textit{asmī}} \) is \( \text{\textit{smī}} \); \( \text{\textit{mhī}} \) is in Sāurasenī.

2.7 please tell \( \text{\textit{ācakkhadu}} \) is a Sāurasenī form. One may consider emending it to \( \text{\textit{ācaskadu}} \), the form prescribed by Hemacandra (the way our manuscripts
write *kkha* is hardly distinguishable from *ska*), or *ásaškadu*, following the most frequent usage of our manuscripts.

2.8 It seems... According to Pischel (§143, §336, see also Vararuci 12.24, Puruṣottama 9.29), ‘*via* is the single prevailing form in *Śauraseni and Māgadhī*’ for Sanskrit *ive*, while Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, and Jaina-Māhāraṣṭrī have *va*, *vva* (Pischel §92, §143). In Hemacandra’s grammar, however, we find the following general rule (2,182): *miva piva viva vva va via ivarththe vā*

2.11 let us not waste our breath The Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *tiṣṭhati* is *ciṣṭhādi* (v.l. *ciṣṭa-, ciṣṭa-*) according to Vararuci 11.14, *ciṣṭhādi* according to Puruṣottama 12.33, and *ciṣṭhādi* (v.l. *ciṣṭha-*) according to Hemacandra 4.298. Pischel votes for *ciṣṭha*—(§483). Cf. note ad 2.4.

2.11 execrable *ex conj.* Cf. Pischel §222: Māhārāṣṭrī *dāḍṭha*, Śauraseni *dāḍṭha*.

2.11 Please tell... Cf. note ad 2.7.

2.12 to his disciples According to Pischel §370, Śauraseni and Māgadhī ‘except in verses, have only the form in -āṇam’ as plur. gen.

2.12 But... Pischel writes in §184 that in Māhāraṣṭrī, Jaina-Māhāraṣṭrī, Śauraseni, and Māgadhī we find *uṇa* in the sense of ‘now’, ‘however’, and also after *anusvāra*.

2.13 piled-up As Raghavan and Thakur point out (p. 118), ‘Pkt. *laṭjāniḥāṇam* suggests *niḍhāṇam. niḍāṇam* gives better meaning.’ Actually the mss read ◦ *nihāne*, masc. *niḍhānam* means ‘pile, hoard, mass’, *niḍānam* would mean ‘cause’.

2.13 shame Cf. note ad 2.4.

2.15 I turned a recluse Cf. Pischel’s note ad Hemacandra 4.225: ‘In der Māgadhī steht 114, 7. 8 [referring to Mṛcchakaṭikā, ed. Stenzler, Bonnac 1847] *pavajide* mit einfachem j, was sich zu Pāli *pabbajito* stellt und daher schwerlich anzufechten ist.’

2.17 The Servant’s speech is full of Śauraseni forms. I have changed *s* to *š* and *r* to *l*, but one might consider more radical emendations to get “proper” Māgadhī forms (*śvīlā*, *yōveṇaṇaḷaśkāṇāe, aṇīścāntīe, aśīśkidaṇaṇaśaśe, talaṇa*). On the other hand, Servant may actually try to speak a kind of Śauraseni in his rōle of a Jain nun, and a medley of the two languages is the result.

2.19 firm-fisted I am uncertain of the meaning here. *dāḍḍhamuṭṭhiie* suggests *dāḍḍhamuṣṭyaṇām* as its chāya, which I cannot interpret, perhaps it is some obscene expression. On the other hand, *dr̥hamuṣṭti*, ‘close-fisted’ is a well-attested word, but it would become *dāṭha*- in Śauraseni and Māgadhī (see
Pischel §242; in fact a few lines below we shall read ḍaḍhaṁ tae khalikado mhi). I am inclined to read ḍaḍha- = ḍṛḍha- with the cerebralisation of the initial da-, which is common in Māhārāṣṭrī (see Pischel §222, although Pischel points out that ‘in Śaurasenī [and probably in Māgadhī as well] the dental remains, except in the cases of transimposition of breath’, so we should actually read ḍaḍḍha° = Sanskrit dagdha°).

2.20 †...† I cannot satisfactorily interpret this sentence. Raghavan and Thakur’s chāya, ‘tena hi sammukhāgataṁ śivam’ is not entirely convincing. saṃmuhāda could be taken as saṃmukhataḥ, but śio remains a puzzle for me (ś is actually not allowed in Śaurasenī). Judging from the context, the sentence may mean something like ‘So our lucky star has risen.’

2.23 How could I look? Cf. note ad 2.4.

2.24 I shall be your slave! *ex em.* Bhat.

2.27 if you say Cf. note ad 2.7, but in this case the manuscripts actually read ācask°.

2.27 I’ll squeal on you *ex conj.* Other possible emendations suggested by Prof. Sanderson: pakāsaiśaṁ, pakādikalaiśaṁ.

2.31 coin *ex conj.* The most plausible Māgadhī form of Sanskrit kāraśāpanaka is kāhāvānae or kahāvānae (see Vararuci 3.39, Hemacandra 2.71, Pischel §263), but I am not certain that this is the best way to emend the reading of the manuscripts (kasevatæ).

2.31 to my master Cf. Pischel §366b: ‘The form in -e is used in Mg. as acc. sing.’

2.31 You’ve hit the jackpot today! Cf. note ad 2.4.

2.33 someone else’s Another possible emendation might be pārakeram.

2.34 against my will One would expect apiścanti in Māgadhī.

2.34 He exits. The first word (tti) of the stage direction is in Prakrit in the manuscripts, which brings to mind the fragments of Aśvaghoṣa’s plays where, as Lüders notes, ‘Die Bühnenanweisung wird in der Sprache der Person, auf die sie sich bezieht, gegeben. Dazu stimmen jedenfalls die meisten Fälle, in denen eine Nachprüfung möglich ist.’ (Lüders, Bruchstücke, p. 34.)

2.35 another nun *ex conj.* The verb ājāśing- requires an object.

2.45 I made a few conjectures in the Boy’s speech to have a clearer sentence-structure.
From the Jain standpoint it seems that the monk has fallen victim to one of the *samyaktvadusānas* (attitudes that spoil the correct, i.e. Jain view), namely *vicikitsā*, which is defined by Hemacandra as follows (*Yogaśāstra* p.188): *vicikitsā cittaviplavāḥ* sā ca saty api yuktyāgamopapanne jina-harme 'syā mahatas tapakleśasya sikatākapakavalo vaśvādasyāgatyāṃ phalasampad bhavitrā, atha klesamāttram evedam nirjarāphalavikalam iti*.

Uncertainty is a confusion in the mind, and it appears in the following form: “Even though the religion of the Jina is well-established through reasoning and scripture, nevertheless this enormous trouble caused by the austerities, which is tasteless like a mouthful of sand-grains—will it produce any result in the future, or is it just pure trouble, devoid of the fruit of immortality?” For we see two kinds of activities: some are fruitful, while others are fruitless, just as for instance [the labours] of peasants.’ (About the other interpretation of *vicikitsā*, see note ad 2.113.)

This verse seems to be in Māhārāṣṭrī.

I am following RAGHAVAN and THAKUR in interpreting "*sumarāṇḍoggaya" as *smarāṇḍogata", but *smarāṇḍavagata" might also be a possible chāyā. The meaning of the second half of the first line is not entirely clear to me. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s conjectures (*suvṛṇṇabalaṇāṃ = *svuṣuvṛṇṇabalaṇāṃ and *svuṣuvṛṇṇapuṇṇabalaṇāṃ = *svuṣuvṛṇṇapuṇṇabalaṇāṃ) both seem to be unmetrical. One might consider *puṇṇaphala-balāṇāṃ* (‘for those who are strong as a result of their merits, which have arisen from remembering the blessed Jina[’s teaching], and which are pure by nature’), but it is also unmetrical, and the meaning is far from being satisfactory. Another possibility could be *puṇṇapuṇṇapuṇṇabalaṇāṃ* (*puṇṇa/puṇṇapuṇṇapuṇṇabalaṇāṃ*), which is metrically correct, and it also refers to the Jain concept of *pudgala*, and possibly to the purification of the soul through meditating on the Jain teaching.

*contemplating* *jhāijjādi* is a passive form in Jaina-Śaurasenī. In Māhārāṣṭrī the ending should be "*ijjādi", while in Śaurasenī "*adi" (see PISCHEL §535).

*plant it deep into your mind* *gēhaha* is mentioned in PISCHEL §471 as a 2. plur. imperative in Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī.

*As Your Reverend commands.* *jamā* is a Śaurasenī form (cf. note ad 2.4), while *bhāṣṭake* is in Māgadhī.

*What is worth choosing...* In Sanskrit the pun is based on the double meaning of *prastuta*: ‘praised’ and ‘declared as the subject of discussion’.

*property* *ex conj.*

*absorption* *ex conj.* ISAACSON.
2.67 doctrine of many-sidedness Anekāntavāda was perhaps the best known concept of Jain philosophy for Brahmanical and Buddhist thinkers. It claims that every single entity possesses innumerable characteristics or natures, even mutually incompatible ones. The soul, for example, is eternal with respect to its qualities (which inhere forever in their substance), but it is non-eternal with respect to the modes of these qualities (which last only for a moment) (cf. JAINI p.90; UNO pp.423f.). Even existence and non-existence are present simultaneously in the object. Says Haribhadra (Anekāntajayapalāka pp.36f.): tatra yat tāvad uktam ‘katham ekam eva ghaṭādirūpaṇaṃ vastu sac cāsac ca bhavati’, tad etad āgopālaṅganādirupasiddham anāsārānīyaṃ eva, yatas tat svadāvyakṣetra-kālabhāvarūpāṇaṃ sad vartate, parādāvyakṣetra-kālabhāvarūpāṇaṃ cāsat, tataḥ ca sac cāsac ca bhavati| (...) tathā ca tad dravyātāḥ pārthiḥvatvena sat, nābādītena; tathā kṣetrātāḥ ihaṭyatvena, na pāṭaliprutakṣetitvena; tathā kā-lato ghaṭākālaḥatvena, na mṛtyupādiḥkālaḥatvena; tathā bhāvaḥ śyāmaḥatvena, na ruktaṭevedinaḥ ‘The first objection that is raised against this [theory of many-sidedness] is as follows: “How can a single thing, which has the form of a pot for example, be both existent and non-existent?” This is a well-established fact for [everyone from scholars] to cowherds, women and the like, and it cannot be questioned in any way, since it is existent in the form of its own substance, place, time, and condition, and it is non-existent in the form of another [object’s] substance, place, time, and condition; and therefore it becomes both existent and non-existent. (...) To explain, it is existent with respect to [its] substance inasmuch as it is made of clay, not inasmuch as it is made of water, etc.; similarly, with respect to [its] place [it exists] inasmuch as it is here, not inasmuch as it is in Pāṭaliputra, etc.; similarly, with respect to [its] time [it exists] inasmuch as it is characterised by the time of the pot, not inasmuch as it is characterised by the time of the lump of clay, etc.; similarly with respect to [its] condition [it exists] inasmuch as it black, not inasmuch as it is red, etc.’ Put differently, the pot is existent inasmuch as it is black, which also means that it is not red, blue, etc. On the other hand, the pot is non-existent inasmuch as it is red, blue, etc., that is not black. This means that the pot is characterised by all colours in a positive or a negative way, and the same can be said about its other attributes as well. This also explains why the knowledge of a single thing in all its aspects entails the knowledge of all things.

2.69 Apart from Jain texts (e.g. Yogāśūstra pp.168f.), we find this verse also in the Tattvopaplavasimha (TUS(GOS) p.79), in the Spandapradīpīkā of Bhagavadutpalā (p.47), in Abhinavagupta’s Mālinīvijayavārttika (v.641ab = the first two lines of the verse, labelled as arhadvāda and quoted in an assentient way), and also in Yogarāja’s viértti to Abhinavagupta’s Paramārtthasāra v.26 (Yogarāja attributes the verse to Śrīśambhubhaṭṭāraka).

2.70ff. If we examine which philosophical schools criticised the Jain theory of
anekāntavāda, we find that for instance Dharmakīrti considered it an obscene (āśīla) idea that curd may be camel from a certain aspect, while from another aspect it may not be camel (Pramāṇavārttika with svavṛtti (GNOL), p. 89,24: syād uṣṭro dadhi syān na iti). If curd does not have a characteristic nature which clearly distinguishes it from a camel, then ‘why does not somebody who has been ordered to eat curd rush towards a camel?’ (Pramāṇavārttika with svavṛtti (GNOL), v.182cd: codito dadhi khaḍeti kim uṣṭraṁ nābhidhāvati) If we admit that there is some special ‘plus’ in curd which makes it different and directs us to recognise it, then that very ‘plus’ is curd itself (ibid. v.183: athāasty atiśayaḥ kaścid yena bhedena vartate sa eva dadhi...), for ‘curd is something the inherent nature of which is characterised by the condition of being the cause of its effect’ (ibid. p.90,10–11: tatphalopādābhāvālaksātāsvabhāvam hi vastu dadhāḥ; put differently, the inherent nature of an object is determined by its causal efficacy, arthakriyākārita.)

Since the Graduate is a champion of mīmāṃsā we might expect that we’ll find the criticism of anekāntavāda in mīmāṃsaka sources as well. Therefore it may seem surprising that some of Kumārila’s arguments are actually quite similar to the Jain notion of ‘manysidedness’. See for example Ślokavārttika (with Nyāyaratnakara) abhava 12: svorūpapararūphābhyaṁ nityaṁ sadasadātmake| vastuni jñāyate kaścid vūpaṁ kiñcit kadācana||
‘With regard to an object, which is always both existent with its own form and non-existent with the form of another object, certain people cognise only certain form at a certain time.’ (The cloth with its non-existent form inheres in the pot, and produces the cognition of its non-existent form in the pot.)

Also Ślokavārttika vanavāda 21–23:
vardhamānakabhaṅge ca rucakah kriyate yadda| tada pūrvarūpinaṁ śokah pritiś cāpy uttarārthinaṁ||
hemārthinas tu mādhyaṣṭhaṁ tasmaṁ vastu trayātmakam|
notpādasthitibhaṅganāṁ abhāve syān matitrāyam||
nā nāśena vinā śoko notpādena vinā sukhām|
sthityā vinā na mādhyaṣṭhyāṁ tena sāmānyanityataṁ||
‘When a vardhamānakā [some kind of ornament] is melt down and then a rucaka [another kind of ornament] is made [out of the gold got from the vardhamānakā], someone who was interested in the former [ornament] becomes sad, while someone who is interested in the latter [ornament] becomes pleased; that person, however, who is interested in gold [alone] remains indifferent. Therefore an object has a threefold nature. If arising, continuance, and perishing were not there [simultaneously present in the same object], there would not be three [different] mental dispositions. There is no sadness without [the] perishing [of the object], no pleasure without [its] arising, and no indifference without [its] continuance; therefore the common characteristic [‘gold’] is permanent.’ (The Āptamīmāṃsā, which was composed in the 5th century by the Digambara
acarya Samantabhadra, contains a verse (v. 59) the content of which is remarkably similar: ghaṭamaulisuvarvārthī nāśotpādaśatātīśv ayam śoka-pramodamādhyaasthāṇ jano yāti saheṭukam; see also Ślokavārttika (with Nyāyaratnakāra) vanavāda 75 seqq.

Tomoyuki Uno showed in his recent article that ‘Kumārila uses the assumption of many-sidedness to defend his theory of the soul’, and that ‘the very same doctrine is used by the Jaina authors to defend their theory of the soul’ (UNO p. 420). As Uno pointed out, the soul must be permanent for Kumārila because the one who performs the ritual and the one who experiences its result must be the same person. On the other hand, the soul cannot be exclusively permanent, because an unchanging subject could not perform any action (see UNO p. 429).

The Jains themselves were aware of the close resemblance between anekāntavādā and the mīmāṃsaka theory of bhedabheda; see for example Vādidevaśūri’s Syādvādaratnakāra (11–12th century), p. 833: mīmāṃsakas tu prāyeva sarvatra jainocchisṭābhōjī; also Guṇaratna’s commentary to Hari-bhadra’s Saṅdarśanasamuccaya §385: mīmāṃsakas tu svayam eva prakārāntareṇaikāntadyanekāntam pratipadyamānas tatpratipattaye sarvathā paryānuṣṭoṣmānāṃ nārhati]

2.72 the afterlife or this life ex conj. ISAACSON.

2.75 The disciple seems to speak a mixture of Śaurasena (bhikkhavā, sampadaṃ, patthudakaṭṭhavēla) and Māgadhī (bhāṣṭakā, cilāyadi).

2.84 of your disputants It is not clear to me why RAGHAVAN and THAKUR give vādaniyuktānam as the chāyā of vādabhīḍhāṇa.

2.84 †...† I cannot decipher the second half of this line. The whole verse seems to be in Māhārāṣṭri.

2.95 According to Bhāsarvajña (Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, p. 393) Jainism and other heretic religions first spread among the low-born, but later certain slow-witted and impoverished brahmans also showed interest in their teachings about the cessation of suffering (duḥkhopakṣaya).

2.107 Jains distinguished ten vikṛtis (certain types of food that have changed their nature, or, according to the traditional interpretation, ‘that by which the tongue is perverted’): kṣīra (milk), dadhi (curd), navanīta (butter), ghṛta (ghee), tāśīla (oil), guḍa (molasses), madya (alcohol), madhu (honey), māṃsa (meat), avaghīma (first three usings of rice in a pan filled with ghee or oil) (see WILLIAMS pp. 39f.). Four of these vikṛtis are considered as abhakṣyas (not fit to be eaten): the three ‘m’-s (madya, madhu, māṃsa) and butter (see WILLIAMS p. 54, 110). Curd, milk, and ghee do not seem to have been forbidden.

2.108 do not use ṇmha belongs to the imperative, but sometimes it is used (wrongly according to Pischel) as an indicative ending (see PISCHEL §455).
2.113 is also called According to Pischel *hodi* is a false Śaurasenī form (Pischel §476), although Hemacandra teaches *bhuvadi*, *huvadi*, *havadi*, *bhodi*, and *hodi* as possible Śaurasenī forms of Sanskrit *bhavati* (Hemacandra 4.269). These statements sound suspiciously like a parody of the Jain doctrine of *syādvāda* (‘*syāt sugato jinaguruḥ syān na, syāj jinaguruḥ sugataḥ syān na*’).

2.113 Arhatas ex conj.

2.113 red clothes In the *Harsācarita* (p. 89) *kāśāya* is associated with the followers of Sāṅkhya (*kāpīlam matam*). Yājñavalkyasṛtī 3.157, however, prescribes *kāśāyadhāraṇa* for ascetics in general who strive after liberation.

2.113 blood-drops In the majority of texts written by the followers of Brahmanical religions we find a lack of comprehension and the expression of actual disgust with regard to Jain doctrine and practice. We have already seen how the practice of *kēśaloca* was mocked by non-Jain authors (see note ad 2.4). In the *Mudrārāksasa* Cāṇakya is delighted to hear that a Jain monk has sided with the enemy (p. 74). In the same play Rākṣasa considers it a bad omen when a *kṣapana* seeks an audience with him, and he orders Priyamvadaka to do something with the disgusting appearance of the mendicant before showing him in (p. 212). Bāṇa’s description of a Digambara monk is also typical (*Harsācarita*, p. 75): *kajjalamaya iva bahudivasam upacitabahalamalapatalamalinitatanur abhimukham ājagāma śikhleticchañchano nagnātakah*| ‘A naked mendicant was coming towards him, looking as if made of lamp-black, his body dirtied by the cover of plenty of dirt that had accumulated on it during many days, holding the attribute of [his sect: a broom made of] peacock feathers.’

The Jains were certainly aware of this repugnance and its dangerous influence on the mind of the mendicants. One of the *samyaktvadāsanas*, ‘attitudes that spoil the correct view’ is called *vicikitsā*, which can be interpreted as becoming doubtful about the effectiveness of the various self-mortifications with regard to the final goal: deliverance (see note ad 2.50), but it can also refer to the disgust that learned people feel towards Jain monks (videṣajjugupsā): *vidvēṇasāh sādhavo viditasaṃsārasvabhāvāh pari- tyaktasamastasāṅgaḥ teṣām jugupsā nindā, asānāt prasvedajalakīni- malavāc ca durgandhivapāsā tān nindati, ‘ko doṣaḥ syād yadi prāsuka- vārṇṇāṅgaprakṣālam kuruver hanavantaḥ?’ iti* ‘The loathing [and] rebuke of learned people, [that is] virtuous men who have become acquainted with the nature of the world and who have abandoned all attachments; one rebukes them [i.e. the Jain monks] because their body stinks since they do not bathe and since [their body is covered with] dirt which is moistened by sweat, saying “what sin would they commit if the reverends washed their body with *prāsukavāri* (?)”? ’ (Siddhasenaṇin’s comm. ad *Tattvārthādhiḥgamasūtra* 7.18, p. 99; cf. *Yogāśṭra* pp. 188f.)

2.113 smeared with†...† I cannot interpret the reading of the manuscripts
Raghavan and Thakur read vattulavasāra-(Achyranthis Aspera?)-caccijjam. ta and give the following chaīyā: vartulavaśīra (Achyranthis Aspera?)-carrītā.

2.113 taken out In the case of a Śauraseṇī speaker one would expect forms such as sonīā and uddharīa instead of sonīā and uddharīa. On the colour of the brahmacārīn’s garment see Āpastamba-dharmasūtra 1.1.2.41–1.1.3.1: kaśāyāṃ caike vastram upadiśantī māniṣṭhamī (dyed with munjeet) rājanśaya]

2.113 The mendicant describes an immense crowd of ascetics, some naked, some wearing white, some red, others black robes (nilāmbaras), but amalgamated into a single flock by the goal of their journey: the feast. There might be differences among these heretic sects concerning their tenets, but on the mundane level they are just part of the same ever hungry plebs—at least this is what the brahmin Jayanta insinuates.

While ‘Jains took great pains to establish and maintain an identity for themselves that was distinct both from Hindu society and from the Buddhists as well,’ observes Granoff (Granoff 1994 p. 258), ‘throughout classical and medieval times Jains and Buddhists had been closely linked together by all of their opponents.’ The bhikṣu and the kṣaṇaṇaka in the Prabodhacandrodaya prove to be equally fickle and easily seducible when they are embraced by the attractive kāpālinī (impersonating the somasiddhāntin śradhā, Prabodhacandrodaya, pp. 198ff).

But the Jains were well aware that mundane pleasures, such as a tooth-some breakfast can be very seductive for ascetics who cannot afford them. This is illustrated by a moral story in the commentary of Devacandra Sūri (11th century) to the Mūlaśuddhiparāśarāṇa. The story occurs twice in the text, once in the context of samyaktvadāsana, ‘things that detract from the pure faith’, as an example of kutirthikapraśamsā, ‘praising ascetics who follow a false path’ (Mūlaśuddhiparāśarāṇa, p. 71), and in the section dealing with the various chīṇḍikās or ‘temporary lapses’ (Mūlaśuddhiparāśarāṇa, p. 72; see Granoff 1994 pp. 250ff). Jīnādāsa, the pious Jain layman, loses the caravan he was travelling with and is unable to find food. Finally he meets a group of bhikṣus who promise him all kinds of pleasures if he joins them:

|ṃṛdvı́ śaitya prātār utthāya pēyā bhaktāṃ madhye pānakaṃ cāparāhne|drāksākhandaṃ sārkārā cārdharātre mokṣaś cānte śākyasiphena drṣṭab||

‘Soft bed, rice-gruel after getting up in the morning, lunch at noon, drinks in the afternoon, some grape flavoured candy and candied sugar at midnight, and salvation in the end was envisioned by the Lion of the Śākyas.’ (The same verse occurs in Hemacandra’s Yogaśāstra (p. 188.) as an illustration of kāvikā, ‘appetite’ for the pleasures provided by non-Jain religions, which belongs to the group of samyaktvadāsanās.)

43
'Having had a nice meal, sitting nicely on a couch, the sage in a nice house meditates upon nice things.'

Buddhism is presented as a religion which guarantees both sukha in this existence and mokṣa thereafter, an easy and therefore attractive way to attain deliverance. Poor Jinādāsa, remembering the Jain teaching that there might be times of distress when one may be forced to abandon true faith, accepts food from the bhikṣus, but, alas, the unusually rich meal causes indigestion, and he dies on the spot, full of repentance and praising the arhats. 'It is a common theme of Jain stories,' writes Granoff (Granoff 1994 p. 259.), 'that Jains may be wrongly duped into becoming Buddhists, particularly because they are attracted to the lush life in a Buddhist monastery compared to the severity of life as a Jain monk. (…) Buddhists countered these Jain stories with their own stories in which they justified the Buddhist monastic practices and criticised the strict regimen of the Jain ascetic.'

2.115 the division of an army I am uncertain in the meaning of katākāṅga. katāka can mean ‘bracelet, zone, ridge of a mountain, army, camp’.

2.120 I don’t know Cf. Pischel §170: ‘… der Wurzel jīṇa … hinter na sehr oft das anlautende ja einbüsst, in AMg. JM., wie im Inlaut, zu ja wandelt …’

2.120 Exits. Cf. note ad 2.34.

2.121ff. We know from the Nyāyamaṇjarī that King Śaṅkaravarman banned the sect of the nīlāmbaras (Nyāyamaṇjarī, vol. I, p. 649.4–7): asitakapataniṇiśāvyutastrīpuṃśasavihitabahuceṣṭam| (asita’: em. ISAACSON, ed.: amita’; śāvyuta’: in Paṭhāntaras and Śodhanas, at the end of vol. II., ed.: ’śāvyuta’, ‘unrestrained’) nīlāmbaravratam idam kila kalpitam āśīt viṭṭaḥ kaiśicī|| tad apūrman iti viditvā nivārayāmāsa dharmatattvajñāḥ| rāja śaṅkararvarnā na punar jainādimatam evam|| ‘Some pimps, as we are told, invented this Black Blanket Observance, in which men and women wrapped together in a single black veil make various movements. King Śaṅkaravarman, who was conversant with the true nature of Dharma, suppressed this practice, because he knew that it was unprecedented, but he did not [suppress] the religions of Jains and others in the same way.’

The same sect was extirpated by King Bhoja of Dhāra (1018–1060), as it is related in the Purāṇaprabandhasaṅgraha (p. 19, Nilapaṭavadhaprabandha): śrībhōjojāvanāre nīlapaṭā darśānāna āsan| te tu ekā strī ekaḥ pumān nīlīṃ ṃdotīṃ prāvṛtya madhye nagunībhūya vijahratuḥ| ekādā dhārāyāṃ prāptāt tatrāpūrvāṃ dṛṣṭvā sarvāḥ ko ’pi teṣāṃ samīpe yātī| te tv itthāṃ pra-rūpanyantu—’eyam isvarasya tathāḥ sañātina ardhanārīvratvāt| itaḥ ca kautukād bhajapatrī samāgamat| kartvayam prṣṭam| tair uktam—’piba
In King Bhoja’s time the Black-Blankets attracted attention. These people, one woman and one man, covered themselves with a black dot, while under it they were naked, and amused themselves. Once they arrived in Dhīrā. There everybody gathered round them because their sight was unprecedented. And they set forth the following teaching: ‘We are truly God’s issue, since we are Ardhanārīśvaras.’ And, out of curiosity, Bhoja’s daughter went there to meet them. [She] asked [them about] the duties [one has to do as a member of this sect]. They replied: ‘Drink and eat, lovely-eyed girl! Things that have passed are not yours, o girl with an exquisite body! For what has gone will not return, timid girl. This body is just an aggregate [of elements].’ (The same verse (with variants) appears in Haribhadra’s exposition of the Lokāyata doctrine in his Śad-darśanasamuccaya, verse 81.) She said: ‘I shall adopt your doctrine.’ She went to ask for the king’s permission. ‘Father, I shall adopt the religion of the black-blankets.’ The king sent for them, and asked them: ‘Are you happy?’ Their leader said: ‘The rivers do not flow with booze, and the mountains are not made of meat, and the world is not made of women: how could a black-blanket be happy?’ The king said: ‘How many are you?’ ‘Forty-nine couples.’ The king said: ‘Summon all of them, I shall be your devotee.’ They all came together. The king executed all the men, and having expelled the women he let them go. That’s how even their seed was destroyed.’

Other sources mentioning the black-blankets are referred to in Wezler pp. 346f. (E.g. the Ceylonese (c. 1400) Nikāyasamgrahaya writes about a depraved Buddhist monk of the sammitiya school who put on a blue robe, venerated prostitutes, an invigorating drink, and the god of love instead of the Three Jewels, and composed a Nīlapatādarśana. King Śrīharṣa (of Kanauj? 606–647) studied this work, recognised how dangerous it was, and burnt it together with most of its followers.)

Some verses attributed to a certain Nīlapatā or Nīlāmbara have found their way to the subhāṣita-collections: Suduktikārṇāmya 468 (= Subhāṣitaratnakosa 323, MSS 2670):

ayaṁ sa bhuvanatrayaprathitasaṁyamaṁ saṅkaro
bibhārti vapiṣṭadhūna virahakātarah kāminim
anena kīla nirjītā vayaṁ iti priyāyāḥ karaṁ
kareṇa paritādyaṇ (v.l. tālāyaṇ) jayati jātahūsah smarṣaḥ | (Nīlapatātasya)
“That Śaṅkara, whose austerity is celebrated all over the three worlds, is now carrying his beloved in his body, afraid of separation [from her]. They say that we’ve been defeated by him!” The god of love is victorious, who with these words gives his beloved a high five and bursts into a laugh.’

