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Notes

- 1.1. at the very start of whose ‘descent’ to level of consciousness** *ex conj.* DEZSÓ-ISAACSON.
- 1.4. before the people** *ex conj.* ISAACSON.
- 1.23. nearby** Dr. Isaacson’s conjecture (*nātidūranīrvāṇamārgadeśini*), which is supported by the awkward position of *nātidūre*, would mean: ‘which shows a relatively short path to final release’ (cf. Act One, l. 48: *ayam eva nīrvāṇamārgo nedāyān*). On the other hand, as Prof. Sanderson has also pointed out to me, *nātidūre* fits the context well: the Director, seeing the monastery nearby, decides to start his life as a wandering pilgrim there. Another argument defending the word ‘*nātidūre*’ might be that it helps the transition to the first act the beginning of which is actually set *in the vicinity* of a Buddhist monastery.
- 1.25** A detailed interpretation of the Prologue can be found in the Introduction, Chapter 3.
- 1.26ff.** The First Act of Jayanta’s play begins with an introductory scene (*viṣkambhaka*), which is set in the garden of a *vihāra*, most probably in or near Śrīnagara. The characters are: a Buddhist Monk, who is a distinguished scholar (his name, Dharmottara, echoes the name of the great logician of the 8th century, cf. *Āgamaḍambara* (ed. pr.), p. xxiv; *Rājataranṅiṇī* 4.498.), well versed in the Teaching of the Buddha, confident in his knowledge, and his Disciple, who is ready to learn, although perhaps not blessed with great acumen. The Disciple speaks Śaurasenī.
- 1.28** Jayanta used the same verse in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (II 424.9–12) to conclude his comments on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.19: *punarutpattiḥ pretyabhāvaḥ*, ‘The state after death is rebirth’.
- 1.31** *ex conj.* The sentence as it stands in the manuscripts (*kiṃ uṇa te cattāri ajjasaccā*) is completely ungrammatical. The conjunct consonants *jja* in the word *ajja*^o are written in the manuscripts with a letter which looks like *dya*. On the reading of this sign see the Introduction. In other cases our manuscripts write the Prakrit

word *ayya* with the standard Devanāgarī ligature *yya* (cf. STEINER 1997, pp. 173ff.).

1.36 the Self *appā* occurs in Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī, and Jaina-Śaurasenī. The Śaurasenī (and Māgadhī) form of Sanskrit *ātmā* should be *attā* (PISCHEL §401, cf. Act Two, l. 39: *attaparaṇmuho*).

1.36 leave behind *mottūṇa* is a Māhārāṣṭrī (and Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī) form of the absolutive, (PISCHEL §586). In Śaurasenī (and Māgadhī) the prevalent absolutive ending is *-ya* (PISCHEL §590).

1.38 The Buddhist opponent in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol.II, p.298) calls the attachment to a Self ‘the anointed, principal delusion’ (*mūrdhābhiṣiktaḥ prathamo mohah*), the termination of which entails that the attachment to anything belonging to a Self (*ātmīyagraha*) also ceases. The realisation of having no self (*nairātmyadarśana*) is said to be the door to Nirvāṇa, and the way leading to it is to establish that all things are momentary, which helps one to realise that cognition, too, has no permanent substratum (*āśraya*) such as a Self.

The Monk’s thoughts on *sthīrātmagraha* have interesting parallels in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Dharmakīrti held that *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* or *satkāyadarśana* (‘the [false] notion [that the five constituents] form a Self or belong to a Self’: *ātmadr̥ṣṭir ātmīyadr̥ṣṭir vā: Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* p.281), which is nothing else but delusion or ignorance (*moha*, *avidyā*), is the fundamental condition behind all false mental attitudes (*kleśas*), all flaws (*doṣas*), and all stains of consciousness (*malas*). Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) p. 111, v. 222:

sarvāsāṃ doṣajātīnāṃ jātiḥ satkāyadarśanāt|
sāvidyā tatra tatsnehas tasmād dveṣādīsambhavaḥ||;
Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi 214c–215b (VETTER 1990, p. 112, v. 212):
mohavīrodhān maitryāder nātyantaṃ doṣanīgrahaḥ|
tanmūlāś ca malāḥ sarve sa ca satkāyadarśanam||.

(In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (loc. cit.) *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* is only one among many other *doṣas*; see VETTER 1990, p. 42, n.1.) As Dharmakīrti explains, the [false] notion of a Self results in the attachment to things belonging to this Self. These two notions generate affection towards *ātmā* and *ātmīya*, which in turn produces hatred and all the other flaws (*Pramāṇavārttika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) p. 111.18–19: *ātmadarśanam ātmīyagrahaṃ prasūte| tau ca tatsnehaṃ sa ca dveṣādīn itī satkāyadarśanaajāḥ sarvadoṣāḥ|*). Dharmakīrti summarises his views on this issue in the following verses (*Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi 219–221, VETTER 1990, pp. 117–119, vv. 217–219*):

yaḥ paśyaty ātmānaṃ tatrāsyāham itī śāśvataḥ snehaḥ|
snehāt sukheṣu tṛṣyati tṛṣṇā doṣāṃs tiraskurute||
guṇadarśī paritṛṣyan mameti tatsādhanāny upādatte|
tenātmābhiniveśo yāvat tāvat sa saṃsāre||
ātmani sati parasamjñā svaparavibhāgāt pariagrahadveṣau|

anayoḥ sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante||

‘The one who sees a Self [apart from the constituents] has an eternal attachment towards this [Self] [because he thinks:] “[this is] me” . Because of this attachment, he desires things that cause pleasure, [and] desire conceals the faults [of these things]. He notices [only] the advantages, ardently longs for [things which he considers pleasant, and,] thinking ‘[these are / must be] mine’, lays hold of the means [with which he can obtain] them. Therefore as long as one clings to a Self, one transmigrates. When there is [the notion of] a Self, there is also the concept of the ‘other’. From the distinction between one’s self and something else, accepting and aversion [arise]. All [other] flaws come about firmly connected with these two.’

As Vetter pointed out (VETTER 1990, p. 126f., n.1.), Dharmakīrti claims that the *naiyāyika* methods of meditation on suffering are not much use if the notion of a Self remains unchanged, cf. *Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi* 228c–230b (VETTER 1990, p. 126, vv. 226–227):

duḥkhabhāvanayā syāc ced ahidaṣṭāṅgahānivat
ātmīyabuddhīhānyātra tyāgo na tu viparyaye||
upabhogāśrayatvena gṛhīteṣv indriyādiṣu
svatvadhīḥ kena vāryeta vāirāgyaṃ tatra tat kutaḥ||;
cf. *Nyāyabhāṣya ad 1.1.9.*

1.42 in fact According to PISCHEL (§§ 95, 336), *eva* becomes *jeva*, *jevva* in Śaurasenī (*jeva*, *jevva* in Māgadhī), and its initial *j* (*y*) is doubled after short vowels, *-e*, and *-o*. Hemacandra (4.280) and Puruṣottama (9.28) teach that Sanskrit *eva* becomes *yyeva* in Śaurasenī (Pseudo-Vararuci 12.23 prescribes *jevva* (v.l. *jjevva*), and Rāmaśarman 2.1.37 *jjevva* or *jevva*). Our manuscripts know only *yyeva* (both in Śaurasenī and in Māgadhī), similarly to the old Nepalese manuscript of the Nāgānanda, in which the form *yyeva* prevails (STEINER 1997, p.200). Steiner draws our attention to the following facts: ‘Nun findet sich *yyeva* aber u.a. auch in den beiden nepalesischen Palmblatt-Mss A und C der COULSONSchen Mālatīm.-Ausgabe, von denen letzteres—wie das Nāg.-Ms A—auf das Jahr 1156 n. Chr. datiert ist. Das läßt vermuten, daß die Form *y(y)ev(v)a* auch noch im 7./8. Jh. in den Schauspielen gebraucht worden ist oder zumindest gebraucht werden konnte. (...) Das Nāg.-Ms A macht nach dem Gesagten jedenfalls wahrscheinlich, daß Harṣa die Form *yyeva* (oder *jeva*) gebrauchte, wobei noch offen bleiben muß, ob es sich hier um eine lokale oder gar individuelle Besonderheit—etwa die Vorliebe für altertümliche Formen—handelt, oder ob wir mit *y(y)eva* die im Schauspiel-Prakrit auch noch des 7. Jh.s gebräuchliche Form vor uns haben. Die genannten Mālatīm.-Mss scheinen letzteres zu bestätigen. Ein weiteres Indiz für die Authentizität dieser Form könnte darin gesehen werden, daß das Nāg.-Ms A ausnahmslos das wohl jüngere *yyeva*, nicht aber das ältere *jeva* überliefert hat. Dazu stimmt wiederum, daß auch Pu[rūṣottama], Namis[ādhu] und Hc. [= Hemacandra] nur die Form *yyeva* lehren.’ (STEINER 1997, pp. 205–207.)

1.42 arrives at Śaurasenī *paḍivajjadi* suggests *prativrajati* as its Sanskrit *chāyā* (see PISCHEL §197), but *pratipadyate* might also be possible (PISCHEL §280: Sanskrit *dya* > Śaurasenī *jja*).

1.43 Therefore this world . . . Cf. *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I p. 70.9–11, \simeq *Nyāyamañjarī* 1.196.1–2: *ekam evedaṃ saṃvidrūpaṃ harṣaviṣādādāyanekākāra-vivartaṃ paśyāmaḥ, tatra yatheṣṭaṃ saṃjñāḥ kriyantāṃ* ‘We see that this [i.e. everything one directly experiences] is one, it has the nature of consciousness, it has many [illusory] modifications, such as joy, dejection, and the like: it can be labelled as one wishes.’

The Vijñānavādin’s position as it is presented in the Śūnyavāda section of Kumāriḥa’s *Śloka-vārttika* also offers interesting parallels: *Śloka-vārttika* (with *Tātparyatīkā*) *śūnyavāda* 15–17b:

matpakṣe yady api svaccho jñānātmā paramārthataḥ|
tathāpy anādau saṃsāre pūrvajñānaprasūtibhiḥ||
citrābhiś citrahetuvād vāsanābhir upaplavāt|
svānurūpyeṇa nīlādigrāhyagrāhakarūṣitam (v.l. -dūṣitam)||
pravibhaktam ivotpannaṃ nānyam artham apekṣate|

‘In my view, although in reality the nature of consciousness is pure, still, in this beginningless existence, because of the disturbance [of consciousness] caused by latent impressions in accordance with their own character—impressions which are produced by former cognitions and are manifold because they have manifold causes—, [cognition] arises as if being divided, overlaid by [the forms of] ‘cogniser’ and ‘cognised’ such as ‘blue’, and it does not require any other [external] object [to appear variegated].’

1.43 having removed . . . Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, *pramāṇasiddhi* 207cd (VETTER 1990, p. 105, v. 205ab): *ukto mārgas tadabhyāsād āśrayaḥ parivartate* ‘The path has been stated. Through its practice the basis transforms.’

According to Manorathanandin, the ‘path’ has been defined as ‘the insight that there is no self’ (comm. *ad loc.*: *nairātmyadarśanalakṣaṇaḥ*), cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, *pramāṇasiddhi* 137c–138b (VETTER 1990, p. 42, v. 135). Prajñākaragupta explains the ‘transformation of the basis’ as follows (*Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam*, p. 142,30–31): *āśrayasya cīttasantānasyālayasya vā pariśuddhatvaṃ bhavati* ‘The stream of cognitions or the substratum consciousness becomes pure.’ In Manorathanandin’s interpretation (comm. *ad loc.*): *tasyābhyāsād āśrayaḥ kleśavāsanābhūtam ālaya-vijñānaṃ parivartate, kliṣṭadaśānirodhāt kleśavisamṃyuktacīttaprabandhātmanā pariṇamati* ‘Through its [i.e. the path’s] practice the basis, [i.e.] the substratum consciousness, which is basically the impressions of defilements, transforms, [i.e.] since the defiled state has been destroyed, it changes into a stream of cognitions which is disconnected from defilements.’ Dharmakīrti’s statement and its various possible interpretations are discussed in FRANCO 1997, pp. 82ff; VETTER 1990, p. 105, n.1; both referring to Schmithausen’s studies. As Franco observes (FRANCO 1997, p. 85), ‘in view of v. 208ab it seems that Dharmakīrti understood the transformation of the basis as the complete elimination of all the defiled *dhar-*

mas which are not the own nature of cognition, but which are accidental to it; the cognition itself is pure and luminous’. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, *pramāṇasiddhi* 210cd (VETTER 1990, p. 108, v. 208ab):

prabhāsivaram idaṃ cittam prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ|

‘This consciousness is luminous by nature, the defilements are adventitious.’

Cf. also *Pañjikā ad Tattvasaṅgraha* 544: *teṣāṃ cāvidyādīnāṃ tattvajñānād vigatau satyāṃ yā nirmalatā dhiyaḥ sā nirmuktir ity ucyate| yathoktaṃ, ‘cittam eva hi saṃsāro rāgādikleśavāsitam| tad eva tair vinirmuktaṃ bhavānta iti kathyata’ iti|* ‘And when, after the disappearance of ignorance and the other [bonds] due to the knowledge of reality, the cognition becomes pure: this [purity] is called “liberation”. As it has been stated, “The world of transmigration is nothing but consciousness infused by defilements such as passion. And it is that same [consciousness], when free of those, which is said to be the end of existence”.

The same verse is alluded to in *Ālokaṃālā* v. 4 (LINDTNER p. 122):

rāgādimalinaṃ cittam saṃsāras tadviviktatā|

saṃkṣepāt kathito mokṣaḥ prahīṇāvaraṇair jinaih|

‘The world of transmigration is [nothing but] consciousness dirtied by such [defilements] as passion. The Buddhas who have cast away the obstructions have taught in brief that liberation is the state of being separated from those [defilements].’ Lindtner (p. 123) also mentions other texts which quote the verse found in in the *Pañjikā*.

1.44 in the present According to PISCHEL (§144), *iṅhiṃ* is used in Māhārāṣṭrī, while it is ‘quite foreign to Śauraseni and Māgadhī’.

1.44 The Disciple’s question alludes to a well-known objection against the Buddhist position: if there is no permanent substratum, i.e. no Self, functioning as the basis of the stream of cognitions, the one who performs an action and the one who experiences its result cannot be the same person. This would entail the impossibility of karmic retribution and all other activities (e.g. memory) which require the permanence of the agent’s self-identity. Says Kumāriḷa (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *ātmavāda* 32–33ab):

nairātmyavādapakṣe tu pūrvam evāvabudhyate|

madvināśāt phalaṃ na syān matto ’nyasyātha vā bhavet||

iti naiva pravṛttiḥ syān na ca vedapramāṇatā|

‘But if the position of the doctrine of having no Self [were accepted], then one would think before [setting about something]: “Since I shall perish, there can be no fruit [of my action for me], or [the fruit] will fall to someone other than me”, so there would be no activity, and the Veda would have no authority.’ (See also *Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *ātmavāda* 3–4.)

But, as Jayanta remarks, even rich Buddhist devotees, for whom *vedaprāmāṇya* is not of crucial importance, would not see the point of giving donations and thereby increasing their own merit (*Nyāyamañjarī* II. p. 296).

Śabara already pointed out that remembrance is impossible if only the momentary constituent of consciousness exists (*Śābarabhāṣya*(F) *ad mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5, p. 54: *kṣaṇike vijñānaskandhamātre smṛtir anupapanneti*). But, as the Buddhist opponent holds in the *Ślokavārttika* (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *ātmavāda* 103 seqq.), memory, just as desire, can be explained with the help of impressions (*vāsanās*) existing in the same continuum.

Kṛṣṇamiśra puts similar questions in the mouth of the Jain monk, who represents the *digambarasiddhānta* in the Third Act of *Prabodhacandrodaya* (a refreshing farcical interlude in an allegorical play, satirising the ‘heretical’ sects of Buddhism, Jainism, and Somasiddhānta), in order to demonstrate that Buddhist philosophy comes off second best even when compared with a practical way of thinking. ‘Tell me now,’ the *kṣapaṇaka* asks the *bhikṣu*, ‘for whose sake do you observe any vow if you perish in each moment?’ (*Prabodhacandrodaya* p.188: *bhaṇa dāva khaṇaviṇāsiṇā tue kassa kae vadaṃ dhalīadi?*) The *bhikṣu*’s answer is in conformity with Buddhist doctrine: ‘Listen: someone who is characterised by consciousness, and is included in my continuum, will attain liberation, after the impressions (of his past perceptions) have been completely uprooted.’ (Ibid.: *are śrūyatām. asmatsaṃtatipatitaḥ kaścīd vijñānalakṣaṇaḥ samucchīnavāsanā mokṣyate.*) ‘O you fool,’ bursts out the Jain monk, ‘if someone will attain liberation in some age, what could he do for you who perish right now?’ (Ibid. p.190: *ale mukkha, kassiṃ pi maṇṇantale ko vi mukko bhavissadi, tado de saṃpadaṃ ṇatṭhassa kīrisaṃ uvaālaṃ kalisadi?*) Even a Jain monk can notice how ‘deeply illogical’ Buddhism is—at least, that is what Vedantist propaganda insinuates.

Similar subjects are dealt with in *Tattvasaṅgraha* 476–545, the section on *karmaphalasambandha* (involving the refutation of the objections of *kṛtanāśa* and *akṛtaprāpti*). According to the Buddhist position, the connection between actions and their results is established on the basis of causality alone, without any need for a stable Self (*Tattvasaṅgraha* 501). In fact, causality is possible only in the case of momentary entities, and this is precisely what the Monk is going to demonstrate.

- 1.46** The Monk’s exposition of the doctrine of momentariness is based on two well-known arguments: *vināśitvānumāna* (‘the inference [of momentariness] from the perishing nature [of produced entities]’) and *sattvānumāna* (‘the inference [of momentariness] from the existence [of things]’). (These two terms were used by Frauwallner in FRAUWALLNER 1935, p.217, and attested by Mimaki in the works of Kaṇṇakagomin and Ratnakīrti (MIMAKI 1976, p.233, n.110).) Modern scholars agree that *sattvānumāna* was established by Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (cf. STEINKELLNER 1968–69, YOSHIMIZU 1999, p.231, n.4); it was already attributed to him by Arcaṭa in his commentary to the Hetubindu (quoted in MIMAKI 1976, pp.235f, n.114).

In order to prove that existence and momentariness are invariably con-

comitant properties, Dharmakīrti uses the so-called *sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa*, ‘a means of valid cognition which refutes the [possibility of the] opposite of the property to be proven [co-occurring with the proving property, i.e. the logical reason (*hetu*)]’ (cf. YOSHIMIZU 1999, pp. 233f.), that is he proves that whatever is not momentary cannot really exist. Cf. *Hetubindu* p. 4*, 6f.: *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva, akṣaṇikatve ’rthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇam vastutvaṃ hīyate* ‘Whatever is existent must be momentary. If it were not momentary, because [non-momentariness] contradicts causal efficacy, it would be deprived of the condition of being a real thing, which [=since this condition] has that [i.e. causal efficacy] as its defining mark.’ More explicitly in *Hetubindu* p. 19*, 10–13: *śaktir hi bhāvalakṣaṇam, sarvaśaktiviraho ’bhāvalakṣaṇam| na cākṣaṇikasya kvacid kācic chaktiḥ, kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt| tasmād yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eveti vyāptisiddhiḥ* ‘For capacity is the defining mark of an entity, [and] the absence of all capacity is the defining mark of a non-entity. And a non-momentary thing does not have any capacity with regard to anything, since [such a thing does] not [have] causal efficacy either gradually, or simultaneously. Therefore the invariable concomitance, namely “whatever exists is momentary”, is established.’ *Pramāṇavinīś-caya* II p. 29*, 15–24 spells out the two alternatives of *krama* and *yaugapadya* (tr. of the Tibetan text in STEINKELLNER 1979, p. 93: ‘Dieses Nichtaugenblickliche ist (nämlich) nicht imstande, einen Zweck zu erfüllen (**arthakriyā*), weil sowohl bei Allmählichkeit (**krama*) als auch bei Gleichzeitigkeit (**yaugapadya*) [seines Wirkens] ein Widerspruch besteht. Es ist (zunächst) nicht (imstande), allmählich (**kramaṇa*) (einen Zweck zu erfüllen), weil bei einem (Ding), wenn es (von Mitursachen) unabhängig bloß durch sein Vorhandensein Wirkendes ist, eine Verzögerung (**kṣepa*) (seines Wirkens) nicht am Platz ist. Ein (Ding), das früher nicht Wirkendes ist, könnte es nämlich auch später nicht sein, weil (sein) Wesen nicht veränderlich ist (**avikāra*). Wenn es aber (von Mitursachen) abhängt, (so) haben wir (diesen Fall schon oben) besprochen. (note 336: Der Verweis bezieht sich auf die obige Wiederlegung der Möglichkeit, daß die ewigen vedischen Wörter von Mitursachen abhängen könnten (18,24ff).) Es ist auch nicht gleichzeitig (**yaugapadyena*) wirkend, weil sein (in der einen Phase gegebenes, fähiges) Wesen auch später nicht nichtwirkend sein kann. Daher hat dieses jedweder Fähigkeit bare (Ding) das Merkmal eines Seienden überschritten.’).

As Yoshimizu pointed out (pp. 237f, 246ff), in *Pramāṇavārttika*, *svārthānumāna* Dharmakīrti refutes the causal efficacy of permanent things in the larger context of establishing the non-eternity of Vedic words (cf. *Pramāṇavārttika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) p. 131, vv. 251–252 and comm., p. 113, 20ff., 116, 15ff., p. 130, 3ff., p. 131, 7ff.) which is a serious challenge for all *mīmāṃsikas*. Cf. also *Tattvasaṅgraha* 385–427, and Dharmottara’s *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (FRAUWALLNER 1935), p. 242, 256.

1. 47 “Only that which has causal efficacy can be ultimately real.” Cf.

Pramāṇavārtika with svavṛtti (GNOLI) p. 84, v. 166ab: *sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya evārthakriyākṣamaḥ*;

Pramāṇavārtika, pratyakṣam 3ab: *arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat*;

Pramāṇavārtika, pramāṇasiddhi 3: *pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam, arthakriyāsthitiḥ| avisamvādanam. . .*;

Hetubindu p. 19*, 10–13: *śaktir hi bhāvalakṣaṇam, sarvaśaktiviraho 'bhāvalakṣaṇam*]

On the meaning of the term ‘*arthakriyā*’ see M. Nagatomi, ‘*Arthakriyā*’ in *Adyar Library Bulletin* 31–31, 1967–68, pp. 52–72.

1.48ff. In the following verses the Monk puts forward *vināśitvānumāna* (‘the inference [of momentariness] from the perishing nature [of things]’). As an example of this argument we can quote the *Tattvasaṅgraha* (353–355):

tatra ye kṛtakā bhāvās te sarve kṣaṇabhāginah|
vināśaṃ prati sarveṣāṃ anapekṣatayā sthiteḥ||
yadbhāvaṃ prati yan naiva hetvantaram apekṣate|
tat tatra niyataṃ jñeyaṃ svahetubhyas tathodayāt||
nirribandhā hi sāmāgrī svakāryotpādane yathā|
vināśaṃ prati sarve 'pi nirapekṣās ca janminah||

‘Among those [entities] the ones which are made are all momentary, since none of them depends on [any other external cause] with regard to its perishing. If A does not depend at all on another cause to be B, then A must be regarded as necessarily [being] B, since it arises as such due to its own causes. For just as the aggregate [of causal factors] does not require any other cause to produce its effect, [in the same way] all things that have once arisen do not require [any other external cause] with regard to their perishing.’

We find a similar argument already in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (p. 193): *ākasmiko hi bhāvānāṃ vināśaḥ| kiṃkāraṇam? kāryasya hi kāraṇaṃ bhavati, vināśas cābhāvaḥ| yaś cābhāvas tasya kiṃ kartavyam? so 'sāv ākasmiko vināśo yadi bhāvasyotpannamātrasya na syāt paścād api na syād bhāvasya tulyatvād|* ‘For the perishing of things is spontaneous. Why? Because an effect has a cause, but perishing is non-existence. And what can be done with something that is non-existence? If a thing did not perish spontaneously as soon as it had arisen, it would not perish later either, since the thing would be the same [later as it was before, when it did not perish].’

If one postulated a cause for perishing, such a cause would not be able to achieve anything. As we read in the *Pañjikā* (*ad Tattvasaṅgraha* 383–384): *bhāvaḥ svahetor utpadyamānaḥ kadācit prakṛtyā svayaṃ naśvarātmaiv utpadyate, anaśvarātmā vā| yadi naśvaras tasya na kiṃcid vināśahetunā, svayaṃ tatsvabhāvatayaiva nāśāt|* (...) *athānaśvarātmēti pakṣas tadāpi nāśahetur akimcītkara eva| tasya kenacit svabhāvānyathābhāvasya kartum aśakyatvāt| tathā hi, yadi svabhāva utpādānantaram na vīnaśyet, tadā paścād api sa eva sthītidharmā svabhāvas tadavastha iti kiṃ nāśahetunā*

tasya kṛtaṃ yena vinaśyēt? ‘When an entity is arising due to its own cause, is it perhaps produced as perishable by itself, or as not perishable? If it [arises as] perishable [by nature], then no cause of destruction could do anything to it, since it perishes by itself because it has that [i.e. perishing] as its inherent nature. (...) If [one holds] the [other] position, namely that [the entity arises] with a nature which is not perishable [by itself], in that case, too, the cause of destruction could not do anything, since nothing can make it [i.e. the entity] to have a nature other than its own inherent nature. To explain, if the inherent nature [of the entity] did not perish immediately after its coming into being, then later, too, the same inherent nature, whose characteristic is stability, would be in the same state, so what can be done to it by the cause of destruction so that it may be destroyed?’

Dharmakīrti also employed *vināśītvānumāna* in his works (see *Pramāṇavārtika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) p. 98,4–100,24; *ibid.* p. 141,17–150,5; *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II pp. 26*–32* (together with *sattvānumāna*); *Hetubindu* pp. 7*–19* (together with *sattvānumāna*). See also Steinkellner’s analysis in STEINKELLNER 1968–69.) He also pointed out that if a pot had to wait for a hammer to be destroyed it might wait for eternity (*Pramāṇavārtika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) 98,14–17, cf. *Pramāṇaviniścaya* II p. 27*): *yady api bahulaṃ vināśakāraṇāni santi, teṣāṃ api svapratyayādhīnasamnidhitvān nāvaśyaṃ samnidhānam iti kaścīn na vinaśyēt api, na hy avāśyaṃ hetavaḥ phalavanto vaikalyapratibandhasambhavāt* ‘Even if there are many causes of perishing, they do not necessarily appear [together] in proximity [with the object], because they appear [together] in proximity [with the object] depending on their own causes. Therefore some thing might not even perish [at all], for causes do not necessarily have a result, because the [complex of causal factors] may be defective or an impediment might occur.’

The Buddhist concludes that things perish as soon as they have arisen, and their permanence is just an illusion. As Dharmakīrti says (*Pramāṇavārtika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) 100,3–7): *uktaṃ cātra na vināśo nāma anya eva kaścīd bhāvāt, svabhāva eva hi nāśaḥ, sa eva hy ekakṣaṇasthāyī jāta iti* | *tam asya mandāḥ svabhāvam ūrdhvaṃ vyavasyanti, na prāk, darśane ’pi pāṭavābhāvād iti tadvaśena paścād vyavasthāpyate, vikāradarśaneneva viṣam ajñaiḥ* | ‘And it has been stated with regard to this that there is no such thing called ‘perishing’, completely different from the entity, for the inherent nature itself [of that entity] is perishing, for it itself arises as existing for a single moment. The slow-witted ascertain this inherent nature of that [entity] later, not earlier, because, although they see it, [their sight] lacks sharpness. Therefore, thanks to this [imperfect vision] [the perishing nature of the entity] is ascertained later, just as ignorant people [ascertain] poison only having noticed the disease [caused by it].’

All kinds of causal relations can be explained with the help of *santāna*. Says Śāntarakṣita (*Tattvasaṅgraha* 543):

keṣāṃcid eva cīttānaṃ viśiṣṭā kāryakāryitā
nīyatā tena nīrbādhaḥ sarvatra smaraṇādayaḥ ||

‘The distinctive condition of being an effect or a cause is restricted only to particular cognitions [in the continuum]. For this reason remembrance and [enjoyment, recognition, etc. can take place] in all cases without any impediment.’ See also *Pramāṇavārttika*, *pramāṇasiddhi* 271c–272b (VETTER 1990, p. 161, v. 269):

anyasmarāṇabhogādiprasaṅgāś ca na bādhakāḥ|
asmṛteḥ kasyacit tena hy anubhūteḥ smṛtodbhavaḥ||

‘Such unwanted consequences as “someone else will remember [the thing that another person experienced]”, or “someone else will enjoy [the results of actions made by another person]” do not oppose [our position], for [there is] no ‘person’ [who] remembers. Therefore a memory arises from an experience.’

Therefore there is no need to postulate a ‘person’ as an agent (*Tattvasaṅgraha* 504):

karṭṛtvādivyavasthā tu santānaikyavivakṣayā|
kalpanāropitaiveṣṭā nāṅgaṃ sā tattvasaṃsthiteḥ||

‘But the condition of being an agent and [enjoyer, etc.] is accepted as a purely mental construction with the intention to refer to the unity of the continuum; it is not a component of the real nature of things.’ The same is pointed out by Kumārila’s Buddhist opponent (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *ātmavāda* 35ab):

kartā ya eva santāno nanu bhoktā sa eva naḥ|

‘Surely, for us the same continuum [of cognitions] which is the agent [of actions that bear fruits] is also the enjoyer [of the results of these actions].’

1.49 One might find the compound *karṭṛbhokṭṛsmṛtyādikāryaghaṭanā* strained. As Dr. Isaacson points out in a letter of 5. xi. 2002, ‘what we expect is really *karmabhogasmṛtyādikāryaghaṭanā*, especially since he is summing up the answer to the *upāsaka*’s question: ‘*kassa kammabhoo ... kassa sumaraṇanibamḍhaṇā homṭi vavahārā*.’

1.50 revealed *pakāsijjade* is a strange, one might even say impossible formation. In Śaurasenī one would expect something like *pakāsiādi*, while in Māhārāṣṭrī *pakāsijjaī*, and in Jaina-Śaurasenī *pakāsijjadi* (see PISCHEL §535).

1.50 produces *ex conj.* *jīṇṇṇto* or rather *jīṇṇto* would suggest *jayan* as its Sanskrit equivalent (cf. PISCHEL §473), but the sense requires rather *janṇṇto* (*janayan*).

1.50 confined *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

1.50 The translation of the last two sentences in this paragraph is based on a reading that contains several tentative conjectures.

The Disciple’s question is a well-known objection against the theory of momentariness. We find it e.g. in *Tattvasaṅgraha* (490): *kṣaṇasthāyī ghaṭādiś cen nopalabhyeta cakṣuṣā| na hi naṣṭāḥ pratīyante cirātītapadārthavat||* ‘If the pot exists only for a moment then it cannot be perceived by the sense

of sight, for [things] that have perished, just as things that vanished long ago, cannot be perceived.’

Dharmakīrti first establishes that the object must exist before its cognition (*Pramāṇavārttika*, *pratyakṣa* 246): *asataḥ prāg asāmarthyāt paścāc cānupayogataḥ| prāgbhāvaḥ sarvahetūnām nāto ’rthaḥ svadhiyā saha||* ‘Since that [thing] which does not exist before [its effect] is not capable [to produce the effect], and [that thing which exists] after [an effect] is of no use [for bringing about that effect], all causes exist before [their effects]. Therefore the object does not [exist] simultaneously with its cognition.’ Then he answers the above objection (ibid. v. 247, = *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I p. 60, v. 20): *bhinnakālaṃ kathaṃ grāhyam iti ced grāhyatām viduḥ| hetutvam eva yuktijñā jñānakārāraṇakṣamam||* ‘If [the opponent objects:] “how can the object of cognition exist at a different time [from the subject]”, [then we answer that] Logicians mean by the condition of being the object nothing but the condition of being the cause which is able to imprint its form on cognition.’ It is this ‘imprint’ which is grasped by cognition and not the actual object: this is the theory of *sākāravijñāna*, ‘form-possessing cognition’. This position does not exclude the existence of an external object (accepted by the *sautrāntikas*), but it can easily be adopted by those who believe that nothing actually exists outside this multiform cognition (*vijñānavādins*).

1.51 if you see clearly *ex conj.* ISAACSON. Instead of this conjecture one might consider *yadi tattvaṃ pṛcchasi* (see *Nyāyamañjarī* II 156.18).