Saduktikarpāṇyta 2362:

śirām pretaḥ kaścid daśāti daśanāgreṇa sarasām
dilikṣur mātiṣkaṃ kalayati ca mūrdhānam itaraḥ|
karaṃ dhūtāv dhūtāv jeyadananaladātipiāṅgalīśikhaṃ
citāsthāḷiṇiṇaṃ harati kṣuṇapakravāyaṃ aparāḥ|| (Nilāmbarasya)
‘One of the ghouls bites into a juicy vein with the tip of his tooth; another one holds a head, eager to lap up the brain. Another one carries the flesh of a corpse, cooked in the cauldron of the pyre, shaking again and again his arm, the fingertips of which have been lighted by the burning fire.’

In the Yāsastilacakacampū (p. 252) the Buddhist Sugataṅkṛti recites approvingly the following verse composed by Nīlapatā:
idam eva ca tatvam upalabhāyāpi nilaṭena—
payoḥdharabharālasaḥ smaravīghīrṣutārdhekaṇāḥ
ekvaśat salayapanācamoccaraṇagītaṃ jhaṅkārinīḥ (MS. Poona : 6daṅkārinah ed.))

vihāya ramanāṁ anūr aparāmokṣasaukhyāṁ
aho jadimāṇḍino viphalaḥ bhāṇḍaḥ (MS. Poona : 6bhāṇḍi ed.) pākhaṇḍināṁ||
‘And Nīlapatā, too, having comprehended the same truth, said: “How loudly those heretic buffoon loosers trumpet abroad their own stupidity who, seeking for the bliss of another kind of deliverance, abandon these lovely women, languid with the weight of their breasts, their half-closed eyes rolling in love, and sometimes humming a rhythmic tune which ascends to the fifth note.”’

Padmanābhamiśra (16th century) also mentions the black-blankets as a division of the digambaras (Setutikā in Padārthadharmasaṅgraha, Caukhamba Sanskrit Series 61, Benares, 1924–1931, p. 107): digambarabhāṣedā eva kṣaṇapakasvētaṅkarāhathanilāmbaravāraktāṁbaracarmacāṁbarahāṁbarārāda-yāḥ. In the biography of Kṛṣṇācārya / Kānha we read about a black-robed Tīrthikā who venerates Maheśvara (see GRÖNBOLD p. 187). According to GRÖNBOLD the nilāṃbaras were Christian missionaries.

2.122 obsession gāho can also stand for gāḍhaḥ, ‘desire, consequence’.
2.123 unique bliss ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

2.124 women The reading of the manuscripts (ittia) suggests iyaṭ or etāvāt as its chāyā, but RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s silent emendation to itthia seems to make better sense.
2.124 deliverance ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

2.125 Both the reading and the interpretation of this verse is highly tentative. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR silently emend sosijjā to so sijjāi (sa sidhyati), and take sarīraḍā as an ablative form. On the other hand cf. TAGARE §80
(p. 110): “This -ḍa of nom. sg. is a special characteristic of WAp [Western Apabhraṃṣa].” so can be a neut. direct singular (see Tagare, p. 225), which makes the following chāyā possible: tat sidhyati sārīram. The reading of the manuscripts, could also be interpreted as śoṣyate sārīram, which is parallel to the expression parisosījjai dehaḍā below. Another possibility might be to take sījjai as the Apabhraṃṣa form of svidyati.

2.127 I am following Raghavan and Thakur’s reading and interpretation. appaī, however, suggests arpayati as its chāyā (cf. Tagare p. 347), or one might read it as appaīn, i.e. ātmanā.

2.128 merits The bare stem form without any ending can be used in plur. gen. (cf. Tagare §86, p. 146).

2.129 †...† I cannot interpret the second half of this verse. Raghavan and Thakur give the following chāyā: prathamah saṅgah yena idṛṣah taddahamsaḥ nir βalavah sahaṣjasvabhāvaḥ nirāsaḥ. Prof. Sanderson conjectured the following chāyā and translation: parivesṭitaḥ samyagam yo yadedṛṣaḥ taddahamsaḥ nirmalaḥ sahaṣjasvabhāvo nirdṛṣaḥ, “When we wrap up and copulate like this [reading eiso], [ours] is the Haṃsa [the vibrating paramātmā], spotless, unequalled, innate-and-spontaneous.” The verse does not seem to be metrical. tāhaṃ could be interpreted as tesaṁ (or, reading perhaps tāḥoṁ, as tasya), followed by so (sah). niṣvāla (Deśi) can mean jaladhauta, pravigaṇita, viyukta. I am not certain that the fragment niira belongs to the same verse.

2.130 †...† Raghavan and Thakur suggest the following chāyā: iti yadi yuge yuge (or, following P.L. Vaidya’s suggestion, prthak prthak) viṣṇyate.

2.131 Both the reading and the interpretation of this verse are conjectural. I took punu bho belonging to the previous verse.

2.133 ... I have conjectured a lacuna at this point, since nothing seems to rhyme with viṇu. satattu may be the corrupted form of the rhyming word, or rather it may belong to the next verse. I’ve made a few tentative conjectures to squeeze some meaning out of the words. The form inu instead of imu is arguably improbable.

2.135 following ex conj. lā in the sense of “take up”.

2.135 ... Again the rhyming word (possibly an imperative) seems to be missing.

2.139 I do not know ex conj. The reading of the manuscripts (rājūna) clearly does not make sense. On the other hand, Raghavan and Thakur’s conjecture (re jantoḥ) is not entirely convincing to me. Although one might argue that jantoḥ can be contrasted with punsaṁ in the following line, I would expect a vocative after the particle re. “nirbhaya” and na are also conjectures.
2.139 unafraid ex conj.

2.139 is there no ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR conjectured hi as the syllable that is missing from this unmetrical line, but it is difficult to see what role this hi could possibly have in the sentence.

2.143 Great Vow ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. This is probably a reference to the kapālika ascetic observance of the skull (kapālavata). On the other hand the learned snātaka might also allude to the ancient solemn Vedic ritual, which involved joyful singing, music, and dance, as well as an obscene altercation and sexual intercourse between a brahmacārin and a prostitute. (See DEZSŐ, pp. 15–41.)

2.144 faithful housewives ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

2.152 scriptures of Shiva I follow Prof. Sanderson’s suggestion in interpreting bhava as ‘Śiva’. I am not entirely certain, however, why is it necessary to mention here Jayanta’s expertise in the Śaiva scriptures. One would expect a more general statement, and the following conjecture might be considered: aśeśabhuvanāgamapāraga, ‘master of all religious doctrines in the world’.
3.1ff. ‘Worshippers in all these Śaiva cults [i.e. the Siddhānta, the Netranātha cult, the Svacchandabhairava cult, the Trika, and the Krama] were of one of two kinds. This was a matter of individual choice and it determined both the form of initiation received and the form of the subsequent ritual discipline. On the one hand were those whose chosen goal was nothing but liberation (mokṣaḥ) from the bondage of transmigration (samsāraḥ). On the other hand were those who elected to pursue supernatural powers and effects (siddhiḥ) while they lived and—or at least—to experience fulfilment in the enjoyment of rewards (bhogaḥ) in a paradisal world of their choice, either in this life through mastery of Yoga, or after death. So worshippers were either seekers of liberation (mumuksuḥ) or seekers of rewards (bubhukṣaḥ).’ (Sanderson 1995, p. 24.)

It is the second kind of worshippers we meet in the prelude of the Third Act. The sādhakas, “masterers [of powers]” (Sanderson 1995, ibid.) or “mantra-masterers” (Sanderson 1995, p. 79, n. 208) were characterised by antinomian behaviour in all Śaiva cults, from the Siddhānta which adapted itself to the orthodox norms of purity in the highest degree (see Sanderson 1985, p. 565) to the more esoteric traditions.

As our two sādhakas appear to be worshippers of Bhairava, perhaps it is not inappropriate to take a cursory view of the presentation of the sādhaka in the Svacchandatantra, the authoritative text of the Mantrapīṭha division of the Tantras of Bhairava, and of the Svacchandabhairava-cult, which incorporated the Kāpālikā culture of the cremation grounds (Sanderson 1988, p. 138). As Arraj points out, ‘though the older order of Śaiva ascetics became largely institutionalized as a hierarchy of masters catering to different grades of initiates, the active and ascetic option did not die out immediately but was integrated as another optional grade of the adept (sādhakah), who still sought superhuman powers. And accordingly, in Svacchandatantaram, the older rites have been collected under this nominal heading as the special entitlement of the adept.’ (Arraj 1988, p. 73.) The consecration of the adept is described in Svacchandatantara 4.482–505ab (vol. I, pp. 298–310, Arraj 1988, pp. 165ff), and his practices are discussed in the sixth book (Svacchandatantara, vol. II, pp. 101ff, Arraj 1988, p. 181ff). He should worship Bhairava and make oblations using human flesh together with bdellium and bathed in ghee (v. 53: nṛmāṃsau purasāmyuktāṃ gṛṣṭenā ca pariplutam) in order to obtain different levels of magical powers. Various secondary rites are also described, resulting in such powers as subjugation (vaśikarāṇa, vv. 58 seqq), scaring away one’s enemies (uccāṭaṇa, vv. 72 seqq), or killing them (māraṇa, vv. 85cd seqq). Book 13 (vol. 4 (part 2), pp. 89ff, tr. Arraj 1988, pp. 457ff) also contains siddhi-oriented rites taking place in the cremation ground and requiring such gruesome ingredients as ‘the dried head of a hero felled in battle with a sword [while he was] facing [to the] front’ (v. 9: abhimukhakhadgaṇipātitaśūraśīraḥ śoṣitaṁ, tr. Arraj 1988, p. 462), or ‘the rib from a dead woman that was hanged by her left foot’ (v. 12: mṛtanāryā vānapadād udbhaddhāyas tu pāṃsuliṁ, tr. Arraj 1988, p. 463).
In belletristic works sadhakas are usually depicted as evil magicians who practice the black art in the cremation grounds. In Bhavabhūti’s Mālatī-mādhava Aghoraghaṇṭa and his disciple Kapālakundalā are ready to sacrifice Mālatī to the goddess Karālā, but Mādhava arrives just in time to save her. The horrid sight of the cremation ground is depicted in vivid colours (Act Five). The source of humour in the Agamadāmbhara is that although the two adepts should feel themselves at home in the śmaśāna and be busy scaring other people, they appear to be scared themselves, trying to sneak away from the police.

3.2 the Great Lord’s mark ex conj. ISAACSON.

3.2 may heart The Māgadhī form of asmākam should be asmānam according to PISCHEL §419. hrdayam can be used in the masculine in Śaurasenī (see PISCHEL §357: hiao), which might support a hiae form in Māgadhī. Another possibility is to read hiaam vva, or hiaam va (cf. PISCHEL §143, where via is prescribed as the correct form in Śaurasenī and Māgadhī).

3.2 seems lakṣhīyadi is a Śaurasenī form. One might consider emending it to laskīyadi, (the way our manuscripts write kkha is hardly distinguishable from ska), or to laškīyadi, following the most frequent usage of our manuscripts.

3.4 Here is . . . shelter eśe ēś (the reading of the manuscripts) seems to be in masculine (just as ēś in the following sentence), while madhiā is a feminine noun. One might consider emending to eśā śā or to maḍhie. maṭhikā may also mean just a hut.

3.4 watching uppekhiā is a Śaurasenī form. One might consider emending to uppeskia, the form prescribed by Hemacandra 4.297 (the way our manuscripts write kkha is hardly distinguishable from ska), or to uppeskia, following the most frequent usage of our manuscripts.

3.4 city guards ex conj.

3.4 I have robbed someone collam suggests cauryam as its chāyā, though cauraḥ gives a better sense.

3.4 prison ex conj.

3.4 hang ex conj.

3.4 Lord Bhāirava is my refuge. ex conj.

3.4 I was afraid ex conj. mhi is a Śaurasenī form, according to Pischel (§§145, 498) one should read smi in Māgadhī.

3.5 is that you? ex conj.

3.5 while ex conj. ISAACSON. bhāva is not used elsewhere by either of the Adepts.
3.6 put you to death *ex conj.* Karnakagomin in his commentary to the *Prānānavārttika* associates different kinds of antisocial behaviour with different Tantras (ed. R. Sānkṛtyāyana, p. 578, quoted in Sanderson 2001, p. 12, n. 10): *tathā kambukinītantratre steyācarṣaṭāt Siddhīr uktāt* ‘In the Kambukinītantras (“Tantras of the Robber Wives”) one is said to attain magical powers through the practice of robbery.’ This certainly does not mean that Skeleton-Banner was a follower of the Kambukinītantras, but his conduct could probably attract the attention of the police.

Kalhana relates how Cakrabhaṇu (‘a Guru at this time in the lineage of the Kālīkula’, as Prof Sanderson points out in a letter of 10. ix. 2002, referring, among others, to Arṇaśinha’s *Mahānāyapraśāsa*, NAK 5–358, f. 119vl–5, and to *Tantrālokaviveka* vol. 3, Āłikā 4, p. 196, ll. 10–12.) was punished by the Kashmirian king Yasaskara (939–948) for his Kaula practices (*Rājatarāṅgini* 6.108–112):

\[
\text{varṇāśramapratyaveksābaddhakṣyaḥ kṣitiśvaraḥ}
\]
\[
cakrabhaṇavabhidham ca kramelake dvijatāpasam||
\]
\[
kṛtāyacāram alokya rājā dharmavāśaṇavadāḥ
\]
\[
nigraha śvapāda lalajatatam aṅkayam||
\]
\[
tanmātulena tādrosād vīrānāthena yoginā
tāṃdhivrahakenātha sa svenaiva nāgṛhyata||
\]
\[
pūrvāīraprabhāvena svamāhātmyādhiropanam|
\]
\[
prakhyāpayadbhir ānabhikṣaḥ śraddhayeti yad ucyate|
\]
\[
tat khyāpitaiva saptāhāḥ sa vipanna iti śrutah|
\]
\[
dīrghāyādhihate tasminn upapattih katham bhavet|
\]

‘The king [was ever] ready to exercise control over the estates and conditions of life [among his] subjects. On discovering that at Cakramelaka a brahmin-ascetic, Cakrabhaṇu by name, had departed from proper conduct, the king, in accordance with the law, punished him by having the mark of a dog’s foot branded on his forehead. Infuriated by this, the uncle of that [Brahman], the magician Virāṇātha who was the king’s own minister of foreign affairs, then took revenge upon him.” This is confidently related by certain Gurus who by [referring to] the supernatural power of former masters would exalt their own greatness. Through them, too, the story has been propagated that he died in seven days. But how is this likely [in view of the fact] that he died by a lingering disease?’ (tr. Stein)

Stein took the word *cakramelaka* as a local name, but, as Professor Sanderson points out to me (in the letter cited above) ‘it is much more probably the Tantric feast known as a *cakrayāgaḥ* or *mūrtiyāgaḥ* which a sponsor convenes for Vīras and Yoginis, male and female Śākta adepts (see *Tantrāloka* 28.60c–61b). In *Tantrāloka* 28.7 the same is referred to as a *yoginīmelakah* “a convening of Yiginis”. In the *Vīratāṇḍavavidhi* chapter of the fourth *ṣaṭka* of the *Jayadrathayāmala*, which sets out the procedure for the celebration of an orgiastic ritual of this kind in the Kālīkula, the tradition to which Cakrabhaṇu belonged, it is termed a *vīramelāpaḥ* (syn. *vīranmelakah*) “a convening of Vīras” (f. 206v, v. 6–8). I have not noted the precise term *cakramelakah* “circle convention” in any text of this tra-
dition. However, it does occur in the sense I attribute to it in a story of the supernatural in the Kashmirian Ocean of Stories (Kathāsaritśāgāra). There (18.4.213ab) a band of Yogiṇīs goes to a cakramelakah in Cakrapura and returns from it in the last watch of the night (18.4.221).

Branding on the forehead with the mark of a dog’s foot was a punishment for theft (see e.g. Manusmṛti 9.237). Professor Sanderson proposes (in the letter cited above) that ‘Cakrabhānu was punished for staging a religious event in which the Tantric participants, men and women, were given substantial sums of money by the yajamānaḥ who invited them. I presume that Cakrabhānu was held responsible as the chief celebrant, the cakranāyakah /cakreśvarah. I doubt that punishment would have been inflicted for mere participation, since such rituals were well established, however abhorrent to Vaidikas. The adepts and Yogiṇīs invited to the feast are given gifts and a sacrificial cash fee (daksīṇaḥ), which should be not less than 4 Rūpakaś in the case of a Guru (Tantrāloka 28.99–100). It was probably in this less strictly religious context that the charge of theft (or extortion) arose.’

Cakrabhānu’s uncle Vīrānātha, alias Hrasvanātha, was probably his Guru as well (see Jayaratha ad Tantrāloka 4.173ab, p. 196). As Professor Sanderson writes (in the above cited letter), ‘that Vīrānātha was Yaśaskarā’s Foreign Minister (sūmadhvīgrahikaḥ) underlines the fact that such practices were not confined to the sort of Prakrit-speaking marginals that Jayantabhatṭa gives us in Śmaśānabhūti and Kaṅkālaketu.’ The name vīrānātha may also be descriptive. Professor Sanderson supplies (in the same letter) the following passage from the Jayadrathayāmala (Mantrād.śālaśālam 3rd šatka, women come forth from Pātalā drawn by the sūdhaka’s mantra-recitation and address him):

\[
\text{ehy ehi vīrānāthaśu pātalābhogasāgaram| sahāsmākaṃ ramaśvātra yāvad ābhūmisamplavam|}
\]

‘Come, come quickly, o Lord of Adepts, to the ocean of pleasure in Pātalā, toy with us here until the earth becomes inundated.’

King Yaśaskarā restored order in Kashmir after the chaotic reigns of various debauched kings following the death of Śaṅkarāvarman. Yaśaskarā, himself a brahmin and elected as king by an assembly of brahmins, was a champion of orthodoxy, and, similarly to Śaṅkarāvarman, he was not favourably disposed towards anti-dharmic religious practices. During his reign, as Kalhaṇa says (Rājatarangini 6.10–12),

\[
\text{na vipraguravah śāma gājanto madirūm papuh| na tāpasāḥ putradārapuṣṭāḥāryāḥ adhaukayam| na mūrkhaguravo matsuṣāpyaṇagadāhāyinah|}
\]
\[
\text{cakrire svakṛtaṅ caturthaiś tarkāgambaparyakṣam|}
\]
\[
\text{nāḍrāyanta ca gheṇyo gurudākoṣṭhādevam| kurvānā bhartrīśīlaśrīṇiśeṣaḥm mūrdhadhūnanaḥ|}
\]

‘The Brahman Gurus did not drink spirits while singing their chants. The ascetics did not get children, wives and crops. Ignorant Gurus did not perform Matsyāpūpa sacrifice, and did not by texts of their own composition revise traditional doctrines. There were not seen house-wives figuring
as divinities at the Guru-consecration, and by shakes of their heads detracting from the distinguished character of their husbands.’ (tr. STEIN)

Stein remarks (in note 11 on p. 237, vol.I of his translation) that ‘the Matsyāpūpa is a complicated sacrifice occurring in the Tantric ritual and still known in Kashmir. It is mentioned in connection with Tantric Śrāddhas in the v. chapter of my MS. of the Mṛtitattvānumarana. Fish and cakes (apūpā) are offered at it.’ Professor Sanderson, however, informs me (in the letter mentioned above) that he has not found any reference to matsyāpūpa offerings in Kashmirian Paddhatis for the various Śaiva śrāddhas, and that perhaps Kalhaṇa condemns Śaiva Tantric ritual in general, in which fish etc. are offered to the Bhairavas and other deities. The expression tarkāgamaparīkṣānam is puzzling. It might be analysed as tarkena āgamaparīkṣānam, meaning ‘examining [in order to refute] Scripture with the help of [destructive] reasoning’, but this may not be the most natural interpretation. Instead we might emend the text, as Professor Sanderson suggests (in the above mentioned letter), to tantrāgama-parīkṣāyam, referring to ‘Gurus who were corrupting the teachings of the Tantras by propagating as Tantras texts that they themselves had composed’. (Stein also refers to the phenomenon of ‘newly concocted Paddhatis’, not unknown even in his time; see STEIN, vol.I, p. 237, n. 11.)

Another conjecture suggested by Professor Sanderson (in the same letter) instead of the unsatisfactory reading gurudīkṣotadevatāh is ‘gurudīkṣottadevatāh’, “[personifying] the goddesses taught for the Gurudīkṣā, i.e. initiation performed by [Kaula] Gurus.” Their head-shaking alludes to the manifestation of the symptoms of devatāvesāh required of the participants in Kaula collective rites.’

3.7 Even if I have… ex conj. ISAACSON.

3.8 How come? Another possible emendation, suggested by Dr Isaacson, is ke sē.

3.9 damned kingdom According to Hemacandra 4.289, Sanskrit śṭa should become śṭa in Māgadhī.

3.10 My heart… Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.10 spill it ex conj. śu and ā look very similar in Śāradā script.

3.11 King According to PISCHEL §399, Sanskrit rājā becomes lāā in Māgadhī.

3.11 his adviser ta and u look very similar in Śāradā script.

3.11 kingdom See note . The change śṭa > ṭṭha occurs in Śauraseni (see PISCHEL §303).

3.11 thrown in jail ex conj. vahādi (Skt. vadhyate) might make better sense (we would have three successive synonyms of ‘kill’).
3.11 Are we not one of them? *ex conj.* Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.11 We drink °mha belongs to the imperative, but sometimes it is used (wrongly according to Pischel) as an indicative ending (see PISCHEL §455).

3.11 eat Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.11 women The Māgadhī form of Sanskrit strī (or rather strīkā) should be isti according to PISCHEL §310.

3.11 Don’t we observe the same religious discipline as the black-blankets? Cf. note ad 3.2.

Until we reach the last book of the Svacchandatantra the adept appears as a solitary, celibate figure (book 13, v. 4: *brahmacye vyavasthitah*), but Book 15 (possibly interpolated and influenced by the Kaula cult, see ARRAJ 1988, pp. 367ff) shows him from another angle. Among the code-expressions (*chummakā*) listed in this book and used to conceal the adept’s activity we find words for the female partners of the adept (v. 3: *bhagīno baladarpitāḥ*, v. 9: *dūtī samvāhikā*, v. 13: *sakhī sarvārthasādhikā*), semen (v. 5: *śukraṃ candrah*), penis and vagina (v. 8: *liṅgam saṃtosaśajanaṃ bhagāḥ prīṭivivardhanāḥ*), as well as alcohol and meat (v. 3: *madyaṃ tu harṣyaṃ jīneyaṃ muditā tu surāṃ śrītā*, v. 4: *matsyā jalacarā jīneyāḥ māṃsāṃ ca balavardhanam*), which were the regular ingredients of Kaula ritual. Later the text enumerates several secret gestures that a *yoginī* (a goddess or her incarnation as a female partner) may show to the adept (vv. 24 seqq).

The cult of the Yoginis had a central role in the Vidyāpiṭha division of the Bhairavatantras (see SANDERSON 1988 pp. 138ff). The *Siddhayogēśvarimata*, a Tantra of the Vidyāpiṭha, contains a detailed classification of incarnate yoginis, teaches the adept the appropriate signs to be exchanged when they meet these women (Chapter 29, tr. TÖRZSÖK 1999, p. 175ff), and refers to the ‘conversation’ (*saṃbhāsaṇa*, i.e. sexual intercourse) with a special *yoginī* who bestows the ‘perfect substance’ (*siddhadravya*, i.e. the mingled sexual fluids offered to the deity; see *Siddhayogēśvarimata* 30.4, tr. TÖRZSÖK 1999, p. 181).

3.11 adept-dress One might consider emending śādhaḥ° to the more plausibly Māgadhī-looking śāhan°.

3.14 how kadham un a would be a more regular form in Śaurasenī and Māgadhī (see PISCHEL §184).

3.25 there is śu and a look similar in Śāradā script.

3.15 that *ex conj.* ISAACSON. Another possible conjecture (closer to the reading of the manuscripts, but perhaps a less natural construction) could be dāva je ē.

3.15 saw Cf. note .
3.15 **couples** Pischel (§367) mentions *midhuṇā* as a nom. / acc. plur. in Śauraseni.

3.15 **Jinarākshita** Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.17 **informed** The Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *jānāti* should be *yāṇādi* / *yāṇādī* according to the grammarians (Hemacandra 4.292, Vararuci 11.4, Pischel §§ 236, 454, 510), but in the old Nepalese manuscript of the *Nāgānanda* we find *jānādi* in a Māgadhī passage. As Steiner remarks, ‘Vermutlich beruht die Aufteilung der Formen Ś. *jānādi* und Mg. *yāṇādi* wiederum nur auf einer Fiktion.’ (Steiner 1997, p. 173.)

3.19 **king** The form *lāṇa* clearly shows that *rājā* is treated as an a-stem noun in this Māgadhī passage.

3.19 **turban** *ex conj.* Raghavan and Thakur.

3.20 **You should rather say**... Hemacandra in 4.297 prescribes *ācaska* as the correct Māgadhī form.

3.21 **now** *ex conj.*

3.22 **before Doomsday-Fire’s-Flame, the sorceress** *ex conj.* Raghavan and Thakur silently conjectured *aśāman*, but I am not certain that one can speak about the ashram of a yogēśvari.

As Judit Tőrzsők pointed out (Tőrzsők 1999, p. iii), ‘Yogēśvari meaning ‘[female] master of Yoga’ denotes the same as Yoginī. (...) I think the word Yoginī or Yogēśvari is not necessarily intended to convey that these sometimes witch-like female spirits or goddesses have any particular relation to certain classical yogic practices. Instead, the word probably refers to the similarity of supernatural effects traditional Yogins can obtain (such as being infinitely small, large, strong etc.) and powers the Yoginīs of this system [i.e. the Trika-Kaula] can bestow.’

The yogēśvari appearing in Bhavabhūti’s *Mālatimādhava* belongs to the more benevolent kind of witches. Saudāmanī once was the favourite disciple of the respected Buddhist mendicant nun Kāmandakī. Later she took up the Kāpālika Observance (*kāvāliavvadaṃ*), achieved miraculous powers through the mastering of mantras (*samāsādidaaccariamantasiiddhiphapāvā*), and became a familiar sight for other Śaiva adepts and their female partners in the cremation grounds (*rattivihāriṇā Ṇādiśūryāṇavāyāṇo sāhassa mupuddhāriṇo aghoragaṇṭanāmadheassa antevāṇī mahāpabbāvā kavālakundalā nāma (...) tado iyaṃ paññati*, Act I, v. 15+). But from her Buddhist antecedents she had preserved compassion towards those who suffer, and she hastened to Mālatī’s help who had been kidnapped by a revengeful kāpālinī. Then Saudāmanī saved the lives of those for whom life has lost its meaning without Mālatī, and even used her transporting magic (*akṣepinī Siddhi*, Act IX, v. 52) to reunite the two young lovers.

The two adepts in Jayanta’s play also think about relying on a yogēśvari’s
protective powers, but it seems that even such powers would be insufficient to counteract the forces of justice.

3.22 trouble ex conj.

3.22 there ex conj. cśu, teśu, yeśu seem to be used in the sense of atra, tatra, yatra in the Māgadhī passages.

3.23 protected Raghavan and Thakur give pārayati as the chāyā of pālādi, which is not entirely convincing to me. One would expect pāledi as a causative form, and iādi seems to be a passive ending.

3.24 suppose ex conj. śaṅkemi seems to be Māgadhī for śaṅkayāmi, but the causative sense is perhaps not appropriate here.


3.24 chief wife o-vallahāe might be a better reading.

3.24 king Cf. note ad 3.19.

3.25 protected o-ijjam. tī is a false Śauraseni ending according to Pischel §535.

3.25 us Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.25 bounded by Raghavan and Thakur read o-pettānte and give o-pratyante as its chāyā.

3.26 You’re right Cf. note ad 3.20.

3.28 damned kingdom Cf. note .

3.30 sacrifice According to Hemacandra 4.293, Sanskrit jñā should become niṇa in Māgadhī, but, as Pischel remarks (§276) in the manuscripts we find jaṇṇa instead of yaṇṇa.

3.31 we Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.31 for fear of Sankārshana ex conj. Raghavan and Thakur.

3.33 we Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.35 prescribed ex conj. Isaacson.

3.36 Our Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.40 vanquished ex conj. One would expect abhi(ahi?)bhaviṃtto as a Śauraseni passive.

3.40 false ascetics Instead of Raghavan and Thakur’s conjecture, one might emend to durārehi ya tāvashei (durācāruiś ca tāpasaiḥ).

3.42 having fallen into disrepute because of your ardor ex conj.
3.44 Perhaps a pub. In the Mattavilāsa-prahasana the kapālin compares the pub to a sacrificial ground (v. 9+). Prof. Sanderson suggested (in a letter of 15. xii. 2003) to emend *yadi vā to yadi no* in order to achieve the sense ‘What in the world could be an appropriate place for asceticism but a pub?’

3.49 path *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. One might consider completing the otherwise unmetrical line with another word.

3.55 as soon as . . . reached them *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. This seems to be the most plausible way to complete the sentence.

3.55 started The ending *ō ao* is characteristic of Ardhamāgadhī, Māhāraṣṭrī, and Jaina-Māhāraṣṭrī. According to Pischel (§367) it is wrong in Śaurasenī, but a similar ending, *ō ho* occurs as a vocative form in Māgadhī (§372).

3.58 I am not certain if this is the correct interpretation of the sentence. Another translation, suggested by Dr. Kataoka, could be: ‘Your power is too strong.’

3.65ff. ashram The inscriptions of the Śaiva monasteries in the Kalacuri-Cedi country, whose ācāryas belonged to the Mattamayūra clan, provide important historical parallels to the following description of the āśrama (for more details about this clan see MIRASHI 1955). The Chandrēhe inscription (AD 973, in MIRASHI 1955, pp. 198ff.) gives the spiritual genealogy of Abbot Prabodhaśiva, who constructed the *mātha*, and excavated a tank and a well. The serenity and peacefulness of the monastery is described with the following charming verses (ibid. p. 201, ll. 19–21):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{jadataramaruc chonasyaṁbhahaṅkaṇair ayam āśramo} \\
\text{mṛgapatimahādhvānai rātrau pratidkvamitāṃvāraḥ} \\
\text{ṣīkharīśkharapraṅṭapreśkadhvirephapayodharo} \\
\text{janayati jane vidyucchאikāṃ mahāuṣadhirociśā]}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{[cun]vanti vānaragaṇāṃ mṛgaśātrupolān} \\
\text{sīṁhistanāṃ pivati cātra śiṣur mṛgasya]}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{vairāṃ niṣaṃ parihranti virodhino 'nye} \\
\text{sarvasya śāmyati mano hi tapovanesu]|}
\end{align*}
\]

‘This ashram, where the winds are very cool with the drops of the river Ṣona, where at night the sky resounds with the loud roars of lions, and the clouds, [black] as bees, whirl around the edges of the mountain-tops—this ashram makes people to suspect lightning with the glimmering of its excellent herbs.

Here the groups of monkeys kiss the lion-cubs, and the fawn sucks the teat of a lioness. Other hostile [animals] set aside their natural enmity, for everyone’s heart calms down in the penance-groves.’

The fragmentary Kadwāhā-inscription (10th century, edited by MIRASHI-SHASTRI) gives us a telling picture about the relations between the rulers and the abbots of these āśramas. We are told that a certain king called
Gobhaṭa came to the monastery with an army of elephants (ibid. p. 123, l. 12: \textit{tatrājagāmonnasindhurāṇaṃ valaṇa bhāṇa kila gobhaṭākhyāḥ}). In the next verse somebody dies, possibly killed by the king (ibid. l. 13: \textit{[\textit{nṛ]pena parāgaṭasah sahasā paṭata}). Abbot Dharmaṣiva sheds tears for the dead person (ibid.: \textit{tasayavagamya sa kathāṃ karṇāvimuktaṃ bāṇaḥ (em. Mirashi : \textit{vāḥ paḥ ep.})}, then he flies into a rage, with a miraculously acquired bow, resembling Śiva himself, defeats the enemy (ibid. ll. 13–15: \textit{क्षणिण्त तद अनु कपावितात्लाक्षाः \ldots अथ ग्रहावागताकार्मु केन \textit{(em. Mirashi): \textit{kena ep.) vānaś ca dīptāḥ sa dharāvṛśāṃkāḥ \textit{atisation}} \textit{tripurāntakasya \ldots sakalam api sa jītvā śātrvam śarvaka-lpaḥ)}, and finally ascends to heaven while celestial women shower flowers upon him (ibid.: \textit{surapatiṃmanānāṃ puṣpavrṣṭyāvakārṇaḥ puram anūpama \ldots \; \textit{em. Mirashi}} : \textit{ena ep.)}). The same inscription tells us about the successor of Dharmaṣiva, who initiated the Pratihāra king Harirāja (ibid. p. 124, l. 24: \textit{ācāryaḥ sa dadau samyag dīkṣāṃ kalavānkarinīḥ}). The king offered elephants in return, but, after repeated requests, the ācārya graciously accepted some villages instead (ibid. l. 27: \textit{prārthito \textit{neka}da grāmaṃ \textit{caka}me smitādṛāvadanaḥ sa \ldots \; \textit{em. Mirashi}} : \textit{ena ep.)}).

The Malkāpuram-inscription (13th century, ed. Pantulu) tells us about Viśvēsvaraśambhu, the ācārya of the Golaki matha, who was the dīkṣāguru of the Kākatiya king Gaṇapatideva. The king and his daughter and heir Rudrāmba granted two villages to the Abbot, who used the donation to establish an agrahāra called Viśvēsvara-Golaki. The inscription gives various details about the inhabitants of the village and the new institutions: Viśvēsvaraśambhu founded a temple, a matha, a choultry / refectory (sattra), a maternity home (prasūṭisāla), and a hospital (ārogāśāla). He settled sixty Drāviḍa brahmin families, eight professors to teach the three Vedas, Grammar, Mimāṃsa, Nāya, literature, and the Agamas (p. 160, ll. 49–51: \textit{ṣvajussāmadvedanāṃ samyag adhyāpakaḥ trayaḥ \textit{padavākāpramāņānāṃ sāhityasāgamaṃ ca| pāṇca vyākhyaṃ|}}, a doctor and an accountant as well (\textit{vaidyakāyaṃstau}). Ten dancing-girls (nartakāḥ), various musicians, one Kashmirian of unnamed profession (kāśmiradeśīyaḥ), and fourteen female singers (gāṇīyaḥ) were employed for the temple, two brahmin cooks (pācakau dvijamānau) and several attendants (paricārākāḥ) for the sattra and the matha. Ten village-guards (grāmasaya rakṣakāḥ) from the Cola country and twenty policemen (bhātāḥ) kept the peace, and the village was also provided with various craftsmen. The income of some lands was used to meet the needs of visiting Śaiva ascetics, Kālamantras, students, and Pāsupatas, and to supply food to all from brahmans down to the caṇḍālas who came to Viśvēsvara-Golaki (p. 160, ll. 70–73: \textit{upeyusāṃ śaivatapodhanānāṃ kālānaṇānāṃ śīvaśūsanānāṃ| vidyārthiṇāṃ pāṣupatavratānāṃ apy annaavastrādisanrpanāya| ārahyā viprān anivārtānāṃ caṇḍālaparyantarum upāgatānāṃ| anna-pradānāya ca}).

The Ranōd-inscription (10–11th century, edited by Kielhorn) gives the earliest genealogy of the Mattamayūra clan. We learn that king Avan-
tivarman persuaded the sage Purandara to come to his country and to establish a *matha* in his capital, Mattamayūra (possibly identical with the modern Kadwāhā). Purandara initiated the king (on this initiation being Sāiddhāntika Śaiva see Sanderson 2001, p. 9f., n. 6), and established another *matha* at Araṇipadra (modern Ranōd). The last *ācārya* of this *matha* mentioned on the inscription is Vyomaśīva (or Vyomaśambhū), who renovated the *matha* and excavated an impressive tank (the beauties of which are extolled in several verses). Vyomaśīva’s asceticism was exemplary (p. 358, ll. 33–34):

> purā yoṣitsaṅgad anibhytanijāksam bhagavatā  
> vijyoge yaḥ kāmas tripuraripuṇāvāśkṛtaruṣā  
> niruddhāhakṣah ksāntyā tam ayaṃ ajayat saṅgaraḥitah  
> suciṃnānāṃ syād vā kim ita tapasaṃ duṣka[ra]m iti.33]

‘Long ago the Blessed Lord, the Enemy of the Three Forts, showed his anger and defeated Kāma by opening his [third] eye, because of the contact with a woman: he[, Vyomaśīva,] has defeated him [i.e. Kāma] with eyes closed, with forbearance, avoiding contact [with women]. Or rather, what would be difficult for well-observed ascetic practices?’

On the other hand, the same Abbot was a great scholar, well-versed in various philosophical doctrines (ibid. ll. 36–38):

> siddhānteṣu maheṣa eṣa nyātam nyāye ‘ksapado munir  
> gambhīre ca kaṇāśinas tu kaṇabhuk śāstre śrutau jaiminiḥ  
> sāṃkhye ‘nolpomatiḥ svayaṃ ca kapilo lokāyate sadgurur  
> vuddho uvuddhamate jinoṭiṣu jinaḥ ko vāthα naṃ kṛtα[36]]

‘He was truly the Great Lord in [the teachings of Śaiva] Siddhānta, the Sage Aksapāda in Nyāya, Kanabhuj [= Kaṇāda] in the deep science of Kaṇāśin [= Kaṇāda], Jainīn in Vedic tradition, the intelligent Kapila himself in Sāṃkhya, a true master of Lokāyata, Buddha in Buddha’s doctrine, Jina in Jina’s teachings. Or rather, whom was this wise person not equal to?’

(pp. 358f., ll. 40–42):

> saṃdinaṃ mukha eva śākyakariṇāṃ atyūrjjitaṃ garjitaṃ  
> trāsād yasya ca jainajamvukaśatāuir ddvuvyāuriaṃ saṃprāya[39]  
> soḍham jātu na jainiṣyakariṇaivlākṛtaṃ haṇkṛtaṃ  
> tasyaṇyad gaganāsanānapanateḥ kīṃ syat stutam prastutam[39]]

‘Out of fear from him, the Buddhist elephants’ thunderous trumpeting died away already in their mouth, and hundreds of Jaina jackals subdued their inarticulate crying. The Māṃsaka antelopes could never endure his playful roaring. What other deed of this lord of Śiva’s forest shall we praise?’

Vyomaśīva apparently does not fit into the picture of the “typical” *ācārya* of the Mattamayūra clan as it was drawn by Richard Davis (Davīs, p. 135): ‘Like Tolstoy’s proverbial hedgehog, the Drunken Peacocks know only one thing [i.e. Śaiva Siddhānta], but they know it very well. The poets seldom praise the Śaiva sages for their mastery of other traditional Indian disciplines of like grammar, or for knowing other genres of religious
texts such as the Vedas.

It is certainly tempting to identify this learned Śaiva Abbot with the author of the Vyomavatī, a work on Vaiśeṣika philosophy. According to Walter Slaje (Slaje, ‘Untersuchungen...’), Jayanta and the philosopher Vyomaśiva were contemporaries, while the date of the Abbot Vyomaśiva might also be settled around 900 AD. The following verse of another inscription (now in the Archaeological Museum, Gwalior), praising the same ācārya, might also support this identification (the inscription was not at my disposal; it is described in Willis, p. 113; the verse is quoted in Pathak, p. 39, n. 4):

\[
\text{munisūryena nirastam īkālokena yena lokasya} \\
\text{prakaṭayateha pādārthām santam asac ca santamasam||}
\]

‘...which sun-like sage dispelled the darkness of the world with the light of his commentary (i.e. the Vyomavatī-īkā on the Praṣastapāḍabhāṣya?) which revealed here both the existing categories and non-existence (asat = abhāva).’ (Praṣastapāda omits abhāva and mentions six pādārthas. Vyomaśiva explains why abhāva is subordinated to the other categories.)

In any case, we shall see that the God-proving arguments of the Śaiva ācārya in the Āgamaḍambara (just as similar arguments in the texts of the Śaiva Siddhānta) are remarkably close to those found in the Vaiśeṣika Vyomavatī (and in several Nyāya texts as well).

3.66 slow, graceful dance Instead of accepting the reading of the manuscripts one might conjecture "manthanalasya", ‘a [graceful] dance: the waving of the mendicant-garments’.

3.67 ex conj. Another possible way of emending the text could be: pasāṃtatarami aija tavoṣaṃi imam no disadi, ‘This penance-grove seems to me most peaceful today.’ The correct Śauraseni form of ramaṇyam should be ramaṇīyaṃ, and not ramaṇījyaṃ (see Pischel§138).

3.69 smiling with ashes The colour of laughter is white, like the ashes smeared on the ascetic’s body.

3.69 act as servants ex conj. ISAACSON. I cannot interpret the reading cairaveda (airaveda?, eraveda?). The only meaningful word which resembles it is Ailavila or Aid. avida, a name of Kubera (cf. Amarakoṣa 2.73).

3.71 upon my word ex conj. The conjecture is a tentative one.

3.71 Shiva’s heaven One could also consider reading śivapuruṣṭhām.

3.72 absorption into Brahman ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’S emendation, balamha, might also be a Prakrit form of brahma, although one would expect baramha in a Śauraseni passage. Another possibility, suggested by Prof. Sanderson, is to understand the Prakrit as ‘brahmabhātām’ (and perhaps emend the text to barambhātām) and translate ‘I imagine myself ascending, merged with Brahman’.

60
3.75 attention ex conj.

3.75 I don’t think ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR, probably misreading the manuscripts, took śāṅkā agreeing with yathāvasthitā. The manuscripts however, read yathāvasthitās, agreeing with āśraminah (which also seems to give a better meaning).

3.75 Why worry? ex conj. One might consider emending this otherwise unmetrical line in another way.

3.81 † . . . † The manuscripts read uggāhaṇakaṇṭhakhamdhamaṇeva, which was emended by RAGHAVAN and THAKUR to uggakhanavaṇamavandham i va, for which they give the following chāyā (with a question mark): ugrākṣana-vacanabandham i va. Although this conjecture is neither convincing nor interpretable for me, I cannot suggest anything better.

3.84 riches of his kingdom ex em. ISAACSON.

3.84 a heavenly tree in a place where there is nothing around it ex conj. The expression ekavyākte often occurs in Tantric context, indicating a suitable place for performing a ritual, see e.g. Siddhayogēśvarimata 6.3. Another possible emendation, suggested by Prof. Sanderson, is ‘marudeśe’, ‘in the desert’.

3.84 for a long time ex em. ISAACSON. Sarvadarśānasāṅgraha (Cārvāka-daṛśana) p. 6: lokasiddho rājā paraphesvarah ‘The [only] Supreme Lord is the king, who[se existence] is [well]-established among the people.’ (also p. 7: lokasiddha bhaved rājā pareśo nāparah smṛtah) As Prof. Sanderson pointed out to me in a letter of 15. xii. 2003, ‘there may be an allusion here to the convention whereby religious texts constrain the king to support their institutions by promising him a long reign if he complies and a short one if he doesn’t’.

3.84 expert ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. The adding of a word with a similar meaning seems to be necessary.

3.85 The Cārvāka’s behaviour is disrespectful probably because he does not wait until he is offered a seat, or, as Prof. Sanderson pointed out to me in the above mentioned letter, ‘because he uses impertinently familiar forms of address to both the ascetic and Śaṅkaraṇa’.

3.88 self-restraint is just a way to cheat yourself of pleasures Cf. Sarvadarśānasāṅgraha (Cārvāka-daṛśana) p. 3: aṅganādyāṅganādiyāṅjanāmyaṃ su-kham eva puruṣārthah ‘The only goal of man is pleasure produced by such [activities] as embracing women and the like.’ Ibid. p. 4: yadi kaścid bhirur drṣṭaṃ sukhaṃ tyajet tarhi sa paśu-vatāvāḥ bhavet tad uktam — ‘tyajyaṃ sukhaṃ viṣayasaṅgamajanmam puṃsāṃ duḥkhoparṣṭam iti mṛkka-vicāraṇa-iṣṭaṃ vrihiṇi jihāsati sitottamatanḍālaḥduḥhyān
‘If someone cowardly gave up the pleasure he had already experienced then he would be as stupid as a beast. It is said: “The idiots express the following opinion: ‘Men should give up pleasure arising from the contact with sense objects. [since it is] accompanied by pain.’ Who on earth, if he means well by himself, would throw away rice which is rich in white grains of the best quality, just because it is mixed with bits of husk?”’

3.88 sacrificial rituals such as the Agnihotra seem to me just like children’s games Cf. Sarvadarśanasangraha (Cārvākaśāna) p. 5: nanu pāralaukikasaukhiśāhāc bhavātātyāsāharātāṛṣādhye āgniḥotrauvidyā vṛddhāḥ kathaṁ pravartisyante iti cet, tad api na pramāṇaḥ praveśaṁ īste arṇṭavāyātārpanamuktodasair dāśītataya vaidikammanyair eva dhūrambhaśaṁ paraspāreṇ karmakādāuprāmāṇyaśvātipāh jñānākāṉyadāṣasya jñānakāṇyaprajñānaśvātipāh karmakāṇyadāṣasya ca pratikṣiptaṁvin traṇyā dhūrambhaśaṁpārā骊āmāraṇāḥ āgniḥotrauvidyāmaṇiḥ śaśvāsoharātāḥ jñānaṁ bhavati tathā cābhāṇakoḥ—agnihotraṁ trayo vedāḥ tridaṇḍam bhāsmagunṭhānam|buddhipauṇḍrahināmāṁ jiviketi bhṛṣpatiḥ||

‘Objection: “If there is no happiness which belongs to the next world, then why should those who are advanced in learning engage in [rituals] such as the Agnihotra, which can [only] be performed at great expense and physical labour?” This [objection] cannot enter the class of proofs either. For [rituals] such as the Agnihotra are good only for making a living, since [the Veda] is defiled by the faults of falsehood, contradiction, and superfluous repetition; and since the shrewd hypocrites who fancy themselves Vedic experts refute each other’s texts: those who hold that [only] the ritualistic part of the Veda is valid reject its esoteric part, while those who hold that [only] the esoteric part is valid reject the ritualistic part; and since the three Vedas are just the ravings of rogues. As the [following] saying also [points out]: ‘The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the triple staff [of a renouncer], the smearing [of one’s body] with ashes are the livelihood of those who lack intelligence and manliness: thus [taught] Bhṛṣpati.’

3.91 There goes the son of a barren woman Cf. Nāresvararāparikṣāprakāśa p. 8: ... eśa vandhyāśuto yāti ityādivīkṣajātaṁva prāmāṇyaṁbhaḥvāt ‘since it lacks validity like such kind of statements as “here goes the son of a barren woman”’.

3.91 a bow made of hare-horn Cf. Bhṛṣpatsamrty (reconstructed by K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series LXXXV, Baroda, 1941) 2.12:
mamānena pradāṇtavyaṁ saśāśyagāktṛmaṁ dhanuḥ|asāṃbhāyasya asādhyāyaṁ taṁ pākṣam ahur maniśīnaḥ||

‘He must give me a bow made of hare-horn.” The wise say that this idea is inconceivable and not accomplishable.’
3.92 he supervises the mass of karmas Cf. Parākhyatantra 1.92cd–94cd:

karmaṇaḥ dehasaṃyogoviḥh or api maheśvaraiḥ
aśaktatvāt svato nāṣya sāmarthyaṃ karmayojane
paśutavaruddhičchakte svātantryaṃ na paśor atāḥ
karma cidrabhitaṃ tasmād yojakaṃ tad apekṣate
yojakaḥ sa maheśānaḥ svecchayā balavān yatāḥ

‘The linking of the soul, though all-pervading, with a body because of action [comes about] through the [intervention of the] Lord. Because the soul is without power he does not of himself have the capacity for linking himself to [the consequences of his] actions, and so the bound soul, whose power of consciousness is blocked by impurity, has no autonomy. [And] action is devoid of consciousness and therefore it depends on something that links it [to those to whom it must accrue]. The entity that links it is the Supreme Lord, who does it by His will, since He has might.’ (tr. Goodall)

3.94ff. The following verses could also have been said from a mīmāṃsaka position. See for example Āgamaprāmāṇya pp. 34ff. (mīmāṃsakapakṣa):

kva vā deśe tiṣṭhān anavaratatṛptaḥ kim iti vā
kadaḥ vā niśśeṣaṃ janayati tad etad vimṛśatu
kvacit tiṣṭhān iṣṭaṃ kīm api phalam uddīṣya karaṇaiḥ
kadaścid yatkiṃciḥ janayati kulaladīr akhilaiḥ
kṛtārthahāvāh svātantryaḥ prakāśitam aho sampratī vibhoḥ
abhīpṛetam kiścīd yad ayam asamikṣayaiva kurute
jagajjanaṃsthemapraśivalayamahāyāsam avaśaḥ
anukampāpyupktena sṛjyaṃānāś ca jantavāḥ
sukhiṇaḥ kīm na sṛjyanāte tatkarmāpekṣayā yaddi
tatāḥ svātantratāhāniṃ kṛṇaṃ tair eva hetubhiḥ
upaprame ‘pi vaicitreyiḥ kīṃ tatkalpanāyaṇayāḥ

‘Consider this: being where, when, and why does He who is constantly satisfied create that entire [universe]? Every [person], such as a potter, creates whatever [he creates] while being at a certain place, at a certain time, with regard to a certain result, [and] with [certain] instruments. And since He has fulfilled a purpose [when He created the world], [mere] sport cannot be the motive [behind His acts]; if the motive is [His] nature: by George, now you have demonstrated the independence of the Lord, since he helplessly makes the great effort of producing, sustaining, and creating the world without taking into account anything [He might have wished for. If He produces the creatures stimulated by compassion, then why does he not produce them happy? If [you reply that] because [God] takes their karmas into consideration, then [His] independence will suffer a loss. Furthermore, if the variety [of worldly phenomena] is explainable with the help of those causes [i.e. karmas] alone, then why postulate Him in this way?’ (Cf. Ślokavārttika sambandhākṣepaparīhāra v. 52 seqq.)

3.94 Bhāsarvajña examines similar alternatives in Nyāyabhūṣaṇa pp. 458ff.: tathā-
Nevertheless we should examine for what purpose the Lord is engaged [in creation]. Some say that [he creates] in order to favour others. (…) Or maybe he is engaged [in creation] only for his own sake. (…) Or maybe he is engaged [in creation] just by his inherent nature, similarly to the sun [which shines because that is its nature].

3.94 **sport** Cf. *Kriṇaṇatāntra* 1.5cd: *jaya nyttamahārambhākṛkādvikṣobhadāruṇa***||
‘Victory, [you who are] fearsome because of the shaking [of the world] as a result of the vigorous playfulness of your dancing!’ (tr. Goodall)

3.94 **impulse** The scriptures of Śaiva Siddhānta often refer to *prerāṇā* as a characteristic act of God and the lords of mantras, on the different levels of creation, e.g. *Kriṇaṇatāntra* 3.25cd–26:

\[\text{īśvara} \ 'dhaṅsthaḥvidyānāṃ \ paṭīn \ saṁprerayaty \ asau|]
\[\text{tena} \ preritamātṛas \ te \ kurvate \ 'dhaṅstanaṃ \ jaga|]
\[\text{śuddhe} \ 'dhvani śivāḥ \ kartā \ prokto \ 'nanto \ 'site \ prabhūh)|]
‘The Lord urges the overlords of the lower mantras [to act]. As soon as they have been urged by Him, they create the lower universe. In the pure path Śiva is the creator. Ananta is taught to be the lord in the impure [path],’ (tr. Goodall)

Ibid. 14d: *yonim prerayate kṣaṇat|* ‘[Ananta] immediately stimulates the matrix [of primal matter to generate from herself all that is material].’ (tr. Goodall)

3.94 **honesty** It is not entirely clear to me why would God create out of *honesty*. The text may be corrupt here.

3.95 **who has no desire** for the group of causal factors like the instrumentational cause, and who is also deprived of assistant factors Cf. *Kriṇaṇatāntra* 3.9cd: *vaikaraṇyaḥ amūrtatvāt kartṛvam yauj-yate katham|* ‘How is it possible for Him to be a creator, since He lacks the means and is not embodied?’ Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s *Kriṇaṇaṅgiṭṭi ad loc.: karṇāṇāṁ abhāvo vaikaraṇyaṁ, tasmād īśvaro jagataḥ kartā na saṁbhavaṁ karṇāḥbhāvād daṇḍacakrasūrādīrahaṁ kumbhakāra iva kum-bhe| tad idam uktaṁ jaiṁiṁyaiḥ—′na ca niḥsādhanāḥ kartā kaścit sṛjati kīṃcaṇa|’ (*Slokavārttika, sambandhāḥpapaparāhāra* 50cd) ‘He lacks instruments, and because of this it is impossible that the Lord created the universe. Because of His lack of instruments He is like a potter who has no stick, wheel, thread or other instrument in regard to [creating] a pot. The same [point] is expressed by the Mīmāṁsakas: “And no creator ever creates anything without means to accomplish it.” (tr. Goodall) As the verse quoted from the *Slokavārttika* shows, this objection could also be made from a Mīmāṁsaka position.

3.95 **particular** ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. One might consider completing the otherwise unmetrical line with another word.
3.103 = Vākyapadīya 1.32, also quoted in Nyāyamaṇjarī vol. I, p. 314, Tattvosāṅgraha 1459, and Syādvādaratnākara p. 262. Bhartrhari illustrates this assertion in his vṛtti (p. 89), e.g. grīṣmahemantādisu kūpyalaldinām atyanthabhināh sparśādayo ṭṛṣyante, ‘things such as water in a well feel and [look, etc.] very different in summer, in winter, or in other [seasons]’ (an illustration of kālabheda, which makes it impossible to infer the exact temperature of the water). Thus, as Vṛṣabhadeva notes, tatra syād api kaścid dhūmo yo nāgneh, gathā śālukād api śālukāh, gomaṇād api, ‘among [all things in the world] there might exist such a smoke which does not arise from fire, just as some frogs are born from frogs, others from cow-dung’.

3.105 = Vākyapadīya 1.42, also quoted in Nyāyamaṇjarī vol. I, p. 316. Bhartrhari actually intended to emphasise the importance of scripture with this verse. As he explains in his vṛtti (pp. 98f.): yasya hi sthālātipuṇyānyāgnaikadēṣāṁ ṭṛṣṭvā śiṣṭe ‘ṛthe pratipatītih so ‘νdha iva viśame girināye caṅkṣasantaṁ naṁtaraṁ antaṃ vidartīpañ kalāci eva mārgakādeṣāṁ hastasparśanavagamyam santākrāntas tatpratigayād aparaṁ api tathaiva pratipadyaṁvān yathā vināsaṁ labhate tad vau aṅgacaksuṣā vinā tarkāṇupāti kevalāṇumāṇena kvacīd āhitapratītyo ṭṛṣṭādyṛṣṭaphāleṣu karmasv agaṁ vīkramyā pravartamāṇo niyataṁ mahatā pratyavāyena samyujjyate| ‘For someone who, following the maxim of the cooking-pot and boiled rice, having seen a portion [of the whole thing] determines the rest of the thing [since he assumes it to be the same as the portion he has seen], just as a blind man, who runs on an uneven mountain path without a guide who can see, covers just a small distance while feeling it by touch of hand, and because of the knowledge (or confidence) [produced] by that he believes the remaining [part of the road] to be the same, perishes—in the same way that man, too, who, without the ‘eye’ of scripture, follows logic and, having attained partial knowledge (or confidence about certain things) with the help of inference alone, becomes engaged in actions that have visible and invisible results while he disregards scripture: [such a person] will necessarily meet great disaster.’

3.107 = Vākyapadīya 1.34, also quoted in Tattvosāṅgraha 1461, Nyāyamaṇjarī vol. I, p. 316.


3.112 suffer the torments of hunger ex conj.

3.120 Cf. Tattvopaplavasimha, p. 125: upaplateṣv eva tattvesv avicāritaramaṇīyāḥ sarve vyavahārā ghaṭanta iti| ‘Only when the principles have been annihilated, all transactions take place pleasantly [as long as] they are not examined.’ The ālanāikika Udhaṇa (who may or may not be the same as the Cārvāka Udhaṇa who wrote a Tattvavṛtti according to Syādvādaratnākara, p. 265) classified subject matters into two groups: “well-established [even after] they have been analysed” (avicāritasusthāḥ) and “pleasing [only as long as] they are not analysed” (avicāritaramaṇīyāḥ).


Sāstras deal with the former group, while kāvyas with the latter (quoted in Kāvyamīmāṃsa, p. 44).

3.212 you just don’t want to yield an inch Cf. Jacob 1909, who gives the following possible interpretations: ‘unduly extending one’s claim or one’s position generally’ ( = bhiksupādāprasāraṇānāga), ‘to establish one’s self freely and fully: to extend one’s power far and wide’. Jacob also makes the following observation: ‘In the passages, however, in which I have met with the expression, it seems to employ a dogged adherence to a position in spite of previous failure, and when there is little prospect of further success.’ (Jacob quotes the Upamitībhavaprapaṇcā Kathā, the Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā, and the Nyāyamaṇḍārya.

3.122 non-smoke and non-fire ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

3.123 accordance ex conj. SANDERSON.

3.125 Therefore . . . = Nyāyabhāṣya ad Nyāyasaūtra 1.1.7 (p. 14).

3.126 for things concerning which cognition is still to be acquired. ex conj. The conjecture is supported by the parallel passage in the Nyāyamaṇḍārya.