1.51 and other forms *ex conj.* ISAACSON, supported by the frequency of expressions such as *nīlādi* in the same context.

1.52ff. It is again the Vijñānavādin in the *Ślokavārttika* whose arguments are remarkably similar to those of the Monk in Jayanta’s play. According to Kumāriḷa’s Buddhist opponent, we do not ascertain two separate forms: one belonging to cognition and the other to its object (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) *śūnyavāda* 6ab): *na cāpy ākārabhedena jñānajñeyāvadhāraṇā|*. Kumāriḷa expounds the Mīmāṃsaka position as follows (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) *śūnyavāda* 10cd–12):

*ekam ākāravat vastu grāhyam ity adhyagīṣmahī||
tad yady ākāravān artho bāhyaḥ kalpyeta tasya ca|
grāhyatvam anyathā na syād iti grāhakakalpanā||
tenākāravataḥ kṣptād grāhyād ākāravarjitam|
vastvantaraṃ pṛthak kalpyaṃ (v.l. prakalpyaṃ syād) grāhakaṃ niṣpramāṇakam||*

‘We hold that a single form-possessing thing is cognised. If that thing were postulated to be an external form-possessing object, then we should postulate a subject of cognition, since its [i.e. the external thing’s] condition of being an object of cognition would not be otherwise possible. Therefore one should postulate another thing as the subject of cognition, which would be separate from the postulated form-possessing object of cogni-

tion, [and which would also be] devoid of form, and lacking any proof [of its existence].’

After showing that it is more ‘economical’ to postulate a single, form-possessing cognition which has the aspects of both subject and object, the Buddhist advances another argument (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) *śūnyavāda* 21–22):

itaś cākāravaḥ jñānam, yasmāt tad vaḥ (v.l. *tadvat*) *prakāśakam* |
svayamprakāśahīnasya bāhyasyopāyasammatam ||
na cāgṛhīte jñānākhyaparakāśe (v.l. *jñānākhye prakāśyo*) *’rtho ’vadhāryate* |
tadadhīnaprakāśatvād dīpābhāse yathā ghaṭaḥ ||
 (...) 31–32:

tasmāt pūrvagṛhītāsu buddhiṣv arthopalmbhanam |
na copalabdhīr astīha nīrākārāsu buddhiṣu ||
vivekabuddhyabhāvāc ca sākārasya ca darśanāt |
ākāravattayā (v.l. *sākāravattayā*) *bodho jñānasyaiva prasajyate* ||

‘Cognition is form-possessing for the following reason as well: since you [also] accept that it [i.e. cognition], being an illuminator, is a means of [illuminating] the external object, which is not luminous by itself. But if the light called ‘cognition’ is not grasped, the object will not be ascertained, since its illumination depends on that [cognition], just as a pot [is cognised] after the shining forth of the light. (...) Therefore objects are apprehended after [their] cognitions have been grasped. And no apprehension is possible in this case if the cognitions are formless. Since we do not cognise any distinctness [i.e. two distinct forms], and since we see something which has form, it follows that it is cognition alone which is apprehended as the form-possessing entity.’

1.52 People do not have a simultaneous, biform perception of the cognition and its object. Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) p. 28,14–16 (*bauddhapakṣa*): *arthajñānayoṛ ākārabhedam nopalabhāmahe pratyakṣā ca no buddhiḥ* | *atas tadbhinnam artharūpaṃ nāma na kiṃcid astīti paśyāmaḥ* | ‘We do not perceive [two] separate forms: one belonging to the object and the other to the cognition. On the other hand, cognition is directly perceptible for us. Therefore we realise that there is no object-form separate from that.’

1.52 grasping would be grasped first Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) p. 28,20–30,1: *utpadyamānāvāsau jñāyate jñāpayati cārthāntaraṃ pradīpavad iti yady ucyeta, tan na*. ‘If [the Buddhist] were to say that [cognition], precisely when it is coming about, is cognised and makes the object cognised, similarly to a lamp, then [our answer would be that] this is wrong.’ See also *Nyāyamañjarī* II 490.10 (\simeq *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I p. 96, v. 55cd): *apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadrṣṭiḥ prasiddhyati* | ‘For [a cognition] whose perceiving is [itself] not [directly] perceived, cannot cognise the object.’ Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) p. 30,3–5 (*bauddhapakṣa*): *nanu utpannāyām eva buddhāv artho ’jñāta’ ity ucyate, nānutpannāyām ataḥ pūrvam buddhir utpadyate, paścāj jñāto ’rthaḥ* | ‘Surely the object is said to be ‘known’ only

after the cognition has arisen, [but] not when it has not yet arisen. Therefore first the cognition arises, and after that the object is cognised.’

1.52 How could there be any other objective entity? Cf. *Nyāyamañjarī* II 495.15–16 (\simeq *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I p. 86, v. 38; cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, *pratyakṣa* 327):

nānyo ’nubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo ’paraḥ|
grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryāt svayaṃ saiva prakāśate||

‘There is nothing else [than cognition itself] to be ascertained by cognition. [On the other hand] it [i.e. cognition] is not ascertained by another [cognition], because [in that case, too,] the object and subject of cognition [each having distinctive features] would be wanting. [Therefore] it shines forth by itself [both as subject and object].’

Also *Pramāṇavārttika*, *pratyakṣa* 354 (= *Pramāṇaviniścaya* I p. 90, v. 45):
avibhāgo ’pi buddhyātmā (: reading in VETTER 1966, p. 90, n. 6, see also MIMAKI 1976, p. 288, n. 308 about other readings; the Pandeya-edition has *buddhyātma-*) *viparyāsitarasānaiḥ|*

grāhyagrāhakasamvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate||

‘Although the nature of cognition is undivided, those whose vision is faulty see it as being divided into object, subject, and consciousness.’

Also *Pramāṇavārttika*, *pratyakṣa* 328:

nīlādirūpas tasyāsau svabhāvo ’nubhavaś ca saḥ|
nīlādyanubhavāt khyātaḥ svarūpānubhavo ’pi san||

‘Forms such as blue are its [i.e. cognitions] inherent nature, and this [nature] is ascertaining. Although it is the ascertaining of its own form, still, because forms such as blue are ascertained, it is called [‘the cognition of blue’ etc.].’

1.55 marks The word *piśuna* also means ‘betraying, treacherous’, or as a noun, ‘informant’.

1.56 In that case let’s make sure that we are not late. ‘Delicious meals served in the *vihāra*’ were one of the main attractions of Buddhism according to satirical literature. In the *Bhagavadajjūkīya* (probably the oldest Sanskrit comedy still extant), Śāṇḍilya, the pupil who pokes his nose into everything, relates how he tried out various religions just to find out where he could eat his fill. Buddhism seemed to be promising in this respect because monks get breakfast every morning, but Śāṇḍilya realised soon that he could not appease his hunger in the *vihāra*, because ‘these sons of slaves eat only once a day’ (*Bhagavadajjūkīya*, p. 8). The commentary, which gives a philosophical / allegorical interpretation of the whole *prahasana*, takes the expression *dāsyāḥ putrāḥ* as referring to the unacceptable tenets of the Buddhists like *vedāpramānya*, *nairātmya*, etc., and *ekakālabhaktatva* as referring to *kṣaṇikatva* (ibid. p. 13).

Buddhism, as we are often told, equals *dolce far niente*, but is it possible to stop on a slope as slippery as this? The satirist’s answer is clear: when human weakness has once tasted pleasures, it asks for more. The Buddhist

monk in king Mahendravarman's comedy, the *Mattavilāsa*, first praises the wise solicitude of *buddhaśāsana*, which teaches living in palace-like buildings, sleeping in well-made beds, enjoying brunch in the morning, tasty juices in the afternoon, *pān* of the finest quality, and dressing in soft clothes (*Mattavilāsaprahasana*, p. 12: *bhoḥ paramakāruṇiṇa bhaavadā tahāgaṇa pāsādesu vāso, suvīhasayyesu pajjaṅkesu saṇaṇaṃ, puvaṇhe bhoṇaṇaṃ, avaraṇhe surasāṇi pāṇāṇi, pañcasugandhovahiṇaṃ* (em. Shastri, also supported by the mss. used by Unni in his edition (*Mattavilāsa Prahasana* of Mahendravarman, ed. and tr. by Dr. N.P. Unni, Trivandrum, 1974, p.49.)) *tambollāṇaṃ, saṇhavaṇaparidhāṇaṃ ti edehi vadeśhi bhikkhusaṅghassa aṇuggahaṇaṃ karanteṇa...*). But if the Lord is so provident, and especially if he is omniscient (that is, omniscient in the matters of both *mokṣa* and *sukha*), why has he omitted booze and women from his Teaching? (Ibid.: ... *kiṇṇu hu itthiāpariggaho surāvāṇavihāṇaṃ ca ṇa diṭṭhaṃ? ahava kahaṇaṃ savvajño edaṇ ṇa pekkhadi?*) Or is it possible that something went wrong in the course of the transmission of the text? Or rather the surly old monks envy the younger brethren these pleasures? As a conclusion the *bhikṣu* draws up a programme, which reminds us of contemporary debates about the original teaching of the Buddha (and even the efforts of modern philologists to find their own ideas reflected in ancient texts): 'Let's find the *codex archetypus* and let's prepare a complete critical edition!' (Ibid.: *kahiṇ ṇu hu avīṇaṭṭhamūlapāṭhaṃ samāsādaeaṇa.*)

- 1.56 with a bamboo staff in his hand** Cf. *Manu-smṛti* 4.35–36.
- 1.57 standing here** According to PISCHEL (§266), *iha* is a false form in Śāurasenī, although Hemacandra (4.268) permits it beside *idha*.
- 1.62** The Mīmāṃsaka's career starts as a glorious campaign against heretics, but by the fourth act it will prove to be a complete failure for the representatives of Vedic orthodoxy (verse 1): *sarva eva hi yathāsthītā ime snātakasya dhig apārthakaṃ śrutam* [OFFICIANT.] 'For all of these [heretic sects] have remained as they were. Shame on the useless learning of the Graduate!'
- 1.63 Shuddhódana's son** The Mīmāṃsaka looks upon the Buddha as simply the mortal son of a human king; cf. *Nyāyamañjarī* I 644.8: *nanu buddhaḥ śuddhodanasya rājño 'patyam, sa katham īśvaro bhavet?*
- 1.70 O what a charming monastery!** The following description of a gorgeous Buddhist monastery might seem exaggerated, but we know from Kalhaṇa that several Kashmirian *vihāras* were very rich indeed owing to generous donations, e.g. the Rājavihāra, the foundation of Lalitāditya (*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 4.200), who also presented a glorious copper statue of the 'Great Buddha' (ibid. 4.203); his minister Caṅkuṇa also supported the building of a *vihāra* and a *stūpa*, and had golden Buddha-images made as well (ibid. 4.211). Another telling example is the beginning of the

last chapter of Kṣemendra's *Avadānakalpalatā*, which was actually written by his son, Somendra (*Avadānakalpalatā*, 108: *Jimūtavāhanāvadāna*). In the first verse Somendra muses upon the beautiful paintings depicting the Buddha's glorious deeds. These paintings used to decorate 'cavities (cells?, niches?) shining with gold' (*kanakacitraguhāgrheṣu*) in a courtyard belonging to the Great Vihāra (*uruvihāra*). But in the following stanza Somendra tells us that his father composed the *Avadānakalpalatā* as a kind of substitute for these pictures, 'lest mankind be agitated because of their loss' (*mā bhūt tadvirahākulaṃ jagad iti*). The treasures of the Buddhist monasteries often aroused the interest of Kashmirian kings, who plundered and sometimes, just for good measure, even burnt down some of the *vihāras*. These atrocities became more frequent from the end of the 10th century according to the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī*, e.g. in the reign of Kṣemagupta (6.171 seqq.), and especially that of king Harṣa (7.1097 seqq.). King Śaṅkaravarman, whom Jayanta served as an advisor (*amātya*), often resorted to confiscations in order to fill his treasury (*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 5.165 seqq.), and *vihāras* like the one described by the *snātaka* and his pupil could easily become a choice morsel for the king. On the other hand, the high taxes introduced during his reign were probably very effective in holding back the rich from further donations.

- 1.71 full of grass** As Dr ISAACSON pointed out to me, Vallabhadeva glosses *kuśavanti* in his commentary ad *Raghuvamśa* 14.28 as *śādvalacitāni*. The description suggests a place that is ideal for assignations.
- 1.73** This verse (very appropriate from the mouth of a Vedic graduate) must have brought to the audience's mind the well-known description of the Cosmic Tree (*R̥gveda* 1.24.7, *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 6.1, *Bhagavadgītā* 15.1 seqq.), and the other famous Vedic image of the two birds nestling on the same tree (*R̥gveda* 1.164.20, *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* 3.1 seqq.).
- 1.74 gentle** *maūa* is a Māhārāṣṭrī form, Śaurasenī has *miu* for Sanskrit *mṛdu* (PISCHEL §52).
- 1.76 futile** *Ex conj.*, cf. 1.140 where we have almost certainly a corruption in the manuscripts: °*vandyātmanaḥ* for °*vandhyātmanaḥ*. As Prof. Sander-son has pointed out to me, confusing unaspirated and aspirated voiced consonants is a common error of the Kashmirian manuscript transmission.
- If we accept the reading of the manuscripts, we should take *vandye* 'commendable' in an ironical sense. Or, as Dr Isaacson suggests in a letter of 5. xi. 2002, 'it might be possible to interpret the idea as being that the rich people are actually trying to follow a praiseworthy path, not that of Buddhism, but that of religion *überhaupt*, or of charity, donating to the religious. But despite this commendable intention they are led astray by the Buddhist *viṭas*.'

- 1.77 Even if this religion is a sham...** On the use of the particle *kila* at the head of a sentence, see GOODALL 1998, p.169, n.26, mentioning other occurrences, e.g. *Nyāyamañjarī* I 631.16–17: *kila dvividho vedaḥ śrūyamāṇaḥ anumāyamaṇāś ca*].
- 1.77 cultivation of meditation** On *samādhībhāvanā* see *Abhidharmakośa* 8.27 and *bhāṣya ad loc.* (ed. Pradhan, p.451).
- 1.78 seem** According to PISCHEL (§143, §336, see also Vararuci 12.24, Puruṣottama 9,29), ‘*via* is the single prevailing form in Śauraseni and Māgadhī’ for Sanskrit *iva*, while Māhāraṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, and Jaina-Māhāraṣṭrī have *va*, *vva* (PISCHEL §92, §143). In Hemacandra’s grammar we find the following general rule (2,182): *miva piva viva vva va via ivārthe vā*]
- 1.79 if they noticed us** Brahmanical invective against Buddhism insinuates that as soon as Buddhist monks think they are out of the range of the pious Addbrahmins’ severe sight, they fling themselves wholeheartedly into pleasures. Public censure is the only retarding force: the *bhikṣu* in the *Mattavilāsaprahasana* (who has already expressed his will to reform Buddhism in order to include more pleasure) is afraid to drink booze because ‘many people / great, exemplary people will see’, *mahājaṇo pekkhissadi* (p.16).
- 1.81ff.** The following denigrating description of life in a Buddhist monastery has many parallels in Sanskrit literature. A popular anonymous quatrain gives a kind of distillate of the stereotypical insinuations (‘heavy drinking, overeating, casual sex with ill-reputed women’) directed against Buddhist monks:
*bhikṣo kanthā ślathā te nanu śapharavadhe jālikaiṣātsi matsyāṃs
te ’mī madyāvadamśāḥ pibasi madhu samaṃ veśyayā yāsi veśyāṃ
dattvārīṇām gale ’ñghriṃ kimu tava ripavo bhittibhettāsmi yeṣāṃ
cauras tvaṃ dyūtaheṭoḥ katham asi kitavo yena dāsīsuto ’smi*||
‘Monk, your rags are loose!’ ‘Surely it serves as a net for killing carp.’
‘You eat fish?’ ‘It is a side-dish to go along with wine.’ ‘You drink wine?’
‘Together with whores.’ ‘You go to whores?’ ‘After putting my foot on
the throat of my enemies.’ ‘You have foes?’ ‘Those in whose wall I’ve
made a breach.’ ‘You are a burglar?’ ‘Because of gambling.’ ‘What? You
are a gamester?’ ‘Since I am the son of a servant-maid!’
We find this verse in two Kashmirian texts, and in Haribhadrasūri’s *vṛtti*
to the *Dasaveyāliya-sutta* (8th century). This latter commentary by a Jain
author enframes the poem in a story about a false ascetic (see BOLLÉE
1974:39, n.65. Unfortunately the text was not at my disposal.). The
Lokaparakāśa, which was attributed to the Kashmirian polygraph Kṣemendra,
but which is rather a ‘guide book for everyday transactions for people dur-
ing the 17th century in Kashmir’ (*Lokaparakāśa*, p.1), places the stanza at
the end of a section listing various kinds of rascals (ibid. p.57). An earlier
Kashmirian text in which we find this verse denouncing a certain monk is

the *hāsyā*-section of Vallabhadeva's *Subhāṣitāvali* (No. 2402, I was quoting the quatrain according to this source).

The hero of the poem declares, somewhat proudly, or at least as if speaking about the most natural way of life, that he has actually broken all the fundamental moral precepts (*pañcaśīlāni*; since he is a gambler, we can be quite sure that he often cheats and lies as well) that are compulsory even for *upāsakas*, not to speak of *bhikṣus*. And the way this 'confession' blossoms out is also very Buddhistic: the necessary concatenation of 'meat—wine—sex—poker—villainy' forms a mock-causal sequence parodying one of the pillars of Buddhist philosophy: the *pratītya-samutpāda* (as Siegel has already observed in SIEGEL 1989:211). Just as we arrive at *avidyā* as the 'basic root' of all other *nidānas*, in the same way, after peeling off the outer layers to get to the kernel, our *bhikṣu* finally announces the fundamental cause of all his vices: 'I am the son of a slave'. The audience (naturally anti-Buddhist, and accepting the orthodox Brahmanical values such as *cāturvarṇya*) laughs at the *bhikṣu*: 'Of course he is a rogue, what else can you expect from a lowborn?' And what else could you expect from a religion that admits such lowborn rascals?

1.81 *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

1.83 It is the same 'lack of restraint' which horrifies the son of a Buddhist merchant in a story of the Kashmirian Somadeva's *Kathāsaritsāgara*. The son despises his father and calls him 'criminal' (*pāpa*) for short, and when his father asks him why, the son launches an invective which is a typical example of orthodox Brahmanical aversion towards Buddhism (*Kathāsaritsāgara*, 6.1.18–20):

tāta, tyaktatrayīdharmas tvam adharmam niṣevase|
yad brāhmaṇān parityajya śramaṇān śaśvad arcasi||
snānādīyantraṇāhīmāḥ svakālāśanalolupāḥ|
apāstasasīkhāśeṣakeśakaupīnasusthitāḥ||
vihārāspadalobhāya sarve 'py adhamajātayaḥ|
yam āśrayanti kiṃ tena saugatena nayena te?||

'My father, in that you disregard the *brāhmaṇas* and always honour Buddhist mendicants, you have abandoned the religion of the three Vedas and follow anti-religion. What has that doctrine of Sugata got to do with you, to which all kinds of low-caste men attach themselves, in order to fulfil their desire to live in a *vihāra* (or: in a place of pleasure), men who are devoid of restraints like bathing and the rest, who long to eat whenever they please, who feel content having discarded their loin-cloth and all their hair including the lock of hair [on the crown of the head]?'

Brahmanical criticism accused Buddhists of denying caste distinctions only to justify their illicit relations with low-caste women. The Jain mendicant in the *Laṭakamelaka*, a *prahasana* from the 11th century, tries to keep away from the *bhikṣu* who is 'polluted by the touch of people belonging to improper castes' (*asadisajādīphaṃsadūśido*, p.25). 'O, you fool, there is no caste at all!' replies the *bhikṣu*, so how could his favourite

washerwoman sweetheart pollute him, especially if there is no permanent Self?

1.84 buxom thora is Māhārāṣṭrī for Sanskrit *sthūla*, in Śaurasenī one would expect *thūla* (PISCHEL §127).

1.86 masquerading as “fruit juice” One might consider accepting the reading of the manuscripts (*pakvarasaśabdanīhnuta-madyavyapadeśam*, ‘which is concealed behind the word “fruit-juice”, [but] the [real] name of which is booze’.

Satire insinuates not just that Buddhist monks run after women and drink wine, but also (what is even worse) that they pretend the opposite. Hypocrisy is one of the most important targets of satire, and especially that of the Sanskrit satirical monologue, the *bhāṇa*. When the *viṭa* in the *Padmaprābhṛtaka* notices a *bhikṣu* hurrying out of the courtyard of a courtesan, it is not Buddhism that he attacks in the first place, but the depraved behaviour of the monk: ‘O, how excellent is the Buddha’s teaching, which is being honoured day by day, even if such false, uselessly shaved monks spoil it! Or rather, the water of a sacred place is not spoiled because crows have drunk from it.’ (*Padmaprābhṛtaka*, p. 36 (23.5ff.): *aho sārīṣṭhatā buddhaśāsanasya, yad evaṃvidhair api vṛthāmuṇḍair asadbhikṣubhīr upahanyamānaṃ pratyaham abhipūjyata eva. athavā na vāyasocchiṣṭaṃ tīrthajalam upahataṃ bhavati*. Although we might suspect a slight irony in the background, the real target here is the individual, and not religion as such.) The monk perceives him and tries to beat it, but the *viṭa* does not want to miss his chance: ‘He will not get off unhurt from the range of my word-arrows!’ (Ibid. 23.10: *mama vākṣaragocarād akṣato na yāsyati*.) So he addresses the *bhikṣu*: ‘Hey, monastery-zombie, where are you going now, alarmed like an owl by daylight?’ (Ibid. 23.13: *aho vihāravetāla kvedānīm ulūka iva divā śāṅkitaś carasi?*) The monk gives the worst possible answer: ‘I am just coming from the *vihāra*.’ (Ibid. 23.14: *sāmprataṃ vihārād āgacchāmīti*.) This is just fuel to the *viṭa*’s fire: ‘I know that your reverence’s frequenting the monastery (or: your addiction to pleasures, *vihāraśīlatā*) is genuine!’ (Ibid. 23.15: *bhūtārthaṃ jāne vihāraśīlatāṃ bhadantasya!*) The *bhikṣu* is still in denial: ‘I have come to comfort with the Buddha’s words Saṅghadāsikā, who is afflicted by the death of her mother.’ (Ibid. 23.18–19: *mātrvṛyāpattiduhkhitāṃ saṅghadāsikāṃ buddhavacanaiḥ paryavasthāpayitum āgato ’smīti*. Cf. SIEGEL (1989:212–213): ‘It is insinuatingly ambiguous as to just what “to comfort” means, just as it is ambiguous as to just how the girl “serves” the brotherhood. The equivocality between the incongruous spheres of experience, the religious and the erotic, creates the comic tension.’) ‘A monk who enters the courtyard of a courtesan, either out of [a moment of] delusion or even by accident, is of no account, like the OM used in the *sūtras* of Dattaka,’ (ibid. 24: *veśyāṅgaṇaṃ praviṣṭo mohād bhikṣur yadṛcchayā vāpi na bhrājate prayukto dattakasūtreṣv ivomkāraḥ*||) remarks the *viṭa* with an edge. But

the *bhikṣu* still shields himself with the Buddha’s teaching: ‘Forgive me, sir, but surely one should be kindly disposed towards all beings.’ (Ibid. 24.1: *marṣayatu bhavān nanu sarvasattveṣu prasannacittena bhavitavyam iti.*) Finally the *viṭa* becomes tired of such a great hypocrisy, especially when the monk tries to escape under the well-known pretext that he must not miss breakfast-time, because ‘one should also avoid eating at the inappropriate time’ (ibid. p.37 (24.8): *gacchāmy aham akālabhojanam api parihāryam iti.*). ‘Ha, ha! That crowns all!’ explodes the *viṭa*. ‘That’s all that was wanting: the meal-time of this monk is running out, although he has never transgressed the five precepts! Beat it!’ (Ibid. 24.9: *hī hī sarvaṃ kṛtam. etad avasiṣṭam askhalitapañcaśikṣāpadasya bhikṣoḥ kālabhojanam atikrāmati. dhvaṃsasva.*) And the *bhikṣu* dashes off, perhaps with a sigh of relief.

- 1.86 allegedly fit for vegetarians** : “free from the three conditions [of impurity]”. See L. SCHMITHAUSEN, ‘Essen, ohne zu Töten. Zur Frage von Fleischverzehr und Vegetarismus im Buddhismus’ (in *Die Religionen und das Essen*, ed. Perry Schmidt-Leukel, Kreuzlingen: Hugendubel Verlag, 2000), pp. 151f.: ‘Das Tier ist also nicht eigens für den Buddha geschlachtet worden. Dies (und nicht der Kauf oder die Zubereitung) ist für den Buddha (bzw. die Redaktoren des Vinaya) das Entscheidende, und in diesem Sinne ist auch die abschließend formulierte Regel zu verstehen, der zufolge die Mönche Fleisch unter der Bedingung annehmen dürfen (oder sogar müssen?), daß es dreifach rein (*tikoṭi-parisuddha*) ist. Diese Bedingung ist erfüllt, wenn sie weder gesehen noch gehört haben, daß das Tier eigens für sie geschlachtet worden ist, noch auch einen begründeten Verdacht in diese Richtung hegen. Mit dieser Regel ist, nach Auffassung des Vinaya, der Mönch in den Augen der Gesellschaft (darum geht es hier!) ausreichend vor Vorwürfen geschützt.’ For further details about the ‘three conditions’ (*drṣṭam, śrutam, pariśankitam*) see also Chandra Shekhar PRASAD, ‘Meat-Eating and the Rule of Tikoṭiparisuddha’ in *Studies in Pali and Buddhism. A Memorial Volume in Honor of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap*, ed. A. K. Narain, Delhi, 1979, pp. 289–295.

1.88ff. The following two verses are in Māhārāṣṭrī.

1.88 The faces of the maidservants corresponding to the beverage and their blue eyes to the water-lily (this interpretation was suggested by Dr. Benson).

1.97 *ex conj.* The word *te* in the manuscripts looks superfluous, and can be explained by dittography.

1.101 *ex conj.* The Monk will clearly protest against the use of the genitive case.

1.103 The grammatical rule in question is *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.29: *ākhyātopayoge*. Patañjali’s examples for the use of *śru-* with the genitive case-ending are (*Mahābhāṣya* ad loc.): *naṭasya śṛṇoti, granthikasya śṛṇoti*

1.104 teaching *ex conj.* SANDERSON. Adding a word with a similar meaning to the sentence seems to be necessary.

1.108 raving *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

1.108 cultivating the doctrine that... *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

1.108 Jayanta remarks in the *Nyāyamañjarī* that animal sacrifices prescribed in the Veda often deter the tender-hearted who may say, ‘What would impiousness be [in a scripture] in which slaughtering living beings is a meritorious duty?’ (*Nyāyamañjarī* I 642.11–12: *yatra prāṇivadhō dharmas tvadharmah tatra kīdrśah?*)

1.118 with a noisy mass I supply again *vacaḥ* and take *kathāḍambaram* as a *bahuvrīhi*. Otherwise °*ḍambaram* (neuter) does not seem to be in the right gender; on the other hand, its emendation means that we have to emend *heyam* and °*prāyam* as well.

1.118 Jayanta recommends the use of *vāda* in the *Nyāyamañjarī* as follows (*Nyāyamañjarī* I 27.1–3): *vāde tu vicāryamāṇo nyāyah saṃśayacchedane nādhyavasitāvabodham adhyavasitābhyanujñāṃ ca vidadhat tattvapariśuddhim ādadhātīti vītarāgaiḥ śiṣyasabrahmacāribhis saha vādaḥ prayoktavyaḥ* ‘In a discussion, however, the way of argumentation, inasmuch as it is examined, produces the realisation of what has been determined and the consensus in what has been determined through removing the uncertainties, and thus it brings about the faultless ascertainment of reality. On these grounds the wise who have subdued their passions should enter into discussion with their disciples and with their fellow-scholars.’ But on certain occasions other kinds of debate may prove to be more useful (ibid. 4–6): *jalpavitaṇḍe tu duṣṭatārkkikoparacitakapaṭadūṣaṇāḍambarasāntṛāsyamānasaralamatisamāśvāsanena taddhṛdayasthatattvajñānasaṃrakṣaṇāya kvacid avasare vītarāgasyāpy upayujyete* ‘On some occasions, however, even the wise who have subdued their passions may find it suitable to use wrangling dispute and destructive criticism in order to protect the knowledge of reality which exists in the heart of the tender-minded, through fortifying them when they are frightened by the noisy arrogance of deceitful objections concocted by a vicious logician.’

1.140 The Graduate’s objection asserts that the Buddhist *sattvānumāna* is not valid because of the fault of *asādhāraṇānaikāntikatā*, ‘the impossibility of drawing a conclusion due to exclusiveness [of the logical reason]’. The classical example of this fallacy is the fifth syllogism in Diñnāga’s *hetucakra*: *śabdo nityaḥ śrāvaṇatvāt* ‘Sound is eternal because of its audibility.’ The problem with this syllogism is that the *hetu* (logical reason or middle term: ‘audibility’) belongs exclusively to the *pakṣa* (subject or minor term: ‘sound’), and therefore it is impossible to produce an example (*dṛṣṭānta*) which is different from the *pakṣa*. In the case of *sattvānumāna* (‘everything is momentary because of its existence’), we face a similar problem, since

all existing things are part of the *pakṣa*, and nothing else is left to serve as a similar instance (*sapakṣa*). On the other hand, the Buddhist cannot show a counterexample (*vipakṣa*) either, the thing which does not possess the *hetu* being non-existent in this case. (Compare with the standard Indian example of syllogism: ‘this mountain is fire-possessing, because it is smoke-possessing, like a kitchen (*sapakṣa*), unlike a pond (*vipakṣa*)’.) Cf. MIMAKI 1976, pp. 46ff.

1.141. This means that it is possible to show the concomitance of *sattva* and *kṣaṇikatva* in the following way: ‘something that is not momentary, does not exist’.

1.142 The second half of this verse clearly contains Buddhist arguments, which are based on accepting *vyatirekavyāpti*, therefore Prof. Sanderson’s conjecture seems to be justified.

1.142 The Monk replies to the Graduate’s objection by putting forward the *sādhyaviparyayabādhakapramāṇa*, ‘a means of valid cognition which refutes the [possibility of the] opposite of the property to be proven [co-occurring with the proving property, i.e. the logical reason (*hetu*)]’. In the case of *sattvānumāna*, this means to establish that the assertion ‘something that is not momentary, exists’ is not valid. Dharmakīrti formulates the argument in the following way (*Hetubindu* p. 4*,3–7): *anvayaniścayo ’pi svabhāvahetau sādhyadharmasya vastutas tadbhāvatayā sādhanadharmabhāvamātrānubandhasiddhiḥ| sā sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakapramāṇavṛttiḥ| yathā yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva, akṣaṇikatve ’rthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇaṃ vastutvaṃ hīyate|* ‘As for the determination of the positive concomitance in the case of the inherent nature being the logical reason, it is proving that the [presence of the] property to be established is connected with the mere presence of the proving property, because [the property to be established] is in reality the inherent nature of that [thing which possesses the proving property]. This [proving] is the operation of a valid cognition which refutes [the co-presence of] the logical reason in the case of the opposite of the property to be established. For instance: Anything that exists is momentary without exception. If it were not momentary, since [the condition of being non-momentary] contradicts causal efficacy, it would lack the condition of being an entity, which [condition] is characterised by that [causal efficacy].’ (Cf. YOSHIMIZU 1999, p. 234.)

1.146 See note ad 1.50. Kumāriila highlights the same problem when he claims that the theory of *vāsanās* is incompatible with the postulated momentariness of cognitions (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatīkā*) *nirālambanavāda* 181cd–185ab):

*kṣaṇikeṣu ca citteṣu vināśe ca nīranvaye||
vāsyavāśakayoś caivam asāhityān na vāsanā|
pūrvakṣaṇair anutpanno vāsyate nottarah kṣaṇaḥ||
uttareṇa vīnaṣṭatvān na ca pūrvasya vāsanā|*

sāhitye ca (v.l. 'pi) tayor naiva sambandho 'stīty avāsanā||
kṣaṇikatvād dvayasyāpi vyāpāro na parasparam|
vinaśyac ca kathaṃ vastu vāsyate 'nyena naśyatā||
avasthitā hi vāsyante bhāvā bhāvair avasthitaiḥ|

‘Since cognitions are momentary and since they perish without a trace, and since the one that receives the imprint and the other that imparts it do not exist simultaneously, there can be no impression. The subsequent [cognition-]phase, which has not yet arisen, cannot be imprinted by the preceding [cognition-]phases, and the preceding [cognition-phase] cannot receive any impression from the subsequent one, since it has already perished. And even if they existed simultaneously, there could be no connection [of any of the accepted types, e.g. *saṃyoga*, *samavāya*] between them, and thus there can be no impression. Since both [cognition-phases] are momentary, they cannot operate on each other. How could something which is being destroyed be imprinted by another [thing] which is [also] being destroyed? For [only] enduring entities are imprinted by [other] enduring entities.’

1.147 The same objection is sprung on Śāntarākṣita (*Tattvasaṅgraha* 500):

etenaiva prakāreṇa smṛtyādīnām asambhavaḥ|
ekādhikaraṇābhāvāt kṣaṇakṣayaṣu vastuṣu||

‘In the same way [as we have shown that ‘bondage’ and ‘liberation’ is interpretable only if there is a single substratum: the Self,] remembrance etc. would also be impossible if things were momentary, since there would be no single substratum.’ (As Kamalaśīla points out in his commentary, Mr. Smith would experience something and Mr. Brown would remember it.)

The Buddhist, however, maintains that causality is sufficient to ensure such operations as memory (ibid. 501–503):

atrābhīdhīyate sarve (: conj., ed.: sarva-) kāryakāraṇatāsthitau|
satyām avyāhatā ete sidhyanty eva (: conj., ed.: evaṃ) nirātmasu||
yathā hi niyatā śaktir bījāder anīkurādiṣu|
anvayyātnaviyoge 'pi tathavādhyātmake sthitiḥ||
pāramparyeṇa sākṣād vā kvacit kiñcid dhi śaktimat|
tataḥ karmaphalādīnāṃ sambandha upapadyate||

‘We answer this objection as follows: if the relation between effect and cause is present, then all these [operations such as memory] are truly established, without any hinderance, [even] if things do not have a Self. For just as the capacity of seeds etc. is restricted to [bringing about] sprouts etc., even if they do not have an [enduring] essence that could be connected [with both seed and sprout], the same is true about mental [operations]. For [only] a particular thing has the capacity [to cause a particular effect] at a particular time, either indirectly or directly. That is why relations such as that of action and result are possible.’

Ibid. 509–510:

atrocyate dvitīye hi kṣaṇe kāryaṃ prajāyate|

prathame kāraṇaṃ jātam avinaṣṭaṃ tadā ca tat||

kṣaṇikatvāt tu tat kāryakṣaṇakāle na vartate|

vṛttau vā viphalam kāryam nivṛttaṃ tad yatas tadā||

‘We answer [your objections] as follows: the effect follows in the second moment. In the first [moment] the cause arises, and then [i.e. at that moment] it does not perish. But since it is momentary, it does not exist at the moment of the effect. Or if it did exist, it would be useless, since the effect has already been accomplished by then.’

Ibid. 516–517:

na hi tat kāryam ātmīyaṃ saṃdaṃśeneva kāraṇam|

grhītvā janayaty etad yaugapadyaṃ yato bhavet||

nāpi gādham samālīṅgya prakṛtiṃ jāyate phalam|

kāmīva dayitām (: em., ed.: dayitā) yena sakṛdbhāvas tayor bhavet||

‘For this cause does not produce that effect by seizing it as if with a pair of tongs, since this would mean that [cause and effect exist] simultaneously. Nor does the effect arise embracing closely its cause as a lover [embraces] his beloved, as a result of which they would exist at the same moment.

Ibid. 521:

ya ānantaryanīyamaḥ saivāpekṣābhidīyate|

kāryodaye sadā bhāvo vyāpāraḥ kāraṇasya ca||

‘It is the necessity of immediate succession that is said to be the ‘dependence’ [of the effect on its cause]. And the ‘operation’ of the cause with respect to the arising of the effect is always its [mere] presence / existence.’

We have already seen (note ad 1.50) that according to Dharmakīrti the condition of being the object of cognition is nothing but the condition of being the *cause* which imprints its form on cognition. In the *Svavṛtti* he provides a detailed analysis (p. 149,21–150,2): *ye kadācit kvacit kenacij jñātāḥ santo na jñāyante teṣāṃ sattānubandhī nāśa iti brūmaḥ| ta eva kṛtakā anītyāḥ sādhyante| na hy ayaṃ sambhavo ’sti yat te jñānajananasvabhāvā vāḥ punar anaṣṭā na janayeyur apekṣeran vā param| tajjananasvabhāvasya niṣpatteḥ| na ca teṣv anapekṣeṣu kasyacit kadācit kiṃcīj jñānaṃ nivarteta| na caivambhūtaṃ kiṃcid asti| sarvasya kenacid kadācid jñānāt| jñānamātrārthakriyāyām apy asāmarthyē vastv eva na syāt| tathā hi tallakṣaṇaṃ vastv iti vakṣyāmaḥ| tasya ca vināśavyabhicārāt sa sattānubandhī* ‘We say that the perishing of those things which, having been cognised sometime somewhere by somebody, are not cognised, is attached to [their] existence. It is these things that are produced [and] are proved to be impermanent. For it is not possible that those things, which have the inherent nature of producing cognition, could, while not yet destroyed, not produce [cognition], or that they would require some other [assisting factor], since [their] inherent nature, which is producing that [i.e. cognition], is complete. And, since they do not require [some assisting cause], [theoretically] no cognition would ever cease for anyone. But nothing like that [actually] takes place, for everything is cognised by some particular person at a particular time. [Therefore these cognisable entities must perish.] If [something] were incapable even to perform the action of merely [producing] cogni-

tion, then it would not even be an entity. To explain, we shall teach that an entity is characterised by that [i.e. *arthakriyākāritva*]. And since this [entity] necessarily perishes, it [i.e. perishing] is attached to existence.’ (I am following Yoshimizu’s interpretation in YOSHIMIZU 1999, p. 244f.)

In Ratnakīrti’s *Sthirasiddhīdūṣaṇa* we find a detailed illustration of the operation of causality in the stream of consciousness (118,14 in MIMAKI 1976, p. 164): *tathā hi upādānopādeyabhāvasthitacittasantatim apy āśrityeyaṃ vyavasthā sustheti katham ātmānaṃ pratyujjīvyatu| tatra kāryakāraṇabhāvapratītis tāvad anākulā| tathāpi prāgbhāvivastuniścayaḥjñānasyopādeyabhūtena tadarpitasaṃskāragarbheṇa paścādbhāvivastujñānenāsmiṃ satīdaṃ bhavatīti niścayo janyate|* ‘To explain, the determination [of the ascertainment of causality] is also well-established resorting to the stream of consciousness which consists in the relation between the material cause and its effect, so why should one resuscitate the Self? First of all, the ascertainment of causality in that [stream] presents no problem. Still [, to go into further details,] the determination [of positive concomitance] in the form of ‘when there is A, there is B’ comes about through a cognition of an object that exists subsequently [C^B], which [cognition] is the effect (*upādeya*) of [another] determining cognition [C^A , being the material cause, *upādāna* of C^B] of an object that existed previously [A], and which [cognition, i.e. C^B] contains the impression imprinted by that [i.e. C^A].’ (I am following Mimaki’s interpretation.)

1.149 *ex conĵ.* ISAACSON. If one follows RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s conjecture, the second sentence requires a masculine subject, and *bhoga* is the only candidate I could think of. One might also consider conjecturing *hetu-phalabhāvavaśas tu ko ’pi*.

1.149 Kumāriḷa argues that causality does not work in the way the Buddhist imagines it (*Slokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatīkā*) *śūnyavāda* 171cd–172ab): *santānāntaravac caiṣāṃ niṣedhyā hetusādhyatā|| vāsyavāsakabhāvaś ca jñānatvād ekasantatau|*

‘The condition of being cause or effect and the relation between something that receives an imprint and something that imparts it must be rejected between these [cognitions in] the same continuum, since they are cognitions, just as [cognitions in] another continuum.’

Ibid. 176cd–177cd:

caitrajñānaṃ tadudbhūtajñānāṃśagrāhyabodhakam|| jñānatvān na bhaved yadvat tasya dehāntarodbhavam|

‘The cognition of Smith cannot ascertain an object of cognition which is a section of the cognition that has arisen in him, because it is a cognition, just as [a cognition] that has arisen in another body [cannot ascertain] it [i.e. Smith’s cognition].’

Later he shows that whether one denies or accepts the working of causality in the continuum of cognition-phases, this continuum cannot fulfil the role of a stable entity (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *ātmavāda* 33cd–34):

janmāntare 'bhyupete 'pi jñānamātrātmavādinām||
jñānānām kṣaṇikatvād dhi kartṛbhoktranyatā bhavet|
niṣkriyatāvibhutvābhyām na ca dehāntarāśritiḥ||

‘For even though rebirth is accepted [by the Buddhists], the one who acts and the one who experiences [the results of this action] would be different for those who hold that the ‘Self’ is merely [a stream of] cognitions, because of the momentariness of [the individual] cognitions [in this stream], and, since [the cognition-phases] are inactive and not omnipresent, they cannot attach themselves to another body.’

Ibid. 36–40:

kartṛtvam eva duḥsādhaṃ dīrghakāleṣu karmasu|
satsu jñānasahasreṣu kulakalpopamaṃ hi tat||
vyatirikto hi santāno yadi nābhyupagamya|
santāninām anityatvāt kartā kaścīn na labhyate||
bhoktur atyantabhedāc ca prasajyetākṛtāgamah|
kṛtanāśaṃ tu na brūmah kṛtaṃ naiva hi kenacit||
santānānanyatāyām tu vācoyuktyantareṇa te|
tatra cōktam, na cāvastu santānah kartṛtām vrajet||
santānakṣaṇikatve ca tad eva, akṣaṇikas tv atha|
siddhāntahāniḥ, evaṃ ca so 'pi dravyāntaram bhavet||

‘In the case of activities which require a long time, it is impossible to establish that there could be any performer at all. For even though there might be thousands of cognition-phases, [if you say that they are the agent,] this would be like a ritual procedure [which is performed in stages over several generations] of a family. For if you do not accept that there is an [entity called] ‘stream’ [of consciousness] which is separate [from the individual cognitions], we find no agent because of the impermanence of the members of the stream. And since the one that experiences [the result of the action] is completely different [from the agent], it would follow that one would attain [the result of] an act one did not perform. As for the loss of [the result of one’s] action, we do not [even] mention it, since nobody has performed any action at all. [If you accept that the continuum is a real entity, if the continuum is not different [from the individual cognitions], then [you would be talking about] these [cognitions] using another expression, and I have already set forth the objection against this [position]. On the other hand [, if you say that the continuum is separate and permanent,] the continuum cannot become the agent, inasmuch as it is a non-entity [since only momentary entities exist in your system]. If the continuum is momentary, then the same [objection would apply as in the case of momentary cognitions]. If it is not momentary [and still a real entity], then you would be giving up your own doctrine, and in this way it would also be a another substance [i.e. the *ātman*].

Ibid. 43–50:

santāno 'yaṃ sa eveti na tv abhedād vinā bhavet|
vāyudīpādisantāne vāyutvādir na bhidyate||
jñānatvenāpy abhinnavam śūnyavāde nirākṛtam|

tathaiva karmabhir veṣṭā phalārthaṃ cittavāsanā||
na cātra vāsanākālaṃ kiñcic cittam avasthitam|
avastutvāc ca santānaḥ karmabhir naiva vāsyate||
tatpāraparyajāte 'pi bhuñjāne karmaṇaḥ phalam|
tādātmyena vinā spaṣṭau kṛtanāśākr̥tāgamau||
santānāntarajebhyaś ca yo hetuphalabhāvataḥ|
viśeṣaḥ so 'pi dussādhaḥ parihāro na cānayoḥ||
tasmīn asaty api brūyāḥ parihāraṃ tvam anyathā|
samānapṛthivivāsajñānatvādyaviśeṣataḥ||
samāna iti nāpy etad ekatvānugamād vinā|
tena yaccittajaṃ tasya santāna iti vo mṛṣā||
na hi yaccabdatacchabdau vartete bhinnavastuni|
tenaikātmakataiṣṭavyā tatsantānātmavādibhiḥ||

‘[If you say that] it is the same continuum [that performed the action]: it cannot be unless [these two] are not separate. In the case of [other] ‘streams’ such as wind or light, the condition of being ‘wind’ etc. is not different [from moment to moment]. As for [your claim that] it is not unchanging inasmuch as it is cognition: this was refuted in the [chapter on] *śūnyavāda*. And similarly the impression on consciousness which you postulate accounting for a fruit [produced] by actions [has also been refuted]. Furthermore, no cognition remains as long as the impression [exists, since cognitions are momentary]. And the continuum, since it is not a real entity [for you, inasmuch as it is permanent], actions do not leave their imprint on it in any way. Even if [you say that a cognition-phase] arisen in the same [uninterrupted] series experiences the result of the action [performed by another cognition-phase in the same series], without the identity [of the one who acts and the one who experiences the result, the unwanted consequences of] the loss [of the result] of something that has been done and the attainment [of the result] of something that has not been done are evident. Furthermore, it is also impossible to prove [that there is a] causality-based difference [of the cognition-phase that experiences the result] from [cognition-phases] arisen in other streams, and the two [above mentioned unwanted consequences] cannot be avoided. Even if there is no [difference caused by causality], you may say that [the above mentioned unwanted consequences] can be avoided in another way, [but then not just the agent cognition-phase and the experiencing cognition-phase would be connected by common characteristics] because [characteristics] such as being in the same earth, or having the same condition of being cognition can be equally applied [to cognitions in other continuums as well]. And to say that something is the ‘same’ is not possible without accepting [its] ‘oneness’. Therefore you are wrong [when you say] ‘it is the stream of that [awareness] from which awareness [the agent-cognition] has arisen’, since the words ‘that—which’ cannot refer to separate things. Therefore those who hold the theory that the Self is the stream of those [cognition-phases] have to accept that [these cognitions] have a single nature.’

1.153 Note the similarity between the Buddhist *sādhya viparyaya bādha kapramāṇa*, ‘a means of valid cognition which refutes the [possibility of the] opposite of the property to be proven [co-occurring with the proving property, i.e. the logical reason (*hetu*)]’, and the Graduate’s claim that ‘the proving property [inheres in a locus that possesses] the opposite of the property to be proved’, *sādhya viparyaya sādhana*. In other words, the Buddhist put forth an argument which refuted that non-momentary entities exist, while the Mīmāṃsaka proves that only those things exist which are non-momentary, since only permanent things have causal efficacy which is a defining characteristic of existence.

1.159 the cause of a different continuum The Buddhist certainly denies that perishing is an effect (see *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* p.193, quoted in note ad 1.48). Dharmakīrti also points out that the so-called ‘causes of destruction’ actually produce a different entity (*Pramāṇavārtika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI) p.141,25–142,3): *agninā kāṣṭhaṃ daṇḍena ghaṭa itī vināśahetavo bhāvānām dṛśyante | anvayavyatirekānuvidhānaṃ hetuadvator lakṣaṇaṃ āhuḥ | na | pūrvasya svarasanirodhe ’nyasya viśiṣṭapratyayāśrayeṇa vikṛtasyotpatteḥ |* ‘[Opponent:] We see that things have causes for their perishing, for instance a log is [destroyed] by fire, a pot by a staff. The defining characteristic of cause and effect is said to be [their] conformity in presence and absence [e.g. when fire is present, the log is destroyed, when fire is not present, the log remains]. [Buddhist:] You are wrong. For when the previous [thing-phase] perishes due to its own essence, another [thing-phase] arises which is different because it depends on the particular causes [of its coming into being].’

Also *Ślokaṅkārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *śabdānityatādīkaraṇa* 24cd–29ab (presenting the Buddhist position):

hetur yasya vināśo ’pi tasya dṛṣṭo ’nikurādivat |
vināśasya vināśas tu nāsti tasmād akṛtrimah |
bhavati hy agnisambandhāt kāṣṭhād aṅgārasantatiḥ |
mudgarādīhatāc cāpi kapālaṃ jāyate ghaṭāt |
svābhāviko vināśas tu jātamātrapratīṣṭhitah |
sūkṣmah sadṛśasantānavṛtter anupalakṣitah |
yadā vilakṣaṇo hetuḥ patet sadṛśasantatau |
vilakṣaṇeṇa kāryeṇa sthūlo ’bhivyajyate tadā |
tenāsadṛśasantāno hetoḥ sañjāyate yataḥ |
tenāvākriyamāṇo ’pi nāśo ’bhivyajyate sphuṭah |

‘Something that has a cause [of its arising] is also observed to perish, just as a sprout [having a seed as its cause]. But perishing does not perish, therefore it is not produced. For from a log, as a result of contact with fire, a [new] continuum of embers comes into being, and from a pot, too, hit by a hammer for instance, shards come about. Perishing, however, is inherent, established as soon as [the thing] arises, subtle, [and] unnoticed because it takes place in a uniform continuum. When a dissimilar cause affects the uniform continuum, because of the dissimilar effect [that is produced],

then [perishing] shows itself to be gross. Thus it is a dissimilar continuum that is produced by the cause, and for this reason perishing, although it is not being produced, is clearly manifested by that very [cause].’

1.160 Possible reference to the view of the Mīmāṃsakas who hold that when one pronounces the eternal *śabda*, it is only manifested, and not actually produced, so it is different from other effects.

Kumārila first shows that for the Buddhist the perishing of a pot is spontaneous, but since it is very subtle, we notice it only when the hammer operates upon it and produces shards (see note ad 1.159 above). Now this goes against the objection made in *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.6 (see *Śābarabhāṣya ad loc.* (ŚBh(Y) ad 1.1.6, p.60): *prayatnād uttarakālaṃ dṛśyate yataḥ, ataḥ prayatnānantaryāt tena kriyate* | ‘Since sound *śabda* is perceived only after the effort [of its utterance], therefore, because it immediately follows the effort, it is produced by that [effort]’), since just as perishing is only manifested (according to the Buddhist) by the so-called ‘causes of destruction’, in the same way the eternal sound (*śabda*) is only manifested, not produced, by utterance (*dhvani*) (see *Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *śabdanityatādhikaraṇa* 29cd–30ab). As Kumārila says (ibid. 42):

yathā ghaṭāder dīpādir abhivyañjaka iṣyate
caḥsuṣo ’nugrahād evaṃ dhvaniḥ syāc chrotrasaṃskṛteḥ ||

‘Just as a lamp for instance is accepted as the manifesting agent of things such as a pot through affecting the eye, in the same way utterance [manifests *śabda*] through its impression upon the ear.’ (See also ibid. 394 seqq. on the eternal ‘actions’ (*kriyā*, *karma*) which are not always perceived due to the lack of manifesting agents, but are nevertheless always present in perceptible objects.)

1.166 because the separation of their constituents etc. must inevitably take place. *ex conj.* Verse 38 in RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s edition is clearly unmetrical, as the editors have already suspected (p. 105: ‘1.38 and III.42 are possibly no verse.’). In fact it seems that when the scribe wrote down the second *vināśakāraṇam* (after *na ca nāsti*), he jumped back to the first *vināśakāraṇam* (after *yasya hi nāsti*), and continued with repeating *ākāśāder iva bhavatu asau nityaḥ* | *kiṃ jātam? na ca nāsti vināśakāraṇam*.

1.177 *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatīkā*) *sūnyavāda* 71:

na cātra karaṇajñānagrāhakākāravedanam
grāhyatvaṃ yena buddheḥ syād abhinnaṭve ’pi pūrvavat ||

‘And in this case [i.e. when a form such as blue is being cognised] there is no ascertaining of the forms belonging to the instrument [of cognition], to the cognition [itself], and to the grasping agent, by which [ascertaining] consciousness could become the object of cognition, even though there was no difference [among the object, the subject, and the instrument of cognition], just as in the previous case [i.e. the case of the Self].’

Umbeka’s comm. *ad loc.* (p. 258): *na tv atra nīlānubhave ’nīlam aham’ ity ātmatayā bhāsante nīlādayaḥ, ’nīlam’ ity anātmatayā pratibhāsanāt*

(...) *nātra nīlādau karaṇajñānagrāhakākāravedanam asti, yena buddhir eva nīlādibhāvena prakāśeta| ākāravedanam iti ca karaṇādiṣu pratyekaṃ sambadhyate| yadi nīlādayo grāhakatvenāvabhāsante grāhako vā nīlādigrāhyatayāvabhāsate* (: conj., °seta: ed.), *tadā pratibhāsabalenābhinnasyaiva prakāśyaprakāśakabhāvo bhavet|* ‘But in the case of the perception of [colours] such as blue, [these colours] such as blue do not appear [as if] they were [cognition’s] own self, in the form of ‘I am blue’, because they become manifest as being different from [cognition’s] own self, in the form of ‘[this is] blue’. (...) The ascertaining of the forms belonging to the instrument [of cognition], to the cognition [itself], and to the grasping agent are not included in [the cognition of forms] such as blue, due to which [ascertaining] consciousness alone would shine forth having the nature of [forms] such as blue. As for ‘the perception of [their] form’: this is connected one by one with the instrument [, the cognition, and the agent]. If [forms] such as blue appeared as the agent of grasping, or the agent of grasping appeared as the object of grasping such as ‘blue’, then, because of appearing [in that way], it would be an undivided [object-subject] that would [simultaneously] have the nature of the object that is shone on and the subject that shines on.’

Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) p. 28,17–30,13.

1.181 For this is the way lights are. *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatīkā*) *sūnyavāda* 184–187ab:

vyāpṛtaṃ cānyasaṃvittau jñānaṃ nātmānam ṛcchati|
tena prakāśakatve ’pi bodhāyānyat pratikṣate||
īdṛśaṃ vā prakāśatvaṃ tasyārthānubhavātmakam|
na cātmānubhavo ’sty asyety ātmano na prakāśakam||
sati prakāśakatve ’pi vyavasthā dṛśyate yathā|
rūpādau cakṣurādīnāṃ tathātrāpi bhaviṣyati||
prakāśakatvaṃ bāhye ’rthe śaktyabhāvāt tu nātmani|

‘And when cognition is engaged in ascertaining something else [i.e. the object], it does not reach itself. Therefore, although it is an agent which shines on [other things], it expects another [cognition] for being cognised [itself]. Or rather, such is its condition of being a light: it consists in the ascertaining of the object, but there is no ascertaining of itself, so it does not shine on its own self. Just as [sense organs] such as the faculty of sight, even though they do have the nature of shining on [other things], are seen to be restricted to [their objects] such as colour, it will be in the same way in this case, too [i.e. in the case of cognition]: its condition of being the agent of illuminating [operates] upon the external object, but not upon its own self, because it is not capable [of doing that].’

See also Umbeka’s comm. ad loc. (p. 284): *anātmaviṣayaṃ caitasya prakāśakatvam, nātmaviṣayaṃ, yato ’nīlam idam’ iti pratibhāsaḥ, na punar ’nīlam aham’ itity āha ’īdṛśam’ iti|* ‘Its [i.e. cognition’s] condition of being the agent of illuminating has as its object things that are not [cognition] itself, [and] it does not have [cognition] itself as its object [or freer: its il-

illuminating is directed towards what is not itself, not towards itself], since there is an appearance in the form of ‘this is blue’, and not in the form of ‘I am blue’; that is why [Kumārila] says “[Or rather], such is...”.’ (See also *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*), *śūnyavāda* 65–67.)

1.181 ‘The three lights illuminate themselves and other things.’ Cf.

Svopajñāvṛtti ad *Vākyapadīya* 1.12 (VP(V) 1966, p. 43): *iha trīṇi jyotīṇṣi trayāḥ prakāśāḥ svarūpapapararūpayor avadyotakāḥ| tad yathā, yo ’yaṃ jātavedā yaś ca puruṣeṣv āntaraḥ prakāśo yaś ca prakāśāprakāśayoḥ prakāśayitā śabdākhyāḥ prakāśaḥ|* ‘In this world there are three lustres, three lights which illuminate their own form and the form of other things: namely, that which is [called] *jātavedas* [i.e. fire], that which is the inner light inside men [i.e. consciousness], and that which illuminates both shining entities [that is all the three lights] and non-shining ones [e.g. pots], and which light is called ‘word’.

1.181 But it is not really cognition that shines forth then... Cf. *Ślo-*

kavārttika (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) *śūnyavāda* 74:
yadā tu grāhyam ākāraṃ nīlādi pratipadyate|
na tadā grāhakākārā samvittir dṛśyate kvacit||
 ‘But when [consciousness] ascertains the form that is to be grasped, such as blue, consciousness, which has the form of the grasping agent, is seen nowhere.’

1.181 And forms such as blue... *ex conj.* Similar sentence-structure in *Nyā-*

yamañjarī I 611.11–12: *nāpy anumānam, anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ trptibhojanayor iva svargayāgayoḥ sādhyasādhanasambandhānavadhāraṇāt|* Another possible conjecture was suggested by ISAACSON: *anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ tasya gotvādivad abodharūpatvāvadhāraṇād iti|*

This argument can be compared with the following passage in the *Śloka-*

vārttika (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) *śūnyavāda* 130–132):

atha saty api bhinnatve grāhyaṃ jñānāntaram vadet|

jñānatve tasya kā yuktiḥ pūrvoktā yadi seṣyate||

jñānam jñānam itīttham tu na dvayor anuvartate|

vyatiriktaṃ ca sāmānyam tvayā nābhyupagamyate||

vyatireke tayoś ceṣṭe (: this is the reading of three manuscripts as

Dr KATAOKA pointed out to me in an e-mail of 19. x. 2001;

Ślokavārttika (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) has *grāhyagrāhakayoś ceṣṭā*,

while *Ślokavārttika* (with *Kāśikā*) reads *vyatireke tayor jñānān|*

na jñānātmakatā bhavet|

tadrūparahitatve ca jñānābhāvaḥ prasajyate||

‘If [the opponent] said that, even though [the subject and the object of cognition are] different, [still] the object is another cognition—what is the argument for that [i.e. the object] being cognition? If [the opponent replies that it is] the [reason] mentioned before [namely just a matter of usage], this [ground] is accepted. But we do not have a recurrent cognition [*anuvṛtti*] of both [object and subject and cognition] in this way:

‘[this one is] cognition [and the other one is also] cognition’; besides you do not assent to a general property which is separate. And [if the Buddhist accepted the existence of the general property of *jñānatva*, and] if he held that they [i.e. *grāhya* and *grāhaka*] are [completely] separate [from *jñānatva*], then [neither of them] could have the nature of cognition. And since [neither of them] has the character of [cognition], it follows that cognition does not exist [at all].’ (In the following verses Kumāṛila refutes various attempts of his Buddhist opponent to connect *jñāna* with both *grāhya* and *grāhaka*.)

- 1.185** As we shall see, the Graduate is going to postpone bathing again, because he cannot help entering into a discussion with potential opponents, which also means that he is postponing lunch, to the great regret of his pupil.

- 2.1ff.** The theme of the following *praveśaka* is not without parallels in Sanskrit dramatic literature. Among the dramatists preceding Jayanta one might think of two examples: Harṣa's *Nāgānanda* and Bhavabhūti's *Mālatīmādhava*. In Bhavabhūti's play *Makaranda*, in the disguise of Mālatī, is wedded to Nandana, and later he rudely repulses his impassioned 'husband' on the bridal night (Act 7). The third act of Harṣa's play provides a closer parallel which may well have served as a model for Jayanta. The drunken *viṭa* enters the garden to meet his ladylove. Meanwhile the *vidūṣaka* puts on a red garment to disguise himself as a woman in order to mislead the bees in the same garden. The *viṭa* naturally mistakes him for his sweetheart, embraces the *vidūṣaka* and offers him some chewed *pān*. When the unhappy *vidūṣaka* tries to get rid of his 'lover', the *viṭa* falls at his feet to conciliate 'her'. At this moment the *viṭa*'s real beloved appears and witnesses with astonishment that her man is lying at the feet of another woman. Then she quickly realises that that 'other woman' is actually the *vidūṣaka*, and decides to make fun of both of them. When the unlucky *vidūṣaka* unveils himself he is insulted by the *viṭa*'s servant who even breaks his sacred thread. And his tortures have not come to an end yet: the *viṭa*'s girlfriend demands him to bow at her feet, which the poor *vidūṣaka*, having lost his sacred thread and not being able to recall any Vedic mantras, cannot refuse to do on the strength of his brahmanhood.
- 2.3ff.** The Servant speaks Māgadhī, the Mendicant and the Nun speak Śaurasenī.
- 2.3 comfortless** *ex conj.* Both the reading of the manuscripts (*viśaṃcate*) and RAGHAVAN and THAKUR's emendation (*viśaṃcaye, post correctionem*) is unmetrical. (The verse is in *vijoginī* metre.)
- 2.3 household** *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. The reading of the manuscripts (*vaṃmhaṇāvāśī*, sing. gen./instr. fem.?) is unmetrical.
- 2.4 has no** *ṇasti* (the reading of the manuscripts) is a correct form in Māgadhī (see PISCHEL §310, §498, Hemacandra 4.289.)
- 2.4 own masters** The correct Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *bhaṭṭakaḥ* should be *bhaṣṭake* according to Hemacandra 4.290 (see PISCHEL §271), *bhaṣṭake* according to Rāmaśarman 2.2.16, and it may be *bhaṣṭake* according to Puruṣottama 12.10.
- 2.4 errands** *āṇā* seems to be an acceptable Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *āṇā* (cf. *āṇavedi*, PISCHEL §276).
- 2.4 thinks up are such that** *ex conj.* Sanskrit *kṣa* becomes *ska* in Māgadhī according to Vararuci 11.8, *hka* (with *jihvāmūlīya*) according to Hemacandra 4.296 (except for *peskadi* and *ācaskadi*, ibid. 4.297), *śka* according to Rāmaśarman 2.2.15 and Puruṣottama 12.6. Both Puruṣottama (12.8) and Rāmaśarman (2.2.15) remark that the consonants of Sanskrit *kṣa* are

reversed in Māgadhī (i.e. it becomes *ska*). A parallel phenomenon which might be worthy of note is that the name of king Huvīṣka sometimes appears as Huvakṣa or Huvikṣa in inscriptions (see SIRCAR 1991, No. 52, 53).

In our play the most frequent reading is *ška* in the Māgadhī sections, which may be explained as the transposition of the consonants of Sanskrit *kṣa*, even if strictly speaking it does not agree with any of the above mentioned Prakrit grammars. On the other hand, sometimes we find *kkha* in the Māgadhī passages, which is the Śaurasenī form of *kṣa*.

The word *eśu* seems to be used in the sense of *atra* in the Māgadhī passages, on the analogy of which I conjectured *yasu* > *yeśu* in this sentence.

2.4 drink The use of *pijjadi* as a passive form seems to be odd (and perhaps incorrect), especially since *pivīadi* has already been used just a few lines above. PISCHEL §539 mentions *pijjaī* as a Māhārāṣṭrī form.

2.4 Sooty Instead of changing Sanskrit *jja* into *yya* in Māgadhī, one might apply the rule that in Māgadhī the palatalisation of the *cavarga*-consonants is distinct (Puruṣottama 12.13: *cuh spaṣṭatālavyah*; Vararuci 11.5: *cavargasya spaṣṭatā tathoccaranah*; Rāmaśarman 2.2.18cd: *cavargakāṇām upari prayojyo yukteṣu cāntaṣṭhayakāra eva*).

2.4 go and see Sanskrit (and Śaurasenī) *cca* becomes *śca* in Māgadhī (see Puruṣottama 12.11, Hemacandra 4.295, Rāmaśarman 2.2.18). In Śāradā script, *cca* and *śca* look very similar, which may explain the *gacca* reading of our manuscripts.

pekkha is a Śaurasenī form. One might consider emending to *peska*, the form prescribed by Hemacandra 4.297 (the way our manuscripts write *kkha* is hardly distinguishable from *ska*), or to *peṣka*, following the most frequent usage of our manuscripts.

2.4 the monk Jinarākshita *jīṇaraṣkidabhikkhū* is a half-Māgadhī half-Śaurasenī form. Later the Servant will refer to the Jain abbot as *jīṇarakkhidabhikkhū*, however the word *bhīṣkuṇo* (not in compound) will also occur once. Cf. STEINER 1997, pp. 16f.: ‘[D]ie stillschweigend zugrunde liegende Prämisse, nach der jeder Dichter tatsächlich in einer ganz genauen und konsistenten Weise Prakrit schrieb (oder diktierte), [ist] problematisch. Hat es jemals ein vollkommen reguliertes Prakrit und insbesondere eine konsequent durchgehaltene Orthographie gegeben? Ist es nicht vorstellbar, daß die Prakrit sprechenden Charaktere gelegentlich verschiedene grammatische und phonetische Formen ein und desselben Wortes gebraucht haben?’