This was the view of the ‘sophisticated’ Cārvākas (suśiksitaṭarāḥ, Nyāyamaṇḍārya vol. I, pp. 326f.), who are identified by Cakradhāra as ‘Udbhaṭa & co.’ (udbhaṭādāyā, Nyāyamaṇḍāryaṇaṭhābhāṅga p. 19; on p. 43 Cakradhāra also tells us that with the term ‘cunning Cārvāka’ (cārvākadhārta) Jayanta also refers to Udbhaṭa).

Kamalaśīla ascribes this position to Purandara (Tattvasāṅgahapāṇijīka, introducing v. 1482): purandaras tv āhā—‘lokaprasiddham anumānaṃ cārvākair apiṣyata eva, yat tu kaścit laukiṇam mārgam atikramanīnyānām ucyate, tan niṣiḍhyate ’ iti ‘Purandara, on the other hand, says: “[That kind of] inference which is well established in everyday life is certainly accepted by the Cārvākas, too, but that [kind of] inference is rejected which some people assert going beyond the everyday path [of reasoning].”’

The Śyādvādaratnākara quotes Udbhaṭa’s commentary on Purandara’s following sūtra (p. 265): pramāṇasya-gaṇavatvād (em.: pramāṇasya gaṇavatvād ed.) anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ ‘Since a [real] means of valid knowledge is not indirect, it is hardly possible to ascertain things on the basis of inference.’ (The same sūtra is also quoted in Nyāyamaṇḍārya vol. I, p. 312, and in Nyāyabhāṣya p. 210; in the latter text one should emend arthādurlabhaḥ to arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ. Bhāsarvajñī glosses agaṇavatva with anupacaritaviṣayatva.) Says Udbhaṭa (Śyādvādaratnākara pp. 265f.): lokaprasiddheṣv api hetuṣu vyabhicārādārāsam asti, tantrasiddheṣv api tena vyabhicārādārāsānālaśaṇāyaṇaṣūdāhmyatas tantrasiddhāhetuṇāṃ tathābhāvo vyavasthāpya īti gaṇavatvam anumāṇa-syaḥ vyabhicārāvegaḥ hi laukikahetūnāṃ anumeyāvagamena nimittam, sa nāsti tantrasiddheṣv īti na tebhāṣa parokṣāvagamanteṣu nyāyāḥ, ata iti idam uktaṃ anumāṇaḥ arthaniścayo durlabho īti ‘As for [those] logical reasons
which are well established in the world, we do not see that they are erroneous; therefore, because of the apparent [but unreal] similarity of the property [called] “the non-perception of erroneousness” also with respect to [logical reasons] that have been established scientific works, it is determined that logical reasons established in scientific works are thus [i.e. non-erroneous]: this is the indirect nature of inference. For the ground of ascertaining the inferendum is the ascertainment of the non-erroneousness of ordinary logical reasons; this does not take place in the case of [logical reasons which are] established in scientific works: so it is not right to infer from them things that are beyond the scope of sense-perception. That is why it has been said: “It is hardly possible to ascertain things on the basis of inference”.

3.130 Cf. *Kīraṇatantra* 3.12ac:

\textit{sthiṇam vicitrayaṁ kāryaṁ naśyathā ghatavad bhavet}

\textit{asti hetur atah kaścit...}

‘The universe is gross, diverse, [and therefore] an effect, like a pot. It cannot be otherwise. And so there exists some [instigating] cause.’ (tr. Goodall)

Commenting on this verse Rāmakaṇṭha distinguishes two positions regarding the origin of the universe. For the Sāṃkhya and the Buddhists, the universe is an effect, but not for the Mīmāṃśakas, Jainas, and Cārvākas, who hold that ‘the universe was never not thus’ (\textit{na kadācid anīḍhaṁ jagad. Kīraṇavṛtti} p. 71.) The Tantra rejects the view of the latter group and establishes that the universe is a product. Says Rāmakaṇṭha: \textit{yat sthiṇam tat kāryam yathā ghatādi, sthiṇam caitad adṛśtakarṇaṁ bhuvanādi, tatāḥ kāryam iti} (ibid.) ‘Whatever is gross is an effect, like such things as pots. This [universe] that consists in the worlds and so on, and whose creator is not directly experienced, is also gross and therefore [it too is] an effect.’ (tr. Goodall)

A few lines below Rāmakaṇṭha further expands on the subject (\textit{Kīraṇavṛtti} p. 72): \textit{yat kāryam tad viśiṣṭaṁ nākṛṣṭaṁ kṛṣṭakartrā vinā na siddhyatītī yathā ghatādi kāryaṁ caitat sarvam eva jagañ atas tad api viśiṣṭaṁ nākṛṣṭaṁ kartṛā vinā na bhavatiḥ yas tat kartṛa so śvaraḥ sidhōva eva} ‘Whatever is an effect cannot exist without a creator equipped of particular powers of knowledge and action, just as pots and such [cannot exist without such a creator]. So too this entire universe is an effect. And therefore that too cannot come into being without a creator equipped of particular powers of knowledge and action. And so its creator, God, is established.’ (tr. Goodall)

Cf. *Mataṅgapārameśvara, vidyāpāda* 99cd–100ab (p. 226):

\textit{nimittakāryaṁ tv iśo hy upādānaṁ tv śaktayaḥ}||

\textit{sanvāyī tathā māyā kāryaṁ etaj jagat sadā}||

‘The Lord is the instigating cause, as for [his] powers, they are the material cause, and māyā is the inseparable cause: this world is always the effect.’ (Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha in his \textit{vr̥tti ad loc.} seems to interpret \textit{upādāna} as
sahakārikārana and samavāyin as upādāna.)
Cf. also Parākhyatantra 2.2–3:

mūrtāḥ sāvayavā yevārthā nānārūpaparicchadāh
sthūlāvayavāsāśīṬavād buddhimaddhetupūrvakāḥ
ato 'sti buddhimān kaścid śīvaraḥ samavāśhītāḥ
pratiponnah svakāhyaṇa drṣṭenāṭrānunānātah]

‘All things that are endowed with form, that are made up of parts, that have various forms, because they are distinguished by having gross parts must necessarily depend on a sentient cause. Therefore there exists some sentient [cause]. [And that is] proved to be the Lord. He is known, according to this system, by the inference that we draw from His effects, which we directly experience.’ (tr. Goodall)

Ibid. v. 12ab (Pratoda’s objection):

ksīter evaṃvidhaṃ rūpam na kaḍācīd anudṛṣan]

‘The form of the earth is thus; it was never not thus. (tr. Goodall)

Ibid. 2.29abc (from Prakāśa’s reply):

nimittam śivākhyām yat tad drṣṭaṃ sahakāraṇam|
upādānaṃ ca yat sūksmaṃ

‘The instigating cause is called the ‘lord’; that which is the auxiliary cause is something seen [such as the stick, wheel, etc.]; that which is the material cause is subtle [matter].’ (tr. Goodall)

The same arguments, establishing that composite entities like mountains must be products (which fact also serves to prove the necessity of God’s existence, since all effects require a cause, and special effects require a special cause), can be found e.g. in the Nyāyabhūṣāna (p. 453: bhūbhūdhārādeś ca kāryatvāṃ sāvayavatvāna pratiṣṭate, sāvayavasya nityatvavirodhat, khanāṇādina caikadeśaśī蒂ēdārśanāḥ) ‘And we learn that the earth, mountains, etc. are products from the fact they are composite, for something which is composite cannot be permanent, and since we see that parts of it get destroyed through digging, etc.’), the Nyāyavārttika (pp. 433ff.) and also in two Īśvarasiddhis (one vaisn. ava and the other īśa va): that of Yāmuncārya (pp. 158, 164.), and that of Utpaladeva (pp. 13ff.).

See also Vīyogavatī, p. 70: prthievī kāryam, avayavasanniveśīśīṭavātvāt| yad yad avayavasanniveśīśīṭvām, tat tat kāryam drṣṭam, yathā ghāṭādī| tathā cāvyavasanniveśīśīṭā prthievī, tasmat kāryetvā| ‘The earth is a product, because it is characterised by the combination of [its] parts. If A is characterised by the combination of [its] parts then A is understood to be a product, like a pot. Accordingly the earth is characterised by the arrangement of [its] parts, therefore it is a product.’

Ibid. p. 101: kṣītyādīmah kārīyāni racānaḥvattvāt| yad yad racanāvat, tat tat kāryam, yathā ghāṭādī| tathā racanāvah kṣītyādī, tasmat kāryam iti| ‘The earth and [mountains and similar objects] are products, because they have arrangement. If A has arrangement then A is a product, like a pot. And the earth and [mountains and similar objects] have arrangement, therefore they are products.’
3.132 Cf. *Kīraṇavṛtti* ad 3.9ab: *nāpi rāpalabhādīnaṃ caṅsura-ūdīr ēva pūrvokta-+

    tanukarāṇaḥ dharmakṣetraḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇiḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇiḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇa
    kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇa
    kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇa
    kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇaḥ kārṇa

    Kīraṇa. avr. [3.9ab]: *nāpi rāpalabhādīnaṃ caṅsura-ūdīr ēva pūrvoktānunādīkāryāntyathānānupapattilakṣaṇanānūnānānena
tasya mahā-būtebhya evotpatti-dṛṣṭeḥ* yad āhuḥ saugataḥ—*yasmin sati bhavaty eva yata tato* *nyasya kālpanī taddhetutvena sarvatra hetūnām anavasthitih*||’

    (Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi 26; Pandeya’s edition reads *yesu satru*)

    *Nor [can we infer a creator God], in the same way as [we infer] the faculty of sight and other [sense faculties] by their effects, such as the perception of form, by an inference on the basis that we cannot otherwise account for [what must be the Lord’s] effects, such as the bodies, instruments and worlds mentioned above, since that [body of effects] is known from experience to arise from the [five] elements alone. As the Buddhists say: “If something comes into being when another thing exists and one posits as the cause of the former some entity other than the latter, then there is an infinite regress of causes.”* (tr. Goodall)

    Also *Parākhyatantra* 2.4 (Pratoda’s objection):

    kāryakāraṇasambandho na grāhīto yatas tayoh
    tena tat-kāraṇabhāvān na khyāpyaṃ kāryadarśanam||

    *‘Since we do not perceive that there is a relation of cause and effect between them [viz. between God and the world we see], and [because] there is therefore nothing [that we know] to have caused this [world], therefore you should not proclaim that we have direct experience of [His] effects [since we do not know them to be effects].’* (tr. Goodall)

    Yāmunācārya cites a similar objection in his *Īśvarasiddhi* (pp. 163f.): *mahīmahādharādī kāryaṃ na bhavati, prasiddhāhārāvīlakṣaṇatvāt, gaganavat, aśakyadarśanopādānapakaraṇavatvād vā vyatirekeṇa ghaṭādīvat| ‘The earth, mountains and [similar objects] cannot be effects, since, like the air, they are different from well-known effects, or, unlike in the case of such things as a pot, it is impossible to see their material and instrumental causes.’

3.134 Cf. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s *vṛtti ad Matarāpārāmēśvarau, vidyāpāda* 6.99 cd–100 ab (p. 228) where he also refutes Dharmakūrī’s objection (*Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi* 13–14) and then says: *anyathā mahānāsavartino dhūmasāgyānīkāryavatvasiddhāv api parvatādīvardinaṃ tato* *nyātivād agniśīrṣṣaṃśātāvād ghaṭātavasya kṛtakavasyāntivatvasiddhāv api sādhasambhādino ‘siddheḥ sarvatrāśiddhātvasya sambhāvāt sarvānāṃmahāvāvāvaeva| ‘Otherwise [i.e. if we accepted the Buddhist position], even though the smoke in the kitchen is proved to be an effect of fire, since the [smoke] on the mountain is different from the one [in the kitchen], we could not prove that it is [also] an effect of fire; [and] even though the artificiality of the pot is proved from its impermanence, [the artificiality] connected with sound could not be established; thus the possibility of not [being able to] draw a conclusion could occur everywhere, and so all inferences would be completely abolished.’

    Cf. also Bhaṭṭa Nārāyanakaṇṭha’s *Mrgendrawṛitti ad* 3.6cd–7ab (p. 110ff.).

3.136 Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* (Pandey), *pramāṇasiddhi* 13: *siddhaṃ yadṛg adhi-
śhātyābhāvābhāvāvānuvṛttim| sanniveśādi tad yuktām tasmād yaḥ anumāyate]

3.137 Rāmākaṇṭha also deals with this Buddhist objection in his Kīraṇavṛtti (pp. 72–73): na ca kāryatvam atra tathābhūtaḥ na siddham ity aśaṅkanīyam| yaḥ āhuk saugataḥ— (Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi 13–14) ‘siddham yādṛg adhiśhātyābhāvābhāvāvānuvṛttim| sanniveśādi tad yuktām tasmād yaḥ anumāyate]
vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdāsmyād abhedinah| na yuktānumitīḥ pāṇḍudravyād itva hatāśane||

And it cannot be questioned that its being an effect in the same way is proved, as the Buddhists [do when they] say: “When that particular kind of compositeness etc. is established to be in positive and negative concomitance with the [existence of the] controller—it is fine that that [i.e. the existence of a controller] is inferred from that [kind of compositeness]. (N.B. The translation of this verse is mine.) But an inference in respect of some particular thing of something well-known from some [logical ground] which is similar [to that in some valid argument such as the one outlined above just] because the wording is the same is not correct. [It is] like [inferring the presence of] fire from [the presence of some] pale substance [simply because smoke can be called a pale substance].” [This objection does not hold] because it is established that every effect is invariably concomitant with an agent, as [we see] in the case of pots and such, just as being a product is invariably concomitant with impermanence. Otherwise both there and elsewhere, if one creates some [imaginary] differentiation of logical grounds by differentiating between the attribute that one wishes to prove and [that of] the example, then all inferences will be impossible. On the other hand, because it exists even where there is no smoke and because one sees it in snow and chalk, and the like, it would be wrong [to allow] that undifferentiated whiteness should be the basis for the inference of fire.’ (tr. Goodall; cf. Nyāyamañjarī, vol. I, pp. 493–494, Nyāyabhuṣaṇa pp. 480ff, Utpaladeva’s Īśvarasiddhi pp. 8f.)

See also Vyomavati, p. 102: atha dhūmasyaśāṇamātyaḥ vyāyāt upalambhāt yatropalambhās tatravāṁprapunādhatvād viruddhatānuvāśa iti cet, śāpi saṃāṁ, kāryatvasya buddhirāt viyāyāt upalambhāt pakṣād satsādhakatvām iti | ‘If [you object that], because we cognise that [the presence of] smoke is pervaded by [the presence of] fire alone, where we perceive [smoke] there and only there [smoke] proves [the presence of] fire, and thus there is no scope of erroneousness, [the train of thoughts] is the same in this case, too: because we cognise that the condition of being a product is pervaded by [the presence of a] rational [maker], [the presence of product-
ness] in the subject proves that [i.e. that it was made by a rational being].’ Later Vyomaśiva also quotes and refutes Dharmakīrti’s objection (*Pramāṇavārttika* pramāṇasiddhi 13–15 in *Vyomavatī*, pp. 106f.). He also makes the same remark about ‘whiteness’ as Rāmakṛṣṇa, and adds: *evaṃ ca valmikādāv api māyāvikāraṇatvaḥ na kalālapūrvakatve līṅgaṃ, vyabhicārītāt* *tasya hi prākāreṣṭākāśāt kalālapūrvakasya api sadbhāvaḥ* ‘And thus, in the case of such things as ant-hills, too, the condition of being a modification of clay is not a logical reason which proves that [the activity of] a potter is a precondition [of their existence], because of the irregularity [of this logical reason], since it is also present in such things as walls or bricks, which are dependent on [the activity of somebody who is] not a potter.’


3.141 Cf. Rāmakṛṣṇa’s refutation of Dharmakīrti’s objection (note ad 3.137). See also Parākhyatantra 2.5:

*sambandho na gṛhitō vā kāryakāraṇatvas te iha|*  
*kāryam dṛṣṭvā paroksam tat kāraṇam gānyate sphuṭam|*  
*tādyugdhaṇa kāreyaṃ kartā kāryasya mihate||*

‘You may argue that a relation [of cause and effect] is not perceived, but because of the [connection between] effect and cause [that we directly experience] in the world, it is clear that when we perceive [what must be] an effect, we understand [that there must have been] a cause of it that cannot directly be perceived by us. Through such an effect the creator of the effect is known.’ (tr. Goodall)

Cf. also Yāmūnācārya’s *Īśvarasiddhi*, p. 164: *na cedr.´ sa eva sanniveśah kāryo netara ity aveṣapanniveśapratiniyātaṃ rūpaḥ pedam udiṣṭāmahe|*  
‘And we do not expect [to find] a difference in nature determined for each [particular case of] compositeness of constituent parts, in the form of “only this kind of compositeness is an effect, and not a different [kind]”.’

3.143 Cf. Bhaṭṭa Nārāyanakaṇṭha’s commentary to *Myṛdṛatantra* 3.2 (pp. 103ff.): *tad evaṃ kāryatvahetunā jagato buddhimatkartrūpavorvakatvasiddhau yo śau tattadvicitṛtyasampādikēcchājñānakriyāśāktiyuktah, kartā sa ity asmadādikāryavilakṣāṇakṣīṣṭyādikāryaviśeṣajanaśanakūrayāviseṣāvagamo yuktah| na ca taitaprasiddhāṃ yasmin|*  
‘vaiśiṣṭyaṃ kāryavaiśiṣṭyād dṛṣṭaṃ lokasthitāv api||’

(as Dr. Goodall informed me in July 2001, this verse seems to belong to the text of the Tantra, and it is indeed quoted as part of the mūla in Trilocana’s *Siddhāntūrthasamuccaya* T.206 p. 62, T.284 p. 133)

*lakṣaṇa vahāre ’pi vaiśiṣṭaṃ kāryaṃ dṛṣṭvā vaiśiṣṭaṃ eva kāraṇaṃ anumiyate, yathā vicitramayanaṇavacitrākleśamādikākalāpasyāmukhyatām nadiṣṇavam anupamaśanduryasampadaṃ ca dṛṣṭvā, tattatkartaro api tadbhīvatāśākṣāśākṣīṣṭaṃ vasiṣṭyāṃ avasīṣṭe, alaś ca|*  
‘yad yathā yadṛṣṭaṃ yāvat kāraṇaṃ tattkāraṇatvā tathā||’

(…) *evaṃ jagalakṣāṇaṇākāraṇyaśa tattatprakārayaṇaśākṣīṣṭaṃ upalabhya tattadvicitṛtyasāyaniratiṣayajñānakriyāśāksīṣṭyuktam kāraṇaṃ anumiyate|*
‘Therefore, having thus proved with the logical reason: “[the world] is an effect” that the world is dependent on an intelligent creator, that person who is endowed with the powers of will, knowledge, and action, which [powers] bring about the manifold diversity [of the world]—that person is the creator: this is the correct ascertaining of an extraordinary cause which creates extraordinary effects such as the earth, which are different from the effects [produced by agents] of our ilk. And this is a well-known fact, since—

“The particular nature [of the cause] is learnt from the particular nature of the effect in everyday life as well.”

In everyday transactions, too, when we see a particular effect, we always infer a particular cause. For example, when we see that in a collection of artifacts like paintings depicting palaces and various other things some are inferior, others are mediocre, yet others have unequalled beauty, we also determine the particular qualities of each [artist] who made these [artifacts] on the basis of the differences in [the qualities of] these [objects]. And for this reason,—

“The cause has the same aspects, qualities, and dimensions as its effect.”

(...) Thus, having ascertained the manifoldness of the various forms of the effect [in question], namely the world, we infer a cause which is endowed with unsurpassed powers of knowledge and action, which have as their object these various particularities [of the world].’

Cf. Nyāyabhaṣana p. 451: yathā ‘garukṛṭadhūmaviśeṣāparijñāne ‘pi tṛṇādi-

kṛṭadhūmaviśeṣebhyo vilakṣaṇaṁ dhūmam upalabhāmānas tṛṇādibhyo vil-

akṣaṇaṁ āvendhanam (conj. : āvendhanam ed.) anumāya tatrāptād

agarusāṁjñāṁ pratyeti svayaṁ vā saṁjñāntaraṁ karo, tathāmadādi-
kṛtyāviveśebhyo vilakṣaṇaṁ kṣiṭyādikṛtyam upalabhāmāno smadādi-
bhyo vilakṣaṇaṁ kartāram anumāya tatrāptād iśvarasamjñāṁ pratyeti sva-
yaṁ vā saṁjñāntaraṁ karotīti. ‘Just as someone, even if he is not familiar with the particular smoke produced from [burning] agaru-wood, perceiving a smoke which is different from the particular smokes produced by [burning] grass etc., infers a fuel which is indeed different from grass etc., and then learns from a reliable person that this [fuel] is called agaru or himself gives it another name, in the same way when someone perceives such products as the earth which are different from the particular products made by our ilk, he infers a maker who is different from our ilk and then learns from a reliable person that this [maker] is called the Lord, or himself gives it another name.’

See also Vyomavati, p. 102, where Vyomaśiva proves that the Creator must be an omniscient person.

3.145 talk about ex conj.

3.149 See Vyomavati, p. 103: athāgniḍhūmayoh pratyakṣaṁ sambandhasiddher

anumānapravṛttir yuktā, naivam atreti cet, na, ihāpi kāryatvasyaādhīṣṭār-
pūrvakateva sambandhasiddher anumānaṁ pravartata iti athāgniṁ anu-
mānaṁ uṛdhvam api pratyakṣo maivam iśvara ity anumānaṁ kathāṁ itī
cet, na, atyantaparokṣasyāpi caikṣurāder upalabdhyanumeyatvat| athātra sāmānyena kriyāyāḥ "karuṇākāryatvopalabdher (conj. : karaṇaḥ ed.) anumānam, tarhi kāryatvasya sāmānyena kartṛpūrvakatvopalabdher anumānam iti (…) na ca sarve drṣṭaṁ tadharmā dāṛṣṭāntike 'pi bhavanti, abhede drṣṭaṁadarṣṭāntikāryaḥ-vahārocchedaprasāṅgaḥ| na hi chidāryāyāḥ karaparokṣ kalāraṇi dṛṣṭāṁ iti rūpopalabdhi-kriyāyāṁ api tathā bhavati| yathā caitrā-paśvāsēṇa karṇaṇa kriyāyā vyāptatvād anumānam, evam śvarānumāne 'pi| If [you object that] we are right to make the inference because the connection between fire and smoke is established through sense-perception, [but] in this case [of inferring God] it is not so, [then I reply that your objection is] not [valid], since in this instance, too, the inference works because it is established that the condition of being an effect is connected with the condition of being dependent on a controller [of the production]. If [you object that] fire is also visible after the inference [has been made], [but] the Lord is not thus, so how could we infer [His existence], [then I reply that your objection is] not [valid], since the faculty of sight and [other sense-faculties] can be inferred from perception, even though they are completely invisible. If [you say that] in this case we make the inference from perceiving the fact that [any] action in general is the effect of an instrument, then [in the case of mountains etc.] we make the inference from perceiving the fact that an effect in general requires an agent. (…) And not all properties of the example belong also to the thing it illustrates, since, if they were the same, talking about example and exemplified would become impossible. For just because such things as an axe are observed to be the instrument of the action of cutting, it is not thus in the case of the action of perceiving colours. And just as in this case we make the inference from the fact that action [in general] is invariably concomitant with an instrument devoid of any particularities, [we make the inference] in the same way also in the case of inferring the Lord.'

Cf. note ad 3.132.

3.154 Cf. note ad 3.132.

3.155 this incurable headache *ex conj.* The feminine pronoun iyam (omitted by RAGHAVAN and THAKUR) suggests that the subject of the sentence is śīraṁ. Instead of emending bhaisajya to abhaśajya, one might consider conjecturing bhīṣajya or bhaisajyena.

3.157 The universe created by God must have a function: it helps the souls to gather the fruits of their actions through a long series of rebirths. But this theory comes to nothing if no eternal Self exists attached to our perishable body. Says Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa-kāṇṭha’s *Mrgendra-vṛtti* ad 6.1ab (atha viśeṣanimittasya prāptaṁ lākṣaṇam ātmāṁ) (p.149): viśeṣasya jagata niṃittām pravartanaḥhetur ātmā tadbhogasādhanāya tanukaranaṁbhuvanaṁ-dināṁ utpattāḥ ‘The Self is the cause of the whole universe, [i.e. it is] the reason of its creation, since bodies, sense faculties, and worlds come into being so that it can experience [the fruits of its past karmas].’
The following verses of the Tantra further clarify why the universe must have been created for the souls (vv. 6.2–3ab):

\textit{kāryam ksīyādi karteśas tat kartur nopayujyate}
\textit{na svārtham apy acidbhāvān nānarthyaṃ kartyaauravāt}|
\textit{pārīsēṣyāt parārthāṃ tat kṣetrajñāḥ sa paras tayoh}|

‘The earth etc. are the product, [their] creator is the Lord. This [product] is of no use to the creator. Neither does it exist for itself, since it is unconscious. It cannot be useless because of the gravity of the creator. Since there is no other alternative left, it must exist for the sake of another, [and] it is the knower of the field [i.e. the Self] which is that “other”[, different from those two [namely the creator and his creation].’

Then the Cārvāka objects the following (v. 3cd):
\textit{paro dehas tadarthatvāt parārthāḥ ks.mādayo nanu}||

‘Surely that “other” is the body; earth etc. exist for the sake of something else in so far as they exist for its sake.’

Then we have the answer to this objection (v. 4ab):
\textit{kāyo ‘py acīttvād ānyārthyam sutarāṃ pratipadyate}|

‘The body, too, since it is insentient, certainly exists for the sake of something else.’

The Cārvāka then puts forth that the body itself is conscious, but the \textit{siddhāntin} rejects this view (vv. 4cd–5):
\textit{cetanāś cet na bhogatvād vikāritvāc ca jātucit}||
\textit{bhogyā vikārino drṣṭāś cidvihīnāḥ patādayāḥ}|
\textit{yasmin sati ca sattvād vā na saty api śave cītiḥ}||

‘If you say that [the body] is sentient, [then my answer is] never, because it is the object of experience [and not the subject], and because it changes. Things which are the objects of experience and which are subject to change, such as cloths, are seen to be devoid of consciousness. Or [if you say that the body is conscious] because the one [i.e. the soul] exists as long as the other [i.e. the body] exists, [this objection is also wrong, because] even if the corpse exists there is no consciousness [in it].’

In the \textit{Mataṅgaparameśvara} first Mataṅga sets forth the Cārvāka position that there is no Self other than the body, and consciousness is just the result of some chemical process in the body (vv. 6.5cd–7ab). In his commentary Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha mentions some details of the materialist view, the final conclusion of which is well known from other sources as well (p. 138): \textit{ata eva ca sārīravināše draṣṭur api vināśat paralokino ’bhāvāt paralokāsiddhir ity uktam— ‘yāvajjivaṃ sukhaṃ jīven nāsti mṛtyur agocaraḥ| bhāmabhūtasya śāntasya punarāgamanam kutaḥ|| iti} ‘And for this very reason, since there is no transmigrating entity because the experiencing agent also perishes when the body perishes, transmigration [itself] is [also] not established. Thus it is said: “Man should live happily as long as he is alive. There is no one who can avoid death. How could a dead man who has been reduced to ashes return [to life] again?” Cf. Bhattacharya, p. 610, \textit{śloka} 7.
3.161 aware of itself Cf. Kīraṇavṛtti ad 2.25ab (p. 53): ātmā svasaṃvedanaṃ svaparātmakāśatayaḥ pratipuruṣaḥ siddhyati kim anyena sādhanena? ‘A soul is proved to exist in every man by one’s own experience as being manifest both to itself and to other souls. What need is there of further proof?’ (tr. Goodall) See also Nareśvarnikṣāprakāśa ad 1.5 (p. 14), and Mrgendratantra 6.5 (quoted above).

3.161 single synthesizer Cf. Nareśvarnikṣāprakāśa ad 1.4 (p. 9): satyam, ata evendriyādīr iva kāryāt so ‘picchātmakād anumāṇita iti naiyāyikāḥ] (. . .) iicehā hi pūrvāntahātasadhanaśādhyāyanasandhānasāmarthhyasiddhatatatsamānakartṛtyajñānasahabdhāviniḥ jñāntāntarabheṣya ievā śāṅkavijñānantarabheṣya ‘pi kāryatvena vyāvarṭamānā viśiṣṭaḥ jñātaḥ sthīraḥ anumāṇapayitīty ātmasiddhiḥ] ‘Say the Naiyāyikas: “True [i.e. the Self is imperceptible]. For this very reason, just as such [invisible things] as the sense-faculties [are inferred from their effects], it [i.e. the Self] is also inferred from an effect, namely desire.” (. . .) For desire will [necessarily] arise together with the cognition that it has the same agent [as the previous experience had], which [cognition] is established through the capacity of synthesizing, for instance, the formerly experienced fact that something is a means of accomplishing pleasure. Thus, inasmuch as it cannot be the effect of another cognition, the body, and the like, just as [it cannot be the effect] of other cognising subjects, [desire] induces us to infer a particular, stable cognising subject: this proves the [existence of the] Self.’ Alex Watson has pointed out (Watson, note 51, p. 63; p. 65) the close resemblance between the naiyāyika view as presented by Rāmakanṭha and Jayanta’s arguments in the Nyāyamañjarī (vol. II, pp. 278f).