2.4 I’ve no idea The Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *jānāmi* should be *yāṇami* / *yāṇāmi* according to the grammarians (Hemacandra 4.292, Vararuci 11.4, PISCHEL §§ 236, 454, 510), but in the old Nepalese manuscript of the *Nāgānanda* we find *jāṇadi* in a Māgadhī passage. As Steiner remarks,

‘Vermutlich beruht die Aufteilung der Formen Ś. *jāṇadi* und Mg. *yāṇādi* wiederum nur auf einer Fiktion.’ (STEINER 1997, p. 173.)

2.4 scattered *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR accept the reading of the manuscripts (*vistīe*), but I am not sure that the *chāyā* they give (*vistr̥tā*) is possible. *paṃśukaṇā* is also suspect since, as Prof. Sanderson has pointed out, ‘dust’ is more likely to be strewn with hair than ‘specks of dust’.

2.4 plucked-out, awn-like hair Pulling out the hair in five handfuls is part of the ceremony (*dīksā*) that initiates the aspirant into Jain mendicancy (see JAINI p. 245). Both Buddhist and Brahmanical authors frequently refer to this practice as the most striking example of the various ‘unnecessary’ austerities of the Jains. For example Prajñākaramati glosses the expression *sukhenaiva sukhaṃ pravṛddham* in his commentary to *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 1.7 as ‘not with great pain, like pulling out the hair, etc.’, *na śīroluñcanādinā mahatā kaṣṭhena* (cf. GRANOFF 1992 p. 39, n. 3). But already Vasubandhu comments on *Abhidharmakośa* 4.73ab (*prāṇātīpātāḥ sañcīntya parasyābhrāntimāraṇam*, ‘taking away life is to kill another deliberately, not by mistake’) in a slightly satirical way: ‘*abuddhipūrvād api prāṇivadhāt kartur adharmah, yathā agnisamyogād dāhah’ iti nirgranthāḥ| teṣāṃ *parastrīdarśanasamsparsāna* (v.l. *parādāradarśane ‘py) eṣa prasaṅgaḥ, nirgranthaśīroluñcane ca kaṣṭatapodeśane ca śāstuh, tadvisūcīkāmaraṇe ca dātuh|* ‘The Jains teach: one who takes away life is guilty, even if he has not resolved it beforehand, just as one gets burnt because of contact with fire. [But in that case,] when they [unintentionally] see or touch the wife of another, it carries the same consequence for them, and for [their] teacher when the Jains pull out their hair or when he gives instructions to practise hard austerities, and for the donor when they die of cholera (or indigestion, *ajīrṇa*, according to Yaśomitra) [because of the food he gave them].’

Jayanta also found it a ridiculous idea that extreme tortures can lead to salvation (*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. II, p. 520.7–14):

*kacanīluñcanadikpaṭadhāraṇa-
kṣītidharākramaṇakramapūrvakam|
kṣapaṇakās tv apavargam uśanty amī
hy atitarāṃ paramārthavidas tu te||
lomnāṃ nityam asaṃbhavāt khalatayo mokṣaṃ kṣaṇāt prāpnuyuh
(nityam asaṃbhavāt em. : nityasambhavāt ed.)
saṃsāroparamo digambaratayā sadyas tiraścām bhavet|
muktāḥ syuh giriśṛṅgavāsina ime śāsvattadārohaṇāt
jantūnām apavargavartma nikaṣaṃ kenedṛśaṃ darśitam||*

‘As for these Jains, they hold that deliverance depends on the procedure of plucking out the hair, wearing the air as garment, and climbing mountains. Now they are indeed deeply knowledgeable about the ultimate reality! The bald would attain liberation in a flash since they can never have hair; transmigration would immediately cease for the animals since

they are sky-clad; those who live on the peaks of mountains would be liberated since they always mountaineer. Who showed the creatures such a shortcut to deliverance?’

2.4 since here According to the grammarians initial *ya* should be retained in Māgadhī (see Hemacandra 4.292, Puruṣottama 12.5, Rāmaśarman 2.2.14, PISCHEL §252). The manuscripts of the *Āgamaḍambara*, however, often have relative pronouns with initial *j* in their Māgadhī passages. Cf. note ad 2.4.

2.4 harpy According to Hemacandra 4.289, Sanskrit *ṣṭa* should become *ṣṭa* in Māgadhī; *duṭṭha* is the Śaurasenī form (see PISCHEL §303). But cf. LÜDERS, *Bruchstücke*, p. 36, fr. 22a2: [i]ṭṭhā.

2.7 notices Cf. note ad 2.4.

2.7 To be sure... According to PISCHEL (§94), in Māgadhī and Śaurasenī *kkhu* (and not *khu*) should stand after *-e*, *-o*, and short vowels. In our manuscripts, however, we find *khu* both after *-e* and *-o*. Steiner points out the same phenomenon in the old Nepalese manuscript of the *Nāgānanda*, in the fragments of Aśvaghōṣa’s plays (see LÜDERS, *Bruchstücke*, p. 51) and in other texts as well (STEINER 1997, pp. 195f.), and draws the following conclusion: ‘Zusammenfassend läßt sich also sagen, daß die Schreibung der Aśvaghōṣa-Fragmente, der „Bhāsa“-Mss (in der überwiegenden Zahl der Fälle) und des ältesten Nāg.-Textzeugen A (ebenso wie die erwähnten Inschriften, und zumindest teilweise auch die Mālatīm.-Mss und die beiden Mudr.-Mss MN) die urschprüngliche Orthographie der Partikel *khu* widerspiegeln dürften.’ (STEINER 1997, p. 198.)

2.7 all I need According to Hemacandra (4.293), Sanskrit *śūnya* should become *śūñña* in Māgadhī; in the fragments of Aśvaghōṣa’s plays Sanskrit *ny* appears as *ññ* in Śaurasenī (LÜDERS, *Bruchstücke*, p. 48). Cf. PISCHEL §282, who also notes that in the manuscripts of the plays we find only *ṇṇ*.

2.7 broom of peacock feathers *picchiā* seems to be a Śaurasenī form, one might consider emending it to the more Māgadhī-looking *piściā*. Cf. however LÜDERS, *Bruchstücke*, pp. 35f, fr. 22.a.2: *vicchadd...*

2.7 that she had been holding and then left behind *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. I am uncertain both in the reading and in the interpretation of this sentence. *paliccaīa* seems to be an absolutive form (cf. PISCHEL §590), and the manuscripts suggest *śā ṇu khavaṇiā*, but I cannot interpret *leśaṃdhayālīdāpaliccaīa*.

2.7 I am According to PISCHEL (§145, §498) the correct Māgadhī form of *asmi* is *smi*; *mhi* is in Śaurasenī.

2.7 please tell *ācakkhadu* is a Śaurasenī form. One may consider emending it to *ācaskadu*, the form prescribed by Hemacandra (the way our manuscripts

write *kkha* is hardly distinguishable from *ska*), or *ācaṣkadu*, following the most frequent usage of our manuscripts.

- 2.8 It seems...** According to PISCHEL (§143, §336, see also Vararuci 12.24, Puruṣottama 9,29), ‘*via* is the single prevailing form in Śaurasenī and Māgadhī’ for Sanskrit *iva*, while Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhmāgadhī, and Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī have *va*, *vva* (PISCHEL §92, §143). In Hemacandra’s grammar, however, we find the following general rule (2,182): *miva piva viva vva va via ivārthe vā*
- 2.11 let us not waste our breath** The Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *tiṣṭhati* is *ciṣṭhadi* (v.l. *ciṣṭa-*, *citta-*) according to Vararuci 11.14, *ciṭṭhadi* according to Puruṣottama 12.33, and *ciṣṭhadi* (v.l. *ciṭṭha-*) according to Hemacandra 4.298. PISCHEL votes for *ciṣṭha-* (§483). Cf. note ad 2.4.
- 2.11 execrable ex conj.** Cf. PISCHEL §222: Māhārāṣṭrī *daḍḍha*, Śaurasenī *daḍḍha*.
- 2.11 Please tell...** Cf. note ad 2.7.
- 2.12 to his disciples** According to PISCHEL §370, Śaurasenī and Māgadhī ‘except in verses, have only the form in *-āṇaṃ*’ as plur. gen.
- 2.12 But...** PISCHEL writes in §184 that in Māhārāṣṭrī, Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī, Śaurasenī, and Māgadhī we find *uṇa* in the sense of ‘now’, ‘however’, and also after *anusvāra*.
- 2.13 piled-up** As RAGHAVAN and THAKUR point out (p. 118), ‘Pkt. *lajjānihāṇaṃ* suggests *nidhānaṃ*. *nidānaṃ* gives better meaning.’ Actually the MSS read °*ṇihāṇe*, masc. *nidhānam* means ‘pile, hoard, mass’, *nidānam* would mean ‘cause’.
- 2.13 shame** Cf. note ad 2.4.
- 2.15 I turned a recluse** Cf. Pischel’s note ad Hemacandra 4.225: ‘In der Māgadhī steht 114, 7. 8 [referring to *Mṛcchakaṭikā*, ed. Stenzler, Bonn 1847] *pavvajide* mit einfachem *j*, was sich zu Pāli *pabbajito* stellt und daher schwerlich anzufechten ist.’
- 2.17** The Servant’s speech is full of Śaurasenī forms. I have changed *s* to *ś* and *r* to *l*, but one might consider more radical emendations to get “proper” Māgadhī forms (°*vilala*°, °*yōvvaṇalaṣkaṇāe*, *aṇiścaṃtīe*, *aśiṣkidamaṇalaśāe*, *taluṇa*°). On the other hand, Servant may actually try to speak a kind of Śaurasenī in his rôle of a Jain nun, and a medley of the two languages is the result.
- 2.19 firm-fisted** I am uncertain of the meaning here. *daḍḍhamuṭṭhīe* suggests *dagdhamuṣṭyāṃ* as its *chāyā*, which I cannot interpret, perhaps it is some obscene expression. On the other hand, *ḍḍhamuṣṭī*, ‘close-fisted’ is a well-attested word, but it would become *daḍḍha-* in Śaurasenī and Māgadhī (see

PISCHEL §242; in fact a few lines below we shall read *dadham tae khalikado mhi*). I am inclined to read *dadha-* = *dr̥dha-* with the cerebralisation of the initial *da-*, which is common in Māhārāṣṭrī (see PISCHEL §222, although Pischel points out that ‘in Śaurasenī [and probably in Māgadhī as well] the dental remains, except in the cases of transimposition of breath’, so we should actually read *dad̥dha*^o = Sanskrit *dagdha*^o).

2.20 †...† I cannot satisfactorily interpret this sentence. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s *chāyā*, ‘*tena hi sammukhāgataṃ śivam*’ is not entirely convincing. *saṃmuhādo* could be taken as *sammukhataḥ*, but *śīo* remains a puzzle for me (*ś* is actually not allowed in Śaurasenī). Judging from the context, the sentence may mean something like ‘So our lucky star has risen.’

2.23 How could I look? Cf. note ad 2.4.

2.24 I shall be your slave! *ex em.* BHAT.

2.27 if you say Cf. note ad 2.7, but in this case the manuscripts actually read *ācaṣk*^o.

2.27 I’ll squeal on you *ex conj.* Other possible emendations suggested by Prof. Sanderson: *pakāśaiśśaṃ*, *pakadīkalaiśśaṃ*.

2.31 coin *ex conj.* The most plausible Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *kārṣāpaṇaka* is *kāhāvaṇae* or *kahāvaṇae* (see Vararuci 3.39, Hemacandra 2.71, PISCHEL §263), but I am not certain that this is the best way to emend the reading of the manuscripts (*kasevatae*).

2.31 to my master Cf. PISCHEL §366b: ‘The form in *-e* is used in Mg. as acc. sing.’

2.31 You’ve hit the jackpot today! Cf. note ad 2.4.

2.33 someone else’s Another possible emendation might be *pārakeram*.

2.34 against my will One would expect *aṇiścaṃti* in Māgadhī.

2.34 He exits. The first word (*tī*) of the stage direction is in Prakrit in the manuscripts, which brings to mind the fragments of Aśvaghōṣa’s plays where, as Lüders notes, ‘Die Bühnenanweisung wird in der Sprache der Person, auf die sie sich bezieht, gegeben. Dazu stimmen jedenfalls die meisten Fälle, in denen eine Nachprüfung möglich ist.’ (LÜDERS, *Bruchstücke*, p. 34.)

2.35 another nun *ex conj.* The verb [*ā*]*liṅg-* requires an object.

2.45 I made a few conjectures in the Boy’s speech to have a clearer sentence-structure.

2.50ff. From the Jain standpoint it seems that the monk has fallen victim to one of the *samyaktvadūṣaṇas* (attitudes that spoil the correct, i.e. Jain view), namely *vicikitsā*, which is defined by Hemacandra as follows (*Yogaśāstra* p. 188): *vicikitsā cittaviplavaḥ| sā ca saty api yuktyāgamopapanne jīnadharṃe 'sya mahatas tapaḥkleśasya sīkatākaṇakavalavan nīsvādasyāyatyāṃ phalasampad bhavitrī, atha kleśamātram evedaṃ nirjarāphalavikalam itī| ubhayathā hi kriyā drśyante saphalā aphalās ca kṛṣṇvalādīnām iva|* ‘Uncertainty is a confusion in the mind, and it appears in the following form: “Even though the religion of the Jina is well-established through reasoning and scripture, nevertheless this enormous trouble caused by the austerities, which is tasteless like a mouthful of sand-grains—will it produce any result in the future, or is it just pure trouble, devoid of the fruit of immortality?” For we see two kinds of activities: some are fruitful, while others are fruitless, just as for instance [the labours] of peasants.’ (About the other interpretation of *vicikitsā*, see note ad 2.113.

2.53 This verse seems to be in Māhārāṣṭrī.

2.55 I am following RAGHAVAN and THAKUR in interpreting °*sumaraṇoggaya*° as °*smaraṇodgata*°, but °*smaraṇāvagata*° might also be a possible *chāyā*. The meaning of the second half of the first line is not entirely clear to me. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s conjectures (°*suiṇṇabalāṇaṃ* = °*śucīṇṇabalāṇāṃ* and °*suiṇṇapūṇṇabalāṇaṃ* = °*śucīṇṇapūṇṇabalāṇāṃ*) both seem to be unmetrical. One might consider °*puṇṇaphalabalāṇaṃ* (‘for those who are strong as a result of their merits, which have arisen from remembering the blessed Jina[’s teaching], and which are pure by nature’), but it is also unmetrical, and the meaning is far from being satisfactory. Another possibility could be °*puṇṇapuggalabalāṇaṃ* (°*puṇya/pūrṇapudgalabalāṇāṃ*), which is metrically correct, and it also refers to the Jain concept of *pudgala*, and possibly to the purification of the soul through meditating on the Jain teaching.

2.57 contemplating *jhāījjadi* is a passive form in Jaina-Śaurasenī. In Māhārāṣṭrī the ending should be °*ijjāī*, while in Śaurasenī °*īadi* (see PISCHEL §535).

2.57 plant it deep into your mind *giṇhaha* is mentioned in PISCHEL §471 as a 2. plur. imperative in Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī.

2.58 As Your Reverend commands. *jaṃ* is a Śaurasenī form (cf. note ad 2.4), while *bhaṣṭake* is in Māgadhī.

2.62 What is worth choosing... In Sanskrit the pun is based on the double meaning of *prastuta*: ‘praised’ and ‘declared as the subject of discussion’.

2.64 property *ex conj.*

2.64 absorption *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

2.67 doctrine of many-sidedness *Anekāntavāda* was perhaps the best known concept of Jain philosophy for Brahmanical and Buddhist thinkers. It claims that every single entity possesses innumerable characteristics or natures, even mutually incompatible ones. The soul, for example, is eternal with respect to its qualities (which inhere forever in their substance), but it is non-eternal with respect to the modes of these qualities (which last only for a moment) (cf. JAINI p.90; UNO pp.423f.). Even existence and non-existence are present simultaneously in the object. Says Haribhadra (*Anekāntajayapatāka* pp.36f.): *tatra yat tāvad uktaṃ 'katham ekam eva ghaṭādirūpaṃ vastu sac cāsac ca bhavati', tad etad āgopālāṅganādīprasiddham anāśaṅkanīyam eva, yatas tat svadravyakṣetrakālabhāvarūpeṇa sad vartate, paraḍravyakṣetrakālabhāvarūpeṇa cāsac, tatas ca sac cāsac ca bhavati* (...) *tathā ca tad dravyataḥ pārthivatvena sat, nābāditvena; tathā kṣetrata ihatyatvena, na pāṭaliputrakāditvena; tathā kālato ghaṭakālatvena, na mṛtpiṇḍādikālatvena; tathā bhāvataḥ śyāmatvena, na raktatvādīnā* 'The first objection that is raised against this [theory of many-sidedness] is as follows: "How can a single thing, which has the form of a pot for example, be both existent and non-existent?" This is a well-established fact for [everyone from scholars] to cowherds, women and the like, and it cannot be questioned in any way, since it is existent in the form of its own substance, place, time, and condition, and it is non-existent in the form of another [object's] substance, place, time, and condition; and therefore it becomes both existent and non-existent. (...) To explain, it is existent with respect to [its] substance inasmuch as it is made of clay, not inasmuch as it is made of water, etc.; similarly, with respect to [its] place [it exists] inasmuch as it is here, not inasmuch as it is in Pāṭaliputra, etc.; similarly, with respect to [its] time [it exists] inasmuch as it is characterised by the time of the pot, not inasmuch as it is characterised by the time of the lump of clay, etc.; similarly with respect to [its] condition [it exists] inasmuch as it black, not inasmuch as it is red, etc.' Put differently, the pot is existent inasmuch as it is black, which also means that it is not red, blue, etc. On the other hand, the pot is non-existent inasmuch as it is red, blue, etc., that is not black. This means that the pot is characterised by all colours in a positive or a negative way, and the same can be said about its other attributes as well. This also explains why the knowledge of a single thing in all its aspects entails the knowledge of all things.

2.69 Apart from Jain texts (e.g. *Yogaśāstra* pp.168f.), we find this verse also in the *Tattvopaplavasīṃha* (TUS(GOS) p.79), in the *Spandapradīpikā* of Bhagavadutpala (p.47), in Abhinavagupta's *Mālinīvijayavārttika* (v.641ab = the first two lines of the verse, labelled as *arhadvāda* and quoted in an assentient way), and also in Yogarāja's *vivṛtti* to Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra* v.26 (Yogarāja attributes the verse to Śrīśambhubhaṭṭāraka).

2.70ff. If we examine which philosophical schools criticised the Jain theory of

anekāntavāda, we find that for instance Dharmakīrti considered it an obscene (*aślīla*) idea that curd may be camel from a certain aspect, while from another aspect it may not be camel (*Pramāṇavārtika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI), p. 89,24: *syād uṣṭro dadhi syān na iti*). If curd does not have a characteristic nature which clearly distinguishes it from a camel, then ‘why does not somebody who has been ordered to eat curd rush towards a camel?’ (*Pramāṇavārtika with svavṛtti* (GNOLI), v. 182cd: *codito dadhi khādeti kim uṣṭraṃ nābhīdhāvati*) If we admit that there is some special ‘plus’ in curd which makes it different and directs us to recognise it, then that very ‘plus’ is curd itself (ibid. v. 183: *athāsty atīśayaḥ kaścid yena bhedena vartate| sa eva dadhi. . .*), for ‘curd is something the inherent nature of which is characterised by the condition of being the cause of its effect’ (ibid. p. 90,10–11: *tatphalopādānabhāvalakṣitasvabhāvaṃ hi vastu dadhi*); put differently, the inherent nature of an object is determined by its causal efficacy, *arthakriyākāritva*.)

Since the Graduate is a champion of *mīmāṃsā* we might expect that we’ll find the criticism of *anekāntavāda* in *mīmāṃsaka* sources as well. Therefore it may seem surprising that some of Kumārila’s arguments are actually quite similar to the Jain notion of ‘manysidedness’. See for example *Ślokaṅkārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *abhāva* 12:

*svarūpapapararūpābhyāṃ nityaṃ sadasadātmake|
vastuni jñāyate kaiścid rūpaṃ kiñcit kadācana||*

‘With regard to an object, which is always both existent with its own form and non-existent with the form of another object, certain people cognise only certain form at a certain time.’ (The cloth with its non-existent form inheres in the pot, and produces the cognition of its non-existent form in the pot.)

Also *Ślokaṅkārttika vanavāda* 21–23:

*vardhamānakabhaṅge ca rucakaḥ kriyate yadā|
tadā pūrvārthinaḥ śokaḥ prītiś cāpy uttarārthinaḥ||
hemārthinas tu mādhyasthaṃ tasmād vastu trayātmakam|
notpādasthitibhaṅgānām abhāve syān matitrayam||
na nāśena vinā śoko notpādēna vinā sukham|
sthityā vinā na mādhyasthyaṃ tena sāmānyanīyatā||*

‘When a *vardhamānaka* [some kind of ornament] is melt down and then a *rucaka* [another kind of ornament] is made [out of the gold got from the *vardhamānaka*], someone who was interested in the former [ornament] becomes sad, while someone who is interested in the latter [ornament] becomes pleased; that person, however, who is interested in gold [alone] remains indifferent. Therefore an object has a threefold nature. If arising, continuance, and perishing were not there [simultaneously present in the same object], there would not be three [different] mental dispositions. There is no sadness without [the] perishing [of the object], no pleasure without [its] arising, and no indifference without [its] continuance; therefore the common characteristic [‘gold’] is permanent.’ (The *Āptamīmāṃsā*, which was composed in the 5th century by the Digambara

ācārya Samantabhadra, contains a verse (v. 59) the content of which is remarkably similar: *ghaṭamaulisuvarṇārthī nāśotpādasthitiṣv ayam| śoka-pramodamādhyasthaṃ jano yāti sahetukam||*; see also *Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *vanavāda* 75 seqq.)

Tomoyuki Uno showed in his recent article that ‘Kumārila uses the assumption of many-sidedness to defend his theory of the soul’, and that ‘the very same doctrine is used by the Jaina authors to defend their theory of the soul’ (UNO p. 420). As Uno pointed out, the soul must be permanent for Kumārila because the one who performs the ritual and the one who experiences its result must be the same person. On the other hand, the soul cannot be exclusively permanent, because an unchanging subject could not perform any action (see UNO p. 429).

The Jains themselves were aware of the close resemblance between *anekāntavāda* and the *mīmāṃsaka* theory of *bhedābheda*; see for example Vāḍidevasūri’s *Syādvādaratnākara* (11–12th century), p. 833: *mīmāṃsakas tu prāyeṇa sarvatra jainocchiṣṭabhojī*; also Guṇaratna’s commentary to Haribhadra’s *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* §385: *mīmāṃsakās tu svayam eva prakārāntareṇaikānekādyanekāntaṃ pratipadyamānās tatpratipattaye sarvathā paryanuyogaṃ nārhanṭi*

2.72 the afterlife or this life *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

2.75 The disciple seems to speak a mixture of Śaurasenī (*bhikkhavā, saṃpadaṃ, paṭthudakajjavelā*) and Māgadhī (*bhaṣṭakā, cilāyadī*).

2.84 of your disputants It is not clear to me why RAGHAVAN and THAKUR give *vādaniyuktānām* as the *chāyā* of *vādabbhīḍiāṇa*.

2.84 †...† I cannot decipher the second half of this line. The whole verse seems to be in Māhārāṣṭrī.

2.95 According to Bhāsarvajña (*Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p. 393) Jainism and other heretic religions first spread among the low-born, but later certain slow-witted and impoverished brahmins also showed interest in their teachings about the cessation of suffering (*duḥkhopakṣaya*).

2.107 Jains distinguished ten *vikṛtis* (certain types of food that have changed their nature, or, according to the traditional interpretation, ‘that by which the tongue is perverted’): *kṣīra* (milk), *dadhi* (curd), *navanīta* (butter), *ghṛta* (ghee), *taila* (oil), *gūḍa* (molasses), *madya* (alcohol), *madhu* (honey), *māṃsa* (meat), *avagāhima* (first three cookings of rice in a pan filled with ghee or oil) (see WILLIAMS pp. 39f.). Four of these *vikṛtis* are considered as *abhakṣyas* (not fit to be eaten): the three ‘m’-s (*madya, madhu, māṃsa*) and butter (see WILLIAMS p. 54, 110). Curd, milk, and ghee do not seem to have been forbidden.

2.108 do not use °*mha* belongs to the imperative, but sometimes it is used (wrongly according to Pischel) as an indicative ending (see PISCHEL §455).

2.113 is also called According to Pischel *hodi* is a false Śaurasenī form (PISCHEL §476), although Hemacandra teaches *bhuvadi*, *huvadi*, *bhavadi*, *havadi*, *bhodi*, and *hodi* as possible Śaurasenī forms of Sanskrit *bhavati* (Hemacandra 4.269). These statements sound suspiciously like a parody of the Jain doctrine of *syādvāda* (*‘syāt sugato jinaguruḥ syān na, syāj jinaguruḥ sugataḥ syān na’*).

2.113 Arhatas *ex conj.*

2.113 red clothes In the *Harṣacarita* (p. 89) *kāṣāya* is associated with the followers of Sāṅkhya (*kāpilam matam*). *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 3.157, however, prescribes *kāṣāyadhāraṇa* for ascetics in general who strive after liberation.

2.113 blood-drops In the majority of texts written by the followers of Brahmanical religions we find a lack of comprehension and the expression of actual disgust with regard to Jain doctrine and practice. We have already seen how the practice of *keśaloca* was mocked by non-Jain authors (see note ad 2.4). In the *Mudrārākṣasa* Cāṇakya is delighted to hear that a Jain monk has sided with the enemy (p. 74). In the same play Rākṣasa considers it a bad omen when a *kṣapaṇaka* seeks an audience with him, and he orders Priyaṃvadaka to do something with the disgusting appearance of the mendicant before showing him in (p. 212). Bāṇa’s description of a Digambara monk is also typical (*Harṣacarita*, p. 75): *kajjalāmaya iva bahudivasam upacitabahalamalapaṭalamalinitatanur abhimukham ājagāma śikhīpicchalāñchano nagnāṭakaḥ* | ‘A naked mendicant was coming towards him, looking as if made of lamp-black, his body dirtied by the cover of plenty of dirt that had accumulated on it during many days, holding the attribute of [his sect: a broom made of] peacock feathers.’

The Jains were certainly aware of this repugnance and its dangerous influence on the mind of the mendicants. One of the *samyaktvadūṣaṇas*, ‘attitudes that spoil the correct view’ is called *vicikitsā*, which can be interpreted as becoming doubtful about the effectiveness of the various self-mortifications with regard to the final goal: deliverance (see note ad 2.50), but it can also refer to the disgust that learned people feel towards Jain monks (*vidvajjugupsā*): *vidvāṃsaḥ sādhave viditasamsārasvabhāvāḥ parityaktasamastasaṅgās teṣāṃ jugupsā nindā, asnānāt prasvedajalaklinnamalatvāc ca durgandhivapuṣas tān nindati, ‘ko doṣaḥ syād yadi prāsukavārīṅgaprakṣālanam kurvīran bhagavantah?’ iti* | ‘The loathing [and] rebuke of learned people, [that is] virtuous men who have become acquainted with the nature of the world and who have abandoned all attachments; one rebukes them [i.e. the Jain monks] because their body stinks since they do not bathe and since [their body is covered with] dirt which is moistened by sweat, saying “what sin would they commit if the reverends washed their body with *prāsukavārī* (?)?”’ (Siddhasenagaṇin’s comm. ad *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra* 7.18, p. 99; cf. *Yogaśāstra* pp. 188f.)

2.113 smeared with†... † I cannot interpret the reading of the manuscripts

(*cattulavasūra*^o). RAGHAVAN and THAKUR read *vattulavasūracaccijjanta*^o and give the following *chāyā*: *vartulavaśīra*-(*Achyranthis Aspera?*)-*carcita*^o.

2.113 taken out In the case of a Śaurasenī speaker one would expect forms such as *soṇida* and *uddharida* instead of *soṇia* and *uddharia*. On the colour of the *brahmacārin*'s garment see *Āpastamba-dharmasūtra* 1.1.2.41–1.1.3.1: *kaśāyaṃ caike vastram upadiśanti| māñjiṣṭhaṃ* (dyed with munjeet) *rājanyasya|*

2.113 The mendicant describes an immense crowd of ascetics, some naked, some wearing white, some red, others black robes (*nīlāambaras*), but amalgamated into a single flock by the goal of their journey: the feast. There might be differences among these heretic sects concerning their tenets, but on the mundane level they are just part of the same ever hungry plebs—at least this is what the brahmin Jayanta insinuates.

While ‘Jains took great pains to establish and maintain an identity for themselves that was distinct both from Hindu society and from the Buddhists as well,’ observes Granoff (GRANOFF 1994 p. 258), ‘throughout classical and medieval times Jains and Buddhists had been closely linked together by all of their opponents.’ The *bhikṣu* and the *kṣapaṇaka* in the *Prabodhacandrodaya* prove to be equally fickle and easily seducible when they are embraced by the attractive *kāpālīnī* (impersonating the *somasiddhāntin śraddhā*, *Prabodhacandrodaya*, pp. 198ff).

But the Jains were well aware that mundane pleasures, such as a toothsome breakfast can be very seductive for ascetics who cannot afford them. This is illustrated by a moral story in the commentary of Devacandra Sūri (11th century) to the *Mūlaśuddhiprakaraṇa*. The story occurs twice in the text, once in the context of *samyaktvadūṣaṇa*, ‘things that detract from the pure faith’, as an example of *kutīrthikapraśamsā*, ‘praising ascetics who follow a false path’ (*Mūlaśuddhiprakaraṇa*, p. 71), and in the section dealing with the various *chīṇḍikās* or ‘temporary lapses’ (*Mūlaśuddhiprakaraṇa*, p. 72; see GRANOFF 1994 pp. 250ff). Jinadāsa, the pious Jain layman, loses the caravan he was travelling with and is unable to find food. Finally he meets a group of *bhikṣus* who promise him all kinds of pleasures if he joins them:

mṛdvī śayyā prātar utthāya peyā
bhaktam madhye pānakam cāparāhne|
drākṣākhaṇḍam śarkarā cārdharātre
mokṣaś cānte śākyasiṃhena dṛṣṭaḥ||

‘Soft bed, rice-gruel after getting up in the morning, lunch at noon, drinks in the afternoon, some grape flavoured candy and candied sugar at midnight, and salvation in the end was envisioned by the Lion of the Śākyas.’ (The same verse occurs in Hemaçandra’s *Yogaśāstra* (p. 188.) as an illustration of *kāñkṣā*, ‘appetite’ for the pleasures provided by non-Jain religions, which belongs to the group of *samyaktvadūṣaṇas*.)

maṇuṇṇam bhoyaṇam bhocā maṇuṇṇam sayāṇasaṇam|
maṇuṇṇamsi agāraṃsi maṇuṇṇam jhāyae muṇi||

‘Having had a nice meal, sitting nicely on a couch, the sage in a nice house meditates upon nice things.’

Buddhism is presented as a religion which guarantees both *sukha* in this existence and *mokṣa* thereafter, an easy and therefore attractive way to attain deliverance. Poor Jinadāsa, remembering the Jain teaching that there might be times of distress when one may be forced to abandon true faith, accepts food from the *bhikṣus*, but, alas, the unusually rich meal causes indigestion, and he dies on the spot, full of repentance and praising the *arhats*. ‘It is a common theme of Jain stories,’ writes Granoff (GRANOFF 1994 p. 259.), ‘that Jains may be wrongly duped into becoming Buddhists, particularly because they are attracted to the lush life in a Buddhist monastery compared to the severity of life as a Jain monk. (...) Buddhists countered these Jain stories with their own stories in which they justified the Buddhist monastic practices and criticised the strict regimen of the Jain ascetic.’

2.115 the division of an army I am uncertain in the meaning of *kaṭakāṅga*. *kaṭaka* can mean ‘bracelet, zone, ridge of a mountain, army, camp’.

2.120 I don’t know Cf. PISCHEL §170: ‘... der Wurzel *jñā* ... hinter *na* sehr oft das anlautende *ja* einbüsst, in AMg. JM., wie im Inlaut, zu *ja* wandelt ...’

2.120 Exits. Cf. note ad 2.34.

2.121ff. We know from the *Nyāyamañjarī* that King Śaṅkaravarman banned the sect of the *nīlāmbaras* (*Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, p. 649.4–7):

asitaikapāṭanivītāviyutastrīpūṃsavihitabahuceṣṭam

(*asita*°: em. ISAACSON, ed.: *amita*°;

°*āviyuta*°: in Pāṭhāntaras and Śodhanas, at the end of vol. II.,

ed.: °*āniyata*°, ‘unrestrained’)

nīlāmbaravratam idaṃ kila kalpitam āsīt viṭaiḥ kaiścit||

tad apūrvam iti viditvā nivārayāmāsa dharmatattvajñāḥ

rājā śaṅkaravarmā na punar jainādīmatam evam||

‘Some pimps, as we are told, invented this Black Blanket Observance, in which men and women wrapped together in a single black veil make various movements. King Śaṅkaravarman, who was conversant with the true nature of Dharma, suppressed this practice, because he knew that it was unprecedented, but he did not [suppress] the religions of Jains and others in the same way.’

The same sect was extirpated by King Bhoja of Dhārā (1018–1060), as it is related in the *Purātanaprabandhasaṅgraha* (p. 19, *Nīlapaṭavadhaprabandha*): *śrībhojarājāvārake nīlapaṭā darśanīna āsan*| *te tu ekā strī ekaḥ pumān nīlīm doṭīm prāvṛtya madhye nagnībhūya vijahratuḥ*| *ekadā dhārāyāṃ prāptās tatrāpūrvān drṣṭvā sarvaḥ ko ’pi teṣāṃ samīpe yāti*| *te tv itthaṃ prārūpayanti*—‘*vayam īśvarasya tathyāḥ santānīna ardhanārīśvaratvāt*’ *itaś ca kautukād bhojaputrī samāgamat*| *kartavyaṃ prṣṭam*| *tair uktam*—‘*pība*

*khāda ca cārulocane yad atītaṃ varagātri tan na te| na hi bhīru gataṃ
nīvartate samudayamātram idaṃ kalevaram||' tayā vyāhṛtam—'bhavan-
matam aṅgikariṣye|' nṛpaṃ utkalāpayituṃ (: em., nṛpaṃ mutka°: ed.)
gatā| 'tātāhaṃ nīlapaṭānāṃ dharmam aṅgikariṣye|' nṛpeṇa āhūtāḥ, pṛṣṭās
ca—'sukhinaḥ stha?' mukhyenoktam—'na nadyo madyavāhinyo na ca
māṃsamayā nagāḥ| na ca nārīmayam viśvaṃ kathaṃ nīlapaṭaḥ sukhi||'
nṛpeṇoktam—'yūyaṃ kiyantaḥ stha?' 'ekonapañcāsad yugalāni|' nṛpeṇok-
tam—'sarvān apy ākārayata, ahaṃ tvadbhakto bhaviṣyāmi|' te sarve mili-
tāḥ| nṛpeṇa puruṣāḥ sarve mārītāḥ, striyaś ca niṣkāśya muktāḥ| atas teṣāṃ
bījam api nāśitam|*

'In King Bhoja's time the Black-Blankets attracted attention. These people, one woman and one man, covered themselves with a black *dotī*, while under it they were naked, and amused themselves. Once they arrived in Dhārā. There everybody gathered round them because their sight was unprecedented. And they set forth the following teaching: 'We are truly God's issue, since we are Ardhanārīśvaras.' And, out of curiosity, Bhoja's daughter went there to meet them. [She] asked [them about] the duties [one has to do as a member of this sect]. They replied: 'Drink and eat, lovely-eyed girl! Things that have passed are not yours, o girl with an exquisite body! For what has gone will not return, timid girl. This body is just an aggregate [of elements].' (The same verse (with variants) appears in Haribhadra's exposition of the Lokāyata doctrine in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, verse 81.) She said: 'I shall adopt your doctrine.' She went to ask for the king's permission. 'Father, I shall adopt the religion of the black-blankets.' The king sent for them, and asked them: 'Are you happy?' Their leader said: 'The rivers do not flow with booze, and the mountains are not made of meat, and the world is not made of women: how could a black-blanket be happy?' The king said: 'How many are you?' 'Forty-nine couples.' The king said: 'Summon all of them, I shall be your devotee.' They all came together. The king executed all the men, and having expelled the women he let them go. That's how even their seed was destroyed.'

Other sources mentioning the black-blankets are referred to in WEZLER pp. 346f. (E.g. the Ceylonese (c. 1400) *Nikāyaśaṃgrahaya* writes about a depraved Buddhist monk of the *sammittīya* school who put on a blue robe, venerated prostitutes, an invigorating drink, and the god of love instead of the Three Jewels, and composed a *Nīlapaṭadarśana*. King Śrīharṣa (of Kanauj? 606–647) studied this work, recognised how dangerous it was, and burnt it together with most of its followers.)

Some verses attributed to a certain *Nīlapaṭṭa* or *Nīlāmbara* have found their way to the *subhāṣita*-collections:

Saduktikarṇāmrta 468 (= *Subhāṣitaratnakośa* 323, MSS 2670):

ayaṃ sa bhuvanatrayaprathitasamāyamaḥ śaṅkaro

bibharti vapuṣādhunā virahakātarāḥ kāmīnīm|

anena kila nirjīta vāyam iti priyāyāḥ karaṃ

kareṇa paritāḍayañ (v.l. °lālayañ) jayati jātahāsaḥ smaraḥ|| (Nīlapaṭṭasya)

‘ “That Śaṅkara, whose austerity is celebrated all over the three worlds, is now carrying his beloved in his body, afraid of separation [from her]. They say that we’ve been defeated by him!” The god of love is victorious, who with these words gives his beloved a high five and bursts into a laugh.’

Saduktikarṇāmṛta 2362:

*śirāṃ pretaḥ kaścid daśati daśanāgreṇa sarasāṃ
lilīkṣur mastiṣkaṃ kalayati ca mūrdhānam itaraḥ|
karaṃ dhūtṅvā dhūtṅvā jvaladanaladīptāṅgulīśikhaṃ
citāsthālīpakvaṃ harati kuṇapakravayam aparāḥ||* (*Nilāmbarasya*)

‘One of the ghouls bites into a juicy vein with the tip of his tooth; another one holds a head, eager to lap up the brain. Another one carries the flesh of a corpse, cooked in the cauldron of the pyre, shaking again and again his arm, the fingertips of which have been lighted by the burning fire.’

In the *Yaśastilakacampū* (p. 252) the Buddhist Sugatakīrti recites approvingly the following verse composed by *Nilapaṭa*:

*idam eva ca tattvam upalabhyālāpi nīlapaṭena—
payodharabharālasāḥ smaraviḥhūrṇitārdheksaṇāḥ
kvacit salayapañcamoccaritagīta*jhānkārīṇīḥ* (MS. Poona : °*daṅkāriṇaḥ* ed.)|

vihāya ramaṇīr amūr aparamokṣasaukhyārthinām

*aho jaḍīmaḍīṇḍīmo viphalā*bhaṇḍa*(MS. Poona : °*bhaṇḍī* ed.)*pākhaṇḍīnām||*

‘And *Nilapaṭa*, too, having comprehended the same truth, said: “How loudly those heretic buffoon losers trumpet abroad their own stupidity who, seeking for the bliss of another kind of deliverance, abandon these lovely women, languid with the weight of their breasts, their half-closed eyes rolling in love, and sometimes humming a rhythmic tune which ascends to the fifth note.” ’

Padmanābhamiśra (16th century) also mentions the black-blankets as a division of the *digambaras* (*Setuṭīkā* in *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, Caukhamba Sanskrit Series 61, Benares, 1924–1931, p. 107): *digambarabhedā eva kṣapaṇakaśvetāmbārhatanīlāmbararaktāmbaracarmāmbarabarhāmbarādāyaḥ|* In the biography of Kṛṣṇācārya / Kāṇha we read about a black-robed Tīrthika who venerates Maheśvara (see GRÖNBOLD p. 187). According to GRÖNBOLD the *nīlāmbaras* were Christian missionaries.

2.122 obsession *gāho* can also stand for *gādhaḥ*, ‘desire, consequence’.

2.123 unique bliss *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

2.124 women The reading of the manuscripts (*ittia*) suggests *iyat* or *etāvat* as its *chāyā*, but RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s silent emendation to *itthia*° seems to make better sense.

2.124 deliverance *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

2.125 Both the reading and the interpretation of this verse is highly tentative. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR silently emend *sosijjai* to *so sijjai* (*sa sidhyati*), and take *sarīraḍā* as an ablative form. On the other hand cf. TAGARE §80

(p. 110): “This *-dā* of nom. sg. is a special characteristic of WAp [Western Apabhraṃśa].” *so* can be a neutr. direct singular (see TAGARE, p. 225), which makes the following *chāyā* possible: *tat sidhyati śarīram*. The reading of the manuscripts, could also be interpreted as *śoṣyate śarīram*, which is parallel to the expression *parisosijjāi dehadā* below. Another possibility might be to take *sijjāi* as the Apabhraṃśa form of *svidyati*.

- 2.127** I am following RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s reading and interpretation. *appaï*, however, suggests *arpayati* as its *chāyā* (cf. TAGARE p. 347), or one might read it as *appaïṃ*, i.e. *ātmanā*.
- 2.128 merits** The bare stem form without any ending can be used in plur. gen. (cf. TAGARE §86, p. 146).
- 2.129 †...†** I cannot interpret the second half of this verse. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR give the following *chāyā*: *prathamah saṅgaḥ yena īdrśaḥ tadā haṃsaḥ nirbalaḥ sahasvasabhāvaḥ nirāsaḥ*. Prof. Sanderson conjectured the following *chāyā* and translation: *pariveṣṭitaḥ saṃgamo yadedṛśas tadā haṃso nirmalaḥ sahasvasabhāvo nīrīdrśaḥ*, “When we wrap up and copulate like this [reading *eiso*], [ours] is the Haṃsa [the vibrating *paramātman*], spotless, unequalled, innate-and-spontaneous.” The verse does not seem to be metrical. *tāhaṃ* could be interpreted as *teṣāṃ* (or, reading perhaps *tahōṃ*, as *tasya*), followed by *so* (*saḥ*). *ṇivvalia* (Deśī) can mean *jaladhauta*, *pravigaṇita*, *vīyukta*. I am not certain that the fragment *ṇira* belongs to the same verse.
- 2.130 †...†** RAGHAVAN and THAKUR suggest the following *chāyā*: *iti yadi yuge yuge* (or, following P.L. Vaidya’s suggestion, *prthak prthak*) *vijñāyate*.
- 2.131** Both the reading and the interpretation of this verse are conjectural. I took *puṇu bho* belonging to the previous verse.
- 2.133 ...** I have conjectured a lacuna at this point, since nothing seems to rhyme with *viṇu*. *satattu* may be the corrupted form of the rhyming word, or rather it may belong to the next verse. I’ve made a few tentative conjectures to squeeze some meaning out of the words. The form *īmu* instead of *īmu* is arguably improbable.
- 2.135 following** *ex conj.* *lā* in the sense of “take up”.
- 2.135 ...** Again the rhyming word (possibly an imperative) seems to be missing.
- 2.139 I do not know** *ex conj.* The reading of the manuscripts (*rājāno*) clearly does not make sense. On the other hand, RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s conjecture (*re jantoh*) is not entirely convincing to me. Although one might argue that *jantoh* can be contrasted with *pumsāṃ* in the following line, I would expect a vocative after the particle *re*. °*nirbhaya*° and *na* are also conjectures.

2.139 unafraid *ex conj.*

2.139 is there no *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR conjectured *hi* as the syllable that is missing from this unmetrical line, but it is difficult to see what role this *hi* could possibly have in the sentence.

2.143 Great Vow *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. This is probably a reference to the *kāpālīka* ascetic observance of the skull (*kapālavrata*). On the other hand the learned *snātaka* might also allude to the ancient solemn Vedic ritual, which involved joyful singing, music, and dance, as well as an obscene altercation and sexual intercourse between a *brahmacārīn* and a prostitute. (See DEZSŐ, pp. 15–41.)

2.144 faithful housewives *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

2.152 scriptures of Shiva I follow Prof. Sanderson's suggestion in interpreting °*bhava*° as 'Śiva'. I am not entirely certain, however, why is it necessary to mention here Jayanta's expertise in the Śaiva scriptures. One would expect a more general statement, and the following conjecture might be considered: *aśeṣabhuvanāgamapārage*, 'master of all religious doctrines in the world'.

3.1ff. ‘Worshippers in all these Śaiva cults [i.e. the Siddhānta, the Netranātha cult, the Svachchandabhairava cult, the Trika, and the Krama] were of one of two kinds. This was a matter of individual choice and it determined both the form of initiation received and the form of the subsequent ritual discipline. On the one hand were those whose chosen goal was nothing but liberation (*mokṣaḥ*) from the bondage of transmigration (*saṃsāraḥ*). On the other hand were those who elected to pursue supernatural powers and effects (*siddhiḥ*) while they lived and—or at least—to experience fulfilment in the enjoyment of rewards (*bhogaḥ*) in a paradisaal world of their choice, either in this life through mastery of Yoga, or after death. So worshippers were either seekers of liberation (*mumukṣuḥ*) or seekers of rewards (*bubhukṣuḥ*).’ (SANDERSON 1995, p. 24.)

It is the second kind of worshippers we meet in the prelude of the Third Act. The *sādhakas*, “masterers [of powers]” (SANDERSON 1995, *ibid.*) or “mantra-masterers” (SANDERSON 1995, p. 79, n. 208) were characterised by antinomian behaviour in all Śaiva cults, from the Siddhānta which adapted itself to the orthodox norms of purity in the highest degree (see SANDERSON 1985, p. 565) to the more esoteric traditions.

As our two *sādhakas* appear to be worshippers of Bhairava, perhaps it is not inappropriate to take a cursory view of the presentation of the *sādhaka* in the *Svacchandatantra*, the authoritative text of the Mantrapīṭha division of the Tantras of Bhairava, and of the Svachchandabhairava-cult, which incorporated the Kāpālīka culture of the cremation grounds (SANDERSON 1988, p. 138). As Arraj points out, ‘though the older order of Śaiva ascetics became largely institutionalized as a hierarchy of masters catering to different grades of initiates, the active and ascetic option did not die out immediately but was integrated as another optional grade of the adept (*sādhakaḥ*), who still sought superhuman powers. And accordingly, in *Svacchandatantram*, the older rites have been collected under this nominal heading as the special entitlement of the adept.’ (ARRAJ 1988, p. 73.) The consecration of the adept is described in *Svacchandatantra* 4.482–505ab (vol. I, pp. 298–310, ARRAJ 1988, pp. 165ff), and his practices are discussed in the sixth book (*Svacchandatantra*, vol. II, pp. 101ff, ARRAJ 1988, p. 181ff). He should worship Bhairava and make oblations using human flesh together with bdellium and bathed in ghee (v. 53: *nṛmāmsaṃ purasaṃyuktaṃ ghr̥tena ca pariḥṛtam*) in order to obtain different levels of magical powers. Various secondary rites are also described, resulting in such powers as subjugation (*vaśīkaraṇa*, vv. 58 seqq), scaring away one’s enemies (*uccāṭaṇa*, vv. 72 seqq), or killing them (*māraṇa*, vv. 85cd seqq). Book 13 (vol. 4 (part 2), pp. 89ff, tr. ARRAJ 1988, pp. 457ff) also contains *siddhi*-oriented rites taking place in the cremation ground and requiring such gruesome ingredients as ‘the dried head of a hero felled in battle with a sword [while he was] facing [to the] front’ (v. 9: *abhimukhakhadganipātitaśūraśiraḥ śoṣitaṃ*, tr. ARRAJ 1988, p. 462), or ‘the rib from a dead woman that was hanged by her left foot’ (v. 12: *mṛtanāryā vāmapadād udbaddhāyās tu pāṃsulīm*, tr. ARRAJ 1988, p. 463).

In belletristic works *sādhakas* are usually depicted as evil magicians who practice the black art in the cremation grounds. In Bhavabhūti's *Mālatī-mādhava* Aghoraghaṇṭa and his disciple Kapālakuṇḍalā are ready to sacrifice Mālatī to the goddess Karālā, but Mādhava arrives just in time to save her. The horrid sight of the cremation ground is depicted in vivid colours (Act Five). The source of humour in the *Āgamaḍambara* is that although the two adepts should feel themselves at home in the *śmaśāna* and be busy scaring other people, they appear to be scared themselves, trying to sneak away from the police.

3.2 the Great Lord's mark *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

3.2 my heart The Māgadhī form of *asmākam* should be *asmāṇam* according to PISCHEL §419. *hrdayam* can be used in the masculine in Śaurasenī (see PISCHEL §357: *hiao*), which might support a *hiae* form in Māgadhī. Another possibility is to read *hiaam vva*, or *hiaam va* (cf. PISCHEL §143, where *via* is prescribed as the correct form in Śaurasenī and Māgadhī) .

3.2 seems *lakkhīyadi* is a Śaurasenī form. One might consider emending it to *laskīyadi*, (the way our manuscripts write *kkha* is hardly distinguishable from *ska*), or to *lašīyadi*, following the most frequent usage of our manuscripts.

3.4 Here is . . . shelter *eśe śe* (the reading of the manuscripts) seems to be in masculine (just as *śe* in the following sentence), while *maḍhiā* is a feminine noun. One might consider emending to *eśā sā* or to *maḍhie*. *maḍhikā* may also mean just a hut.

3.4 watching *uppekkhia* is a Śaurasenī form. One might consider emending to *uppeškia*, the form prescribed by Hemacandra 4.297 (the way our manuscripts write *kkha* is hardly distinguishable from *ska*), or to *uppeškia*, following the most frequent usage of our manuscripts.

3.4 city guards *ex conj.*

3.4 I have robbed someone *collam* suggests *cauryam* as its *chāyā*, though *cauraḥ* gives a better sense.

3.4 prison *ex conj.*

3.4 hang *ex conj.*

3.4 Lord Bhāirava is my refuge. *ex conj.*

3.4 I was afraid *ex conj.* *mhi* is a Śaurasenī form, according to Pischel (§§145, 498) one should read *smi* in Māgadhī.

3.5 is that you? *ex conj.*

3.5 while *ex conj.* ISAACSON. *bhāva* is not used elsewhere by either of the Adepts.

3.6 put you to death *ex conj.* Karṇakagomin in his commentary to the *Prāmāṇavārttika* associates different kinds of antisocial behaviour with different Tantras (ed. R. Sāṃkṛtyāyana, p. 578, quoted in SANDERSON 2001, p. 12, n. 10): *tathā kambukinītantrā steyācaraṇāt siddhir uktā*, ‘In the Kambukinītantras [“Tantras of the Robber Wives”] one is said to attain magical powers through the practice of robbery.’ This certainly does not mean that Skeleton-Banner was a follower of the Kambukinītantras, but his conduct could probably attract the attention of the police.

Kalhaṇa relates how Cakrabhāṇu (‘a Guru at this time in the lineage of the Krama, a tradition within the Kālikula’, as Prof Sanderson points out in a letter of 10. ix. 2002, referring, among others, to Arṇasiṃha’s *Mahānayaṇaparakāśa*, NAK 5–358, f. 119v1–5, and to *Tantrāloka* vol. 3, Āhnika 4, p. 196, ll. 10–12.) was punished by the Kashmirian king Yaśaskara (939–948) for his Kaula practices (*Rājataranṅiṇī* 6.108–112):

varṇāśramapratyavekṣābaddhakakṣyaḥ kṣitīśvaraḥ|
cakrabhāṇvabhidhaṃ cakramelake dvijatāpasam||
kṛtātyācāram ālokya rājā dharmavaśaṃvadaḥ|
nijagrāha śvapādena lalāṭataṭam anḱayan||
tanmātulena tadroṣād vīranāthena yoginā|
sāndhivīgrahakeṇātha sa svenaiva nyagrhyata||
pūrvācāryaprabhāveṇa svamāhātmyādhiropaṇam|
prakhyāpayadbhir gurubhiḥ śraddhayeti yad ucyate|
tat khyāpitaiva saptāhāt sa vipanna iti śrutih|
dīrghavyādhihate tasminn upapattiḥ katham bhavet||

‘The king [was ever] ready to exercise control over the estates and conditions of life [among his] subjects. On discovering that at *Cakramelaka* a brahmin-ascetic, Cakrabhāṇu by name, had departed from proper conduct, the king, in accordance with the law, punished him by having the mark of a dog’s foot branded on his forehead. Infuriated by this, the uncle of that [Brahman], the magician Vīranātha who was the king’s own minister of foreign affairs, then took revenge upon him.’ This is confidently related by certain Gurus who by [referring to] the supernatural power of former masters would exalt their own greatness. Through them, too, the story has been propagated that he died in seven days. But how is this likely [in view of the fact] that he died by a lingering disease?’ (tr. STEIN) Stein took the word *cakramelaka* as a local name, but, as Professor Sanderson points out to me (in the letter cited above) ‘it is much more probably the Tantric feast known as a *cakrayāgaḥ* or *mūrtiyāgaḥ* which a sponsor convenes for Vīras and Yoginīs, male and female Śākta adepts (see *Tantrāloka* 28.60c-61b). In *Tantrāloka* 28.7 the same is referred to as a *yoginīmelakaḥ* “a convening of Yoginīs”. In the *Vīratāṇḍavavidhi* chapter of the fourth *ṣaṭka* of the *Jayadrathayāmala*, which sets out the procedure for the celebration of an orgiastic ritual of this kind in the Kālikula, the tradition to which Cakrabhāṇu belonged, it is termed a *vīramelāpaḥ* (syn. *vīramelakaḥ*) “a convening of Vīras”. (f. 206v, v. 6–8). I have not noted the precise term *cakramelakaḥ* “circle convention” in any text of this tra-

dition. However, it does occur in the sense I attribute to it in a story of the supernatural in the Kashmirian Ocean of Stories (*Kathāsaritsāgara*). There (18.4.213ab) a band of Yoginīs goes to a *cakramelakaḥ* in Cakrapura and returns from it in the last watch of the night (18.4.221).’

Branding on the forehead with the mark of a dog’s foot was a punishment for theft (see e.g. *Manusmṛti* 9.237). Professor Sanderson proposes (in the letter cited above) that ‘Cakrabhānu was punished for staging a religious event in which the Tantric participants, men and women, were given substantial sums of money by the *yajamānaḥ* who invited them. I presume that Cakrabhānu was held responsible as the chief celebrant, the *cakranāyakaḥ* /*cakreśvaraḥ*. I doubt that punishment would have been inflicted for mere participation, since such rituals were well established, however abhorrent to Vaidikas. The adepts and Yoginīs invited to the feast are given gifts and a sacrificial cash fee (*dakṣiṇā*), which should be not less than 4 Rūpakas in the case of a Guru (*Tantrāloka* 28.99–100). It was probably in this less strictly religious context that the charge of theft (or extortion) arose.’

Cakrabhānu’s uncle Vīranātha, alias Hrasvanātha, was probably his Guru as well (see Jayaratha ad *Tantrāloka* 4.173ab, p. 196). As Professor Sanderson writes (in the above cited letter), ‘that Vīranātha was Yaśaskara’s Foreign Minister (*sāṃdhivigrahikaḥ*) underlines the fact that such practices were not confined to the sort of Prakrit-speaking marginals that Jayantabhaṭṭa gives us in Śmaśānabhūti and Kaṅkālaketu.’ The name *vīranātha* may also be descriptive. Professor Sanderson supplies (in the same letter) the following passage from the *Jayadrathayāmala* (*Mantra-dāmarikāpaṭala* of the 3rd *ṣaṭka*, women come forth from Pātāla drawn by the *sādhaka*’s mantra-recitation and address him): *ehy ehi vīranāthāśu pātālabhogasāgaram | sahāsmākaṃ ramasvātra yāvad ābhūmisamplavam ||* ‘Come, come quickly, o Lord of Adepts, to the ocean of pleasure in Pātāla, toy with us here until the earth becomes inundated.’

King Yaśaskara restored order in Kashmir after the chaotic reigns of various debauched kings following the death of Śaṅkaravarman. Yaśaskara, himself a brahmin and elected as king by an assembly of brahmins, was a champion of orthodoxy, and, similarly to Śaṅkaravarman, he was not favourably disposed towards anti-dharmic religious practices. During his reign, as Kālhaṇa says (*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 6.10–12),

na vipraguravaḥ sāma gāyanto madirāṃ papuḥ |
na tāpasāḥ putradārapaśudhānyāny adhaukayan ||
na mūrkhaguravo matsyāpūpayāgavidhāyinaḥ |
cakrire svakṛtair granthais tarkāgamaparīkṣaṇam ||
nādrśyanta ca gehīnyo gurudīkṣotthadevatāḥ |
kurvāṇā bhārtr̥śīlaśrīṇiṣedhaṃ mūrdhadhūnanaiḥ ||

‘The Brahman Gurus did not drink spirits while singing their chants. The ascetics did not get children, wives and crops. Ignorant Gurus did not perform Matsyāpūpa sacrifice, and did not by texts of their own composition revise traditional doctrines. There were not seen house-wives figuring

as divinities at the Guru-consecration, and by shakes of their heads detracting from the distinguished character of their husbands.’ (tr. STEIN) Stein remarks (in note 11 on p. 237, vol. I of his translation) that ‘the *Matsyāpūpayāga* is a complicated sacrifice occurring in the Tantric ritual and still known in Kaśmīr. It is mentioned in connection with Tantric Śrāddhas in the v. chapter of my MS. of the *Mṛtitattvānusmaraṇa*. Fish and cakes (*apūpa*) are offered at it.’ Professor Sanderson, however, informs me (in the letter mentioned above) that he has not found any reference to *matsyāpūpa* offerings in Kashmirian Paddhatis for the various Śaiva *srāddhas*, and that perhaps Kalhaṇa condemns Śaiva Tantric ritual in general, in which fish etc. are offered to the Bhairavas and other deities. The expression *tarkāgamaparikṣaṇam* is puzzling. It might be analysed as *tarkenā āgamaparikṣaṇam*, meaning ‘examining [in order to refute] Scripture with the help of [destructive] reasoning’, but this may not be the most natural interpretation. Instead we might emend the text, as Professor Sanderson suggests (in the above mentioned letter), to *tantrāgamaparikṣayam*, referring to ‘Gurus who were corrupting the teachings of the Tantras by propagating as Tantras texts that they themselves had composed’. (Stein also refers to the phenomenon of ‘newly concocted Paddhatis’, not unknown even in his time; see STEIN, vol. I, p. 237, n. 11.) Another conjecture suggested by Professor Sanderson (in the same letter) instead of the unsatisfactory reading *gurudīkṣoṭthadevatāḥ* is ‘*gurudīkṣoṭtadevatāḥ*, “[personifying] the goddesses taught for the Gurudīkṣā, i.e. initiation performed by [Kaula] Gurus.” Their head-shaking alludes to the manifestation of the symptoms of *devatāveśaḥ* required of the participants in Kaula collective rites.’

3.7 Even if I have... *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

3.8 How come? Another possible emendation, suggested by Dr Isaacson, is *ke śe*.

3.9 damned kingdom According to Hemacandra 4.289, Sanskrit *ṣṭa* should become *ṣṭa* in Māgadhī.

3.10 My heart... Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.10 spill it *ex conj.* *śu* and *ā* look very similar in Śāradā script.

3.11 King According to PISCHEL §399, Sanskrit *rājā* becomes *lāā* in Māgadhī.

3.11 his adviser *ta* and *u* look very similar in Śāradā script.

3.11 kingdom See note . The change *ṣṭa* > *ṭṭha* occurs in Śārasenī (see PISCHEL §303).

3.11 thrown in jail *ex conj.* *vahādi* (Skt. *vadhyate*) might make better sense (we would have three successive synonyms of ‘kill’).

3.11 Are we not one of them? *ex conj.* Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.11 We drink °*mha* belongs to the imperative, but sometimes it is used (wrongly according to PISCHEL) as an indicative ending (see PISCHEL §455).

3.11 eat Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.11 women The Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *strī* (or rather *strikā*) should be *istiā* according to PISCHEL §310.

3.11 Don't we observe the same religious discipline as the black-blankets? Cf. note ad 3.2.

Until we reach the last book of the *Svacchandatantra* the adept appears as a solitary, celibate figure (book 13, v. 4: *brahmacarye vyavasthitah*), but Book 15 (possibly interpolated and influenced by the Kaula cult, see ARRAJ 1988, pp. 367ff) shows him from another angle. Among the code-expressions (*chummakāḥ*) listed in this book and used to conceal the adept's activity we find words for the female partners of the adept (v. 3: *bhaginyo baladarpitāḥ*, v. 9: *dūtī saṃvāhikā*, v. 13: *sakhī sarvārthasādhikā*), semen (v. 5: *śukraṃ candraḥ*), penis and vagina (v. 8: *liṅgaṃ saṃtoṣajanaṇaṃ bhagaḥ prītivivardhanaḥ*), as well as alcohol and meat (v. 3: *madyaṇ tu harṣaṇaṇ jñeyaṇ muditā tu surā smṛtā*, v. 4: *matsyā jalacarā jñeyāḥ māṃsaṇ ca balavardhanam*) which were the regular ingredients of Kaula ritual. Later the text enumerates several secret gestures that a *yoginī* (a goddess or her incarnation as a female partner) may show to the adept (vv. 24 seqq).

The cult of the Yoginīs had a central role in the Vidyāpīṭha division of the Bhairavatantras (see SANDERSON 1988 pp. 138ff). The *Siddhayogeśvarīmata*, a Tantra of the Vidyāpīṭha, contains a detailed classification of incarnate *yoginīs*, teaches the adept the appropriate signs to be exchanged when they meet these women (Chapter 29, tr. TÖRZSÖK 1999, p. 175ff), and refers to the 'conversation' (*sambhāṣaṇa*, i.e. sexual intercourse) with a special *yoginī* who bestows the 'perfect substance' (*siddhadravya*, i.e. the mingled sexual fluids offered to the deity; see *Siddhayogeśvarīmata* 30.4, tr. TÖRZSÖK 1999, p. 181).

3.11 adept-dress One might consider emending *śādhaka*° to the more plausibly Māgadhī-looking *śāhaa*°.

3.14 how *kadhaṇ uṇa* would be a more regular form in Śaurasenī and Māgadhī (see PISCHEL §184).

3.25 there is *śu* and *a* look similar in Śāradā script.

3.15 that *ex conj.* ISAACSON. Another possible conjecture (closer to the reading of the manuscripts, but perhaps a less natural construction) could be *dāva je śe*.

3.15 saw Cf. note .

3.15 couples Pischel (§367) mentions *midhuṇā* as a nom. / acc. plur. in Śaurasenī.

3.15 Jinarākshita Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.17 informed The Māgadhī form of Sanskrit *jānāti* should be *yāṇadi* / *yāṇādi* according to the grammarians (Hemacandra 4.292, Vararuci 11.4, PISCHEL §§ 236, 454, 510), but in the old Nepalese manuscript of the *Nāgānanda* we find *jāṇadi* in a Māgadhī passage. As Steiner remarks, ‘Vermutlich beruht die Aufteilung der Formen Ś. *jāṇadi* und Mg. *yāṇadi* wiederum nur auf einer Fiktion.’ (STEINER 1997, p. 173.)

3.19 king The form *lāeṇa* clearly shows that *rājan* is treated as an *a*-stem noun in this Māgadhī passage.

3.19 turban *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

3.20 You should rather say... Hemacandra in 4.297 prescribes *ācaska* as the correct Māgadhī form.

3.21 now *ex conj.*

3.22 before Doomsday-Fire’s-Flame, the sorceress *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR silently conjectured *aśśamaṇ*, but I am not certain that one can speak about the ashram of a *yogeśvarī*.

As Judit Törzsök pointed out (TÖRZSÖK 1999, p. iii), ‘Yogeśvarī meaning ‘[female] master of Yoga’ denotes the same as Yoginī. (...) I think the word Yoginī or Yogeśvarī is not necessarily intended to convey that these sometimes witch-like female spirits or goddesses have any particular relation to certain classical yogic practices. Instead, the word probably refers to the similarity of supernatural effects traditional Yogins can obtain (such as being infinitely small, large, strong etc.) and powers the Yoginīs of this system [i.e. the Trika-Kaula] can bestow.’