3.165 . . . the contact of its threads with one another disintegrates Cf. Bhaṭṭa Nārāyanakāṇṭha’s definition of kārya, quoted in note ad 3.180. See also Nareśvarnikṣāprakāśa p. 114: yat ra yat ra sāvayavatvam tatra tatra kāryaḥ ghaṭāda[v] yat ra tu kāryatvam nāsti tatra sāvayavatvam nāsti yathātmadāv [‘If A is composite than A is an effect, like such things a pot. But if A is not an effect then A is not composite, like such things as the Self.’

3.165 it must be eternal Cf. Rāmakanṭha’s commentary ad Matoṅgapāra-mesvāra vidyāpāda 6.34–35 (p. 172): grāhyopādibhede ‘py anāśvadita-svātmahedah, kāl śatriya ‘pi tirakṛtyasvagatapraghābhāvapradhāvamsābhāvo, nānāvidhashramāṇyadānecittavṛtyudayasaṃvedane ‘py akampitadaggā- hakahasthairyaśvedana, vṛtyantarāty evy api aśuṣṭaṇāv api a-khaṇḍītasasamait, satatam evārthāvagamakatvena bhāsanād ātmapadapratiṣṭhāyaḥ pratipuruṣaḥ svasaṃvedanasiddhaḥ  *sthīra eva (ed. MSS ā, ī, ū: sthīrabhāva ed.) iti kim aṭrāṇyena sādhanena? [The grasping subject] never experiences [any] differentiation in itself, even though the adventitious factors, i.e. the objects of cognition are different; [both possible forms of its own [non-existence: non-existence prior to production and non-existence after destruction are concealed from it in all three times;
even though it cognises the arising of many conditions of the mind due to various means of knowledge and the like, it has an unshaken cognition of the stability of [itself as] the grasper of these [thoughts and feelings]; its radiance is unimpaired even in the intervals of the [mental] activities; its self-cognition is unbroken even in deep sleep and [similar conditions]; it is expressed by the word ‘Self’ because it always shines forth as the conveyor of knowledge about objects; it is established through self-cognition for each one of us as permanent: so what other proof is needed in its case?’ The same sentence (with variations) is found in Rāmakaṇṭha’s Nareśvaraparīksāprakāśa ad 1.5 (p.14, see Watson, p.127ff), and Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti (p.294 in Aṣṭapakaraṇam: Tattvapakāśa-Tattvasaṅgraha-Tattvatrayaniṣaya-Ratnaśirākāra-Nādaśākāra-Mokṣakāśa-Paramokṣanirāsakārika, ed. Brajavallabha Dvivedi, Yogatantragrañthamālā 12, Vārāṇasi, 1988).

3.165 Because... Cf. Bhattacharya, p. 605, IV.2.

3.165 the Self has to be inferred to be eternal Cf. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s commentary (p.18) on Kirṣaṇatātra 1.15 (paśu... amūrtta): kim ca amūrtatvam asya prāyag eva mūrtalakṣitasparśayuktamahābhūtatākāra-śarirād anyatvam tadgrāhatayā prakāśanād ity anubhavanaiva bhūtātmimagadhaḥ at aevam bhūtodbhūtacāsa vilakṣaptaṃvēnasūnaṃvān na bhūtebhyaḥ samutpattih| pratiyajna pūrvatakapramāṇubhavasambhaṅgācāraprakāśaṣṭādaśārṇaṃ pūrvanayāṃvanteṣvārṇaḥ ity anubhavāt ca| ‘Moreover [the statement] that the soul is ‘formless’ means, as [has been said] before, that it is different from the body, which has the form of the coarse elements that are amenable to the sense of touch and that are characterised as ‘having form’, because it [i.e. the soul] manifests as that which perceives those [bodies and things made up of coarse elements]. Thus [the contention that] the soul [is] composed of the [coarse] elements is refuted by experience itself. From this it follows that it does not arise from the elements, since it is experienced as different also from all that arises from the elements and because it is established to be eternal, because it is beginningless, since we perceive in every birth actions that are dependent on memory arising from the mental traces of experience in previous births.’ (tr. Goodall)

3.168 Cf. Nyāyasūtra 3.2.60: pūrvakṛtaphalānubandhāt tadutpattih| ‘It [i.e. the body] comes into being due to the continuing existence of the fruits of the previously performed actions.’

Nyāyaḥpaṇḍita ad loc. (p.210): pūrvavāsīre yā pravṛttir vāgbudhiśārīrārambhalaśaṇā tat pūrvāṅkaṃ karmoktaṃ tasya phalam tajjanitau dharmādharmau| tatphalasyānubandhātaḥ utrasamavetasyaḥvāśāhām| tena avasthi-tena pruyuktebhayo bhūtebhyaḥ tasyoṭpattih śārīrasya, na svatantrebhyaḥ| ‘Previously performed action is said to be the activity [made] in the previous body, namely an effort made with voice, intellect, or body. Its fruits are merit and demerit produced by it. The continuing existence of its
fruit means that the fruit stays inherently attached to the Self. The body comes into being from the elements which have been impelled by this staying fruit, and not from independent elements.' See also Uddyotakara’s commentary ad loc. (Nyāyavārttika p. 415): purusa-guṇaviśesa-preritabhūtātapāravakāṃ sārīraṃ puruṣārthakriyāsamartham| yod yat puruṣārthakriyāsamartham tat tat puruṣa-guṇaviśesa-preritabhūtātapāravakaṃ drṣṭaṃ yathā rathādi puruṣa-guṇena prayaṭṇena preritair bhūtair āra-bhyamānaṃ puruṣārthakriyāsamartham drṣṭaṃ| tathā ca sārīraṃ| The creation of the body depends on the elements which are impelled by particular human qualities, since the body is able perform actions fulfilling human purposes. Anything that is capable to perform actions fulfilling human purposes is seen to depend on the elements which are impelled by particular human qualities, as a chariot, which is made of the elements impelled by effort: a human quality, is seen to be able to perform actions fulfilling human purposes. The same is true about the body.

As for entities other than the body, the objection is raised that their coming into being does not have any cause, since we see for example that thorns prickle without any apparent reason (Nyāyasūtra 4.1.22: animitto bhāvotpattih. kan. t. akataikṣṇ. yādidadraṇāna). According to Vātsyāyana, the same argument that establishes adṛṣṭa (i.e. merit and demerit caused by former actions) as the cause of the arising of the body can be employed to refute this objection as well (Nyāyabhāṣya ad loc., pp. 229ff.) Uddyotakara remarks that we see that certain things which possess a particular kind of shape do have a cause of their coming into being. From this we infer that other composite things, such as thorns or bodies, are also produced by some cause, even if we never see them being actually produced (Nyāyavārttika p. 442). The preceding nyāyasūtras reject the assumption that God alone can be the cause of the world’s creation, because ‘if men do not have any karma [i.e. if they do not perform any action] then no fruit is produced’ (4.1.20: puruṣakarmābhāve phalānispattah).

The texts of the Śaiva Siddhānta also take karma to be the cause of the variety of worldly phenomena (certainly not in itself, but under God’s supervision). See Parākhyaṭantra 2.8:
sambandhāgraḥaṃ karma hetuvena kathāṃ tanau| drṣṭvā citrasaśīrāṇi karmasattādhiśigamyaṃ||

‘How do we understand past actions to be the cause of the body though we do not perceive the causal connection? After perceiving various bodies the existence of [the retributive force of] past action is understood.’ (tr. Goodall)

The soul’s experiences are determined by its karma, and the worldly phenomena come into being in order to become the objects of these experiences. See Śvāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha, vidyāpāda with the commentary of Sadyojotis (pp. 22f.):
bhovo 'sya vedaṇā puṃsāḥ sukha-duḥkhādilakaṇaḥ| tāṃ samartha-tacaitanyāḥ puṃśān abhyeti karmataḥ| 1.12||
vedanā saṃvittir anubhavaḥ sukha-duḥkhādbhir viṣayaś ca upakratvaś tair
Experience is the soul’s sensation, which is characterised by such [feelings] as pleasure, pain, etc. The soul whose consciousness is empowered attains this [sensation] as a result of [its] karma.” Sensation [means] cognising, experiencing. Since it is coloured by [its] objects such as pleasure and pain, it is characterised, [i.e.] particularised by them as “pleasurable sensation”, “painful sensation”, [or] “uncertain sensation”. And, similarly to activity, only that soul attains it, [i.e.] obtains it, whose consciousness is empowered by *kala* (limited power of action), [i.e.] which is not separated from *kala*, [and it has this experience] as a result of its karma which is [its] cause. For karma, having transformed itself into the [mental] states of pleasure, pain, and uncertainty, becomes the cause of the sensation of the souls. [The next verse is] “And as a result of karma bodies…” “And as a result of karma bodies, sense objects, and faculties [of cognition and action] do or do not come into being in order to accomplish the experience of the experiencing subject.” The verse says (*iti*) that the existence and non-existence of bodies and the like, which [existence or non-existence] are the causes of experience, also depend on karma as [their instrumental] cause. For in all circumstances everything that is the cause of experience results from karma. For example, the existence of sons, food, etc. is the cause of experiencing pleasure; the existence of snakes, thorns, etc. is the cause of experiencing pain; thus the non-existence of sons, food, etc. is the cause of experiencing pain or uncertainty, [while] the non-existence of snakes, thorns, etc. is the cause of experiencing pleasure.’

Also *Kiranāvṛtti* ad 3.7 (p. 66): *puruṣaṇām hi sarvadā sarirabhogādvivaicitryāntāḥ ṣātvatāḥ sṛṣṭikāle 'pi paśumagopakṣisaṃsūnaśāstrādbardhāvaramanasyādīdījanamāvacaicitryādirdeh* | For *karman* exists at all times for souls, since the diversity of experience [mediated] through [different] bodies and so on could not otherwise be accounted for, for scripture tells us that even at the time of creation there was a diversity of births as domestic and wild beasts, as birds, creeping animals, plants, humans and so on.’ (tr. Goodall) Cf. *Mataṅgāparameśvara* 6.97cd and Rāmacaṅṭha’s commentary *ad loc.* (pp. 224f), *Nareśvaraparikṣāprakāśa* ad 2.14 (pp. 139ff.), *Abhidharmakośa* 4.1a (*karmajam lokavacitra*).

3.170 The body is defined as follows in the *Nyāyasūtra* (1.1.11): *ceṣṭendriyārtha*-
śrayaḥ śarīram| ‘Our body is the substratum of volitions, sense-faculties, and sense-objects.’ (Cf. Nyāyavārttika ad loc. (p.65): na hi gandhādayo īrthāḥ śarīравyuttayaḥ, yat tu teśāṃ kāryaṃ sukhadūkhkopalabdhinimmittavam, tad nāsaṁ śarīre bhavati, iti śārīrāśrayā ity ucyante| ‘For sense-objects such as smell are not located in the body, but their function, namely the condition of being causes of feeling pleasure or pain, is impossible if the body does not exist: that is why they are taught to have the body as their substratum.’) Since our pleasurable and painful experiences are the results of our former deeds, the creation of our body, which is the sine qua non of these experiences, is also determined by karma (Nyāyasūtra 3.2.60: pūrvakṛtalānubandhāt tadutpattih| ‘It [i.e. the body] arises as a consequence of the result [i.e. merit and demerit] of former deeds’), just as the conjunction of particular souls with particular bodies (śārīrottaṃniṃittavat saṃyogettaṃniṃittavāṃ karma, Nyāyasūtra 3.2.66).

3.171 Although Vṛddhāmbhi is a cārvaka, accepting the role of karma in the creation of the body does not seem to worry him very much. We would expect a die-hard nāstika to hold that the body arises from the elements which are independent of karma (cf. Nyāyabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra 3.2.61 (pūrva-pakṣa): karmanirapekṣeḥ bhūteḥ śarīreḥ śarīram utpannam).

3.172 According to the Naiyāyikas, the fruition of karma alone is not enough to explain the creation of the world: an intelligent creator must also take an essential part in the process. Says Vatsyāyana (Nyāyabhāṣya ad 4.1.21): puruṣakāraṁ ivaṁr ṣugraḥāt phalāyapsya yatamānasyeśvaram phalāṃ sampādayatiḥ| yadā na sampādayati, tadā puruṣakāram phalāhāram bhavatī| ‘God favours human effort, which means (iti) that God makes the result [of karma] come about for a man who strives to attain the result. This [also] means (iti) that when [God] does not make [it] come about then the person’s karma becomes fruitless.’

Uddyotakara’s commentary on the same sūtra (pp.433ff): yenaiva nyāyeṣvareṣvaya kāraṇatvaṃ sidhyati, tenaivaśitvan iti| (…) pradhānaparamānyakarmāṇi prāk pravṛttier buddhimatākaraṇādhiśhātāṃ pravartante, acatanatvād, vāṣyāvidv iti| yathā vāṣyaḥ buddhimatā taksādhiśhātām acatanatvāt pravartate, tathā pradhānaparaṃānyakarmāṇy acatanāni pravartante| tasmāt tāṁ api buddhimatākaraṇādhiśhātāṃ (…) dharmādharmaṇau buddhimatākaraṇādhiśhātām puruṣasyopabhogāṁ kūrtaḥ, karanatvāt, vāṣyāvidv iti| atmaiva taksādhiśhātā dharmādharmanor bhavisyaḥ tāt, yasya tāv dharmādharmanor sa evādhiśhātā bhavisyaḥ iti| na yuktam, prāk kāya-karaṇotpattes tadasambhavat| (…) yadi ca puruṣāḥ svatantrāḥ pravartate, na duḥkham kuryaḥ na hi kaścida itmano duḥkham ičchātītāḥ| yas caṁnāno ‘igopaghātaṁ siraśchihādī vā karoti, so ‘pi tavaikalye ṛṇage vā hitabuddhiḥ pravartata iti| yadi punar dharmādharmanor evādhiśhātāḥ paramānāṇāḥ pravartane, na yuktam idam, acatanatvāt na hi kiścid acatanām svatantrām adhiśhāyakaḥ drṣṭam iti| ‘The same argumentation which proves that God is a cause also proves that he exists. (…) The
source of the material world, particles, and karmas become active when
presided over by an intelligent cause before becoming active, since they
are insentient, like such things as axes. Just as such things as axes become
active when presided over by an intelligent carpenter, since they are in-
sentient, in the same way, the source of the material world, particles, and
karmas also become active [though they are] insentient, and therefore they
are also presided over by an intelligent cause. (…) Merit and demerit
bring about experience for man in as much as they are presided over by an
intelligent cause, since they are instruments, like such things as axes. If
[you object that] it is the Self alone that presides over merit and demerit,
[then the answer is that] it is not proper that the same person will be the
overseer to whom those merit and demerit belong, since this is impossible
before the body and the sense faculties come into being. (…) Furthermore,
if the soul acted at will, it would not create pain [for itself]. For
nobody desires pain for himself. When somebody injures his own body or
cuts off his own head etc., that man also acts in the belief that it is ben-
eficial to mutilate that [body of his], or to die. On the other hand, if the
subtle particles became active when presided over by merit and demerit
alone, this would not be appropriate, since [merit and demerit] are insen-
tient. For no insentient thing has been seen to be an autonomous overseer.’
See also Nyāyabhūṣāṇa p. 452: karmāṇo 'py acetanatvān na svataḥpravr̥ttir
nāpi pravartakatvām, na hy acetano *hetur acetanānām (conj. : hetuś
cetanānām ed.) adhiśṭhātā kaścid avisēsād adṛṣṭatvāc ca adhiśṭhātur ac-
tanatve ca nirbhriyopopārāvartvāt tadadhiśṭhitēbhyo ghuṇādipadāvinyāsava-
nān deśānuyātasaṁbhāvāṁ kāryam upapadyate| (…) buddhimadadiś-
hiśṭhitēbhya eva hi citralekāyupopādānopaḥbharmēbhayaḥ śhāvārajyagamavacā-
tviśēṣākṛtiṁ avayavaracanāvīśēṣāniyamopalaḥdhiḥ| ‘Since karma is uncon-
scious, it cannot perform any action by itself, neither can it propel [other
things], for no unconscious cause can preside over unconscious things, be-
because it does not differ [from them], and because nobody has seen [such
an unconscious overseer]. Furthermore, if the overseer were unconscious,
because its activity would be unintentional, no effect whose nature is reg-
ulated through place, [time,] etc. would come into being from things
presided over by that [unconscious overseer], just as in the case when a
worm leaves its traces [in palm-leaf or wood, which may accidentally re-
semble letters]. (…) For one obtains the regularity of the particular
arrangement of the constituents in the case of the shapes of particular
species of animate and inanimate things only from those materials and
instruments, such as a painting, which have been presided over by an in-
telligent [being].’
The authors of Śaiva Siddhānta expounded similar views. Says Rāma-
kanṭha in his Kīraṇavṛtti ad 3.12 (p. 74):
atra parābhīprāyaḥ|
karma cet (12d)
anena hi pravogavacanena bhavadbhiḥ kartmyātvarāṁ sādhyam upaksiptam|
tac cobbhayāvādisiddhāṁ karmāstv iti śrāvaṇāḥ sābda itivat siddhasādhana-

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tvād ayuktam etat yad āhur jaiminīyāḥ (Ślokavārttika sambandhākṣeṣaparipāhāra 75)—

dsyaṣcad dhetumāt rasya yady adiśṭhātṛteṣyate
karmabhiḥ sarvabhāvāṇāṁ tatsiddheḥ Siddhasādhanam||
itīḥatra Siddhāntaḥ

na hy acetanaṁ|| (12d)

na Siddhasādhanam yasmāt karmacetanaṁ iti ayam arthāḥ nāsmābhīh
atra kartrimātram sādhyate ‘pi tu viśiṣṭajñānakriyāyuktāḥ karteti kuto
‘cetanaḥ karmabhiḥ Siddhasādhanam iti’

‘Here [follows] an opponent’s opinion:
“What if it is karman [that is the cause of the universe]?”

All that you have put forward to be proved with this syllogism [of yours]
is [the existence of] some agent. Let that [agent] be karman, which is
accepted by both sides in the dispute, and thus this [argument of the
Sādhdhāntika] is inappropriate, because the syllogism would then prove
what is already well-established, just like the assertion ‘sound is audible’.
As the Mīmāṃsakas assert, “If one requires just any cause to preside [over
the creation of the universe, then let this role be performed] by [the fruits
of past] actions, since they are proved to exist for all beings. [And in that
case the fault of] proving what is already established [vitiates the argu-
ment].” In response to this [the view of] the Siddhānta is:
“No, because [karman is] insentient.”

This is not [a case of] proving what is already established, because kar-
man is insentient. What is meant by this is that we have not sought to
prove here simply that there must be an agent, but that there is an agent
equipped with particular [powers of] knowledge and action. Why then
should there be [the logical fault of] proving what is already established
because of insentient actions [being all that is proved]?” (tr. Goodall)

Bhāṭṭa Nārāyaṇakoṇḍha in his Mṛgendravyatı (pp. 108ff.) also rejected
the possibility that either karma (quoting Ślokavārttika, sambandhākṣeṣa-
paripāhāra 75) or māya could be the agent of creation, on the ground that
both are insentient. (The Vaiśeṣika Vyomāśīva also quotes and refutes
Ślokavārttika sambandhākṣeṣaparipāhāra 75 in Vyomavatī, pp. 103f.)

See also Parākhyatantra 2.12cd (Pratoda’s objection):
tanvadeḥ kāraṇaḥ karna kalpitena matena kim||

‘The cause of bodies and such is [the retributive force of] past action. Why
trouble with some artificial theory?’ (tr. Goodall)

Ibid. v. 15ab (Prakāśa’s reply):
asya drśṭasya hetu vā karmākhyo buddhimān bhavet||

‘Or [you might be forced to maintain that] the cause of this perceived [uni-
verse] that we call [the retributive force of] past action must be endowed
with sentience.’ (tr. Goodall)

Yāmuniśārya in his Āgamaprāmāṇya (p. 25) also argues against the agency
of unconscious karmas: cetanānadhīśṭāni tāni [i.e. karmāṇi] na kāryani
janayitum utsahante, acetanātved vāṣīvāt na hi cetanena takṣṇā ‘nadhiśhī-
tā vāsī svayam eva yūpādīṇy āpādayitum alam|| ‘Those [karmas] are not
capable of producing effects without being presided over by a sentient [agent], since they are insentient, like an axe. For an axe is not able to bring about such things as posts if it is not presided over by a sentient carpenter.' (Cf. Uddyotakara’s commentary ad Nyāyasūtra 4.1.21, quoted above.)

3.174 See Vyomavati, p. 103: sarvam acetanam cetanādhiṣṭhitam pravartanānām drṣṭam, yathā tantvādi, tathā ca karmādi ‘All insentient things, such as threads etc., are seen to become active when presided over by a sentient [agent], and the same is true about karmas.’

3.180 The Čārvāka’s objection may bring to our mind Maṇḍanamiśra’s arguments against a single creator God, also quoted by Rāmānuja in his Kīrāṇavṛtti (p. 73): nāpi dharmisvarūpaṇirvāpasādhano ‘yaṃ viruddhaḥ| yathāḥ maṇḍanāḥ (Vidhīviveka, pp. 219 and 224)—

sanniveśādīmat sarvaṃ buddhimaddhetu yadyapi| prasiddhasanniveśāder ekakāraṇatā kutaḥ|| rathādyavavāvā nānātakṣaṇanirmitā api||
drṣyante jagati prāya upakāryopakārakāb|| iti| yato rathādyavavāvānām anekatākṣaṇanirmitānām api naikasthapatibusdhikriyābhāyān vinakarathārāmbhakatvāṃ drṣṭam|‘Nor is the [logical ground] contradicted as proving [some quality that is] the opposite of the nature of the subject of the argument, as Maṇḍana states: “Although everything that is composite and so on must have a sentient cause, how can one say that well-known composite things and so on have only one cause? Although the parts of something like a chariot are constructed by various craftsmen, generally one experiences that things in the universe which help to [bring something about] require [in turn] to be helped [themselves].” [The counter argument above is wrong,] because although the parts of something like a chariot are [individually] created by various craftsmen, they are not seen to create a chariot without the knowledge and action of a single master craftsman.’ (tr. Goodall) See also his Mataṅgavṛtti ad 6.99cd–100ab (p. 229). Maṇḍanamiśra’s objection had already been quoted and rejected by Bhaṭṭa Nārāyanaṇakaṇṭha in his commentary (p. 103) to the following verse of the Mṛgendratantra (3.1): athopalabhya dehāṃ vastu kāryatvadharmakam| kartāram asya jānīmo viśeṣṭam anumānatah|| Nārāyaṇaṇakaṇṭha first establishes that everything that had been first non-existent and that was subsequently made existent is an effect; since the body is such, it is also an effect (p. 99: abhiṣvava bhāvītavam eva hi kāryatvam, tac ca dehasyopalabhyata eva). Another reason which proves that things such as the body are products is the fact that they are composite and impermanent (ibid.: kim ca sanniveśavishēṣavattvād vinaśavaratvāc ca dehādeḥ kāryatvam apahnotum asākyam yad yat sanniveśaviṣeṣavav vinaśavaraṃ, tat tat kāryam yathā ghaṭādi). The next step in the argumentation is to show that every effect is dependent on a sentient agent (ibid.: yad yat kāryaṃ tat tad buddhimatkarṇaṇpravyākṣaṃ drṣṭaṃ yathā rathādi| yat tu naivamvidham,
Wild plants, rice, forest trees are also part of the subject of the argument, since it has not been proved that they were not produced by an agent (p. 100: \(\text{na ca}\) \(\text{yam akṛṣṭajātaiḥ śālayādibhir vanadrumādibhir vānaikāntikaiḥ, teṣu kartrabhāvasyānīśrayat teṣāṁ ca paśṣhāhātavat}\\)). The Mīmāṃsākās might object that pots are made by potters, not by God (Sūkṣmaśīta sambandhāksāparāhāra 79 is quoted), but then it was the Lord who made the potters capable of making pots. Then follows Maṇḍanamīśra’s objection and its refutation. The Naiyāyika Bhāsarvājña also argues against the multiplicity of creators in his Nyāyaśāstra (p. 476, probably referring to Prajñākaragupta’s objection: \(\text{tathā bahuhīr ēkasya bahūnāṁ caikataḥ kriyā, Pramāṇavārttikā-lāṅkāra, v. 2.234, p. 37})\): \(\text{nān caikasyāpyā kāryasyaiḥ kartā bhāvah sa dhṛṣyante, tathā bahūnāṁ āpy eko bhāvah ca}\\) "But surely, we see that one product has [sometimes] one, and [sometimes] many makers, and similarly many [products can] also have one or many [makers]. So how can one ascertain that the whole world has only one creator: the Lord, and not many [creators] who are not gods?" We have [already] answered [this objection]. That person who employs the causes which he thoroughly knows and who is not employed by them is said to be the autonomous agent. And someone who is not God cannot employ such things as particles and \(\text{adrṣṭa}\\) (the result of good and bad deeds), or for example the interior parts of the earth, mountains, and bodies, which employment requires the thorough knowledge of these things. To perform such a deed (\(\text{tatra}\\)), the many creators of the earth, etc., who are not gods (\(\text{aniśvarāḥ}\\)), are [just] babies, like the builders of an extraordinary palace who, countless as they be, are not masters (\(\text{aniśvarāḥ}\\)). If one holds that the many creators of the earth etc. are indeed gods, then, if that is the case, you arrive at a conclusion that is opposed to your position. You get rid of one and then accept many: this proclaims how extremely clever you are in refuting what you do not accept. Furthermore, do those gods possess divine faculties, omniscience, and unsurpassed power, or do they not? If they do, then why postulate several gods? For [such a postulation] is useless. If they don’t then they have a superior (\(\text{kāścit}\\) master as [their] governor. Otherwise how could they continuously engage in the creation of the world etc. without quarrelling?"
Cf. *Vyomavati*, p. 203: *na cāsmadādyaṭmaivaḥṣṭhāyakāḥ, tvasya tadvishaya-
jiūnābhavāḥ* | *tathā cāsmadādyaṭmano na karmaviṣayaṁ jīnānaṁ indriya-
jaṁ, nāpi paramādviṣaviṣayaṁ* | ‘And the controller cannot be the Self of our kind, since it lacks the knowledge of that matter. And thus, on the other hand, the knowledge that the Self of our kind has, in as much as it arises from the senses, does not pertain either to the karmas or to such [invisible things] as the particles.’

3.182 do not rejoice at its production Therefore if it depended on them they would probably hinder its creation.

3.182 mountains, etc. *ex conj.* ISAACSON. Candrānanda in his commentary to *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5.2.2 points out that such phenomena as earthquakes occur in order to indicate good and evil for the creatures (*prajñāṇāṁ su-
bhāśubhasucanāya*), and thus they are especially caused by their *adṛṣṭa* (merit and demerit).

3.182 wild plants *ex conj.* ISAACSON. The three kinds of wild plants correspond to the three kinds of uncultivated land.

3.182 they cause them pleasure or pain Cf. *Nyāyabhūṣana* p. 479 (answering Prajñākaragupta’s objection in *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* v. 2.284cd, p. 39: *chāgādināṁ puriśāder vartulikaraṇena kim[||]): *chāgādipuriśāder vartulikara-
raṇe prekṣāvataḥ kim prayojanam iti cet, chāgādināṁ tādṛṣenaiva puriśa-
viṣesenaotsaryakāle sukhāṁ duḥkhāṁ vā bhavati tannimittakarmaphala-
sampāḍakatvam eva prayojanaṁ etena badarikaṇṭakamaṇyāracandrikādi-
vaiśeṣīkāraṇe ṣū prajñāmaṁ draṣṭavyam| tatrāpy avaṣyaṁ kasyacit su-
khaṁ duḥkhāṁ vā, darśanaṁ sparśanaṁ vā bhavatity aśu vicīraṁ prāṇi-
naṁ karmādhīṣṭhayasya tadānuviṣayaṁ phalaṁ kurvaṁ kathāṁ apareṣāpura-
kārtītvam? | ‘If [you raise the objection: ] “What purpose can a considerate [creator] have in making round such things as the droppings of goats and other [animals]?” [, then I give you the following reply:] goats and other [animals] feel pleasure or pain at the time of excretion precisely because of those particular droppings of precisely that kind, so the goal [of the creator] is nothing but to be the accomplisher of the results of the karmas which are the causes of that [pleasure or pain]. In the same way one should also see the purpose of creating diversity [in the form of] such [things] as the thorns of the jujube tree, the eyes in the peacock’s tail, etc. In the case of these things, too, someone will necessarily feel pleasure or pain, [since someone will necessarily] see or touch [them]. So how could [the creator] act without consideration when he presides over the manifold karma of creatures, and produces a result which suits that [karma]?’

Cf. Śaṅkara’s commentary to *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.34: *ataḥ sṛjyamāṇaprā-
ṇidharmādharmāpekṣā viṣamaṁ srṣṭir iti nāyam ṽivarasyāparādhaḥ* | ‘Thus the creation is not uniform inasmuch as it is dependent on the merit and demerit of the created beings: this is not the Lord’s fault.’
3.184 **presided over by the Blessed Lord** Cf. *Parākhyatāntra* 2.19:

 svakarmāpekṣya jīvānāṃ svapravṛttih sahetukā

 so ‘pi karmēvarākhyo ‘smīn hetub kārṣya gamyate]

 ‘The activity of individual souls depends on their own actions, [and] it has a [further] cause; and that cause, who is called the Lord over action, is known here from [His] effect[s].’ (tr. GOODALL)

3.185 = *Mahābhārata* 3.31.27.

3.187 **The ascetic followers of the abbot** *ex conj.* When the Cārvāka is silenced by the Snātaka’s arguments, the followers of the GRADUATE (snātakānucarāḥ) will mock him in the same way.

3.187 **humiliate** *ex conj.* ISAACSON. *parikramanti* does not give a satisfactory meaning.

3.188 **the suffering caused by your karma** More precisely ‘cholera of your karma’. One might consider emending the text to ‘karṇe ‘pi sūcīm’, meaning ‘Endure still a needle in your ear, too, for a moment.’

3.194 **sense perception and the like, which is not eternal** *ex em.* Cf. *Tātparyāṭikā* (*Ślokavarttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*), p. 38): tathā cāhur bhartriśvara-rādayaḥ—kim hi nityam pramāṇaṃ drśtaṃ? pratyaśādā vā yad avitāyata tasya prāmaṇye kasya vipratipattiḥ? I thank Dr. Kei Kataoka for this reference.

3.196 **since it creates awareness** Cf. *Śārabhāṣya* (F) ad 1.1.2 (p. 16): nanv atathābhūtām api arthaḥ brūyāc codanā, yathā yaṭākṣeṇa laukikaṃ va-canaṃ ‘nadyās tīrē phalānī santī’ iti, tat tathāyam api bhavati, vitathām api bhavati[ti] ucyeate, vipratipattiḥ idam abhidhīyate ‘bravīti ca vitathām ca’ iti] bravīty ity ucyeate ‘vabodhayaḥ, budhyamānasya nimittaṁ bhavatīti] yasminśa ca nimitābhūte satyā avabudhīyate, so ‘vabodhayaḥ yadi ca codānaṁ satyām ‘agnihotīrṇi svarga bhavati’ ity avagamyate, kathām ucye- ate, ‘na tathā bhavati’ iti? atha na tathā bhavati, kathām avabudhīyate? asantam artham avabudhīyata iti vipratipattih] ‘[Objection:] But surely, an injunction may also say something which is untrue, just as an everyday statement of little importance, e.g. “there are fruits on the bank of the river”, can be sometimes true, sometimes false. [Reply:] We answer [this objection] as follows: to say that “one states [something] and [what one states is] false” is contradictory. “One states” means “one creates awareness, one is the cause for a person who cognises”. And if [someone] becomes aware of [something] when X is present as the cause, then X creates the awareness. And if we learn, when there is an injunction, that paradise results from the Agnihotra, [then] how can you say that it is not so? If it is not so then how can one become aware of it? To say that one becomes aware of a nonexistent thing is contradictory.’

3.200 Cf. *Ślokavarttika* (with *Kāśikā*) codanā 52–53:

 yadā svataḥ pramāṇatvaṁ tadāyam naiva mṛgyate]
nivartate hi mithyātvam doṣajñānād aytanatāḥ||
tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatāḥ||
arthānyathātvahetūtthadosajñānād apodyate||
‘When the validity [of a cognition] is given by itself, then no other [means of cognition] is sought for [to prove the validity of the original cognition], for the falsity [of the original cognition] is excluded without any effort through the non-cognising of any defect. Therefore the validity of a [false] cognition that has been learnt from the fact that it has the nature of [creating] awareness is annulled due to the [subsequent] cognising of the fact that the object is otherwise, or that some defect has arisen in the causes [of the first cognition].’

3.202 Surely verbal expression operates with reference to objects known by other means of valid knowledge. Cf. Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyāṭikā) codanā 22:
pramāṇāntarādyṛṣṭam hi śādo ’rtham prāpayet sadā|
snvīrīṣa ca svayaṃ tasya prāmāṇyaṃ noapadyate||
[Objection:] ‘For in all cases a verbal expression can convey a referent that has [already] been ascertained through other means of valid knowledge, and, just like memory, it cannot be valid in itself.’


3.205 Cf. Śābaraḥsya(F) ad 1.1.2 (pp. 16, 18): yo hi janitvā pradhoṁsate ‘nastad evam’ iti, sa mithyāpratayah na caśa kālāntare puruṣāntare ’vasthāntare deśāntare vā viparyetā, tasmād avitathāḥ (…) viplavate khalv api kaścit puruṣākṛtā vacanāḥ pratyayah na tu vedavacanāsya mithyāve kiṃcana pramāṇam asti[ ‘For that is a false cognition which, after arising, becomes invalid, [as one establishes that] ‘this is not so’. This [cognition created by the words of the Veda], however, does not change into its opposite either at another time, or in another person, or among other circumstances, or at another place; therefore it is not false. (…) Though certainly there are some cognitions [arising] from man-made statements that become invalid, but there is no proof at all with regard to the falsity of a Vedic statement.’

3.206 it is only repetition Cf. Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyāṭikā) codanā 72:
tenetaraḥ pramāṇair ya codanānām aṣaṅgatih|
tayaiva syat pramāṇaṁvam anuvādaṁvam anyathā||
‘Therefore Vedic injunctions are valid precisely because they have no association with other means of valid knowledge. Otherwise they would [only] be repetitions.’

In fact all means of valid knowledge operate independently when they produce cognition. Says Kumārika (Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyāṭikā) codanā 47–48):
svalaḥ sarvapramāṇāṇāṃ prāmāṇyam iti āhyaṃ (v.l. gamyatām) na hi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena śakyate||
ātmalābhe hi bhāvanāṃ kāraṇāpekṣītā bhavet| labdhatmacchaitaṃ svakāreyas prarūtīṣā svayam eva tu||
‘One should understand that all means of cognition are valid by themselves, for a capacity which is not inherently present [as a thing such as a pramāṇa] cannot be brought about by another [thing such as another pramāṇa]. For things may depend on some cause for their coming into being, but once they have come into being they operate independently with respect to [the production of] their own effects.’

3.208 dependent on a person Cf. Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyaṭikā) citrākṣepa 60–61:
puruṣādhiṇavijnānas tebhyaḥ prāg anirūpitaḥ|
yah samjñāsanajñāsambandah sa cestaś ced dhruvaṃ kṛtaḥ||
bhinndesādyadhishṭānaś yathā rajjuḥatādīśu|
samaṃ nāsty anayoḥ kīcī cit tenānagatatā svalaḥ||
‘The connection between the sign / name and the signified / named [object], the ascertainment of which depends on men [and which] has not been seen [to exist] before those [men]—if you accept that [connection], it must be artificial [and not inherent]. These two [i.e. the sign and the signified object] have nothing in common, just as a rope and a jar for example, since they occupy different places and [time periods]; therefore they are not joined by themselves.’
See also Śābaraḥāṣya(F) pp. 36–38.

3.210 the word’s power Cf. Ślokavārttika (with Nyāyaśāstra) sambandhā-kṣepaparśāra 28a: śaktiv eva hi sambandro.

3.210 innate Cf. Mīmāṁsāsūtra 1.1.5: autpattikas tu śabdasārthena sambandhas tasya jñānaṃ upadeso ‘vyasātakṣā cārthe anupalabdhe, tat pramāṇaṃ bādarāyanasya, anapekṣātvaḥ ‘Rather it is the innate connection of the word with its referent which is [the means of] its [i.e. dharma’s] cognising, [in as much as] it is instruction and not error, with regard to an object which is not ascertained [with the help of other pramāṇas]; it is a means of valid cognition according to Bādarāyaṇa, since it is independent.’
Śābaraḥāṣya(F) ad loc. (p. 24): autvattikah śabdasārthena sambandhas tasya agnihotrādikasānasya dharmaśya nimittat pratyaksādibhir anavagataśya katham? upadeso hi bhava-te upadeso iti viśiṣṭaśasya śabdasya uccāraṇam[ anapekṣātca bhavati tasya jñānasya] na hi tat uppannaṃ jñānaṃ viparyeyeta yac ca nāma jñānaṃ uppannaṃ na viparyeyti, na tat chakṣyate vaktuṃ ‘naitad evam’ iti, ‘yathā vijñāyate, na tathā bhavati; yathaitān na vijñāyate, tathaitad’ iti anuyog asya hiḍaye anuyog vāci syāt[ evam vadato viruddham idam avagamate ‘asti nāsti ca’ iti] tasmāt tat pramāṇam, anapekṣātvaḥ na hy evam sati prayāyāntaram apekṣitavas yuṣmayaṃ paruṣāntaram vaś svayampratyagyo hy asu| ‘With [the word] “innate” we mean eternal. (…) The innate connection

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of the word with its referent is the cause of dharma characterised as agni-hotra and the like, which [dharma] is not known through sense perception and other [means of cognition]. Why? Since it is instruction. “Instruction” means uttering a particular word. And that cognition cannot go wrong, since that cognition, when arisen, does not change into its opposite. And indeed one cannot say about a cognition which, having arisen, does not change into its opposite that “this is not thus”, [or] “this is not thus as it is cognised”, [or] “this is thus as it is not cognised”. [If one were to speak in this way then] he would have one thing in his heart and speak something else. We find that the person who speaks thus makes this contradictory [statement]: “it is and it is not”. Therefore it is a means of valid cognition, since it is independent. For in this case one should not wait for another cognition or another person, since it is a [valid] cognition in itself.’

Cf. also Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyatīkā) citrākṣepa 19cd–20ab

sambandho 'sti ca niyāya cety uktaṃ autpattikādīnā||
mithyatāsya nirāsārtham tat parair nesvat dvayam||

‘There is a connection [between the word and its referent], and [this connection] is eternal: this is taught in [the sūtra] beginning with “autpattikas...”, in order to refute the falsity [of śabda]. Others do not accept either of these two [facts].’

3.211 Maṇḍānanāsiṭṭa in his Vidhiviveka (p. 35) gives a summary of the Prābhākara view on the nature of vidhi, ‘Vedic injunction’, which is remarkably similar to the Graduate’s position: pramāṇāntarāgocaraḥ śabdāntarāgocarabho ‘niyukto ‘smi’ iti pratyātmavedaniyāḥ sukhaśivad aparāṁśaktakālātayo liṅādīnām artho vidhīr’ iti ‘Vedic injunction is not accessible to any other means of cognition; it depends only on the Word [of the Vedas]; everyone experiences it in its own self, [realising that] “I have been enjoined”, just as [one feels] pleasure and the like; it is not connected with any of the three times; and it is the referent of the optative and other [verbal suffixes, e.g. the imperative].’

3.213 Cf. Vācaspati Miśra’s Nyāyakāṇṭhikā on the Prābhākara theory of niyoga as presented in the Vidhivakeka: (p. 35) yato liṅādīniyuktaśvāprayavaṇaṇa-

manantarām svayakāmadīnā niyoyena ‘niyukto ‘smi’ iti pratyātmavedaniyāḥ sukhaśivad| gathā hi santāpadināś candanānulepanānantaram āntaraṃ api manomātrapravedaniyām ānālītacanah sukhabhedān ananya-

pramāṇakām anubhavati, evaṃ niyogam api liṅādīviyāśravaṇaṇaṇantararam ity arthah[ (...) (p.38) kārībhādhyāyārī tāvāl liṅādīnām avagatācārvavā-

kṛyesu ‘māṇavaka, samidham āhara’ ityādiṣu| tathā hi etadvāyāśravaṇān-

antarām pravartamānaṁ samidāharane māṇavakam upalabhya pārśvastho vyutpāsā sur evam avadūrayati— buddhipūrveyaṁ asya pravṛttiḥ, svatantra-

pravṛttiḥvāt, madhyapraavṛttiḥvāt| yac cāhaṃ buddhavā pravṛttas tath evaṃ
dataṃśeṣaḥ| ahaṃ ca na kriyāmātravagamānāṃ nāpi phalamātravagamānām
tvam pūrveyaṁ ahaṃ ca na kriyāmātravagamānāṃ nāpi phalaśādhanavagamānāt, kintu kāryatavagamāt| na khalv antato ‘ṛbhakaḥ
cyanapāndikām api kriyāṁ kāryatayā yāveṇa nāvagatavān *asti (conj.}
Since immediately after hearing a sentence which contains a verbal suffix such as the optative, everyone who, for example, desires heaven and who is to be enjoined can feel [vidhi] in himself [realising]: “I have been enjoined [to perform the sacrifice]”, just as [one feels] pleasure and the like. For just as someone who is afflicted by heat, immediately after smearing sandal-paste [on his or her own body], also experiences, with eyes closed, a kind of internal pleasure, which can only be felt by [one’s own] mind, and for which there is no other means of valid cognition [to ascertain it]—[one] also [experiences] the enjoiment in the same way, immediately after hearing a sentence [containing] a verbal suffix such as the optative; this is the meaning [of Manḍana’s words]. (. . .) First of all one understands that such verbal suffixes as the optative express duty in such sentences of the teacher as “Boy, fetch the firewood”. To explain, having seen that the boy becomes engaged in fetching the firewood immediately after hearing this sentence, the observer, who wants to learn, reasons in the following way: “This engagement of his is intentional, because he has acted at will, in the same way as I act. And he must have cognised the same thing that I cognise before I engage in something, since he is not different from me. And I [set about doing something] neither because I understand the action alone, nor because I understand the result alone, nor because I understand that [the action] is the means of accomplishing the result, but because I understand that it is something that must be done. Clearly, until the infant finally understands that even such actions as sucking are things that must be done, it will not set about doing even that. (. . .) Therefore, since I set about [doing something] because I know that it must be done, which is different from [knowing] that it is a means of accomplishing the result, the boy has also become engaged precisely because he had understood that [i.e. kāryatā]” — this is the conclusion [that the observer] reaches. And inasmuch as his [i.e. the boy’s] understanding of that [kāryatā] arises immediately after the speaking of the teacher, it is caused by that [i.e. by the words of the teacher] alone: therefore he [i.e. the observer] postulates that the word has the function of expressing duty.’

On the two possible functions of niyoga, namely prerana (instigating) and bodhana (creating awareness) see the article of Yoshimizu (cited in note ad 3.204), who also deals with the interpretation of these two functions in Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa literature.

3.217 tying a rope around its neck Cf. Śābarabhāṣya(F) (p.38) and Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyatīkā) citrākṣepa 60–61, where fastening a rope on a pot is mentioned as an example of an artificial (kṛtaka) connection of two separate entities.

3.218 Cf. Ślokavārttika (with Kāśikā) codanā 49–51:
If an object is not ascertained, even if its cognition has arisen, until the correctness of the cause of this cognition is established from another cognition then, with respect to the correctness of this cause one should wait for the arising of another cognition from another cause. For correctness is as good as non-existent as long as it is not well established. And that cognition of the correctness of the cause of the first cognition can be valid only if its own cause is correct and if there is a cognition of that (i.e. of the correctness of the cause of the second cognition). (cf. Kāśiśka ad loc.: tasyāḥ śuddhār aparicchinnāy asamātavāt tasyāpi śuddhijñānasya kāraṇaḥ sa mayā ca sāt pramāṇatā bhavati) The reading of Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyatikā) might be interpreted as follows: ‘And that cognition will also be invalid if the cause of its cognition is not pure.’ And the same [can be said about the validity of that third cognition], so in this way one could never reach the end [of subsequent cognitions].’

3.219 two reasons Cf. Śābarabhāṣya (F) (quoting the Vyākaraṇā) ad 1.1.4a (p. 26): yasya ca dusṭam karaṇam yatra ca mithyātī pratīyāyaḥ, sa eva asamicaiḥ pratīyāyaṁ nāpya iti ‘That, and only that cognition is erroneous the instrumental cause of which is defective, or with regard to which another cognition has arisen which establishes that “it is false.”’ See also Ślokavārttika (with Tātparyatikā) codanā 53 seqq.

3.221 we should rely on ex conj. GOODALL. Another possible conjecture, suggested by Dr. Isaacson, is saiva jyeṣṭhā.

3.221 “the sacred tradition...” = Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.1.3. Candrāṇanda’s commentary ad loc.: tad iti hiranyagarbhapramārasāh, hiranyam reto ‘syeti kṛtvā bhagavān mahēśvara evocyate āptenoktatvasya satyaṁyāptatvād ihāptena hiranyagarbhenaṁoktatvād āmnāyasya prāmnāyaṁ sādhyaṁ iśuvaś ca sādhitaṁ tanubhavanādaṁ kāryatāṁ ghaṭādīvat buddhimatkārtakavānumānestā ‘[The word] “His” relates to Hiraṇyagarbha. Interpreting it as “his seed is golden” it is the blessed Śiva who is being referred to. Since a statement must invariably be true if it has been said by a trustworthy person, the validity of scripture becomes established since it was enunciated by Hiraṇyagarbha. As for the Lord, he has been proved to exist from the fact that such things as bodies and worlds are products, like pots and the like, with the help of inferring the fact that they have an intelligent maker.’
The sūtra is repeated as 10.21; Candrānanda’s commentary ad loc.: tanubhuvanādikāryatayā vijnāto bhagavān iśvarah, tatprāṇayanāc cāmnāyasya siddhaṁ prāmaṇyam | ’[The existence of] God has been realised due to the fact that such things as bodies and worlds are products; and the authoritiveness of scripture is established because He composed it.’

3.221 “it is valid because...” = Nyāyasūtra 2.1.68.

3.229 As Prof. Sanderson pointed out (“Hinduism”, Handout 3, 22.ii.1999) the same fourfold division of śaivas (Pāśupatas / Pañcārthikas, Lākulas / Kālamukhas, Somasiddhāntins / Kāpālikas / Mahāvratis, Śaivas) also appears in Yāmuna's Agamaprāmāṇya (p. 46.), in the Śribhāṣya (ad 2.2.35), in the Bhairavamanigalākalpa (fol. 4v3–5), and in the Kāraṇāgama (I, 26.58c–59).

3.230 to which it is justly established ex conj. A similar idea occurs at the end of the play, when the Graduate warns against the confusion of various religious traditions.
4.9 **Quite right.** *ex em.* **Isaacson.** *evam evam* usually occurs after stage directions such as *karṇe* and stands for ‘whisper whisper’.

4.11 **adopt brahminical manners** Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 11: *nanu tatrūpi śrutismytiprapātaśikhāyajnopavitādi dhārayadbhir bhāgyavatabrāhmaṇaṁ aharharanuṣṭhiyamanārthatvamena codanāmūlative sambhāvyamāne katham iva prāmāṇyapratanikābhātā bhramavipralambhādayah smaranakāraṇata-yā kalpyante?* ‘But surely, when Vedic injunction is considered as the source of that [i.e. the Pañcarātra], too, due to the fact that Bhāgyavata brahmins, who wear the lock of hair, the sacred thread, and other [attributes of brahmins] prescribed in the Veda and the Smrīts, perform daily the rituals [enjoined in the scriptures of the Pañcarātra], how, I ask, can you postulate error, deception and the like, the enemies of validity, as the cause of [this] Smṛti [i.e. Pañcarātra]?’

The Mīmāṁsaka’s answer (ibid.): *śikhāyajnopavitādayas tu brāhmaṇādīnāṁ vidhiyāmānā na tadbhāvam āpādayitum kṣamante, nāpy avagamayanti, duṣṭaśūdrādīśu vyabhicārarādārānāṁ|’The lock of hair, the sacred thread and other [such attributes] that are prescribed for brahmins and others are unable to bring about the condition of that [brahmin, etc.], nor do they help us recognising it, since we see that delinquent Śūdras transgress [the rules concerning these attributes].’ (Cf. *Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṁsāsūtra 1.2.2.)*

In his reply Yāmuna argues against the negative discrimination of the Bhāgyavata brahmins (*Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 141): *iha vā kim aharharadhiṣya-mānāvājasaneyaśākhān vīlasadupavitottariyaśikhāśālino ‘dhyāpaya-tah, yājyataḥ, pratigrhṇato vidūṣaḥ paśyanto brāhmaṇaṁ iti nivāyantī? atha yājan-pravacanapālaśadaṇḍādīnāṁ duṣṭaśūdrādīśu vyabhicāraśambhōvad brāhmaṇoṣyasiddhavatākārēṇa pravṛttēs ca na tebhyaḥ brāhmaṇamayiṁyāyah, tad bhāgyatetravaṁprāṇāṁ api samānāṁ|’And in this case, when people see learned people who recite daily the Vājasaneyya and the Ekāyana recensions [of the *Yājurveda*], wear clearly visible sacred threads, upper garments, and locks of hair, teach, officiate at sacrifices, and receive [fees due to priests]—don’t they consider them as brahmins? If you say that since the transgressive occurrence of officiating, teaching, [carrying] a staff made of palāśa-wood, etc. is possible among delinquent Śūdras and other [criminals], and since [these attributes and activities] are displayed as if the brahmin status [of those who display them] were as good as proved, one’s Brahman status cannot be determined on their basis—then the same applies to priests other than the Bhāgyavatas, too.’

4.11 **Veda as their example** This might be a reference to the (now “lost”) *Ekāyanaśākhā* (belonging allegedly to the White *Yājurveda*) which was regarded by the Pañcarātrikas as the Vedic foundation of their religion, and which they found mentioned in the following passage of the *Chāndogya- upaniṣad* (7.1.2): *tvēdēma bhāgavan ‘dhyemi yājurvedaṁ sāmavedaṁ ątharvaṁ ca utarāṁ īthāsāpuraṇaṁ pañcamaṁ vedāṁ vedāṁ pitṛyaṁ rāṣṭra daivaṁ nīdiṁ vākovākyam ekāyanaṁ . . . ‘I have studied the
Rgveda, sir, as also the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, the Ātharvaṅga as the fourth, the corpus of histories and ancient tales as the fifth Veda among the Vedas, ancestral rites, mathematics, soothsaying, the art of locating treasures, the dialogues, the monologues . . .’ (tr. Olivelle). As Olivelle points out (p. 563), ‘[t]he original meaning of some of these entries is clearly uncertain, and the interpretations of later commentators are often anachronistic. (…) The meaning of ēkāyana (lit., “point of convergence,” see C[hāndogya] U[pānīad] 7.5.2) is uncertain. (Horsch [P.] 1966 [Die vedische Gāthā- und Śloka-Literatur. Bern: Francke Verlag.], 37). The commentator Śaṅkara’s interpretation as “statecraft” (nīśāstra) is clearly anachronistic. I follow Faddegon [B.] ("The catalogue of Sciences in the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad." Acta Orientalia 41 1926, 52) in taking the term as the opposite of vākōvākya (“speech and reply” or “dialogue”); it would then mean an uninterrupted speech.’

4.11 they set themselves apart Yāmuna emphasises that one should not judge Śaiva and Viśnūtana tantras by the same standard, just because they happen to share the name “tantra” (likewise we do not put an equals sign between killing a brahmin and performing a Horse Sacrifice just because both are “actions” (see Āgamaprāmāṇya p. 101). The Śaiva scriptures—and on this point Yāmuna shares the view of the Mīmāṁsakas—are indeed heretical (Āgamaprāmāṇya p. 91):

na ca tantrāntareṣu esa nyāyāḥ prasam arhati
yatās tatāṇibbandhīrāṁ vibhrāmādy api sambhāvi|| (…) yathā māhesāhre tanitre viruddhāṁ bahu jālpitam

‘But this argument [about validity] cannot extend to other tantras, since error and other [defects] are possible with regard to their respective authors. (…) For instance, lots of contradictory prattles are found in the Śaiva Tantras.

(… p. 96)

kīṁ ca śaivādayo vedasiddhavārṇāśramād bahih
kalpayantī aśramadini tato 'pi śrutibāhyatā||

‘Furthermore, the Śaivas and [Kāpālikas, Pāṇḍatās, etc.] posit life-periods and other [constituents of Dharma] outside the system of social estates and life-periods established in the Veda, and for this reason, too, they are excluded from Vedic religion.’

(… p. 97)

pramādō 'pi na cātyantam rudrādiṣu na sambhāvi
yad vā mohāsāstrapraṇetṛtyayāvagatavādvī vāyomohāyitum apīdṛśaśāstrapraṇayanam upadyayata iti nāvāṣyam pramāda evāśrayitavah|| ‘The possibility of inadvertence, too, cannot be completely precluded in the case of Rudra, etc. Alternatively, from the fact that [Rudra, etc.] are known to be the authors of delusory scriptures, it is also possible that they composed such scriptures [i.e. Śaiva Tantras] in order to delude people. Thus it is not necessary to chose inadvertence of all [factors].’

4.11 “We have been truly brahmins . . .” Cf. Āgamaprāmāṇya p. 142: atha
matam—“anyeśāṃ brāhmaṇaṃ tadasādharṇaṃ gotrasmarāṇām” iti, tad bhāgavaṇāṃ api samānaṃ| smaranti hi bhāgavataḥ—“vayaṃ bhāradvijāḥ, vayaṃ kāśyapaḥ, vayaṃ gautamaḥ, vayaṃ auptaḥ” iti| na cedaṃ gotra-smarāṇaṃ nirvālaṃ sāmayikam vā, sarva gotrasmarāṇāṃ tathābhāva-prasāṅgāti|}

sambhāvyāmidānadoṣatvād vaśānāṃ yadi saṃśayaḥ| tadbrāhmaṇe, tatō lokam sarvam vyaṅgulayed ayaṃ||

jananijārasandehācaṇḍālasanāśayaḥ|

nirviśāṅkaḥ kathaṃ vedān adhise śādhisattvām||

tenā bhāgavaṇānām api avicechīnavaramparāprāptavicitrayaṅgāsāṃ gotraṃ vayaṃ anapoditaṃ āsta iti na bhāgavaṇānāṃ anyeśāṃ ca brāhmaṇe kaścid viśeṣaḥ| yadi param, te paramaputraṃ evaśīti ekāntiḥ, ane keśudradavatakah śādhiṣaḥ iti||

‘If you hold that others are brahmans since they remember their specific gotra, the same applies to the Bhāgavatas as well. For the Bhāgavatas remember that they belong to the Bhāradvijā gotra, or to the Kāśyapa, or to the Gautama, or to the Aupta. And this recollection of the gotras is neither without any basis nor is it based on convention [alone], since then everybody’s recollection of his own gotra would follow to be in the same way. If you had doubts in their brahmin status because it may be presumed that defects occur in the lineages, then this [sceptical view] would confuse the whole world. How can you study the Vedas without scruples, o best of the pious, when the uncertainty whether your mother had a lover or not raises the suspicion that you might be an outcast? Therefore the brahmin status of the Bhāgavatas, which is firmly established by the recollection of the various gotras received through an unbroken tradition, also remains undisputed, and thus there is no difference between the brahmin status of the Bhāgavatas and of others, unless the fact that they are devoted to a single [deity] only inasmuch as they worship the Supreme Person, while others are ordinary [brahmans] inasmuch as they have their own petty godlings.’

4.13 Cf. Āgama-prāmāṇya p. 15 (mimāṃsakapakṣa): api ca yadavolokanādāv api viśiṣṭā candrāyanaṇādāprājyaścittāni vidhadhiḥ, kathaṃ tadapraśāhaṃ śrutimulatvām avagamaṇaṭīti sambhāvaṃ. saṃmatvā mahā devalakāvalokaṇe prājaścittāṃ| devalakāś cāmī—‘devakoṣopojitvād vṛtṛtartham devalajīṇāḥ!| Furthermore, when the élite perform such expiatory rituals as the candrāyana even when they set eyes on them etc., how could we assume that the [Paścātātra’s] acceptance by such people gives us to understand that it is based on the Veda? For the Smr. prescribes expiation if one catches sight of a devalaka. And these [Paścātātras] are devalakas, “since they live on the wealth of God’s temple and since they worship God in order to earn a livelihood”.’

4.14 Cf. Āgama-prāmāṇya p. 12 (mimāṃsakapakṣa): na ca bhāgavateṣu brāhmaṇapadām aviśāṅkāṃ laukikāḥ prayājiteḥ bhavati ca bhedena vyapadeṣah—‘ito brāhmaṇā ito bhāgavatā’ iti| ‘And common people do not apply the
word “brāhmaṇa” to the Bhāgavatas without hesitation. And naming takes place with a differentiation: “these are brahmins, those are Bhāgavatas.”