The *yogeśvarī* appearing in Bhavabhūti’s *Mālatīmādhava* belongs to the more benevolent kind of witches. Saudāmanī once was the favourite disciple of the respected Buddhist mendicant nun Kāmandakī. Later she took up the Kāpālika Observance (*kāvāliavvadamaṇ*), achieved miraculous powers through the mastering of mantras (*samāsādidaaccariamantasiddhipahāvā*), and became a familiar sight for other Śaiva adepts and their female partners in the cremation grounds (*rattivihāriṇo ṇādidūrāraṇṇavāsīṇo sāhaassa muṇḍadhāriṇo aghoraḥaṇṭanāmadheassa antevāsīṇī mahāpabbāvā kavālakuṇḍalā ṇāma (...) tado iam paṭṭī*, Act I, v. 15+). But from her Buddhist antecedents she had preserved compassion towards those who suffer, and she hastened to Mālatī’s help who had been kidnapped by a revengeful *kāpālinī*. Then Saudāmanī saved the lives of those for whom life has lost its meaning without Mālatī, and even used her transporting magic (*ākṣepiṇī siddhi*, Act IX, v. 52) to reunite the two young lovers.

The two adepts in Jayanta’s play also think about relying on a *yogeśvarī*’s

protective powers, but it seems that even such powers would be insufficient to counteract the forces of justice.

3.22 trouble *ex conj.*

3.22 there *ex conj.* *eśu, teśu, yeśu* seem to be used in the sense of *atra, tatra, yatra* in the Māgadhī passages.

3.23 protected RAGHAVAN and THAKUR give *pārayati* as the *chāyā* of *pālīadi*, which is not entirely convincing to me. One would expect *pāledī* as a causative form, and *°īadi* seems to be a passive ending.

3.24 suppose *ex conj.* *śānkemi* seems to be Māgadhī for *śāṅkayāmi*, but the causative sense is perhaps not appropriate here.

3.24 Queen *ex conj.* Cf. Hemacandra 4.293, PISCHEL §276.

3.24 chief wife *°vallahāe* might be a better reading.

3.24 king Cf. note ad 3.19.

3.25 protected *°ijjamṭī* is a false Śaurasenī ending according to PISCHEL §535.

3.25 us Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.25 bounded by RAGHAVAN and THAKUR read *°pettamṭe* and give *°pratyante* as its *chāyā*.

3.26 You're right Cf. note ad 3.20.

3.28 damned kingdom Cf. note .

3.30 sacrifice According to Hemacandra 4.293, Sanskrit *jñā* should become *ññā* in Māgadhī, but, as Pischel remarks (§276) in the manuscripts we find *jañña* instead of *yañña*.

3.31 we Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.31 for fear of Sankārshana *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

3.33 we Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.35 prescribed *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

3.36 Our Cf. note ad 3.2.

3.40 vanquished *ex conj.* One would expect *abhi(ahi?)bhavīamṭo* as a Śaurasenī passive.

3.40 false ascetics Instead of RAGHAVAN and THAKUR's conjecture, one might emend to *durāārehi ya tāvasehi (durācāraiś ca tāpasaiḥ)*.

3.42 having fallen into disrepute because of your ardor *ex conj.*

- 3.44 Perhaps a pub.** In the *Mattavilāsa-prahasana* the *kapālin* compares the pub to a sacrificial ground (v. 9+). Prof. Sanderson suggested (in a letter of 15. xii. 2003) to emend *yadi vā* to *yadi no* in order to achieve the sense ‘What in the world could be an appropriate place for asceticism but a pub?’
- 3.49 path** *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. One might consider completing the otherwise unmetrical line with another word.
- 3.55 as soon as . . . reached them** *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. This seems to be the most plausible way to complete the sentence.
- 3.55 started** The ending °*āo* is characteristic of Ardhamāgadhī, Māhāraṣṭrī, and Jaina-Māhāraṣṭrī. According to Pischel (§367) it is wrong in Śaurasenī, but a similar ending, °*āho* occurs as a vocative form in Māgadhī (§372).
- 3.58** I am not certain if this is the correct interpretation of the sentence. Another translation, suggested by Dr. Kataoka, could be: ‘Your power is too strong.’
- 3.65ff. ashram** The inscriptions of the Śaiva monasteries in the Kalacuri-Cedi country, whose *ācāryas* belonged to the Mattamayūra clan, provide important historical parallels to the following description of the *āśrama* (for more details about this clan see MIRASHI 1955). The Chandrēhē inscription (AD 973, in MIRASHI 1955, pp. 198ff.) gives the spiritual genealogy of Abbot Prabodhaśiva, who constructed the *maṭha*, and excavated a tank and a well. The serenity and peacefulness of the monastery is described with the following charming verses (ibid. p. 201, ll. 19–21):
- jaḍataramaruc choṇasyāmbhaḥkaṇair ayam āśramo*
mṛgapatimahādhvānai rātrau pratidhvanitāmvaraḥ|
śikhariśikharaprāntaprenkhaddvirephapayodharo
janayati jane vidyucchanḥkām mahauṣadhirociṣā||
 [cum]vanti vānaragaṇā mṛgaśatrupotān
siṃhīstanam pivati cātra śīsur mṛgasya|
vairam niḥjaṃ pariharanti virodhino ’nye
sarvvasya sāmyati mano hi tapovaneṣu||
- ‘This ashram, where the winds are very cool with the drops of the river Śoṇa, where at night the sky resounds with the loud roars of lions, and the clouds, [black] as bees, whirl around the edges of the mountain-tops—this ashram makes people to suspect lightning with the glimmering of its excellent herbs.
- Here the groups of monkeys kiss the lion-cubs, and the fawn sucks the teat of a lioness. Other hostile [animals] set aside their natural enmity, for everyone’s heart calms down in the penance-groves.’
- The fragmentary Kadwāhā-inscription (10th century, edited by MIRASHI-SHASTRI) gives us a telling picture about the relations between the rulers and the abbots of these *āśramas*. We are told that a certain king called

Gobhaṭa came to the monastery with an army of elephants (ibid. p.123, l.12: *tatrājagāmonmadasinthurāṇāṃ valena bhūpaḥ kila gobhaṭākhyah*). In the next verse somebody dies, possibly killed by the king (ibid. l.13: *[nṛ]peṇa parāgatāsuḥ sahasā papāta*). Abbot Dharmasīva sheds tears for the dead person (ibid.: *tasyāvagamya sa kathāṃ karuṇāvīmukta*^bāṣpaḥ* (em. MIRASHI : °*vāḥpaḥ* ep.)); then he flies into a rage, with a miraculously acquired bow, resembling Śiva himself, defeats the enemy (ibid. ll.13–15: *kṣa[ṇaṃ] tad anu kopavipāṭa[lākṣaḥ] ... atha prabhāvāgatakārmu*keṇa* (em. MIRASHI : °*kena* ep.) *vāṇaiś ca dīptaiḥ sa dharāvṛṣāṃkaḥ| ātta[sva]līlas tripurāntakasya ... sakalam api sa jītvā sātravaṃ śarvvakalpah*), and finally ascends to heaven while celestial women shower flowers upon him (ibid.: *surapatiramaṇināṃ puṣpavṛṣṭyāvakīrṇaḥ puram anupama...*). The same inscription tells us about the successor of Dharmasīva, who initiated the Pratīhāra king Harirāja (ibid. p.124, l.24: *ācāryaḥ sa dadau samyag dīkṣāṃ kalyāṇakārīṇīm*). The king offered elephants in return, but, after repeated requests, the *ācārya* graciously accepted some villages instead (ibid. l.27: *prārthito 'nekadā grāmāṇāṃ cakame smitārdravadanaḥ sa ...*).

The Malkāpuram-inscription (13th century, ed. PANTULU) tells us about Viśveśvaraśambhu, the *ācārya* of the Golakī *maṭha*, who was the *dīkṣāguru* of the Kākatīya king Gaṇapatideva. The king and his daughter and heir Rudrāmbā granted two villages to the Abbot, who used the donation to establish an *agrahāra* called Viśveśvara-Golakī. The inscription gives various details about the inhabitants of the village and the new institutions: Viśveśvaraśambhu founded a temple, a *maṭha*, a choultry / refectory (*sattra*), a maternity home (*prasūtīśālā*), and a hospital (*ārogyaśālā*). He settled sixty Drāviḍa brahmin families, eight professors to teach the three Vedas, Grammar, Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, literature, and the Āgamas (p.160, ll.49–51: *ṛgyajussāmavedānāṃ samyag adhyāpakās trayah| padavākyapramāṇānāṃ sāhityasyāgamasya ca|| pañca vyākhyākṛto*), a doctor and an accountant as well (*vaidyakāyasthau*). Ten dancing-girls (*nartakyah*), various musicians, one Kashmirian of unnamed profession (*kāśmīradeśīyah*), and fourteen female singers (*gāyinyah*) were employed for the temple, two brahmin cooks (*pācakau dvījanmānu*) and several attendants (*paricārakāḥ*) for the *sattra* and the *maṭha*. Ten villageguards (*grāmasya rakṣakāḥ*) from the Coḷa country and twenty policemen (*bhaṭāḥ*) kept the peace, and the village was also provided with various craftsmen. The income of some lands was used to meet the needs of visiting Śaiva ascetics, Kālamukhas, students, and Pāśupatas, and to supply food to all from brahmins down to the *caṇḍālas* who came to Viśveśvara-Golakī (p.160, ll.70–73: *upeyuṣāṃ śaivatapodhanānāṃ kālānanānāṃ śivaśāsanānāṃ|| vidyārthīnāṃ pāśupatavratānāṃ apy annavastrādīsamarpaṇāya| ārabhya viprān anivāritānāṃ caṇḍālaparyantam upāgatānāṃ|| annapradānāya ca*).

The Ranōd-inscription (10–11th century, edited by KIELHORN) gives the earliest genealogy of the Mattamayūra clan. We learn that king Avan-

tivarman persuaded the sage Purandara to come to his country and to establish a *maṭha* in his capital, Mattamayūra (possibly identical with the modern Kadwāhā). Purandara initiated the king (on this initiation being Saiddhāntika Śaiva see SANDERSON 2001, p. 9f., n. 6), and established another *maṭha* at Araṇipadra (modern Ranōd). The last *ācārya* of this *maṭha* mentioned on the inscription is Vyomaśiva (or Vyomaśambhu), who renovated the *maṭha* and excavated an impressive tank (the beauties of which are extolled in several verses). Vyomaśiva’s asceticism was exemplary (p. 358, ll. 33–34):

*purā yoṣitsaṅgād anibhṛtanijākṣaṃ bhagavatā
vijigye yaḥ kāmā tripuraripuṇāvīkṛtaruṣā
niruddhākṣaḥ kṣāntyā tam ayam ajayat saṅgarahitaḥ
sucirṇṇānām syād vā kim iha tapasām duṣka[ra]m iti||33||*

‘Long ago the Blessed Lord, the Enemy of the Three Forts, showed his anger and defeated Kāma by opening his [third] eye, because of the contact with a woman: he[, Vyomaśiva,] has defeated him [i.e. Kāma] with eyes closed, with forbearance, avoiding contact [with women]. Or rather, what would be difficult for well-observed ascetic practices?’

On the other hand, the same Abbot was a great scholar, well-versed in various philosophical doctrines (ibid. ll. 36–38):

*siddhāntesu maheśa eṣa nīyataṃ nyāye ’kṣapādo munir
gambhīre ca kaṇāśinas tu kaṇabhuk śāstre śrutau jaiminiḥ
sāṃkhye ’nalpamatih svayaṃ ca kapilo lokāyate sadgurur
vuddho vuddhamate jīnoktiṣu jīnaḥ ko vātha nāyaṃ kṛtī||36||*

‘He was truly the Great Lord in [the teachings of Śaiva] Siddhānta, the Sage Akṣapāda in Nyāya, Kanabhuj [= Kaṇāda] in the deep science of Kaṇāśin [= Kaṇāda], Jaimini in Vedic tradition, the intelligent Kapila himself in Sāṃkhya, a true master of Lokāyata, Buddha in Buddha’s doctrine, Jina in Jina’s teachings. Or rather, whom was this wise person not equal to?’

(pp. 358f., ll. 40–42:)

*saṃlīnaṃ mukha eva śākyakariṇām atyūrjjitaṃ garjjitaṃ
trāsād yasya ca jainajamvukaśatair dduvvyāhṛtaṃ saṃhṛtaṃ
soḍhaṃ jātu na jaiminīyahariṇair līlākṛtaṃ huṃkṛtaṃ
tasyānyad gaganeśakānanapateḥ kiṃ syāt stutaṃ prastutaṃ||39||*

‘Out of fear from him, the Buddhist elephants’ thunderous trumpeting died away already in their mouth, and hundreds of Jaina jackals subdued their inarticulate crying. The Mīmāṃsaka antelopes could never endure his playful roaring. What other deed of this lord of Śiva’s forest shall we praise?’

Vyomaśiva apparently does not fit into the picture of the “typical” *ācārya* of the Mattamayūra clan as it was drawn by Richard Davis (DAVIS, p. 135): ‘Like Tolstoy’s proverbial hedgehog, the Drunken Peacocks know only one thing [i.e. Śaiva Siddhānta], but they know it very well. The poets seldom praise the Śaiva sages for their mastery of other traditional Indian disciplines of knowledge like grammar, or for knowing other genres of religious

texts such as the Vedas.’

It is certainly tempting to identify this learned Śaiva Abbot with the author of the Vyomavatī, a work on Vaiśeṣika philosophy. According to Walter Slaje (SLAJE, ‘Untersuchungen. . .’), Jayanta and the philosopher Vyomaśiva were contemporaries, while the date of the Abbot Vyomaśiva might also be settled around 900 AD. The following verse of another inscription (now in the Archaeological Museum, Gwalior), praising the same *ācārya*, might also support this identification (the inscription was not at my disposal; it is described in WILLIS, p. 113; the verse is quoted in PATHAK, p. 39, n. 4):

*munisūryeṇa nīrastam tīkālokena yena lokasya|
prakaṭayateha padārtham santam asac ca santamasam||*

‘. . . which sun-like sage dispelled the darkness of the world with the light of his commentary (i.e. the Vyomavatī-ṭīkā on the Praśastapādabhāṣya?) which revealed here both the existing categories and non-existence (*asat* = *abhāva*).’ (Praśastapāda omits *abhāva* and mentions six *padārthas*. Vyomaśiva explains why *abhāva* is subordinated to the other categories.)

In any case, we shall see that the God-proving arguments of the Śaiva *ācārya* in the Āgamaḍambara (just as similar arguments in the texts of the Śaiva Siddhānta) are remarkably close to those found in the Vaiśeṣika Vyomavatī (and in several Nyāya texts as well).

- 3.66 slow, graceful dance** Instead of accepting the reading of the manuscripts one might conjecture °*manthanalāsyā*°, ‘a [graceful] dance: the waving of the mendicant-garments’.
- 3.67 ex conj.** Another possible way of emending the text could be: *paśaṃtataraṃ ajja tavovanaṃ imaṃ ṇo dīsadi*, ‘This penance-grove seems to me most peaceful today.’ The correct Śaurasenī form of *ramaṇīyam* should be *ramaṇīam*, and not *ramaṇījam* (see PISCHEL§138).
- 3.69 smiling with ashes** The colour of laughter is white, like the ashes smeared on the ascetic’s body.
- 3.69 act as servants ex conj.** ISAACSON. I cannot interpret the reading *cāiraveda* (*airaveda?*, *eraveda?*). The only meaningful word which resembles it is Ailavila or Aīdaviḍa, a name of Kubera (cf. *Amarakośa* 2.73).
- 3.71 upon my word ex conj.** The conjecture is a tentative one.
- 3.71 Shiva’s heaven** One could also consider reading *śīvapuraḥsthaṃ*.
- 3.72 absorption into Brahman ex conj.** RAGHAVAN and THAKUR’s emendation, *balamha*, might also be a Prakrit form of *brahma*, although one would expect *baramha* in a Śaurasenī passage. Another possibility, suggested by Prof. Sanderson, is to understand the Prakrit as ‘*brahmabhūtaṃ*’ (and perhaps emend the text to *bamhabhūdaṃ*) and translate ‘I imagine myself ascending, merged with Brahman’.

3.75 attention *ex conj.*

3.75 I don't think *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR, probably misreading the manuscripts, took *śānikā* agreeing with *yathāvasthitā*. The manuscripts however, read *yathāvasthitās*, agreeing with *āśramaṇaḥ* (which also seems to give a better meaning).

3.75 Why worry? *ex conj.* One might consider emending this otherwise unmetrical line in another way.

3.81 †...† The manuscripts read *uggāhaṇakaṇakhaṇdhaṇva*, which was emended by RAGHAVAN and THAKUR to *uggakhaṇavaṇavaṇdhaṇ vva*, for which they give the following *chāyā* (with a question mark): *ugrakṣaṇa-vacanabandham iva*. Although this conjecture is neither convincing nor interpretable for me, I cannot suggest anything better.

3.84 riches of his kingdom *ex em.* ISAACSON.

3.84 a heavenly tree in a place where there is nothing around it *ex conj.* The expression *ekavṛkṣe* often occurs in Tantric context, indicating a suitable place for performing a ritual, see e.g. *Siddhayogeshvarīmata* 6.3. Another possible emendation, suggested by Prof. Sanderson, is ‘*marudeśe*’, ‘in the desert’.

3.84 for a long time *ex em.* ISAACSON. *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha (Cārvāka-darśana)* p. 6: *lokasiddho rājā paramēśvaraḥ* | ‘The [only] Supreme Lord is the king, who[se existence] is [well-]established among the people.’ (also p. 7: *lokasiddho bhaved rājā pareśo nāparaḥ smṛtaḥ*) As Prof. Sanderson pointed out to me in a letter of 15. xii. 2003, ‘there may be an allusion here to the convention whereby religious texts constrain the king to support their institutions by promising him a long reign if he complies and a short one if he doesn’t’.

3.84 expert *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. The adding of a word with a similar meaning seems to be necessary.

3.85 The Cārvāka’s behaviour is disrespectful probably because he does not wait until he is offered a seat, or, as Prof. Sanderson pointed out to me in the above mentioned letter, ‘because he uses impertinently familiar forms of address to both the ascetic and Saṃkarṣaṇa’.

3.88 self-restraint is just a way to cheat yourself of pleasures Cf. *Sarvadarśanasāṅgraha (Cārvākadarśana)* p. 3: *aṅganādyālīṅganādijanyam sukham eva puruṣārthaḥ* | ‘The only goal of man is pleasure produced by such [activities] as embracing women and the like.’ Ibid. p. 4: *yadi kaścid bhīrur drṣṭam sukham tyajet tarhi sa paśwan mūrkhō bhavet tad uktam—* ‘*tyājyaṃ sukhaṃ viśayasaṅgamajānma puṃsāṃ duḥkhopaśṣtam’ iti mūrkhavicāraṇaiṣā* | *vṛhīṅ jihāsati sitottamataṇḍulādhyān*

ko nāma bhos tuṣakaṇopahitān hitārthā|

‘If someone cowardly gave up the pleasure he had already experienced then he would be as stupid as a beast. It is said: “The idiots express the following opinion: ‘Men should give up pleasure arising from the contact with sense objects, [since it is] accompanied by pain.’ Who on earth, if he means well by himself, would throw away rice which is rich in white grains of the best quality, just because it is mixed with bits of husk?’”

3.88 sacrificial rituals such as the Agnihotra seem to me just like children’s games Cf. *Sarvadarśanasanīgraha (Cārvākadarśana)* p. 5: *nanu pāralaukikasukhābhāve bahuvittavyayaśārīrāyāsasādhye ’gnihotrādau vidyāvṛddhāḥ katham pravartiṣyante iti cet, tad api na pramāṇakoṭim praveṣtum iṣṭe| anṛtavāghātapunaruktadoṣair dūṣitatayā vaidikammanyair eva dhūrtabakaiḥ parasparaṃ karmakāṇḍaprāmāṇyavādibhir jñānakāṇḍasya jñānakāṇḍaprāmāṇyavādibhiḥ karmakāṇḍasya ca pratikṣiptatvena trayyā dhūrtapralāpamātratvena agnihotrāder jīvikāmātraprayojanatvāt| tathā cābhānakaḥ—*

agnihotraṃ trayo vedās tridaṇḍaṃ bhasmaguṇṭhanam|

buddhipauruṣahīnānāṃ jīviketi bṛhaspatiḥ|

‘Objection: “If there is no happiness which belongs to the next world, then why should those who are advanced in learning engage in [rituals] such as the Agnihotra, which can [only] be performed at great expense and physical labour?” This [objection] cannot enter the class of proofs either. For [rituals] such as the Agnihotra are good only for making a living, since [the Veda] is defiled by the faults of falsehood, contradiction, and superfluous repetition; and since the shrewd hypocrites who fancy themselves Vedic experts refute each other’s texts: those who hold that [only] the ritualistic part of the Veda is valid reject its esoteric part, while those who hold that [only] the esoteric part is valid reject the ritualistic part; and since the three Vedas are just the ravings of rogues. As the [following] saying also [points out]: ‘The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the triple staff [of a renouncer], the smearing [of one’s body] with ashes are the livelihood of those who lack intelligence and manliness: thus [taught] Bṛhaspati.’

3.91 There goes the son of a barren woman Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* p. 8: . . . *eṣa vandhyāsuto yāti ityādivākyaajātasyeva prāmāṇyābhāvāt* ‘since it lacks validity like such kind of statements as “here goes the son of a barren woman”.’

3.91 a bow made of hare-horn Cf. *Bṛhaspatismṛti* (reconstructed by K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series LXXXV, Baroda, 1941) 2.12:

manānena pradātavyaṃ śaśaśṛṅgakṛtaṃ dhanuḥ|

asambhāvyaṃ asādhyāṃ taṃ pakṣam āhur manīṣiṇaḥ|

‘“He must give me a bow made of hare-horn.” The wise say that this idea is inconceivable and not accomplishable.’

3.92 he supervises the mass of karmas Cf. *Parākhyantra* 1.92cd–94cd:

*karmaṇā dehasaṃyogo vibhor api maheśvarāt||
 aśaktatvāt svato nāsya sāmārthyam karmayojane|
 paśutvaruddhacicchakteḥ svātantryam na paśor atah||
 karma cidrahitam tasmād yojakam tad apekṣate|
 yojakah sa maheśānaḥ svecchayā balavān yataḥ|*

‘The linking of the soul, though all-pervading, with a body because of action [comes about] through the [intervention of the] Lord. Because the soul is without power he does not of himself have the capacity for linking himself to [the consequences of his] actions, and so the bound soul, whose power of consciousness is blocked by impurity, has no autonomy. [And] action is devoid of consciousness and therefore it depends on something that links it [to those to whom it must accrue]. The entity that links it is the Supreme Lord, who does it by His will, since He has might.’ (tr. GOODALL)

3.94ff. The following verses could also have been said from a *mīmāṃsaka* position. See for example *Āgamaprāmāṇya* pp. 34ff. (*mīmāṃsakapakṣa*):

*kva vā deśe tiṣṭhann anavaratatrptaḥ kim iti vā
 kadā vā niśśeṣam janayati tad etad vimṛṣatu|
 kvacit tiṣṭhann iṣṭam kim api phalam uddiśya karaṇaiḥ
 kadācid yatkiñcij janayati kulālādir akhilah||
 kṛtārthatvāt krīḍā na ca bhavati hetur yadi khalu
 svabhāvaḥ svātantryam prakāṣitam aho samprati vibhoḥ|
 abhipretam kiñcid yad ayam asamīkṣyaiva kurute
 jagajjanmasthanapravilayamahāyāsam avaśah||
 anukampāprayuktena sṛjyamānāś ca jantavaḥ|
 sukhīnaḥ kiṃ na sṛjyante tatkarmaṇapekṣayā yadi||
 tataḥ svatantratāhāniḥ kiṃca tair eva hetubhiḥ|
 upapanne ’pi vaicitrye kiṃ tatkalanayānaya||*

‘Consider this: being where, when, and why does He who is constantly satisfied create that entire [universe]? Every [person], such as a potter, creates whatever [he creates] while being at a certain place, at a certain time, with regard to a certain result, [and] with [certain] instruments. And since He has fulfilled a purpose [when He created the world], [mere] sport cannot be the motive [behind His acts]; if the motive is [His] nature: by George, now you have demonstrated the independence of the Lord, since he helplessly makes the great effort of producing, sustaining, and creating the world without taking into account anything [He might have] wished for. If He produces the creatures stimulated by compassion, then why does he not produce them happy? If [you reply that] because [God] takes their karmas into consideration, then [His] independence will suffer a loss. Furthermore, if the variety [of worldly phenomena] is explainable with the help of those causes [i.e. karmas] alone, then why postulate Him in this way?’ (Cf. *Ślokaṁvārttika sambandhākṣepaparihāra* v. 52 seqq.)

3.94 Bhāsarvajña examines similar alternatives in *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* pp. 458f.: *tathā-*

pi vicāryam etat, kimartham pravartate bhagavān iti? parānugrahārtham ity eke| (...) athavā svārtham eva pravartate| (...) athavā ādityavat svabhāvenaiva pravartate| ‘Nevertheless we should examine for what purpose the Lord is engaged [in creation]. Some say that [he creates] in order to favour others. (...) Or maybe he is engaged [in creation] only for his own sake. (...) Or maybe he is engaged [in creation] just by his inherent nature, similarly to the sun [which shines because that is its nature].’

3.94 sport Cf. *Kiraṇatantra* 1.5cd: *jaya nṛttamahārambhakrīḍāvīkṣobhadāruṇa||* ‘Victory, [you who are] fearsome because of the shaking [of the world] as a result of the vigorous playfulness of your dancing!’ (tr. GOODALL)

3.94 impulse The scriptures of Śaiva Siddhānta often refer to *preraṇā* as a characteristic act of God and the lords of mantras, on the different levels of creation, e.g. *Kiraṇatantra* 3.25cd–26:

īśvaro ’dhaḥsthavidyānāṇi patīn samprerayaty asau||
tena preritamātrās te kurvate ’dhastanaṃ jagat|
śuddhe ’dhvani śivaḥ kartā prokto ’nanto ’site prabhuh|

‘The Lord urges the overlords of the lower mantras [to act]. As soon as they have been urged by Him, they create the lower universe. In the pure path Śiva is the creator. Ananta is taught to be the lord in the impure [path].’ (tr. GOODALL)

Ibid. 14d: *yonim prerayate kṣaṇāt||* ‘[Ananta] immediately stimulates the matrix [of primal matter to generate from herself all that is material].’ (tr. GOODALL)

3.94 honesty It is not entirely clear to me why would God create out of ‘honesty’. The text may be corrupt here.

3.95 who has no desire for the group of causal factors like the instrumental cause, and who is also deprived of assistant factors Cf. *Kiraṇatantra* 3.9cd: *vaikaraṇyād amūrtatvāt kartṛtvaṃ yujyate katham||* ‘How is it possible for Him to be a creator, since He lacks the means and is not embodied?’ Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s *Kiraṇavṛtti ad loc.*: *karaṇānām abhāvo vaikaraṇyaṃ, tasmād īśvaro jagataḥ kartā na sambhavati| karaṇābhāvād daṇḍacakrasūtrādirahitaḥ kumbhakāra iva kumbhe| tad idam uktam jāiminīyāiḥ—’na ca niḥsādhanāḥ kartā kaścit sṛjati kiñcana|’ (Ślokavārttika, sambandhākṣepaparihāra 50cd)* ‘He lacks instruments, and because of this it is impossible that the Lord created the universe. Because of His lack of instruments He is like a potter who has no stick, wheel, thread or other instrument in regard to [creating] a pot. The same [point] is expressed by the Mīmāṃsakas: “And no creator ever creates anything without means to accomplish it.” (tr. GOODALL) As the verse quoted from the *Ślokavārttika* shows, this objection could also be made from a Mīmāṃsaka position.

3.95 particular *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. One might consider completing the otherwise unmetrical line with another word.

3.103 = *Vākyapadīya* 1.32, also quoted in *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, p. 314, *Tattvasaṅgraha* 1459, and *Syādvādaratnākara* p. 262. Bhartṛhari illustrates this assertion in his *vṛtti* (p. 89), e.g. *grīṣmahemantādiṣu kūpajalādīnām atyantabhinnāḥ sparśādayo drśyante*, ‘things such as water in a well feel and [look, etc.] very different in summer, in winter, or in other [seasons]’ (an illustration of *kālabheda*, which makes it impossible to infer the exact temperature of the water). Thus, as Vṛṣabhadeva notes, *tatra syād api kaścīd dhūmo yo nāgneḥ, yathā śālūkād api śālūkaḥ, gomayād api*, ‘among [all things in the world] there might exist such a smoke which does not arise from fire, just as some frogs are born from frogs, others from cow-dung’.

3.105 = *Vākyapadīya* 1.42, also quoted in *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, p. 316. Bhartṛhari actually intended to emphasise the importance of scripture with this verse. As he explains in his *vṛtti* (pp. 98f.): *yasya hi sthālīpulākānyāyenaikadeśaṃ dr̥ṣtvā śiṣṭe ’rthe pratipattiḥ so ’ndha iva viṣame girimārge cakṣuṣmantam netāram antareṇa tvarayā paripatan kaṃcid eva mārgaikadeśaṃ hastasparśenāvagamya samatīkrāntas tatpratyaṅyād aparam api tathaiva pratipadyamāno yathā vināśaṃ labhate tadvad āgamacakṣuṣā vinā tarkānupātī kevalenānumānena kvacid āhitapratyaṅyāyo dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭaphaleṣu karmasv āgamam utkrāmya pravartamāno niyataṃ mahatā pratyavāyena saṃyujyate* ‘For someone who, following the maxim of the cooking-pot and boiled rice, having seen a portion [of the whole thing] determines the rest of the thing [since he assumes it to be the same as the portion he has seen], just as a blind man, who runs on an uneven mountain path without a guide who can see, covers just a small distance while feeling it by touch of hand, and because of the knowledge (or confidence) [produced] by that he believes the remaining [part of the road] to be the same, perishes—in the same way that man, too, who, without the ‘eye’ of scripture, follows logic and, having attained partial knowledge (or confidence about certain things) with the help of inference alone, becomes engaged in actions that have visible and invisible results while he disregards scripture: [such a person] will necessarily meet great disaster.’

3.107 = *Vākyapadīya* 1.34, also quoted in *Tattvasaṅgraha* 1461, *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, p. 316.

3.109 Cf. BHATTACHARYA, p. 605, III.1.

3.112 suffer the torments of hunger *ex conj.*

3.120 Cf. *Tattvopaplavasīṃha*, p. 125: *upapluteṣv eva tattveṣv avicāritaramaṇīyāḥ sarve vyavahārā ghaṭanta iti* ‘Only when the principles have been annihilated, all transactions take place pleasantly [as long as] they are not examined.’ The *ālamkārika* Udbhaṭa (who may or may not be the same as the Cārvāka Udbhaṭa who wrote a *Tattvavṛtti* according to *Syādvādaratnākara*, p. 265) classified subject matters into two groups: “well-established [even after] they have been analysed” (*vicāritasusthaḥ*) and “pleasing [only as long as] they are not analysed” (*avicāritaramaṇīyah*).

Śāstras deal with the former group, while *kāvya*s with the latter (quoted in *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, p. 44).

3.212 you just don't want to yield an inch Cf. JACOB 1909, who gives the following possible interpretations: 'unduly extending one's claim or one's position generally' (= *bhikṣupādaprasāraṇanyāya*), 'to establish one's self freely and fully: to extend one's power far and wide'. Jacob also makes the following observation: 'In the passages, however, in which I have met with the expression, it seems to employ a *dogged adherence to a position* in spite of previous failure, and when there is little prospect of further success.' (Jacob quotes the *Upamitibhavaprapaṅcā Kathā*, the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, and the *Nyāyamañjarī*).

3.122 non-smoke and non-fire *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

3.123 accordance *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

3.125 Therefore... = *Nyāyabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.7 (p. 14).

3.126 for things concerning which cognition is still to be acquired. *ex conj.* The conjecture is supported by the parallel passage in the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

This was the view of the 'sophisticated' Cārvākas (*suśikṣitatarāḥ*, *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, pp. 326f.), who are identified by Cakradhara as 'Udbhaṭa & co.' (*udbhaṭādayaḥ*, *Nyāyamañjarigranthibhaṅga* p. 19; on p. 43 Cakradhara also tells us that with the term 'cunning Cārvāka' (*cārvākadhūrta*) Jayanta also refers to Udbhaṭa).

Kamalaśīla ascribes this position to Purandara (*Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, introducing v. 1482): *purandaras tv āha— 'lokaprasiddham anumānam cārvākair apīṣyata eva, yat tu kaiścil laukikaṃ mārgam atikramyānumānam ucyate, tan niśidhyate' iti* 'Purandara, on the other hand, says: "[That kind of] inference which is well established in everyday life is certainly accepted by the Cārvākas, too, but that [kind of] inference is rejected which some people assert going beyond the everyday path [of reasoning]."'