4.16 They will never get to study the Veda... Cf. Āgama-prāmāṇya p.14f. (mimāṃsakapakṣa):

> api cācāratas teśām abhraṁanyāṃ pratīyate
> vṛttīto devatāpiyā dīkṣā naivedyabhakṣayam||
> garbhādhanādīdīhantasaṃśkārāntarasevanām||
> śravaṇakriyānasūṭhānaṇām dvijais sambandhavaranām|
> ityādibhir anacārāt abhraṁanyāṁ suṁṣayam||
> smaranti hi vṛttīto devapiyāyā brahmakarmasv anadhi-kārahetutvam, ya-

thā—

> ‘yeṣām vaṃśakramād eva devārcā vṛttīto bhāvet|
> teśām adhyayane yajñē yājane nāsti yogyata||’ iti|
> (i. e. p. 16.)
> ‘vṛttyartham pūjayed devam trīpi varṣāṇi yo dvijāḥ|
> sa vai devalako nāma sarvakarmasv gahitab||’

Furthermore, we also know from their conduct that they are not brahmins. Worshiping God to make a living, [Tantric] consecration, eating from the offering presented to the deity, observing abnormal sacraments from the rite before conception to cremation, neglecting the performance of solemn Vedic rituals, avoiding contact with the twice-born: with the help such and similar aberrant customs we can easily determine that they are not brahmins. For the Smṛtis teach that worshiping the deity in order to earn a livelihood is a cause of disqualification for Vedic rituals. For example, “Those who have been worshiping a deity to make a living for several generations are not entitled to study the Veda or to sacrifice for themselves or for others.” (…) “A twice-born who worships a deity for three years is truly a devalaka, excluded from all [Vedic] rituals.”

4.16 married “against the grain” i.e. having married a woman from a higher caste. Cf. Āgama-prāmāṇya p.11 (mimāṃsakapakṣa):

> teśām travaṃśikatvam eva nāsti, dūre brāhmaṇaḥbhāvaḥ (… p.13.) santi ca sāttvata
> nāma upanayanādisaṃśkārāhīnā vaiśyavrāṭyānvyāyānā h avaraṇjanmānāh ke
cič yathāha manuh—

> ‘vaiśyāt tu jāyate vrātyāt sudhanvācārya eva ca|
> bhārūṣaḥ ca nijaṅgaḥ ca maitraḥ sāttvata eva ca||’ iti (Manusmrīti 10.23)

‘They do not even belong to any of the three higher estates, and far less to the brahmins. (…) And there are certain people called Sāttvatas, devoid of such sacraments as the upanayanam, descendants of Vaiśya vrātyas, of the lowest birth. As Manu teaches: “From a vrātya [of the] Vaiśya [estate] are born a Sudhanvan, an Ācārya, a Bhārūṣa, a Nijaṅga, a Maitra, and a Sāttvata.”

4.18 Brahmadvipa As Kalhana relates (Ṛājatarāṅgini 3.439ff.) the Raṇasvāmin-temple was built by king Raṇāditya. According to a legend the
queen made a certain siddha called Brahman consecrate the images of the Raṇasvāmin and the Raṇeśvara temples. Having consecrated the linga, Brahman placed himself on the pīṭha of the Raṇasvāmin temple (Rājatarangini 3.458: sa sva yan pīṭham avātaraḥ). In honour of this siddha the queen built the splendid Brahmanaḍapa (ibid. 3.459), which might be connected with the Brahmadvīpa mentioned in our text.

4.25 Nevertheless According to Pischel §113, the Śaurasenī form of Sanskrit tathā, yathā should be tadhā, jadhā, while taha, jaha are the corresponding forms in Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, and Jaina-Māhāraṣṭrī.

4.25 thronged ex conj.

4.25 hundreds According to Pischel §448, the Śaurasenī form of Sanskrit śata should be sada, while saa or saya are the corresponding forms in Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, and Jaina-Māhāraṣṭrī.

4.30 Raṇasvāmin See note ad 4.18.

4.35 discus ex conj. Sanderson.

4.35 illuminates ex conj. Sanderson.

4.35 beatitude ex conj. Sanderson.

4.36 . . . ex conj. It seems likely that pādas cd of this verse have been lost (they might have begun with rāhu°).

4.37 she told ex conj.

4.37 please do not leave ex conj.

4.37 without adducing your view ex conj.

4.42 every ex conj.

4.44 Your Honor’s favor ex conj. Sanderson.

4.58 according to your inspiration ex conj. Sanderson.

4.66 First of all ex conj. Kataoka.

4.66 The darbha grass ex conj. Cf. Baudhāyana-dharmasūtra 1.13.30 (prescribing purification with darbha grass and water, darbhārdhā ṛddhāh prakṣālaṇam, at the Agnihotra and other rituals); also Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa 5.5.4.22.

4.66 has swept away its author and the dust of both challenges to its validity ex conj. Isaacson. Another possible interpretation has been suggested by Dr. Kataoka: ‘The darbha grass of beginninglessness has swept away the dust-fall of both its author and its invalidation by another pramāṇa.’

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4.69 imperceptible object *ex conj.*, i.e. heaven.

4.71 Where can we see a non-human arrangement... *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 6.1.1: *buddhipūrvā vākyakṛttir vede*| ‘The composition of sentences in the Veda is preceded by cognition.’

Candrānanda’s commentary ad loc.: ‘agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāma’ ity evaṁbhiṭṭa racanaḥ bhagavato mahaśevasya buddhipūrvā, sā tataḥ pramaṇam, āptapraṇītatvasya satyatāvyāptetḥ| ‘The Blessed Great Lord’s knowledge is a prerequisite of an arrangement [of words in] such [sentences] as “one who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice”. That is why it is a means of valid cognition, since if A has been composed by a trustworthy person then A is invariably true.’

Vādindra’s commentary ad loc.: vākyakṛttir vākyaracanakrama iti yāvat| buddhipūrvā puruṣabuddhijanyā| vedavākyakramah puruṣabuddhijanyah, vākyakramatvāt, kālīdāsavākyakramavat| “A composition of sentences” is as much as [to say] “a sequence of composing of sentences”. “Preceded by cognition” [means] produced from the cognition of a soul. [Expressed as a formal syllogism, the point made by the sūtra is that] the sequence of sentences in the Veda is one which was produced from the cognition of a soul, because it is a sequence of sentences [and all orders of sentences are produced from the cognition of souls], like the sequence(s) of sentences [produced by] Kālidāsa.’ (tr. Isaacson)

*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 6.1.2: na cāṃodbuddhibhyo liṅgam ṛṣey| ‘And [the composition of sentences in the Veda can] not [have been produced] from the cognitions of [ordinary] people like us; [this fact is] the inferential mark of the ṛṣi.’

Candrānanda’s commentary ad loc.: liṅgaye ’nenārtha iti liṅgam vijñānam| na hi yādṛṣaṃ asmadvijñānaṃ vartamāṇāvyavahārasambuddhārthaviśayaṃ tādṛṣaṃ eva bhagavato vijñānam| ataḥ sambhavati bhagavato ’tindriyārthaviśayaṃ vijñānam| ‘Mark’ [means] “the object is marked by it”, [i.e.] “cognition”. For the Lord’s cognition is not simply like our cognition which has as its objects existing, not hidden, and related things. Thus the Lord can have a cognition which has as its objects things that are beyond sense perception.’

Vādindra’s commentary ad loc.: asmādibuddhivākyajanakatvasya bādhitaṭatvāt tadativraktpuruṣabuddhau vedavākyam (liṅgam) sa ca bhagavān ṛṣir īśvarah| ‘Since it is denied that cognitions of [ordinary] people [like us] can have produced the sentences [of the Veda] the sentences of the Veda are an inferential mark for [the existence of] a cognition belonging to a person different from [and superior to] such [ordinary people like us]. And this [different person] is the blessed ṛṣi [who in this case must be taken to be] God.’ (tr. Isaacson)

*Prāśastapadabhāṣya* p. 519ff: śrutismṛtyutlakṣaṇo ’py ōmnāyo vaktvāpramāṇyāpekṣaḥ, ‘advacanat ōmnāyapramāṇyam’, ‘liṅgac caṇityah’, ‘buddhipūrvā vākyakṛttir vede’, ‘buddhipūrvāvā dūtātīḥ’ ityuktavat| ‘The validity of scriptures called Śruti and Smṛti also depends on the authority of the person
who enunciated [them], since it has been taught that “the validity of scriptures is [established] because they are His [i.e. God’s] words” (Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 1.1.3, 10.21), “from logical reason [we know that] it [i.e. scripture] is not eternal” (Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 2.2.37), “the composition of sentences in the Veda is preceded by cognition” (Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 6.1.1), “[the word] “gives” is preceded by cognition’ (Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 6.1.3).”

Vyomavatī ad loc. (p. 168): atha śabdasyānityatve satyāptoktatvena prāmāṇyaḥ syat, tat tu nāstity āśaṅkyaḥ, ‘liṅgāc cānityāḥ’ iti paraṁ pratyakṣeṣvoccāraṇāt prāg ārdhvaṁ cānupalambhād anityāḥ śabda iti pratiyate, liṅgāc ceti, tat tu vakṣyaṃ śabdaprākṣayāṁ| vedānāṁ cānityate 'numānam, anityāṁ vedavyāyāṁ vakyaṭvād ubhayāḥbhāmatavākyavat| tathā 'buddhipūrva vakya[ṣṭ]rīr vākyaracanā 'vēde| vākyaracanātvād ubhayāḥbhāmatavākyaracanavat| (…) evaṁ vēde| 'buddhipūrvo dadātiḥ| dadātśabadāḥ dadātyuktatvād ubhayāḥbhāmatadādātiśabdavat|

* ed. adds [śabdaḥ]
† ed. adds [buddhipūrvā]
‡ ed. (vēde?)
§ ed. adds [vēde buddhipūrvo (sic)]

′ “Now, if the Veda (Śabda) were not eternal, it would be authoritative because it has been pronounced by a trustworthy person; this, however, does not hold true”—anticipating this objection [the Sūtrakāra] says: “from logical reason [we know that] it [i.e. scripture] is not eternal”. It is plainly recognised by sense perception that words (śabda) are not eternal, since we do not perceive them before and after their pronunciation, and [the same can] also [be proved] by means of a logical reason, but that we shall explain in the examination of śabda. Concerning the non-eternity of the Vedas [we set forth the following] inference: “the propositions of the Veda are not eternal, since they are propositions, just as propositions which both [disputants] hold [to be propositions and to be non-eternal].” Likewise “the composition of sentences”, [i.e.] the construction of sentences, “in the Veda is preceded by cognition”, since it is a construction of sentences, just as those constructions of sentences which both [disputants] hold [to be sentences and to be non-eternal]. (…) Thus in the Veda “gives”, [i.e.] the word “gives”, “is preceded by cognition”, since it is a statement saying “gives”, just as the word “gives” [in ordinary contexts], which is accepted by both [disputants to be such].’

4.72 Kumārila’s answer (Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.12, TV(A) p. 237, TVP p. 469):

veḍeṣu hi tāvad eva padavākyasamghatātmakatvādiḥtavābhāsaiḥ kṛṭakatva bhrāntir bhavati, *yāvad (msB: yā tad eds.) bahiravasthānād vedarūpaṁ na drśyate|
rksāmādīsvarūpe tu drṣṭe bhrāntir nivartate||
ādīnātrum api śrutvā vedanaṁ puruṣasyatād|
na śakyāḥdyavasātum hi maṇaḥ api saṣcetanaṁ||
dṛṣṭārthavāyahāreṣu vakyaṁ lokānusārībhāḥ|
‘For, it is only as long as one does not realise the true nature of the Veda because of being an outsider that one erroneously regards the Vedas as products, due to such false logical reasons as the fact that they consist in the combination of words and sentences. But when the nature of Ṛgvedic verses, Śāmaavedic hymns, and other [Vedic texts] has been realised, the [above mentioned] mistake ceases. No sensible person can believe in the slightest degree that the Vedas have an author as soon as he has listened just to their beginning. When people make poems about transactions with visible goals they only employ sentences that follow ordinary usage and words of the same kind. Who could make a Ṛgveda with words which have practically never been heard among ordinary people and whose accents are prescribed in sixty-four prapāthakas?’

4.74 Hiranyagarbha was the author Cf. Nyāyakandalī, p. 522: yac cedam ‘asmaryamānakartaḥkaṭvād’ iti, tad asidham, ‘prajāpatir vā idam eka āśīn nāhaḥ āśīn na rātrir āśiṣ, sa tapo ‘tapyata, taṃśmā tapasaś cātvāro vedā ajāyanta’ ity āmnāyenaiva kartṛsmaranaḥ। ‘As for this [argument] saying “[the Veda is eternal] because no author of it is being held in our memory”, it is not established, since the Veda itself mentions the author in such passages as “This [universe] was Prajāpati alone, there was no day, there was no night. He practiced austerities, from those austerities the four Vedas were born.”

4.74 you cannot adduce... ex conj. The tradition that Vyāsa was the author of the Mahābhārata might also have been created by arthavāda.

4.76 Aṣṭakā For a description of the Aṣṭakā (a domestic ritual honouring the ancestors), see e.g. Āśvalāyana-grhyasūtra 2.4, cf. Manusmrṭi 4.119, 4.150. Śabarar and Kumārila in their commentary to Mimāṃsāsūtra 1.3.1 refer to the Aṣṭakā as an example of a ritual which is prescribed in Smrṭi texts but which is not enjoined in the Vedas themselves. According to the view of Prabhakara Mimāṃsā, the Vedic texts from which such prescriptions derive had never actually been perceptible to the compilers of these Smrṭi texts, but only always inferable (nityānuneyya) on the basis of the acceptance of these Smrtis by the moral majority (mahājana; see Pollock 1997, pp. 409f, quoting the Prakaraṇapañcitkā). Kumārila disagrees and points out that if a Vedic injunction had never been pronounced then it would be impossible to ascertain its existence since no one could ever perceive it, and therefore Manu’s recollection (smṛti) of the Aṣṭakā would be as mistaken as a barren woman talking about her grandson (the missing son or daughter corresponding to the missing cognition of the Vedic proposition; see TVP, p. 265, TVA, p. 164).

4.82 “The regular study...” Ślokavārttika, vākyādhiṣṭhikarana 366.
4.83 You yourself say… Cf. Ślokavārttika, anumāna 13cd ff.

4.84 whose source is not error ex conj.

4.88 All-conquering sacrifice The Viśvajit is a one-day Soma-sacrifice (ekāha), which requires the sacrificer to pay extensive fees to the officiants (see Mylius Glossar s.v., ibid. pp. 301, 357). As the name of this sacrifice suggests, it is performed ‘in order to conquer everything’ (Taittriya-saṃhitā 7.1.10.4: sarvasyābhijityai).

4.91 as the reason ex em. ISAACSON.

4.91 postulated ex conj.

4.92 is possible ex conj. ISAACSON.

4.100 Quoting Nyāyamañjarī vol. I, p. 636.8–11 (v.l. pratītiḥ for prasiddhiḥ).

4.108 who wishes for a long life Cf. Kātha-saṃhitā 11.4: prajāpatyaṁ caruṁ nirupec chatakṛṣṇalam gṛṭa āyuṣkāmaḥ; Maitreyani-saṃhitā 2.2.2: prajāpatyaṁ gṛṭe caruṁ nirupec satakṛṣṇalam āyuṣkāmaḥ

4.108 who wants to die Cf. Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa 17.12.1: trivyadagniṣṭoṁ sa sarvasvāro, yaḥ kāmavetanāmayatāmam lokam igāṁ iti sa etena yajeta (commentary ad loc.: anāmayatā āmayarādenaiva dehena vyādhyārāhyena); Śāṅkhyāya-śrutasūtra 15.10.1: sarvasvāro nāmakāhaḥ sa sarvaśāyatro maruṇakāmasya gajamānasya bhavati| prayogāntare ca svargākāmasya|

4.109 there is no more fault ex em. SANDERSON.

4.111 beings to be favored ex em. ISAACSON.


4.121 clearly ex conj. SANDERSON.

4.122 Bhagavadgītā 10.41.

4.123 meditation on the All-holy See Yogasūtra 1.23, 1.28–29, 2.1, 2.32, 2.45.

4.126 do not lose ex conj. ISAACSON.

4.126 According to the Mīmāṃsaka position, when the heterodox proclaim that their scriptures have authors they necessarily admit that these scriptures cannot be authoritative. Says Kumārila (Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.4, TVP, p. 329; TVA, p. 195): pāratantryaṁ tāvad esāṁ smāryamāṇapuruṣaviśeṣapraṇaṭiṇītāṁ tair eva pratipannam, Šabdakṛtaka-

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First of all, the fact that these [scriptures] are not autonomous [i.e. that their validity depends on their author] because they were composed by particular persons whose memory is alive is admitted by [their followers] themselves, and it is also learnt by those who get close to them from the acceptance of the proving of such [theories] as the artificial nature of words. (...) And how could we believe that someone [i.e. the Buddha] who has transgressed the duties of his own estate and thus, while being a kṣatriya, vindicated the role of a teacher and the right of receiving gifts, is going to teach the undefiled Dharma?

4.127 in the same way ex conj. Sanderson. See Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.11 (purvapakṣa, TVP, p. 459; TVA, p. 234f):

> dharmam aviplutam upadeksyatīti kaḥ samāśvāsaḥ
>
> ‘With the help of the same argumentation which proves that the Veda is not a product [the same nature] of Buddhist and other scriptures can also be [established]. They are also found to be means of valid knowledge by themselves due to the fact that they create awareness, and the cognition [they create] is neither questioned nor ever refuted. Furthermore, inasmuch as they have no author, they are not impaired by the faults of the author either, since, similarly to the Veda, the memory of the author of the Buddha’s propositions and other [sacred texts] has been excluded. The origin of the label ‘the Buddha’s proposition’ is the fact that [the Buddha was] the teacher [of these scriptures], or it is based on the fact that [these scriptures] were seen by him, by analogy with such [Vedic texts] as the Kāthaka and the Āṅgirasa [which were taught / seen by Kātha and Āṅgiras].’

Kumārila’s reply (Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.12, TVP p. 467ff, TVA p. 235ff):

> dharmam aviplutam upadeksyatīti kaḥ samāśvāsaḥ
> dharmam aviplutam upadeksyatīti kaḥ samāśvāsaḥ
> dharmam aviplutam upadeksyatīti kaḥ samāśvāsaḥ
> dharmam aviplutam upadeksyatīti kaḥ samāśvāsaḥ

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bhūyasāṁ vedabhāyatvād buddhādīvacasām ami
ahimsādy aþy atatpūrvam ity aþus tarkamānīnaḥ||
tataś ca pauṣuṣayatvād aprāmāyam atidriyey
prāguktair vedanityatvavāgābhāsair vimohyate||
("nityatvā TVAmsB : nityatvān TV")
yādṛśatādṛśaṁmāṁśasakair aþy atidriyaviśayapauruṣavacanaprāmānyanir-
ākaraṇād aþauberuṣeṣyatvādhyavasājanirākṣakaraṇadodā śāṅkā(eds. : śāṅkā
tivarpāṇa-prāmāṇyāsiddhiḥ pratiḥantum aškyamānā niruttaribhūtā baluñkaraṇavākyasadṛśaṁ svavākyair vyāpaśśīya(con). :
śāṅkā ed. : śāṅkāmsB ac : śāṅkāmsDpc) rājanādayāḥ santo pi prakṣśinakahetvavacanajālaḥ kanyāvaramārthāgatamārkhavaragotrapraśnottara

yad eva bhavatām gotraṁ tad asmākam apiśvāt
āḥuḥ svāgaṃnityatvām paravākyānukārīnāṁ||
asminyam idaṁ vākyam bhavatām ity coditāḥ
jalpante asmākum evaitat churnāṁ māṁśasakāṁ hṛtyāṁ||
tyaktalajjanāṁ bruvāno hi vācoyuktān anarthikāṁ
kurvan parātisandhānāṁ aśrāntaḥ ko 'vasadiṭā||
tatra sākyāṁ prasiddhāpi sārvākṣaṃkāvādita
 tyajyate vedasiddhāntātāya jālpadīhīḥ nityam āgānam||
(... ) *śarva(msB : sarvadā ed.ḥ)pūrdhāḥsaṁbandhānityatvavapritipādanāt
tadviparatām āgānityatvām abhyupagamyānāṁ lokopahāśāpadamā-

trām eva bhavē
t

For some people, when they are having a debate with someone else, “reflex arguments” are born from the assertions of the opponent, and they prattle with echoed words while nevertheless they also keep up the appearance of someone who considers his own doctrine as self-evident. As, for example, the Buddhists, Vaiśeṣikas (?) and others, afraid of the Māṁśakās, mindlessly say: “Our scripture is in fact eternal”, admitting in no way, because of hatred, the precedence of the Veda, and holding that, even if that much is the case, [their scripture] still has the greatest truthfulness. Conceited with reasoning they say that, since most of the Buddha’s propositions are outside the Veda, even non-violence and other [precepts] are not dependent upon it. And thus the fact that [non-Vedic scriptures] are not authoritative with regard to imperceptible matters since they have authors is effaced with the above mentioned replicas of the statements about the Veda’s eternity. Since even an average Māṁśaka can refute the validity of human assertions with regard to imperceptible matters, [the heterodox] think that it is impossible to counteract the establishing of validity if it is unobjectionable inasmuch as it has been freed from the suspicion of faults in the causes [which produce the cognition] through the determination of its independence from any person, and, dumbfounded, with their own assertions that resemble the imitative talk of children and using a tattered net of reasoning though their hearts sink with fear, they claim, imitating the statements of their opponents, that their own scripture is eternal, just as a foolish suitor, who has come to ask the girl’s hand,
answers the question about his gotra like this: “My gotra is the same as yours” [which actually makes the marriage impossible]. And when they are told: “This statement of yours is [in fact] ours”, they prattle: “It is ours alone! The Mimāṃsakas have overheard and then stolen it.” For why would someone give way who shamelessly speaks meaningless sophistries and spares no effort to deceive others? At that stage the Buddhists give up even their well-known adherence to the doctrine of the momentariness of all things when they prattle that their scripture is [also] eternal on the basis of the established truth of the Veda[’s eternal nature]. (. . . ) Since [the Buddhist] have demonstrated the non-permanent nature of the connection of all words with their referents, the world would only laugh if they were to accept the eternal nature of scripture, which is contrary to that [doctrine of momentariness].’

When the language of non-Vedic scriptures is itself debased, how could their content be eternal and authoritative? Says Kumārila (Tantravārttika, ibid.):

\[ \text{asādhuśabdhāḥṣiṣṭhāḥ śākyajaināgāmadāyah|} \\
\text{asannibhandhānāt vā sāstratvaṁ na prātiyate||} \\
\text{tataś cāsatyaśabdeṣu kutaś teṣu arthasatyatā|} \\
\text{dṛṣṭāpabṛṣṭāraṇeṣu kathāṁ vā syād anādītā||} \\
\text{(TV\textsuperscript{P} p. 238f, TV\textsuperscript{A} p. 470f.) śākyadigranṭheṣu punar yad api kiṃcit sādhunābhāśprāṇeṇaṁśaḥbuddhyā prayuktam, tatrāpi praṇāpi*vijñāpi (eds. : om. ms\textsuperscript{B})} \text{paśyataḥ(eds. : o paśyana\textsuperscript{o} ms\textsuperscript{Bac} : o paśyana\textsuperscript{o} ms\textsuperscript{B})} \text{tiṣṭhata-di(eds. : o tiṣṭhāmādi ms\textsuperscript{B})prāyaṃpravṛtyāt kiṃcid eva iśvāplutām labhyate|} \\
\text{kim uta yāni prasiddhāpabṛṣṭāraṇeṣu sāhvāṣabhāḥyā 'py apabhṛṣṭātaraṇāṃ bhi-} \\
\text{khave ity evamādīni, devitiyābhuvačanasthāne hy ekārāntaṃ (TV\textsuperscript{A} ms\textsuperscript{B} : ekārā tam TV\textsuperscript{P}) prākṛtaṃ padaṃ dṛṣṭan, na prathamaḥbhuvacane sans-} \\
\text{bodhane 'pi sanskrātaśabdaṁsthāne ca kakāra-devyaśasmyogah, anuvārālopaḥ,} \\
\text{rvarṣakārāntimātram eva prākṛtāpabṛṣṭaṁsṛṣu dṛṣṭan, na dūkaśapattiv} \\
\text{api so 'yaṃ sanskrāta dharmā ity asya sarvakāłam svayam eva pratisiddhi} \\
\text{*'pi (eds. : om. ms\textsuperscript{B}) vināśaḥ kṛtaḥ (??) } \\
\text{)}

‘The Buddhist, Jaina and other [non-Vedic] scriptures mostly consist of solecistical words, and, since they are bad compositions, their śāstric nature is not recognised. (. . . ) And thus how could their subject be correct / real when their words are incorrect / unreal? Or how could they be beginningless when their form is visibly corrupt? (. . . ) In the works of Buddhists and other [heterodox people], however, whenever something is used with the intention of [using] correct words and with a clear mind, even in that case we hardly find anything that is not spoiled due to such frequent usages as “praṇāpi”, “vijñāpi”, “paśyata” (read “paśyana” or vipaśyana?), “tiṣṭhata” (? , read tiṣṭhantika?), etc. What shall we say about those [expressions] which are even more corrupt than the well-known corrupt vernaculars, such as “bhikkhave”? For a Prakrit word ending in \textit{e} is seen to stand for the Accusative Plural, [but] not for the Nominative Plural, even in the case of a Vocative. And in the place of the word “sanskrāta” we see the application of a double \textit{k}, the elision of the
Anusvāra, and only the change of r into a in Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa languages [i.e. sanskṛta becomes sakkā / sakkā], but not the change [of t] into d as well. Thus [the Buddhists] themselves constantly destroy this [statement]: “sanskṛtā dharmāḥ” [i.e. by the incorrect and therefore non-existent grammatical form: “sakkādā”], even if they deny its destruction [by asserting the eternity of the Buddha’s propositions].

4.128 Kumārila sets up strict criteria on the basis of which someone can be regarded as a real propagator of Dharma (Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.6, TVP, p. 360; TVA, p. 202):

vedenāvābhyaṇujñātāṃ yaśām eva pravakṛtā]

nityānām abhidheyaṇāṃ manvantaranyugādiśu|

teṣāṃ viparivarteṣu kurvaṇāṃ dharmasaṃhitāḥ|

vacanāni pramāṇāni nāyeṣām iti niścaṣayaḥ]

‘Whose [Veda-] propagator status is acknowledged by the Veda itself, and who are always to be named in the Manvantaras, Yugas and other [aeons]: the statements of these people alone, who compose compendiums on Dharma whenever they are reborn, and not of others, are authoritative: this is the settled view.’

4.129 people know well ex conj. SANDERSON.


4.131 here ex em. SANDERSON.

4.131 one of their particular recensions Cf. Kumārila’s argument concerning the Vedic basis of Śruti texts containing apparently non-Vedic regulations (Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.2, TVP, p. 265; TVA, p. 164):

yad vā vidyāmānaśākhāgataśrutimāṇātm evāstu| katham anupalabdhir iti cet, ucyate—

śākhānāṃ vipraṅkārayaḥ puruṣāṇāṃ pramāṇāḥ|
nānāpakaṅkārayaḥ śnyeta mīloṇa na śnyate]

‘Or rather let [their] source be nothing but a Vedic passage in the available recensions [of the Veda]. If you ask why don’t we find [this Vedic passage], my answer is as follows: The [Vedic] source of the Śruti passage is not found since the recensions [of the Veda] are scattered, since people are negligent, and since it is contained in separate sections [of the Veda].’ Using the above argument Dhairyarāsi could claim that the source of the Pañcarātra is a Vedic text which is hidden from us in the countless branches of the Veda. Actually he goes one step further and asserts that the Pañcarātra itself is one of these Vedic recensions.

Kumārila also points out that, once the Śruti status of the heterodox scriptures has been refuted, the nāstika dares to claim the same status for their own scriptures as the Veda has. The disastrous consequences are easy to foresee (Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.11; TVP, p. 455; TVA, p. 230):

yad vā sākyādīṣāstrānāṃ śrutiśāstratvavāraṇāḥ|
vedaśākhāsamānātavam aśaṅkyeḥa nivāryate||
(...)
tataś ca vedavan nityās te 'pi ced āgamā matāḥ
(codana)alakṣaṇo dharmas tadukto 'pi prasajyate||
kāmaṃ na praviśed grāmaṃ vārito danda-pāṇībhibh||
spaṣṭam mahāpathenaiva sampratī pravivikṣati||

‘Or rather, having refuted that Buddhist and other [heterodox scriptures] are Smṛti texts, in this [part of the Mīmāṃsāśūtra] the [possible claim of their] equality to the recensions of the Veda is anticipated and set aside. (...)

Therefore if those [heterodox] scriptures are also accepted to be eternal like the Veda, it will follow that the Dharma taught by them will also have scriptural proposition as its defining characteristic [similarly to Vedic Dharma]. Though [the heterodox scriptures] cannot enter the village [of authoritativeness] because the [Mīmāṃsaka] policemen have kept them off [by rejecting their Smṛti status], now they want to enter openly on the High Street [of Vedic status].’

Cf. also note ad 4.11.