The *Syādvādaratnākara* quotes Udbhaṭa's commentary on Purandara's following sūtra (p. 265): *pramāṇasyāgaṇatvād* (em. : *pramāṇasya gaṇatvād* ed.) *anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ* 'Since a [real] means of valid knowledge is not indirect, it is hardly possible to ascertain things on the basis of inference.' (The same sūtra is also quoted in *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, p. 312, and in *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* p. 210; in the latter text one should emend *arthadurlabhaḥ* to *arthaniścayo durlabhaḥ*. Bhāsarvajña glosses *agaṇatva* with *anupacaritaviśayatva*.) Says Udbhaṭa (*Syādvādaratnākara* pp. 265f.): *lokaprasiddheṣv api hetuṣu vyabhicārādarśanam asti, tantrasiddheṣv api tena vyabhicārādarśanalakṣaṇaguṇasādharmyatā tantrasiddhahetūnām tathābhāvo vyavasthāpyata iti gaṇatvam anumānasya* *avyabhicārāvagamo hi laukikahetūnām anumeyāvagame nimittam, sa nāsti tantrasiddheṣv iti na tebhyaḥ parokṣāvagamo nyāyāḥ, ata idam uk-tam anumānād arthaniścayo durlabha iti* 'As for [those] logical reasons

which are well established in the world, we do not see that they are erroneous; therefore, because of the apparent [but unreal] similarity of the property [called] “the non-perception of erroneousness” also with respect to [logical reasons] that have been established scientific works, it is determined that logical reasons established in scientific works are thus [i.e. non-erroneous]: this is the indirect nature of inference. For the ground of ascertaining the inferendum is the ascertainment of the non-erroneousness of ordinary logical reasons; this does not take place in the case of [logical reasons which are] established in scientific works: so it is not right to infer from them things that are beyond the scope of sense-perception. That is why it has been said: “It is hardly possible to ascertain things on the basis of inference”.’

3.130 Cf. *Kiraṇatantra* 3.12ac:

*sthūlaṃ vicitrakaṃ kāryaṃ nānyathā ghaṭavad bhavet|
asti hetur ataḥ kaścit. . .*

‘[The universe is] gross, diverse, [and therefore] an effect, like a pot. It cannot be otherwise. And so there exists some [instigating] cause.’ (tr. GOODALL)

Commenting on this verse Rāmakaṇṭha distinguishes two positions regarding the origin of the universe. For the Sāṃkhyas and the Buddhists, the universe is an effect, but not for the Mīmāṃsakas, Jainas, and Cārvākas, who hold that ‘the universe was never not thus’ (*na kadācid anīdṛśaṃ jagad, Kiraṇavṛtti* p. 71.) The Tantra rejects the view of the latter group and establishes that the universe is a product. Says Rāmakaṇṭha: *yat sthūlaṃ tat kāryaṃ yathā ghaṭādi, sthūlaṃ caitad adṛṣṭakarṭṛkaṃ bhuvanādi, tataḥ kāryam iti* (ibid.) ‘Whatever is gross is an effect, like such things as pots. This [universe] that consists in the worlds and so on, and whose creator is not directly experienced, is also gross and therefore [it too is] an effect.’ (tr. GOODALL)

A few lines below Rāmakaṇṭha further expands on the subject (*Kiraṇavṛtti* p. 72): *yat kāryaṃ tad viśiṣṭajñānakriyāyuktakartrā vinā na siddhyatīti yathā ghaṭādi| kāryaṃ caitat sarvam eva jagat| atas tad api viśiṣṭajñānakriyāyuktena kartrā vinā na bhavati| yas tatkartā sa īśvaraḥ siddha eva|* ‘Whatever is an effect cannot exist without a creator equipped of particular powers of knowledge and action, just as pots and such [cannot exist without such a creator]. So too this entire universe is an effect. And therefore that too cannot come into being without a creator equipped of particular powers of knowledge and action. And so its creator, God, is established.’ (tr. GOODALL)

Cf. *Mataṅgapārameśvara, vidyāpāda* 99cd–100ab (p. 226):

*nimittakāraṇaṃ tv īśo hy upādānaṃ tu śaktayaḥ||
samavāyi tathā māyā kāryam etaj jagat sadā|*

‘The Lord is the instigating cause, as for [his] powers, they are the material cause, and *māyā* is the inseparable cause; this world is always the effect.’ (Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha in his *vṛtti ad loc.* seems to interpret *upādāna* as

*sahakārikāra*na and *samavāyin* as *upādāna*.)

Cf. also *Parākhyantra* 2.2–3:

mūrtāḥ sāvayavā ye 'rthā nānārūpaparicchadāḥ|
sthūlāvayavaśiṣṭatvād buddhimaddhetupūrvakāḥ||
ato 'sti buddhimān kaścīd īśvaraḥ samavasthitāḥ|
pratipannaḥ svakāryeṇa dr̥ṣṭeṇātrānumānataḥ||

‘All things that are endowed with form, that are made up of parts, that have various forms, because they are distinguished by having gross parts must necessarily depend on a sentient cause. Therefore there exists some sentient [cause]. [And that is] proved to be the Lord. He is known, according to this system, by the inference that we draw from His effects, which we directly experience.’ (tr. GOODALL)

Ibid. v. 12ab (Pratoda’s objection):

kṣīter evaṃvidhaṃ rūpaṃ na kadācid anīdr̥śam|

‘The form of the earth is thus; it was never not thus. (tr. GOODALL)

Ibid. 2.29abc (from Prakāśa’s reply):

nimittam īśvarākhyam yat tad dr̥ṣṭam sahakāraṇam|
upādānam ca yat sūkṣmaṃ

‘The instigating cause is called the ‘lord’; that which is the auxiliary cause is something seen [such as the stick, wheel, etc.]; that which is the material cause is subtle [matter].’ (tr. GOODALL)

The same arguments, establishing that composite entities like mountains must be products (which fact also serves to prove the necessity of God’s existence, since all effects require a cause, and special effects require a special cause), can be found e.g. in the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (p. 453: *bhūbhūdhārādeś ca kāryatvaṃ sāvayavatvena pratīyate, sāvayavasya nityatvavirodhāt, kha-*
nanādinā caikadeśavināśadarśanāt| ‘And we learn that the earth, mountains, etc. are products from the fact they are composite, for something which is composite cannot be permanent, and since we see that parts of it get destroyed through digging, etc.’), the *Nyāyavārttika* (pp. 433ff.) and also in two *Īśvarasiddhis* (one *vaiṣṇava* and the other *śaiva*): that of Yāmunācārya (pp. 158, 164.), and that of Utpaladeva (pp. 13ff.).

See also *Vyomavatī*, p. 70: *pr̥thivī kāryam, avayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt|*
yad yad avayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭam, tat tat kāryam dr̥ṣṭam, yathā ghaṭādī|
tathā cāvayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭā pr̥thivī, tasmāt kāryetī|; ‘The earth is a product, because it is characterised by the combination of [its] parts. If A is characterised by the combination of [its] parts then A is understood to be a product, like a pot. Accordingly the earth is characterised by the arrangement of [its] parts, therefore it is a product.’

Ibid. p. 101: *kṣityādīni kāryāni racanāvattvāt| yad yad racanāvat, tat tat*
kāryam, yathā ghaṭādī| tathā racanāvat kṣityādi, tasmāt kāryam iti| ‘The earth and [mountains and similar objects] are products, because they have arrangement. If A has arrangement then A is a product, like a pot. And the earth and [mountains and similar objects] have arrangement, therefore they are products.’

3.132 Cf. *Kiraṇavṛtti* ad 3.9ab: *nāpi rūpalabdhyādinā cakṣurādir iva pūrvokta-tanukaraṇabhuvanādikāryānyathānupapattilakṣaṇenānumānena tasya mahābhūtebhya evotpattidrṣṭeḥ| yad āhuḥ saugatāḥ—‘yasmin sati bhavaty eva yat tato ’nyasya kalpane| taddhetutvena sarvatra hetūnām anavasthitih||’* (*Pramāṇavārttika*, *pramāṇasiddhi* 26; Pandeya’s edition reads *yeṣu satsu*) ‘Nor [can we infer a creator God], in the same way as [we infer] the faculty of sight and other [sense faculties] by their effects, such as the perception of form, by an inference on the basis that we cannot otherwise account for [what must be the Lord’s] effects, such as the bodies, instruments and worlds mentioned above, since that [body of effects] is known from experience to arise from the [five] elements alone. As the Buddhists say: “If something comes into being when another thing exists and one posits as the cause of the former some entity other than the latter, then there is an infinite regress of causes.” (tr. GOODALL)

Also *Parākhyatantra* 2.4 (Pratoda’s objection):

kāryakāraṇasambandho na gṛhīto yatas tayoh| tena tatkāraṇābhāvān na khyāpyaṃ kāryadarśanam||

‘Since we do not perceive that there is a relation of cause and effect between them [viz. between God and the world we see], and [because] there is therefore nothing [that we know] to have caused this [world], therefore you should not proclaim that we have direct experience of [His] effects [since we do not know them to be effects].’ (tr. GOODALL)

Yāmunācārya cites a similar objection in his *Īśvarasiddhi* (pp. 163f.): *mahāmahādhārādī kāryaṃ na bhavati, prasiddhakāryavilakṣaṇatvāt, gagana-vaṭ, aśakyadarśanopādānopakaraṇatvād vā vyatirekeṇa ghaṭādivat|* ‘The earth, mountains and [similar objects] cannot be effects, since, like the air, they are different from well-known effects, or, unlike in the case of such things as a pot, it is impossible to see their material and instrumental causes.’

3.134 Cf. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s *vṛtti ad Mataṅgapārameśvara, vidyāpāda* 6.99 cd–100 ab (p. 228) where he also refutes Dharmakīrti’s objection (*Pramāṇavārttika*, *pramāṇasiddhi* 13–14) and then says: *anyathā mahānasa-vartino dhūmasyāgnikāryatvasiddhāv api parvatādivartinas tato ’nyatvād agnikāryatvasiddheḥ, ghaṭagatasya kṛtakatvasyānityatvasiddhāv api śabdā-sambandhīno ’siddheḥ sarvatrasiddhatvasya sambhavāt sarvānumānābhāva eva|* ‘Otherwise [i.e. if we accepted the Buddhist position], even though the smoke in the kitchen is proved to be an effect of fire, since the [smoke] on the mountain is different from the one [in the kitchen], we could not prove that it is [also] an effect of fire; [and] even though the artificiality of the pot is proved from its impermanence, [the artificiality] connected with sound could not be established; thus the possibility of not [being able to] draw a conclusion could occur everywhere, and so all inferences would be completely abolished.’

Cf. also Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha’s *Mṛgendravṛtti ad* 3.6cd–7ab (p. 110ff.).

3.136 Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* (Pandey), *pramāṇasiddhi* 13: *siddhaṃ yādṛg adhi-*

*ṣṭhātr̥bhāvābhāvānurvṛttimat| sanniveśādi tad yuktaṃ tasmād yad anumī-
yate||*

3.137 Rāmakaṇṭha also deals with this Buddhist objection in his *Kiraṇavṛtti* (pp. 72–73): *na ca kāryatvam atra tathābhūtaṃ na siddham ity āśaṅkanī-
yam| yad āhuḥ saugatāḥ— (Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi 13–14)*

*‘siddhaṃ yādṛg adhiṣṭhātr̥bhāvābhāvānurvṛttimat|
sanniveśādi tad yuktaṃ tasmād yad anumīyate||
vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdāsāmyād abhedinaḥ|
na yuktānumitiḥ pāṇḍudravayād iva hutāsane||
iti| kāryamātrasya kartṛmātreṇa ghaṭādau kṛtakatvamātrasyānityatvamā-
treṇeva vyāpteḥ siddhatvāt| anyathā tatrāpy anyatrāpi ca dṛṣṭāntasādhya-
dharmabhedena hetubhedakalpane sarvānumānābhāva eva| aviśeṣāt pāṇḍu-
tvasya tu bhāvād dhūmābhāve ’pi himamakkolādiṣu ca taddarśanād vah-
nyānumāpakatvam ayuktam eva|*

‘And it cannot be questioned that its being an effect in the same way is proved, as the Buddhists [do when they] say: “When that particular kind of compositeness etc. is established to be in positive and negative concomitance with the [existence of the] controller—it is fine that that [i.e. the existence of a controller] is inferred from that [kind of compositeness]. (N.B. The translation of this verse is mine.) But an inference in respect of some particular thing of something well-known from some [logical ground] which is similar [to that in some valid argument such as the one outlined above just] because the wording is the same is not correct. [It is] like [inferring the presence of] fire from [the presence of some] pale substance [simply because smoke can be called a pale substance].” [This objection does not hold] because it is established that every effect is invariably concomitant with an agent, as [we see] in the case of pots and such, just as being a product is invariably concomitant with impermanence. Otherwise both there and elsewhere, if one creates some [imaginary] differentiation of logical grounds by differentiating between the attribute that one wishes to prove and [that of] the example, then all inferences will be impossible. On the other hand, because it exists even where there is no smoke and because one sees it in snow and chalk, and the like, it would be wrong [to allow] that undifferentiated whiteness should be the basis for the inference of fire.’ (tr. GOODALL; cf. *Nyāyamañjarī*, vol. I, pp. 493–494, *Nyāyabhū-
ṣaṇa* pp. 480ff, Utpaladeva’s *Īśvarasiddhi* pp. 8f.)

See also *Vyomavatī*, p. 102: *atha dhūmasyāgnimātreṇa vyāpter upalambhāt
yatropalambhas tatraivāgniprasādhakatvād viruddhatānavakāśa iti cet, ihā-
pi samānaṃ, kāryatvasya buddhimatā vyāpter upalambhāt pakṣe tatsādha-
katvam iti|* ‘If [you object that], because we cognise that [the presence of] smoke is pervaded by [the presence of] fire alone, where we perceive [smoke] there and only there [smoke] proves [the presence of] fire, and thus there is no scope of erroneousness, [the train of thoughts] is the same in this case, too: because we cognise that the condition of being a product is pervaded by [the presence of a] rational [maker], [the presence of product-

ness] in the subject proves that [i.e. that it was made by a rational being].’ Later Vyomaśiva also quotes and refutes Dharmakīrti’s objection (*Pramāṇavārttika pramāṇasiddhi* 13–15 in *Vyomavatī*, pp. 106f.). He also makes the same remark about ‘whiteness’ as Rāmakaṇṭha, and adds: *evaṃ ca valmīkādāv api mṛdvikāratvaṃ na kulālapūrvakatve liṅgam, vyabhicārāt| tasya hi prākāreṣṭakādiṣv akulālapūrvakeṣv api sadbhāvāt|* ‘And thus, in the case of such things as ant-hills, too, the condition of being a modification of clay is not a logical reason which proves that [the activity of] a potter is a precondition [of their existence], because of the irregularity [of this logical reason], since it is also present in such things as walls or bricks, which are dependent on [the activity of somebody who is] not a potter.’

3.138 Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika, pramāṇasiddhi* 14, quoted above.

3.141 Cf. Rāmakaṇṭha’s refutation of Dharmakīrti’s objection (note ad 3.137).

See also *Parākhyatantra* 2.5:

*sambandho na gṛhīto vā kāryakāraṇatas tv iha|
kāryaṃ dṛṣṭvā parokṣaṃ tat kāraṇaṃ gamyate sphuṭam|
tādṛgvidhena kāryeṇa kartā kāryasya mīyate|*

‘You may argue that a relation [of cause and effect] is not perceived, but because of the [connection between] effect and cause [that we directly experience] in the world, it is clear that when we perceive [what must be] an effect, we understand [that there must have been] a cause of it that cannot directly be perceived by us. Through such an effect the creator of the effect is known.’ (tr. GOODALL)

Cf. also Yāmunācārya’s *Īśvarasiddhi*, p. 164: *na cedṛśa eva sanniveśaḥ kāryo netara ity avayavasanniveśapratīnyatam rūpabhedam udikṣāmahe|* ‘And we do not expect [to find] a difference in nature determined for each [particular case of] compositeness of constituent parts, in the form of “only this kind of compositeness is an effect, and not a different [kind]”.’

3.143 Cf. Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha’s commentary to *Mṛgendratantra* 3.2 (pp. 103ff.): *tad evaṃ kāryatvahetunā jagato buddhīmatkartṛpūrvakatvasiddhau yo ’sau tattadvaicitryasampādikecchājñānakriyāśaktiyuktaḥ, kartā sa ity asmadādikāryavilakṣaṇakṣityādīkāryaviśeṣajanakakāraṇaviśeṣāvagama yuktaḥ| na ca itad aprasiddhaṃ yasmād*

’vaiśiṣṭyaṃ kāryavaiśiṣṭyād dṛṣṭam lokasthitāv api|’

(as Dr. Goodall informed me in July 2001, this verse seems to belong to the text of the Tantra, and it is indeed quoted as part of the *mūla* in Trilocana’s *Siddhāntārthasamuccaya* T.206 p. 62, T.284 p. 133)

lokavyavahāre ’pi vaiśiṣṭyaṃ kāryaṃ dṛṣṭvā vaiśiṣṭam eva kāraṇam anumīyate, yathā vicitrabhavanādivastucitrālepādikalākalāpasyāmukhyatām madhyatvam anupamasauṇḍaryasampadam ca dṛṣṭvā, tattatkartur api tadgatavai- lakṣaṇyād vaiśiṣṭyaṃ avasīyate| ataś ca

’yad yathā yādṛśaṃ yāvat kāryaṃ tatkāraṇaṃ tathā|’

(...) evaṃ jagallakṣaṇakāryasya tattatprakārākāraṇavaiśiṣṭyaṃ upalabhya tattadviśeṣaviśayaniratisayajñānakriyāśaktiyuktaṃ kāraṇam anumīyate|

‘Therefore, having thus proved with the logical reason: ‘[the world] is an effect’ that the world is dependent on an intelligent creator, that person who is endowed with the powers of will, knowledge, and action, which [powers] bring about the manifold diversity [of the world]—that person is the creator: this is the correct ascertaining of an extraordinary cause which creates extraordinary effects such as the earth, which are different from the effects [produced by agents] of our ilk. And this is a well-known fact, since—

“The particular nature [of the cause] is learnt from the particular nature of the effect in everyday life as well.”

In everyday transactions, too, when we see a particular effect, we always infer a particular cause. For example, when we see that in a collection of artifacts like paintings depicting palaces and various other things some are inferior, others are mediocre, yet others have unequalled beauty, we also determine the particular qualities of each [artist] who made these [artifacts] on the basis of the differences in [the qualities of] these [objects]. And for this reason,—

“The cause has the same aspects, qualities, and dimensions as its effect.”
(...) Thus, having ascertained the manifoldness of the various forms of the effect [in question], namely the world, we infer a cause which is endowed with unsurpassed powers of knowledge and action, which have as their object these various particularities [of the world].’

Cf. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* p. 451: *yathā ’garukṛtadhūmaviśeṣāparijñāne ’pi tṛṇādikṛtadhūmaviśeṣebhyo vilakṣaṇaṃ dhūmam upalabhamānas tṛṇādibhyo vilakṣaṇam *evendhanam* (conj. : *ivendhanam* ed.) *anumāya tatrāptād agarusaṃjñāṃ pratyeti svayaṃ vā saṃjñāntaraṃ karoti, tathāsmadādikṛtakāryaviśeṣebhyo vilakṣaṇaṃ kṣityādikāryam upalabhamāno ’smadādibhyo vilakṣaṇaṃ kartāram anumāya tatrāptād īśvarasaṃjñāṃ pratyeti svayaṃ vā saṃjñāntaraṃ karotīti* | ‘Just as someone, even if he is not familiar with the particular smoke produced from [burning] *agaru*-wood, perceiving a smoke which is different from the particular smokes produced by [burning] grass etc., infers a fuel which is indeed different from grass etc., and then learns from a reliable person that this [fuel] is called *agaru* or himself gives it another name, in the same way when someone perceives such products as the earth which are different from the particular products made by our ilk, he infers a maker who is different from our ilk and then learns from a reliable person that this [maker] is called the Lord, or himself gives it another name.’

See also *Vyomavatī*, p. 102, where Vyomaśiva proves that the Creator must be an omniscient person.

3.145 talk about *ex conj.*

3.149 See *Vyomavatī*, p. 103: *athāgnidhūmayoḥ pratyakṣeṇa sambandhasiddher anumānapravṛttir yuktā, naivam atreti cet, na, ihāpi kāryatvasyādhiṣṭātpūrvakatvena sambandhasiddher anumānaṃ pravartata iti* | *athāgnir anumānād ūrdhvam api pratyakṣo maivam īśvara ity anumānaṃ katham iti*

*cet, na, atyantaparoḥṣasyāpi cakṣurāder upalabdhyanumeyatvāt| athātra sāmānyena kriyāyāḥ *karaṇakāryatvopalabdher (conj. : kāraṇa° ed.) anumānam, tarhi kāryatvasya sāmānyena karṭṭpūrvakatvopalabdher anumānam iti| (...) na ca sarve dṛṣṭāntadharmā dārṣṭāntike 'pi bhavanti, abhede dṛṣṭāntadārṣṭāntikavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgāt| na hi chidikriyāyāḥ karaṇaṃ kuṭhārādi dṛṣṭam iti rūpopalabdhyakriyāyām api tathā bhavati| yathā cātrāpāstaviśeṣeṇa karaṇena kriyāyā vyāptatvād anumānam, evam īśvarānumāne 'pi|* 'If [you object that] we are right to make the inference because the connection between fire and smoke is established through sense-perception, [but] in this case [of inferring God] it is not so, [then I reply that your objection is] not [valid], since in this instance, too, the inference works because it is established that the condition of being an effect is connected with the condition of being dependent on a controller [of the production]. If [you object that] fire is also visible after the inference [has been made], [but] the Lord is not thus, so how could we infer [His existence], [then I reply that your objection is] not [valid], since the faculty of sight and [other sense-faculties] can be inferred from perception, even though they are completely invisible. If [you say that] in this case we make the inference from perceiving the fact that [any] action in general is the effect of an instrument, then [in the case of mountains etc.] we make the inference from perceiving the fact that an effect in general requires an agent. (...) And not all properties of the example belong also to the thing it illustrates, since, if they were the same, talking about example and exemplified would become impossible. For just because such things as an axe are observed to be the instrument of the action of cutting, it is not thus in the case of the action of perceiving colours. And just as in this case we make the inference from the fact that action [in general] is invariably concomitant with an instrument devoid of any particularities, [we make the inference] in the same way also in the case of inferring the Lord.'

Cf. note ad 3.132.

3.154 Cf. note ad 3.132.

3.155 this incurable headache *ex conj.* The feminine pronoun *iyam* (omitted by RAGHAVAN and THAKUR) suggests that the subject of the sentence is *śirortih*. Instead of emending *bhaiṣajyā* to *abhaiṣajyā*, one might consider conjecturing *bhiṣajā* or *bhaiṣajyena*.

3.157 The universe created by God must have a function: it helps the souls to gather the fruits of their actions through a long series of rebirths. But this theory comes to nothing if no eternal Self exists attached to our perishable body. Says Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha's *Mṛgendravṛtti ad 6.1ab (atha viśvanimittasya prāptaṃ lakṣaṇam ātmanaḥ|)* (p.149): *viśvasya jagato nimittaṃ pravartanahetur ātmā tadbhogasāadhanāya tanukaraṇabhuvanā-dīnām utpatteḥ|* 'The Self is the cause of the whole universe, [i.e. it is] the reason of its creation, since bodies, sense faculties, and worlds come into being so that it can experience [the fruits of its past *karmas*].'

The following verses of the Tantra further clarify why the universe must have been created for the souls (vv. 6.2–3ab):

*kāryaṃ kṣityādi karteśas tat kartur nopayujyate|
na svārtham apy acidbhāvān nānarthyam kartṛgauravāt||
pāriśeṣyāt parārtham tat kṣetrajñāḥ sa paras tayoh|*

‘The earth etc. are the product, [their] creator is the Lord. This [product] is of no use to the creator. Neither does it exist for itself, since it is unconscious. It cannot be useless because of the gravity of the creator. Since there is no other alternative left, it must exist for the sake of another, [and] it is the knower of the field [i.e. the Self] which is that “other” [different] from those two [namely the creator and his creation].’

Then the Cārvāka objects the following (v. 3cd):

paro dehas tadarthatvāt parārthāḥ kṣmādayo nanu||

‘Surely that “other” is the body; earth etc. exist for the sake of something else in so far as they exist for its sake.’

Then we have the answer to this objection (v. 4ab):

kāyo ’py acittvād ānyārthyam sutarām pratipadyate|

‘The body, too, since it is insentient, certainly exists for the sake of something else.’

The Cārvāka then puts forth that the body itself is conscious, but the *siddhāntin* rejects this view (vv. 4cd–5):

*cetanaś cet na bhogyatvād vikāritvāc ca jātucit||
bhogyā vikāriṇo dṛṣṭāś cidvihināḥ paṭādayaḥ|
yasmīn sati ca sattvād vā na saty api śave citiḥ||*

‘If you say that [the body] is sentient, [then my answer is:] never, because it is the object of experience [and not the subject], and because it changes. Things which are the objects of experience and which are subject to change, such as cloths, are seen to be devoid of consciousness. Or [if you say that the body is conscious] because the one [i.e. the soul] exists as long as the other [i.e. the body] exists, [this objection is also wrong, because] even if the corpse exists there is no consciousness [in it].’

In the *Mataṅgapārameśvara* first Mataṅga sets forth the Cārvāka position that there is no Self other than the body, and consciousness is just the result of some chemical process in the body (vv. 6.5cd–7ab). In his commentary Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha mentions some details of the materialist view, the final conclusion of which is well known from other sources as well (p. 138): *ata eva ca śarīravīnāśe draṣṭur api vīnāśāt paralokīno ’bhāvāt paralokāsiddhir ity uktam— ’yāvajjīvaṃ sukhaṃ jīven nāsti mṛtyur agocaraḥ| bhaṣmābhūtasya śāntasya punarāgamaṇam kutaḥ|| iti|* ‘And for this very reason, since there is no transmigrating entity because the experiencing agent also perishes when the body perishes, transmigration [itself] is [also] not established. Thus it is said: “Man should live happily as long as he is alive. There is no one who can avoid death. How could a dead man who has been reduced to ashes return [to life] again?”’ Cf. BHATTACHARYA, p. 610, *śloka* 7.

3.161 aware of itself Cf. *Kiraṇavṛtti ad 2.25ab* (p. 53): *ātmā svasaṃvedanena svaparātmaprakāśatayā pratipurusaṃ siddhyati kim anyena sādhanena* | ‘A soul is proved to exist in every man by one’s own experience as being manifest both to itself and to other souls. What need is there of further proof?’ (tr. GOODALL) See also *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa ad 1.5* (p. 14), and *Mṛgendratāntra 6.5* (quoted above).

3.161 single synthesizer Cf. *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa ad 1.4* (p. 9): *satyam, ata evendriyādir iva kāryāt so ’pīcchātmakād anumīyata iti naiyāyikāḥ* | (...) *icchā hi pūrvānubhūtasukhasādhanatvādyanusandhānasāmarthyasiddhatatsamānakartṛtvajñānasahabhāvinīti jñātrantarebhya iva śarīravijñānāntarādibhyo ’pi kāryatvena vyāvartamānā viśiṣṭaṃ jñātāraṃ sthīram anumāpayatīty ātmasiddhiḥ* | ‘Say the Naiyāyikas: “True [i.e. the Self is imperceptible]. For this very reason, just as such [invisible things] as the sense-faculties [are inferred from their effects], it [i.e. the Self] is also inferred from an effect, namely desire.” (...) For desire will [necessarily] arise together with the cognition that it has the same agent [as the previous experience had], which [cognition] is established through the capacity of synthesizing, for instance, the formerly experienced fact that something is a means of accomplishing pleasure. Thus, inasmuch as it cannot be the effect of another cognition, the body, and the like, just as [it cannot be the effect] of other cognising subjects, [desire] induces us to infer a particular, stable cognising subject: this proves the [existence of the] Self.’ Alex Watson has pointed out (WATSON, note 51, p. 63; p. 65) the close resemblance between the *naiyāyika* view as presented by Rāmakaṇṭha and Jayanta’s arguments in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. II, pp. 278f).

3.165 ... the contact of its threads with one another disintegrates Cf. Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha’s definition of *kārya*, quoted in note ad 3.180. See also *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa p. 114*: *yatra yatra sāvayavatvaṃ tatra tatra kāryatā yathā ghaṭādau* | *yatra tu kāryatvaṃ nāsti tatra sāvayavatvaṃ nāsti yathātmādau* | ‘If A is composite than A is an effect, like such things as a pot. But if A is not an effect then A is not composite, like such things as the Self.’

3.165 it must be eternal Cf. Rāmakaṇṭha’s commentary *ad Mataṅgapārameśvara vidyāpāda 6.34–35* (p. 172): *grāhyopādhibhede ’py anāsvādita-svātmabhedah, kālatraye ’pi tiraskṛtasvagataprāgabdhāvaprādhvaṃsābhāvo, nānāvidhapramāṇādyanekacittavṛttyudayasamvedane ’py akampitatadgrāhakaṣṭhāiryavedano, vṛttyantarāleṣv apy aviluptajyotiḥ, suṣuptādāv apy akhaṇḍitasvasamvit, satatam evārthāvagamakatvena bhāsanād ātmapada-pratipādyah pratipurusaṃ svasaṃvedanasiddhah *sthīra eva* (ed. MSS ū, ṛ, ṛ : *sthīrabhāva* ed.) *iti kim atrānyena sādhanena?* | ‘[The grasping subject] never experiences [any] differentiation in itself, even though the adventitious factors, i.e. the objects of cognition are different; [both possible forms of] its own [non-existence:] non-existence prior to production and non-existence after destruction are concealed from it in all three times;

even though it cognises the arising of many conditions of the mind due to various means of knowledge and the like, it has an unshaken cognition of the stability of [itself as] the grasper of these [thoughts and feelings]; its radiance is unimpaired even in the intervals of the [mental] activities; its self-cognition is unbroken even in deep sleep and [similar conditions]; it is expressed by the word ‘Self’ because it always shines forth as the conveyor of knowledge about objects; it is established through self-cognition for each one of us as permanent: so what other proof is needed in its case?’ The same sentence (with variations) is found in Rāmakaṇṭha’s *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa* ad 1.5 (p. 14, see WATSON, p. 127ff), and *Paramokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti* (p. 294 in *Aṣṭaparakaraṇam: Tattvaprakāśa-Tattvasaṅgraha-Tattvatrayanirṇaya-Ratnatraya-Bhogakārikā-Nādakārikā-Mokṣakārikā-Paramokṣanirāsakārikā*, ed. Brajavallabha Dvivedī, Yogatantra-granthamālā 12, Vārāṇasī, 1988).

3.165 Because... Cf. BHATTACHARYA, p. 605, IV.2.

3.165 the Self has to be inferred to be eternal Cf. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s commentary (p. 18) on *Kiraṇatantra* 1.15 (*paśur ... amūrto*): *kiṃ ca amūrtatvam asya prāgvad eva mūrtopalakṣitasparśayuktamahābhūtākāraśārīrād anyatvaṃ tadgrāhakatayā prakāśanād ity anubhavenaiva bhūtātmaniṣedhaḥ| ata eva bhūtodbhūtāc cāsya vilakṣaṇatvenānubhavān na bhūtebhyaḥ samutpattiḥ| pratijanma pūrvatarajanmānubhavasamaṅskārotpannasmarāṇapūrvaceṣṭādarśanato ’nāditvena nityatvena siddheś ca|* ‘Moreover [the statement] that the soul is ‘formless’ means, as [has been said] before, that it is different from the body, which has the form of the coarse elements that are amenable to the sense of touch and that are characterised as ‘having form’, because it [i.e. the soul] manifests as that which perceives those [bodies and things made up of coarse elements]. Thus [the contention that] the soul [is] composed of the [coarse] elements is refuted by experience itself. From this it follows that it does not arise from the elements, since it is experienced as different also from all that arises from the elements and because it is established to be eternal, because it is beginningless, since we perceive in every birth actions that are dependent on memory arising from the mental traces of experience in previous births.’ (tr. GOODALL)

3.168 Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* 3.2.60: *pūrvakṛtaphalānubandhāt tadutpattiḥ|* ‘It [i.e. the body] comes into being due to the continuing existence of the fruits of the previously performed actions.’