4.136 cannot be interrogated by another doctrinal work Similarly, as Yāmuna argues, just because the Pānicāratrikas follow the prescriptions of a different, but equally valid Vedic school, i.e. the Ekāyanaśākhā, it does not follow that they are not brahmans at all. See Āgama-prāmāṇya p. 169: ye punaḥ sāvitrtyānuvacanaprabhṛtātṛtyādharmaṭyāgena ekāyanaśrutivihītān eva catvārimśat samaskārān kurvate, te 'pi svaśākhāṃ ghyōktam arthāṃ yathā-vad anuvishṭhāminā na sākhāntariyakarmānaṃ anuṣṭānād brahmānyāt procyantwā, anyeṣām api parāsākhāṃ ghyātikarmānaṃ anuṣṭānām iti abhātraṃyaṇaprasaṅgā||

Those who observe only the forty sacraments laid down in the Ekāyana Śrutī while giving up the sacred duties found in the Three Vedas, such as the recitation of the Gāyatrī mantra etc., they too, inasmuch as they properly observe the rituals taught in the āghyāsūtras of their own recension, do not become excluded from the brahmin status, since it would follow that others too would become non-brahmin because they neglect the observance of rituals laid down in other people’s recensions.’

Ibid. p. 170: vilakṣaṇaḥ ca traya-vihītāsvarūpāprativedaiviṣayopahogasādha-

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...
Vedas (e.g. the *aindrāgneya*) which are the instruments of enjoying heaven or a son, or similar sensual objects. On this ground, the fact that they do not observe the rituals laid down in each other's [Vedic] recensions does not produce non-brahmin status for either of these two groups. And I have already expounded in [my work entitled] “The Validity of the Kashmirian Scripture(s)” in what way the Ekāyana recension [of the Veda] is not the work of a person, so I do not go into details now.'

4.136 *Sautrāmaṇī* The Sautrāmaṇī is an expiatory sacrifice that involves a *surū*-offering. (See *Mylius*, Glossar s.v., ibid. p. 144; *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* 5.5.4.)

4.137 taught ex conj. ISAACSON.

4.138 This might be true, says Kumārila, but in all other respects they are at variance with Vedic tradition (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4; *TV* p. 329; *VA* p. 195): *smṛtivākyam ekam ekena śrutivacanena viruddhyeta* sākyādvacanāni tu kati-paṇḍita-madādvacanāvacanāvrajaṃ sarvāny eva samastacaturdāvīṣṭābhāvāvaitaviruddhāṇi, trayānāṃgavyāthātaviruddhācaraṇaiś ca buddhādibhiḥ pranītāni, trayābhyebhyāḥ ca caturdāvānirvātrasita-prāyebhyo vyāmūdhebhhyāḥ samarpitānī (eds. : samarthitānī msB) na vedānāvata-van vāḥbhāvyante| ‘One sentence in a Śrāṇi text might contradict one Vedic proposition. Every single one of Buddhist and other [heterodox] propositions, however, except for a few statements about self-control, munificence and the like, contradict all the fourteen sciences, and they were composed by the Buddha and others whose conduct deviates from and contradicts the doctrine of the Three Vedas, [and] they have been taught to deluded people most of whom are excluded from the fourth estate [i.e. to outcasts]: thus their source cannot be the Veda.'

4.139 to something else ex conj. SANDERSON.

4.141 of this teaching ex conj. SANDERSON.

4.141 more specific designation ex conj. SANDERSON.

4.141 Cf. *Āgama-prāmāṇya* p. 12: *brāhmaṇeṣv eva kutaścid guṇayogāt sāttvatabhāgavatādyapadeśa, yathā teso eva parivṛjakaśīśablā iti* ‘Such names as sāttvata, bhāgavata, etc. refer precisely to brahmins in some way, through the application of the secondary sense, just as words such as parivṛjaka refer to the very same people [i.e. to brahmins].

Ibid. p. 154: *yat punar uktaṁ, ‘samāne brahmanaṃ kinti sāttvatabhāgavataikāntikaśābhair eva teṣāṁ niyamena vyapadeśa’ iti, tat parivrājakani-gadādīvad ity adoṣāḥ| yathā eva samāne brahmaṇe *yayaṣṭve (corr., ed.: yayaṣṭve) ca kecid eva brahmaṇaḥ kāniccid eva yajāṃśi parivṛjakaśādabhyām adhiyante, ‘tis’ḥantu brahmaṇaḥ, parivṛjakaśādāniyantāmi, ‘yajāṃsi varante na nigadāḥ, nigadā varante na yajāṃsi’ iti ca, tathēhāpi bhavisyate| ‘As for the objection, “Why are these people standardly named 106
with the words sāttvata and bhāgavata alone, provided that their brahmin status is the same", there is nothing wrong in this matter, just as [names like] parivrājaka and nigada [are unproblematic]. For just as some brahmans and some mantras of the Yajurveda are called parivrājaka and nigada [respectively] even though they are equally brahmans and Yajurvedic mantras, in such expressions as “The brahmans should stay, the parivrājaka should be fetched”, and “The Yajurvedic mantras apply, not the nigadas”, or “The nigadas apply, not the Yajurvedic mantras”, the same goes for this case, too.’

4.144 “Are such caste universals...” See Halbfass 1991, p. 363ff., referring to the discussion of this problem in the Tantravārttika (ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.2) and the Nyāyamanjari.

4.147 Manu and other Smritis ex em. Isaacson.

4.147 are valid because they are based on the Veda Jayanta observes in the Nyāyamanjari (vol. I, p. 645) that all of Kumārila’s arguments proving that Śruti texts are based on the Veda can be applied to other scriptures as well. Cf. Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.2 (TVP, p. 264f; TVA, p. 163f): manvādān cāpratyaksatvāt tadvijñānānātman aṃ drastāṃ kīm cīcid avāyān kalpanīyamān tātra ca— bhrānter anuvbhavād vāpi purvävatīd vipralambhanāt| drṣṭāṃ svāyasnādhyatvac cocoṣata va laghiyasi| sarvatraiva cādrṣṭakalpanāyām *tādṛṣṭaṃ adṛṣṭaṃ (msB : tādṛṣṭaṃ eds.) kālapatīvayam, yād dṛṣṭaṃ na virūṣaddhi na *cā( msB : vāś eds.) dṛṣṭānter aṃ sarvajāyati| tātra bhrāntau tāvat samyānāvaddhaśāstrādānāvābhāpattiḥ, sarvalokāhupagatadṛṣṭhaprāmnāyāḥ *tādhaś (TVA, msB : vāsda TVP) ca | *tāda(m B : idāś eds.) niśtantais cā purvasāer api bhrāntir manvādānān anvārūṛtaḥ, tatparyārāpayāsā sva manvādānān ity *anekā (TVA, msB : ekā TVP) dṛṣṭakalpanā ( . . . ) puruṣāvākyāṃ paramprāparāpy (TVP, msB : pa parāpy TVA) andhāparampara vā nirākṛtā, na hi niṣpratiṣṭhapāmnāṇātimālābhālo dṛṣṭaye| tathā vipralambhe ‘pi tatkalpanā, vipralipśā pratījñānam, lokasya ca tātra bhrāntiḥ, tasyāś ceyantam kālam anvṛttir ityādy āsrayaṇīyam| utpannasaya ca dṛṣṭasya pratījñāsya prāmnāyanīrā karaṇād dṛṣṭa(e ds. : karaṇādṛṣṭa msB)virodhah| tasmāt sarvebhāṣās cōdanākalpanaiva āgyayaḥ, tātra hi *tanmātrādṛṣṭā (TVA, msB : tanmātrādṛṣṭā TVP) bhavyaganam, śeṣas tu mahājanaparigrahādāyayah sarve ’nuviḥhiyante|

Since we cannot contact Manu and other [authors of Śruti texts], we must necessarily postulate something imperceptible as the basis of their knowledge. And among [the various possible bases] it is the Veda which is simpler [to postulate] than error, or even experience, [other] people’s assertions, [or] the intention to deceive, since it can be established in accordance with what we see. And in all cases when we postulate something unseen, we must postulate such an unseen thing which does not contradict the observed [facts] and which does not entail another unseen thing.
Among [the above mentioned assumptions], first, if [we supposed that] error [was the basis], this would contradict the fact that we see [that the Smṛtis are] properly composed texts, and [their] firm authority, which everyone accepts, would also be set aside. We should also postulate many unseen facts, namely that people of that age also followed Manu’s and other [Smṛti authors'] error, and that a refutations of that [error] of Manu and other [Smṛti authors] have been put forth. (…) [The supposition that Smṛti texts are based on] a series of human assertions has also been refuted with the help of [the analogy to] a series of blind men, since we do not see that valid cognition arises without any foundation [i.e. humans cannot transmit knowledge about Dharma without relying on the Veda, just as blind men cannot hand down information about colour without the help of a sighted person]. Likewise in the case of deception we must resort to the following: the postulation of that [deception], the intention to deceive as purpose, people’s mistake about that, the continuation of that [mistake] for such a long time, etc. And since it would annul the validity of a firm belief, it would contradict the visible [facts]. Therefore the postulation of Vedic propositions [as the basis of Smṛti] is better than all the other [assumptions], since in this case we admit that unseen thing alone. As for such facts as the acceptance [of Smṛti] by the moral majority, they are all in harmony [with this postulation].'

Kumārila thinks that heretics are unlikely to lay a claim to the support of the Veda (Tantrovaśītikā ad Mīmāṃsāsātra 1.3.4, TVP, p. 329, TVA, p. 195): 

vedamūlatvam punas te tulyakṣamāvatvāksamāvaih lajyā ca mātpitrādvesiduṣṭapurutvan nābhagyapacchanti

‘On the other hand, since they cannot stand having [a scripture] of the same rank as basis, and because they feel ashamed, they do not acknowledge that their source is the Veda, just as depraved sons who hate their parents.’ But even if they tried to establish a Vedic foundation, the heterodox scriptures are so inconsistent with the Vedas that their claim would be clearly nonsensical (see note ad 4.138).

4.151 identity among the performers Mīmāṃsāsātra 1.3.2: api vā kartṛaśāmānyat pramanāṇam anumāṇaṁ syāt ‘Or rather, since the agents [who perform works prescribed in the Veda on the one hand and in Smṛti texts on the other] are the same, the inference [of now unavailable Vedic texts being the basis of Smṛti regulations that do not directly correspond to Vedic injunctions] is a means of valid cognition.’ (On the interpretation of this sūtra see POLLOCK 1997, pp. 404ff.)

Cf. also Śābara ad Mīmāṃsāsātra 1.3.2 (TVP, p. 258): granthas tv anumāyeta, kartṛaśāmānyat smṛti-vidikapadārthayoh tenopapanno vedasanyoṣas traivarṇikānām ‘But a [Vedic] text [which is the basis of a ritual that is prescribed only in a Smṛti text but not in the Veda itself] can be inferred [though it cannot actually be perceived] on the ground that the performers of a ritual act [laid down] in a Smṛti text and [of another one laid down] in a Vedic text are the same. Therefore it is appropriate that those who
belong to the three higher estates associate a Vedic text [with a purely Smrti-based ritual].’
Cf. also Agamapramāṇya p. 10 (pūrva-pāka): na caivaṃ acamanopanayanā- 
din i va śrutivihitāgniḥrādipadārthānūṣṭhāyinaḥ tántrikācārān upacaratāḥ 
apyāmbah
pratyutaitān vīgarhante kurvāṇāṃ vedavādinaḥ||
tasmād yat ‘kartṛsāṁmaṇyāt prāmāṇyaṃ’ smṛtiśūditam||
naiva tat pāncārātrādibālghasmargaṇam arhate
na hi traiyāṇīkaś śiṣṭāḥ taduktārthān upāsate||
‘And we do not see that those who perform the Agnihotra and other rituals 
laid down in Śrutī texts observe Tantric customs in the way they observe 
ācāmana, upanayana, and other [orthodox customs]. On the contrary, the 
adhērents of the Veda despise those who follow these [Tantric customs]. 
Therefore what is taught with respect to the Smṛti, namely “Because 
of the identity of the performers [they have] validity”, does not apply to 
such heterodox Smṛti as the Pāncarātra, for the educated members of the 
three higher estates do not recognise their teachings.’
The Pāncarātrīka certainly holds that the postulation of a Vedic basis is 
appropriate since the performers of these Tantric rituals are also brahmans. 
On the other hand, a Mīmāṃsaka would certainly never acknowledge even 
the twice-born status of the Bhāgavatas (see Āgamaṇaṇāya p. 11ff).

4.151 the inference of a Vedic text ex em. ISAACSON.

4.155 is only its cause ex conj. ISAACSON.

4.155 for any reason whatsoever As Kumārila points out, although such 
Śruti passages as the one prescribing the Aṣṭakā ritual can be inferred to 
be based on lost Vedic texts, this fact does not mean that any scripture 
can be nominated for having a Vedic basis. See Tantravārttika ad Mī-
māṃsāṣṭṭha 1.3.2 (TVP, p. 265; TVA, p. 164): na caivaṃ sati yatkiṃicit 
prāmaṇam āpātṣyate, śiṣṭāvāśānīvyādhikāśyāsminayatānāpratīkhyāntābhāyā-
tvāc chrutyanumānasya|| ‘And it is not the case that at this state of affairs 
anything can be a source of authoritative knowledge, since a Vedic text 
can [only] be inferred [as the basis of some other scripture] if the unbroken 
recollection of learned members of the three higher estates remains other-
wise inexplicable.’
Though some heretic scriptures might contain Vedic elements, nevertheless 
their obvious anti-Vedic character must be emphatically declared. Says 
Kumārila (Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāṣṭṭha 1.3.4, TVP, p. 328, TVA, 
p. 194): yāny etānī trayīvidbhīra na paripṛhitāni, kiṃcittalniśraddhārma-
kaṇṭikacchāyāpaitāni lokopasāntgrahālābhāpūjāvāyātiprayojanaparāṇī tra-
yāvaparāśāntaḥbuddhāśāsabhādhiprāyaksāṃsūnamānupārayātāḥprātya-
kṣīnulopanaibuddhāni sāmkhyāyogapāncārātrapāśūpataśākṣyagranthaparīgr-
hitadhrmaḥdharmaṁbandhanāni viṣācikṣāsāvaśākṣyacchāntanomnadanañādi-
samarthakataprayaṃsāntprātyadikāśācāntikāśiddhimirdarśanabaleṇaḥiṃśāṣa-
yacanadadānayaḍīśrutīsmṛtisaṇvādīstōkārthagandhavāsitajīvākāra-

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This [sūtra, i.e. Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.4] teaches that the following [texts] should be discarded since they are opposed to the Veda and because we see [other] causes [of their coming into being]:
— texts on piety and impiety contained in Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pāṇcarātra, Pāṣupata, and Buddhist scriptures: they are not accepted by those who are learned in the Three Vedas, [though] they are placed in the shade of the gown of piety which is slightly blended with the [teaching of the Vedas], [but] their main concern is how to please the plebs, make profit, gain adoration and fame; they were put together on grounds that are contradictory to and unconnected with the Veda: sense perception such as visible splendour, and arguments consisting for the most part in inference, analogy, and presumption; and, while perfumed with the scent of a few things that are in accordance with Śruti and Smṛti, such as non-violence, truthfulness, self-control, munificence, and compassion, they teach other subjects which are mainly connected with making a living, using as corroboration the evidence of the random success of a few mantras and medical herbs that are able to cure poisoning, induce enchantment, ruin one's enemy, causing madness, and the like;
— those completely alien texts which deal with the conduct of the barbarians, [such as?] dining in the company of others [who belong to the lower castes].

And this has not been taught in any other section [of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra], while it cannot be left unmentioned [just] because [the invalidity of such heterodox texts] is public knowledge, just as the [correct] view about the expressivity of such [ungrammatical] words as gāvī [should also be pronounced, even if it is well known]. For if they were disregarded and thus their invalidity was not asserted, thinking that [this assertion] cannot be made people would consider [these texts] equal [to the Manu- and other Smṛtis], or, because of the beauty, feasibility, or the argumentation [found in these texts], or due to the influence of the Iron Age, they would arrive at the erroneous conclusion that such acts as the killing of animals, which is taught in the context of Vedic sacrifice, should be given up.'

Kumārila also reckons with the possibility that any freshly established religion could derive itself from lost Vedic texts (Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.4, TVP, p. 329, TVA, p. 194f): yaiś ca mānavādismṛṭīnaṃ *apy (eds. : adhy 2 msB) usvanvedasākhāmulaṇavatvam abhyupagatam, tān prati sutārām śākyādibhir api śākyāṇaṃ tannulasvam eva vaktum| ko hi
śaknuyād utsannānāṃ vākyaviṣayāyattāniyamānāṃ kartum| tatas ca yāvat
kiṃ cit kiyantam api kālaṃ kaiś cid ādīryamānaṃ prasiddhim gataṃ tat
pratyakṣāśākhāvīṣayāvyayaṃvāsātānām anubhava-
tulyaṃkṣaṭatāyā śāhāvyāt| ata āḥa—‘virodhe tv anapaścetāṃ syād’ (Mī-
maṃśāsītra 1.3.3) iti| ‘And those who hold that the Śmr̤ti texts of Manu
and other [authors] are based on lost recensions of the Veda can easily
be told by the Buddhist and other [heterodox people] that [the Buddhist
and other heretic scriptures] also have the very same basis. For who could
impose a restriction on the limit of sentences and topics in lost [texts]? And
thus anything whatsoever that has been cultivated by any people for
any time and has become well-known, even if it were inconsistent with
the available [Vedic] recensions, would appear as having a stable status
inasmuch as it is based on a lost recension, since it would be looked upon
in the same way [as the orthodox Smṛtis]. Therefore [the author of the
Mīmaṃśāśītra] says: “When there is a contradiction, [the text that con-
tradicts the Veda] must be discarded.” (Mīmaṃśāśītra 1.3.3)’

4.162 greed and the like are the visible source As Kumārila himself says
(Tantravārttika ad Mīmaṃśāśītra 1.3.4, TVP, p. 330, TVA, p. 195f):
lobhādikārayāṇāṃ cātra bahu evānyat pratiyate|
yasmīn saṃsāhrte dṛṣṭe nasti mūlantarānūmā|
śākyādayās ca sarvatra kurvāṇa dharmaṁśeṣanām|
hetujālarinmuktāḥ na kadācana kurvate||
na ca tair vedamūlataṃ ucye gautamādīvat|
hetavāḥ cābhidhiyante ye dharmāḥ dūrataḥ sthitāḥ||
(dharmāḥ: conj., dharme: TVA, dharmā: TVP, TVA, msB (or dharmād?))
etā eva ca te yeṣāṃ vāṃmārṇāpi nārcanam|
pākhanāṇaḥ vikarnasthā *haśtu (eds. : heta? msB) kāś caita eva hi||
‘In this case [i.e. in the case of heterodox scriptures] we recognise many
other causes [of their creation], such as greed and the like, and when we
see that these are present there is no [need for] inferring another source.
And the Buddhists and other [heretics], whenever they give instructions
about Dharma, they never give it without a network of motivations. On
the other hand, those who stand far removed from Dharma do not say,
unlike Gautama and other [authors of Smṛti texts], that [their scriptures]
are based on the Veda, and they put forth arguments. It is they to whom
one should not pay reverence even by mere words, for it is no-one but they
who are [referred to as] heretics, sinners, and sophists.’

4.162 also ex em.

4.162 a means of livelihood Cf. Yāmuna’s answer to the same charge (Āga-
maprāṃcāya pp. 155f.):
aḥ hi bhāgavatāais sarvaiḥ vṛttaye 'bharcayate hariḥ|
dṛṣṭā hi bahavah svārtham pujayanto 'pi sāttvataḥ||
kecid yadi paraṇaḥ sāttataḥ vṛttikarśītaḥ||
Not all Bhāgavatas worship Hari to make a living, for many Śāttvatas are seen who also perform pūjā for their own sake. Even if some virtuous Śāttvatas, attracted to earn a livelihood, [but otherwise] being distinguished Vaiṣṇavas, perform pūjā because they want to make money, one cannot assert on the basis of this fact alone that they are not brahmīns. [Likewise a priest] who acts as an adhvaryu at a jyotis-toma sacrifice will certainly not be degraded. If they did not accept fees the pūjā itself would be fruitless: that is why they accept fees, so that the pūjā may be correct and [thus] successful. “And at the end of the worship one should give him gold to the best of one’s ability. Otherwise the priest who performs the pūjā may get the fruit of the pūjā”, since the Smṛti says among others: “[The organs of sense and action, honour, bliss in heaven, longevity, fame, offspring, and cattle] are destroyed by a sacrifice at which [too] small sacrificial fees are given.” (tr. BÜHLER) That officiating work alone is prohibited prior to which an officiant himself makes demands because of avarice. (…) A donation of fee, however, which is purified by reverence is certainly beneficial for both [the priest and the sacrificer].’

4.163 accepted by intelligent people Kumārila points out that every anti-Vedic scripture must be explicitly rejected. It is not enough to show that the adherents of Vedic religion have always been the learned and the respectable, since the heretics can assert the same about their own followers (Tantra-vārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.4 TVP, p. 329, TVA, p. 194):

‘The followers of heterodox scriptures] also say, referring to other continents, that their own doctrines are accepted by honorable people and have been followed and [handed down] by their fathers and [forefathers]. In this matter faith alone is the only basis of the settled order since everyone is disposed to follow the deeds of his own father, forefathers, and other [ancestors].’
According to the Vaiśeṣika commentator Śrīdhara, consentient acceptance by those who exercise correct judgement is a feature that sets apart the Veda from heterodox scriptures (Nyāyakandalī, p. 520):

atha puruṣaviśeṣa-pranīto veda iti kuta esā pratiti iti, sarvai varṇāśramibhir avigānena tadarthaparigrahāḥ yatkiṃcana puruṣa-praṣaṇītve tu vedaśya buddhādvākya-van na sarveśaṃ parikṣakānāṃ avigānena tadarthānusthānam syāt, kasya cid apramāṇyāvabodhena visanvādapratipātī api sambhavāḥ?

‘If you ask how we know that the Veda was composed by an extraordinary person, the answer is that we know it because its contents are unanimously accepted by all, belonging to any social estate or life-period. On the other hand, if the Veda had been composed by just any ordinary person, then not everybody who examines things carefully would unanimously put its contents into practice, as not every discriminating person follows the Buddha’s and other [heterodox teachers’] propositions, because someone might realise that it is not authoritative and therefore adopt a dissenting view.’

4.164 As the pūrvapakṣin says in Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.11 (TVP, p. 459; TVA, p. 235):

yāyad evoditaṃ kimcid vedaprāmāṇyasiddhayetat sarvau buddhāvṛtyānaṃ atideśena gamyate||

‘Whatever has been put forth in order to prove the authority of the Veda, all of that can be applied by analogy to the Buddha’s propositions.’

4.165 have always existed ex conj. Isaacson.

4.171 This would certainly be an unacceptably generous view for Kumārila, in whose interpretation Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.5–6 excludes such a liberal position (Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.3.5–6, TVP, p. 360–362, TVA, p. 201–203):

gyat tarhi vedavihitam na bādhate, śiṣṭān vā vedavidv na ko-payati, vihārārāmānāśalakarāpa-vāragyadhāniḥbhayāsāsāyatavacanadamadānayādā, tad buddhādhāsitaṃ *pramāṇatvena(conj. : pramāṇe-po

eds., pramāṇatvāṃ ma B)viruddhaṃ iti cet, ‘na śāstraparimāṇyatvāt’ parimitāṃ eva hi caturādastasāṣṭā(eds. : 6aṣṭāśaṃ ms B)daśa vā vidyāsthāna-ni dharmaprāmāṇatvena śiṣṭāh parigṛhitāni, vedopvedārāgarāstādā- dharmanāśāyātanā-sāstrāsāśādantaḥsamānyānāvaiṃ kaṇāvaiṃ na ca teṣām ma-dhye buddhābhaṭādigranthāḥ smṛtaḥ *pratigrhitā (em. : pratigrhitā ms B : grhitā eds.) vā

pratikāncarūpeṇa pūrvāśātra-thāgocaram|

yad anyat kriyate tasya dharmāṇaḥ prayat apramāṇatā||

(. . .)

tasmād yāṇy eva śāstrāṇi vedamūlānatikramāt|

avasthitāni tair eva jñāto dharmāḥ phalapradaḥ||

yathāvā yaḥyaḥvijñānātād vedād keśyādipūrvavād|

śudānādhitgatād vapi dharmajñānānaṃ na saṃmatam||

tathākṛtāntavedoktāmbhāya-yāvahārīrāṁ|

saṃśādiḥ api vākyeṣu nasyate dharmahetutā||
smaryante ca purāṇesu dharmaviplavahetavah
kalau śākyādayas teṣām ko vākyam śrotam arhati||
yathā kṛtakarpūrasuvanrādiṣu dīyate||
yad bijam tad api vyaktam agrāhyatvād *pratiyate||
(TV\(^{P}\), TV\(^{Aac}\), ms\(^{B}\) : pratiyate TV\(^{APC}\))
tena karmānurūpyasāmyatodṛṣṭārthāpatiṁ *balāt (eds. : vya/dyattvāt
ms\(^{B}\)) tadabhiprāyakalpitadharmābhāṣāsamadhyapatitam sanmūlam *apy a-
hiṃśādī (eds. : atha hiṃśādī ms\(^{B}\)) śvadṛttinikṣiptakṣiruvaḥ anupa *yogya,(eds.
: bhogya ms\(^{B}\)) viśrambhaniyam ca tanmātropalabdhāṃ bhavatī avuṣyāṁ
yāvat pariṇaṭaśāḍāręḥ bhavatī, tāvađ agrāḥyam bhavati| yadā śastraśāntareṇāciva so ʾrthaḥ sāspaṭo ʾvadāḥrṣyate|
tadā tenaiva siddhatvād *itarat syād (eds. : itarasyād ms\(^{B}\)) anarthakam||
‘One may have the following view: “Then those things mentioned by the
Buddha and other [heterodox teachers] which are not at variance with
what is enjoined in the Veda and do not incense the educated [brahmins]
who are versed in the Veda—the construction of monasteries, gardens,
and manḍalas, dispassion, meditation, exercise, non-violence, truthfulness,
self-control, munificence, compassion and the like—are not at variance
with authoritativeness.” [The answer of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (1.3.6) to this
view is as follows:] “No, since the number of [authoritative] scriptures is
limited.” For the only a limited number (14 or 18) of sciences is accepted
by educated people as a source of valid knowledge about Dharma, namely
the Vedas, the Upavedas [Āyurveda (Medicine), Dhanurveda (Military
Science), Gandharvaveda (Music)], the [Veda-]Āṅgas [Śīkṣā (Pronuncia-
tion) in the general sense, Chandas (Prosody), Vyākaraṇa (Grammar),
Nirukta (Etymology), Jyotiṣa (Astronomy), Kalpa (Ritual)], the Upāṅgas
[Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya], the eighteen Dharmasūtras, the Purāṇas, Śīkṣā
[with a special subject, e.g. the one written by Pāṇini], and Daṇḍanīti (= Arthaśāstra).\(^{†}\) And Buddhist, Jain or other [heterodox] works
are neither mentioned among them nor admitted [to this group]. If they do
something different [from their real teachings] which belongs to the sphere
of the above mentioned sciences, using it as a kind of armour / disguise
[against the attacks of the orthodox], it does not have any validity with
respect to Dharma. (…) Therefore only that Dharma yields fruit which
has been mastered from scriptures which are well-established because they
do not transgress their basis: the Veda. Just as knowledge about Dharma
is not sanctioned if it derives from a Vedic text which has been mastered
in an unauthorised way, which has previously been committed to writing
and the like, or has been learnt by a Śūdra, likewise the propositions—
may they be in accordance with [the Veda]—of those whose behaviour has
transgressed the limits of propriety taught in the Vedas are not accepted
as means of [learning] Dharma. And the Buddhists and other [heretics] are
mentioned in the Purāṇas as those who bring about the ruin of Dharma
in the Iron Age. Who could possibly listen to what they say? Just as a
drop [of real camphor, gold, etc.], if put into fake camphor, gold, etc., will
also dissolve, since it cannot be clearly grasped, thus such [virtuous princi-
plexes] as non-violence, even though their basis is positive, are like milk put in the skin of a dog and being such they should not be neither adopted nor relied on, inasmuch as they have fallen into the middle of counterfeit Dharma that had been cooked up according to their [i.e. the heretics'] intentions by means of [analogy based on] the conformity of actions [“the fruit of a sacrificial action that causes pain to the victim will be pain for the sacrificer himself”], inference from a common property [“Vedic violence, just as everyday violence, is against Dharma”], and presumption [“since the experience of suffering is the result of sins formerly committed, the experience of various kinds of suffering brings about the destruction of sins”].‡ These [principles] are known only from those [Buddhist and other such scriptures], so they will necessarily be unadaptable as long as they are not known from recognised works on Dharma. If the matter was clearly learnt from another doctrinal work alone, then, since it would be established by that alone, this other one [i.e. the Buddhist etc. scripture] would be useless.’

‡ I follow the Nyayasudhā’s interpretation (TV P. 379f.).


4.177 Or is there any virtue... ex conj.

4.180 that of brahmin sages ex conj. Raghavan and Thakur.

4.180 uniquely fluent ex conj. Sanderson.

4.183 universal piety taught by Manu ex conj. Cf. Manusmṛti 10.63: ahaṃṣā satyam asteyam śaucam indriyanigrahah| etam sāmāsikām dharmaṃ cāturvarṇye 'brahīṃ manuḥ||