Nyāyabhāṣya ad loc. (p. 210): *pūrvāśarīre yā pravṛttir vāgbuddhiśārīrārambhalakṣaṇā tat pūrvakṛtaṃ karmoktam| tasya phalaṃ tajjanitau dharmā-dharmau| tatphalasyānubandha ātmasamavetasyāvasthānam| tena avasthitena prayuktebhyo bhūtebhyas tasyotpattiḥ śarīrasya, na svatantrebhyaḥ|* ‘Previously performed action is said to be the activity [made] in the previous body, namely an effort made with voice, intellect, or body. Its fruits are merit and demerit produced by it. The continuing existence of its

fruit [means] that [the fruit] stays inherently attached to the Self. The body comes into being from the elements which have been impelled by this staying [fruit], and not from independent[ly acting elements].’

See also Uddyotakara’s commentary *ad loc.* (*Nyāyavārttika* p. 415): *puruṣa-guṇaviśeṣaprēritabhūtapūrvakaṃ śarīraṃ puruṣārthakriyāsāmarthyāt| yadyat puruṣārthakriyāsamarthaṃ tat tat puruṣaguṇaviśeṣaprēritabhūtapūrvakaṃ dr̥ṣṭaṃ yathā rathādi puruṣaguṇena prayatnena prēritair bhūtair ārabhyamāṇaṃ puruṣārthakriyāsamarthaṃ dr̥ṣṭaṃ| tathā ca śarīraṃ|* ‘The [creation of the] body depends on the elements which are impelled by particular human qualities, since [the body] is able perform actions fulfilling human purposes. Anything that is capable to perform actions fulfilling human purposes is seen to depend on the elements which are impelled by particular human qualities, as a chariot, which is made of the elements impelled by effort: a human quality, is seen to be able to perform actions fulfilling human purposes. The same is true about the body.’

As for entities other than the body, the objection is raised that their coming into being does not have any cause, since we see for example that thorns prick without any apparent reason (*Nyāyasūtra* 4.1.22: *animitto bhāvotpattiḥ kaṅṭakataikṣṇyādidarśanāt|*) According to Vātsyāyana, the same argument that establishes *adr̥ṣṭa* (i.e. merit and demerit caused by former actions) as the cause of the arising of the body can be employed to refute this objection as well (*Nyāyabhāṣya ad loc.*, pp. 229ff.) Uddyotakara remarks that we see that certain things which possess a particular kind of shape do have a cause of their coming into being. From this we infer that other composite things, such as thorns or bodies, are also produced by some cause, even if we never see them being actually produced (*Nyāyavārttika* p. 442). The preceding *nyāyasūtras* reject the assumption that God alone can be the cause of the world’s creation, because ‘if men do not have any karma [i.e. if they do not perform any action] then no fruit is produced’ (4.1.20: *puruṣakarmābhāve phalāniṣpatteḥ|*).

The texts of the Śāiva Siddhānta also take karma to be the cause of the variety of worldly phenomena (certainly not in itself, but under God’s supervision). See *Parākhyaṅtra* 2.8:

*sambandhāgrahaṇe karma hetutvena kathaṃ tanau|
dr̥ṣṭvā citraśarīrāṇi karmasattādhigamyate||*

‘How [do we understand] past actions to be the cause of the body though we do not perceive the causal connection? After perceiving various bodies the existence of [the retributive force of] past action is understood.’ (tr. GOODALL)

The soul’s experiences are determined by its karma, and the worldly phenomena come into being in order to become the objects of these experiences. See *Svāyambhuvasūtrasaṅgraha*, *vidyāpāda* with the commentary of Sadyojotis (pp. 22f.):

*bhogo ’sya vedanā puṃsaḥ sukhaduḥkhādīlakṣaṇā|
tām samarthitacaitanyaḥ puṃān abhyeti karmataḥ||1.12||
vedanā saṃvittir anubhavaḥ| sukhaduḥkhādibhir viśayair uparaktatvāt tair*

eva lakṣyate viśiṣyate, sukhā vedanā duḥkhā vedanā mūḍhā vedaneti| tāṃ ca pravṛttivat kalāsamarthitacaitanyaḥ kalayāvīyukta eva pumān abhyeti prāpnoti karmata ālambanāt| sukhaduḥkhamohabhāvena pariṇataṃ karma puṃsām vedanāyā ālambanaṃ bhavatīti| karmataś ca śarīrāṇītyādi|

karmataś ca śarīrāṇi viśayāḥ karaṇāni ca|

bhogasamsiddhaye bhoktur bhavanti na bhavanti ca||13||

śarīrādīnāṃ yāv api bhāvābhāvau bhogasya nimittabhūtau tāv api karmato nimittād iti| sarvathā yat kiṃcid bhoganimittam tat sarvaṃ karmata iti| tatrodāharaṇaṃ putrānnādibhāvaḥ sukhabhoganimittam, ahikaṇṭakādibhāvo duḥkhabhoganimittam iti putrānnadyabhāvo duḥkhamohabhoganimittam, ahikaṇṭakādyabhāvaḥ sukhabhoganimittam|

‘ “Experience is the soul’s sensation, which is characterised by such [feelings] as pleasure, pain, etc. The soul whose consciousness is empowered attains this [sensation] as a result of [its] karma.” Sensation [means] cognising, experiencing. Since it is coloured by [its] objects such as pleasure and pain, it is characterised, [i.e.] particularised by them as “pleasurable sensation”, “painful sensation”, [or] “uncertain sensation”. And, similarly to activity, only that soul attains it, [i.e.] obtains it, whose consciousness is empowered by *kalā* (limited power of action), [i.e.] which is not separated from *kalā*, [and it has this experience] as a result of its karma which is [its] cause. For karma, having transformed itself into the [mental] states of pleasure, pain, and uncertainty, becomes the cause of the sensation of the souls. [The next verse is] “And as a result of karma bodies. . .” “And as a result of karma bodies, sense objects, and faculties [of cognition and action] do or do not come into being in order to accomplish the experience of the experiencing subject.” The verse says (*iti*) that the existence and non-existence of bodies and the like, which [existence or non-existence] are the causes of experience, also depend on karma as [their instrumental] cause. For in all circumstances everything that is the cause of experience results from karma. For example, the existence of sons, food, etc. is the cause of experiencing pleasure; the existence of snakes, thorns, etc. is the cause of experiencing pain; thus the non-existence of sons, food, etc. is the cause of experiencing pain or uncertainty, [while] the non-existence of snakes, thorns, etc. is the cause of experiencing pleasure.’

Also *Kiraṇavṛtti ad 3.7* (p. 66): *puruṣāṇāṃ hi sarvadā śarīrabhogādīvaicitryānyathānupapattiyā karmaṇaḥ sattvaṃ sṛṣṭikāle ’pi paśumṛgapakṣisarīsṛpa-sthāvaramanusyādījanmavaicitryaśruteḥ|* ‘For *karman* exists at all times for souls, since the diversity of experience [mediated] through [different] bodies and so on could not otherwise be accounted for, for scripture tells us that even at the time of creation there was a diversity of births as domestic and wild beasts, as birds, creeping animals, plants, humans and so on.’ (tr. GOODALL) Cf. *Mataṅgapārameśvara 6.97cd* and Rāmakaṇṭha’s commentary *ad loc.* (pp. 224f), *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa ad 2.14* (pp. 139ff.), *Abhidharmakośa 4.1a* (*karmajaṃ lokavaicitryam*).

3.170 The body is defined as follows in the *Nyāyasūtra* (1.1.11): *ceṣṭendriyārthā-*

śrayaḥ śarīram | ‘Our body is the substratum of volitions, sense-faculties, and sense-objects.’ (Cf. *Nyāyavārttika* ad loc. (p. 65): *na hi gandhādayo ’rthāḥ śarīravṛttayaḥ, yat tu teṣāṃ kāryaṃ sukhaduḥkhopalabdhinimittatvam, tad nāsati śarīre bhavati, iti śarīrāśrayā ity ucyante* | ‘For sense-objects such as smell are not located in the body, but their function, namely the condition of being causes of feeling pleasure or pain, is impossible if the body does not exist: that is why they are taught to have the body as their substratum.’) Since our pleasurable and painful experiences are the results of our former deeds, the creation of our body, which is the *sine qua non* of these experiences, is also determined by karma (*Nyāyasūtra* 3.2.60: *pūrvakṛtaphalānubandhāt tadutpattiḥ* | ‘It [i.e. the body] arises as a consequence of the result [i.e. merit and demerit] of former deeds’), just as the conjunction of particular souls with particular bodies (*śarīrotpattinimittavat saṃyogotpattinimittam karma* |, *Nyāyasūtra* 3.2.66).

3.171 Although Vṛddhāmbhi is a *cārvāka*, accepting the role of karma in the creation of the body does not seem to worry him very much. We would expect a die-hard *nāstika* to hold that the body arises from the elements which are independent of karma (cf. *Nyāyabhāṣya* ad *Nyāyasūtra* 3.2.61 (*pūrvapakṣa*): *karmanirapekṣebhyo bhūtebhyaḥ śarīram utpannam*).

3.172 According to the Naiyāyikas, the fruition of karma alone is not enough to explain the creation of the world: an intelligent creator must also take an essential part in the process. Says Vātsyāyana (*Nyāyabhāṣya* ad 4.1.21): *puruṣakāram īśvaro ’nugṛhṇāti* | *phalāya puruṣasya yatamānasyeśvaraḥ phalaṃ sampādayatīti* | *yadā na sampādayati, tadā puruṣakarmāphalaṃ bhavati* | ‘God favours human effort, which means (*iti*) that God makes the result [of karma] come about for a man who strives to attain the result. This [also] means (*iti*) that when [God] does not make [it] come about then the person’s karma becomes fruitless.’

Uddyotakara’s commentary on the same *sūtra* (pp. 433ff): *yenaiva nyāyeneśvarasya kāraṇatvaṃ sidhyati, tenaivāstitvam iti* | (...) *pradhānaparamāṇukarmāṇi prāk pravṛtter buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni pravartante, acetanatvād, vāsyādivad iti* | *yathā vāsyādi buddhimatā takṣṇādhiṣṭhitam acetanatvāt pravartate, tathā pradhānaparamāṇukarmāṇy acetanāni pravartante* | *tasmāt tāny api buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni* | (...) *dharmādharmau buddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitau puruṣasyopabhogaṃ kurutaḥ, kāraṇatvāt, vāsyādivad iti* | *ātmaivādhiṣṭhitā dharmādharmau bhaviṣyatīti cet, yasya tau dharmādharmau sa evādhiṣṭhitā bhaviṣyatīti na yuktam, prāk kāyākāraṇotpattes tadasambhavāt* | (...) *yadi ca puruṣaḥ svatantraḥ pravartate, na duḥkhaṃ kuryāt* | *na hi kaścīd ātmano duḥkham icchatīti* | *yaś cātmano ’ngopaghātaṃ śiraśchedādi vā karoti, so ’pi tadvaikalye prāyaṇe vā hitabuddhiḥ pravartata iti* | *yadi punar dharmādharmaubhyām evādhiṣṭhitāḥ paramāṇavaḥ pravarteran, na yuktam idam, acetanatvāt* | *na hi kiñcid acetanaṃ svatantram adhiṣṭhāyakaṃ drṣṭam iti* | ‘The same argumentation which proves that God is a cause also proves that he exists. (...) The

source of the material world, particles, and karmas become active when presided over by an intelligent cause before becoming active, since they are insentient, like such things as axes. Just as such things as axes become active when presided over by an intelligent carpenter, since they are insentient, in the same way, the source of the material world, particles, and karmas also become active [though they are] insentient, and therefore they are also presided over by an intelligent cause. (...) Merit and demerit bring about experience for man in as much as they are presided over by an intelligent cause, since they are instruments, like such things as axes. If [you object that] it is the Self alone that presides over merit and demerit, [then the answer is that] it is not proper that the same person will be the overseer to whom those merit and demerit belong, since this is impossible before the body and the sense faculties come into being. (...) Furthermore, if the soul acted at will, it would not create pain [for itself]. For nobody desires pain for himself. When somebody injures his own body or cuts off his own head etc., that man also acts in the belief that it is beneficial to mutilate that [body of his], or to die. On the other hand, if the subtle particles became active when presided over by merit and demerit alone, this would not be appropriate, since [merit and demerit] are insentient. For no insentient thing has been seen to be an autonomous overseer.’ See also *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* p. 452: *karmaṇo ’py acetanatvān na svataḥpravṛttir nāpi pravartakatvam, na hy acetano *hetur acetanānām* (conj. : *hetuś cetanānām* ed.) *adhiṣṭhātā kaścīd aviśeṣād adṛṣṭatvāc ca| adhiṣṭhātur acetanatve ca nīrabhiprāyavyāpāratvāt tadadhiṣṭhītebhyo ghuṇādīpadavinyāsan na deśādīnīyatasvabhāvaṃ kāryam upapadyate| (...) buddhimadadhiṣṭhītebhya eva hi citralekhādīyupādānopakaraṇebhyaḥ sthāvaraṅgamajā-tiviśeṣākṛtiṣv avayavaracanāviśeṣanīyamopalabdhiḥ|* ‘Since karma is unconscious, it cannot perform any action by itself, neither can it propel [other things], for no unconscious cause can preside over unconscious things, because it does not differ [from them], and because nobody has seen [such an unconscious overseer]. Furthermore, if the overseer were unconscious, because its activity would be unintentional, no effect whose nature is regulated through place, [time,] etc. would come into being from things presided over by that [unconscious overseer], just as in the case when a worm leaves its traces [in palm-leaf or wood, which may accidentally resemble letters]. (...) For one obtains the regularity of the particular arrangement of the constituents in the case of the shapes of particular species of animate and inanimate things only from those materials and instruments, such as a painting, which have been presided over by an intelligent [being].’

The authors of Śaiva Siddhānta expounded similar views. Says Rāmakaṇṭha in his *Kīraṇavṛtti ad* 3.12 (p. 74):

atra parābhiprāyaḥ|

karma cet (12d)

anena hi prayogavacanena bhavadbhiḥ kartṛmātraṃ sādhyam upakṣiptam| tac cobhayavādisiddham karmāstv iti śrāvaṇaḥ śabda itivat siddhasādhana-

*tvād ayuktam etat| yad āhur jaiminīyāḥ (Ślokavārttika sambandhākṣepa-
parihāra 75)—*

*kasyacid dhetumātrasya yady adīṣṭhātṛteṣyate|
karmabhiḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ tatsiddheḥ siddhasādhanam||
iti| atra siddhāntaḥ|*

na hy acetanam|| (12d)

*na siddhasādhanam yasmāt karmācetanam iti| ayam arthaḥ| nāsmābhir
atra kartṛtvamātram sādhyate 'pi tu viśiṣṭajñānakriyāyuktaḥ karteti kuto
'cetanaiḥ karmabhiḥ siddhasādhanam iti|*

‘Here [follows] an opponent’s opinion:

“What if it is *karman* [that is the cause of the universe]?”

All that you have put forward to be proved with this syllogism [of yours] is [the existence of] some agent. Let that [agent] be *karman*, which is accepted by both sides in the dispute, and thus this [argument of the Saiddhāntika] is inappropriate, because the syllogism would then prove what is already well-established, just like the assertion ‘sound is audible’. As the Mīmāṃsakas assert, “If one requires just any cause to preside [over the creation of the universe, then let this role be performed] by [the fruits of past] actions, since they are proved to exist for all beings. [And in that case the fault of] proving what is already established [vitiates the argument].” In response to this [the view of] the Siddhānta is:

“No, because [*karman* is] insentient.”

This is not [a case of] proving what is already established, because *karman* is insentient. What is meant by this is that we have not sought to prove here simply that there must be an agent, but that there is an agent equipped with particular [powers of] knowledge and action. Why then should there be [the logical fault of] proving what is already established because of insentient actions [being all that is proved]?” (tr. GOODALL) Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha in his *Mṛgendravṛtti* (pp.108ff.) also rejected the possibility that either karma (quoting *Ślokavārttika, sambandhākṣepa-parihāra 75*) or *māyā* could be the agent of creation, on the ground that both are insentient. (The Vaiśeṣika Vyomaśiva also quotes and refutes *Ślokavārttika sambandhākṣepaparihāra 75* in *Vyomavatī*, pp.103f.)

See also *Parākhyantra* 2.12cd (Pratoda’s objection):

tanvādeḥ kāraṇam karma kalpītena matena kim||

‘The cause of bodies and such is [the retributive force of] past action. Why trouble with some artificial theory?’ (tr. Goodall)

Ibid. v. 15ab (Prakāśa’s reply):

asya dṛṣṭasya hetur vā karmākhyo buddhimān bhavet|

‘Or [you might be forced to maintain that] the cause of this perceived [universe] that we call [the retributive force of] past action must be endowed with sentience.’ (tr. Goodall)

Yāmunācārya in his *Āgamaprāmāṇya* (p. 25) also argues against the agency of unconscious karmas: *cetanānadhiṣṭitāni tāni* [i.e. *karmāṇi*] *na kāryāṇi janayitum utsahante, acetanatvād vāsīvat| na hi cetanena takṣṇā 'nadhiṣṭhitā vāsī svayam eva yūpādāny āpādayitum alam* ‘Those [karmas] are not

capable of producing effects without being presided over by a sentient [agent], since they are insentient, like an axe. For an axe is not able to bring about such things as posts if it is not presided over by a sentient carpenter.’ (Cf. Uddyotakara’s commentary ad *Nyāyasūtra* 4.1.21, quoted above.)

3.174 See *Vyomavatī*, p. 103: *sarvam acetanaṃ cetanādhiṣṭhitam pravartamaṇam dr̥ṣṭam, yathā tantvādi, tathā ca karmādi* ‘All insentient things, such as threads etc., are seen to become active when presided over by a sentient [agent], and the same is true about karmas.’

3.180 The Cārvāka’s objection may bring to our mind Maṇḍanamiśra’s arguments against a single creator God, also quoted by Rāmakaṇṭha in his *Kiraṇavṛtti* (p. 73): *nāpi dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhanā ’yaṃ viruddhaḥ| yathāha maṇḍanaḥ* (*Vidhiviveka*, pp. 219 and 224)—

*sanniveśādimat sarvaṃ buddhimaddhetu yadyapi|
prasiddhasanniveśāder ekakāraṇatā kutah||
rathādyavayavā nānātakṣanirmāpitā api|
dr̥ṣyante jagati prāya upakāryopakārah|
iti| yato rathādyavayavānām anekataṣṇanirmītanām api naikasthapatibud-
dhikriyābhyāṃ vinaikarathārambhakatvaṃ dr̥ṣṭam*

‘Nor is the [logical ground] contradicted as proving [some quality that is] the opposite of the nature of the subject of the argument, as Maṇḍana states: “Although everything that is composite and so on must have a sentient cause, how can one say that well-known composite things and so on have only one cause? Although the parts of something like a chariot are constructed by various craftsmen, generally one experiences that things in the universe which help to [bring something about] require [in turn] to be helped [themselves].” [The counter argument above is wrong,] because although the parts of something like a chariot are [individually] created by various craftsmen, they are not seen to create a chariot without the knowledge and action of a single master craftsman.’ (tr. GOODALL) See also his *Mataṅgavṛtti ad* 6.99cd–100ab (p. 229).

Maṇḍanamiśra’s objection had already been quoted and rejected by Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha in his commentary (p. 103) to the following verse of the *Mṛgendratāntra* (3.1): *athopalabhya dehādi vastu kāryatvadharmakam| kar-
tāram asya jānīmo viśiṣṭam anumānataḥ||* Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha first establishes that everything that had been first non-existent and that was subsequently made existent is an effect; since the body is such, it is also an effect (p. 99: *abhūtvā bhāvitvam eva hi kāryatvam, tac ca dehasyopala-
bhyata eva*). Another reason which proves that things such as the body are products is the fact that they are composite and impermanent (ibid.: *kiṃ ca sanniveśaviśeṣavattvād vinaśvaratvāc ca dehādeḥ kāryatvam apah-
notum aśakyam| yad yat sanniveśaviśeṣavad vinaśvaram, tat tat kāryam
yathā ghaṭādi*). The next step in the argumentation is to show that every effect is dependent on a sentient agent (ibid.: *yad yat kāryam tat
tad buddhimatkarṭṭpūrvakaṃ dr̥ṣṭam yathā rathādi| yat tu naivamaṇvidham,*

na tat kāryam yathātmādi). Wild plants, rice, forest trees are also part of the subject of the argument, since it has not been proved that they were not produced by an agent (p. 100: *na cāyam akṛṣṭajātaiḥ śālyādibhir vanadrumādibhir vānaikāntikaḥ, teṣu kartrabhāvasyāniścayāt teṣāṃ ca pa-kṣībhūtāt*). The Mīmāṃsakas might object that pots are made by potters, not by God (*Śloka-vārttika sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 79 is quoted), but then it was the Lord who made the potters capable of making pots. Then follows Maṇḍanamiśra's objection and its refutation.

The Naiyāyika Bhāsarvajña also argues against the multiplicity of creators in his *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* (p. 476, probably referring to Prajñākaragupta's objection: *tathā bahubhir ekasya bahūnāṃ caikataḥ kriyā, Pramāṇavārtikā-lanikāra*, v. 2.234, p. 37): *nanu caikasyāpi kāryasyaikaḥ kartā bahavaś ca dṛśyante, tathā bahūnāṃ apy eko bahavaś ca| tat katham avagamyate— 'sarvasya jagata eka eveśvaraḥ kartā na tu bahavo 'nīśvarā' iti? uktam atra| yaḥ paridṛṣṭāni kāraṇāni prayunkte, taiś ca na prayujyate sa svatantraḥ kartety ucyate| na cānīśvarasya paramāṇvadṛṣṭādiṣu bhūbhūdhara-śārīrābhyanantarāvayavādiṣu ca paridarśanapūrvakam prayoktrtvam sambhava-ti| tatra bahavo 'nīśvarāḥ kṣityādeḥ kartāraḥ prāsādaviśeṣasyevāsaṅkhyā-tā api stanamdhayā iti| atheśvarā eva bahavaḥ kṣityādeḥ kartāra iṣyante, tathā saty apasiddhāntas te prāpnoti| ekanirākaraṇe ca bahvabhyupagamo 'niṣṭaparihāre 'tikauśalaṃ khyāpayati| kim ca teṣāṃ īśvarāṇāṃ kim aiśva-ryam sarvajñatvam anuttamā śaktiś cāsti na vā? yady asti, tadānekeśva-rakalpanayā kim? vaiyarthyaṭ| atha nāsti, tadā teṣāṃ nīyamitā kaścit pra-bhur asti, anyathā katham avirodhena sadā jagadutpattyādiṣu pravarterann iti?* ‘ “But surely, we see that one product has [sometimes] one, and [some-times] many makers, and similarly many [products can] also have one or many [makers]. So how can one ascertain that the whole world has only one creator: the Lord, and not many [creators] who are not gods?” We have [already] answered [this objection]. That person who employs the causes which he thoroughly knows and who is not employed by them is said to be the autonomous agent. And someone who is not God cannot employ such things as particles and *adrṣṭa* (the result of good and bad deeds), or for example the interior parts of the earth, mountains, and bod-ies, which employment requires the thorough knowledge [of these things]. To perform such a deed (*tatra*), the many creators of the earth, etc., who are not gods (*anīśvarāḥ*), are [just] babies, like the builders of an extraor-dinary palace who, countless as they be, are not masters (*anīśvarāḥ*). If one holds that the many creators of the earth etc. are indeed gods, then, if that is the case, you arrive at a conclusion that is opposed to your position. You get rid of one and then accept many: this proclaims how extremely clever you are in refuting what you do not accept. Furthermore, do those gods possess divine faculties, omniscience, and unsurpassed power, or do they not? If they do, then why postulate several gods? For [such a postu-lation] is useless. If they don't then they have a superior (*kaścit*) master as [their] governor. Otherwise how could they continuously engage in the creation of the world etc. without quarrelling?”

Cf. *Vyomavatī*, p. 203: *na cāsmadādyātmaivādhiṣṭhāyakaḥ, tasya tadviśaya-jñānābhāvāt| tathā cāsmadādyātmano na karmaviśayaṃ jñānam indriya-jaṃ, nāpi paramāṇvādiviśayam|* ‘And the controller cannot be the Self of our kind, since it lacks the knowledge of that matter. And thus, on the other hand, the knowledge that the Self of our kind has, in as much as it arises from the senses, does not pertain either to the karmas or to such [invisible things] as the particles.’

3.182 do not rejoice at its production Therefore if it depended on them they would probably hinder its creation.

3.182 mountains, etc. *ex conj.* ISAACSON. Candrānanda in his commentary to *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 5.2.2 points out that such phenomena as earthquakes occur in order to indicate good and evil for the creatures (*prajānāṃ śubhāśubhasūcanāya*), and thus they are especially caused by their *adr̥ṣṭa* (merit and demerit).

3.182 wild plants *ex conj.* ISAACSON. The three kinds of wild plants correspond to the three kinds of uncultivated land.

3.182 they cause them pleasure or pain Cf. *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* p. 479 (answering Prajñākaragupta’s objection in *Pramāṇavārtikālaṅkāra* v. 2.284cd, p. 39: *chāgādīnāṃ puriṣāder vartulīkaraṇena kiṃ||*): *chāgādīpuriṣāder vartulīkaraṇe prekṣāvataḥ kiṃ prayojanam iti cet, chāgādīnāṃ tādr̥śenaiva puriṣa-viśeṣenotsargakāle sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ vā bhavātīti tannimittakarmaphala-sampādatvam eva prayojanam| etena badarīkaṇṭakamayūracandrikādī-vaicitryakaraṇe ’pi prayojanaṃ draṣṭavyam| tatrāpy avaśyaṃ kasyacit sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ vā, darśanaṃ sparśanaṃ vā bhavātīty ato vicitraṃ prāṇi-nāṃ karmādhiṣṭhāya tadanurūpaṃ phalaṃ kurvataḥ katham apreṣāpūrvakāritvam?* ‘If [you raise the objection:] “What purpose can a considerate [creator] have in making round such things as the droppings of goats and other [animals]?” [then I give you the following reply:] goats and other [animals] feel pleasure or pain at the time of excretion precisely because of those particular droppings of precisely that kind, so the goal [of the creator] is nothing but to be the accomplisher of the results of the karmas which are the causes of that [pleasure or pain]. In the same way one should also see the purpose of creating diversity [in the form of] such [things] as the thorns of the jujube tree, the eyes in the peacock’s tail, etc. In the case of these things, too, someone will necessarily feel pleasure or pain, [since someone will necessarily] see or touch [them]. So how could [the creator] act without consideration when he presides over the manifold karma of creatures, and produces a result which suits that [karma]?’

Cf. Śaṅkara’s commentary to *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.34: *ataḥ sṛjyamānaprā-ṇidharmādiharmāpekṣā viśamā sṛṣṭir iti nāyam īśvarasyāparādhaḥ|* ‘Thus the creation is not uniform inasmuch as it is dependent on the merit and demerit of the created beings: this is not the Lord’s fault.’

3.184 presided over by the Blessed Lord Cf. *Parākhya Tantra* 2.19:

*svakarmāpekṣya jīvānāṃ svapravṛttiḥ sahetukā|
so 'pi karmesvarākhyo 'smin hetuḥ kāryeṇa gamyate|*

‘The activity of individual souls depends on their own actions, [and] it has a [further] cause; and that cause, who is called the Lord over action, is known here from [His] effect[s].’ (tr. GOODALL)

3.185 = *Mahābhārata* 3.31.27.

3.187 The ascetic followers of the abbot *ex conj.* When the Cārvāka is silenced by the Snātaka’s arguments, the followers of the GRADUATE (*snātakānucarāḥ*) will mock him in the same way.

3.187 humiliate *ex conj.* ISAACSON. *parikrāmanti* does not give a satisfactory meaning.

3.188 the suffering caused by your karma More precisely ‘cholera of your karma’. One might consider emending the text to ‘*karṇe 'pi sūcīm*’, meaning ‘Endure still a needle in your ear, too, for a moment.’

3.194 sense perception and the like, which is not eternal *ex em.* Cf. *Tātparyatīkā* (*Ślokaṅkārttika* (with *Tātparyatīkā*), p. 38): *tathā cāhur bhartrīśva-rādayaḥ—kiṃ hi nityaṃ pramāṇaṃ dṛṣṭam? pratyakṣādi vā yad anityaṃ tasya prāmāṇye kasya vipratipattiḥ?* I thank Dr. Kei Kataoka for this reference.

3.196 since it creates awareness Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) *ad* 1.1.2 (p. 16): *nanv atathābhūtam apy arthaṃ brūyāc codanā, yathā yatkiṃcana laukikaṃ vacanaṃ 'nadyās tīre phalāni santi' iti, tat tathyam api bhavati, vitatham api bhavatīti| ucyate, vipratīṣiddhaṃ idam abhidhīyate 'bravīti ca vitathaṃ ca' iti| bravīty ity ucyate 'vabodhayati, budhyamānasya nimittaṃ bhavatīti| yasmimś ca nimittabhūte saty avabudhyate, so 'vabodhayati| yadi ca codanāyāṃ satyām 'agnihotrāt svargo bhavati' ity avagamyate, katham ucyate, 'na tathā bhavati' iti? atha na tathā bhavati, katham avabudhyate? asantam artham avabudhyata iti vipratīṣiddham|* [Objection:] But surely, an injunction may also say something which is untrue, just as an everyday statement of little importance, e.g. “there are fruits on the bank of the river”, can be sometimes true, sometimes false. [Reply:] We answer [this objection] as follows: to say that “one states [something] and [what one states is] false” is contradictory. “One states” means “one creates awareness, one is the cause for a person who cognises”. And if [someone] becomes aware of [something] when X is present as the cause, then X creates the awareness. And if we learn, when there is an injunction, that paradise results from the Agnihotra, [then] how can you say that it is not so? If it is not so then how can one become aware of it? To say that one becomes aware of a nonexistent thing is contradictory.’

3.200 Cf. *Ślokaṅkārttika* (with *Kāśikā*) *codanā* 52–53:

yadā svataḥ pramāṇatvaṃ tadānyan naiva mṛgyate|

nivartate hi mithyātvaṃ doṣājñānād ayatnataḥ||
tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā|
arthānyathātvahetūthadoṣajñānād apodyate||

‘When the validity [of a cognition] is given by itself, then no other [means of cognition] is sought for [to prove the validity of the original cognition], for the falsity [of the original cognition] is excluded without any effort through the non-cognising of any defect. Therefore the validity of a [false] cognition that has been learnt from the fact that it has the nature of [creating] awareness is annulled due to the [subsequent] cognising of the fact that the object is otherwise, or that some defect has arisen in the causes [of the first cognition].’

3.202 Surely verbal expression operates with reference to objects known by other means of valid knowledge. Cf. *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) *codanā* 22:

pramāṇāntaradṛṣṭaṃ hi śabda ’rthaṃ prāpayet sadā|
smṛtivac ca svayaṃ tasya prāmāṇyaṃ nopapadyate||

[Objection:] ‘For in all cases a verbal expression can convey a referent that has [already] been ascertained through other means of valid knowledge, and, just like memory, it cannot be valid in itself.’

3.204 command On the concept of *niyoga* see Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU, ‘Der Geltungsbereich der vedischen Weisung (*niyoga*) bei den Prābhākaras’, in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* XXXVIII, 1994, pp. 485ff.

3.205 Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) *ad* 1.1.2 (pp.16, 18): *yo hi janitvā pradhvaṃsate ’naitad evam’ iti, sa mithyāpratyayah| na caiṣa kālāntare puruṣāntare ’vasthāntare deśāntare vā viparyeti, tasmād avitathaḥ| (...) vīplavate khalv api kaścit puruṣakṛtād vacanāt pratyayah| na tu vedavacanasya mithyātve kiṃcana pramāṇam asti|* ‘For that is a false cognition which, after arising, becomes invalid, [as one establishes that] ‘this is not so’. This [cognition created by the words of the Veda], however, does not change into its opposite either at another time, or in another person, or among other circumstances, or at another place; therefore it is not false. (...) Though certainly there are some cognitions [arising] from man-made statements that become invalid, but there is no proof at all with regard to the falsity of a Vedic statement.’

3.206 it is only repetition Cf. *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) *codanā* 72:

tenetaraiḥ pramāṇair yā codanānām asaṅgatiḥ|
tayaiva syāt pramāṇatvam anuvādatvam anyathā||

‘Therefore Vedic injunctions are valid precisely because they have no association with other means of valid knowledge. Otherwise they would [only] be repetitions.’

In fact all means of valid knowledge operate independently when they produce cognition. Says Kumārila (*Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) *codanā* 47–48):

svataḥ sarvapramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyam iti gṛhyatām (v.l. gamyatām)|
na hi svato 'satī śaktiḥ kartum anyena śakyate||
ātmalābhe hi bhāvānāṃ kāraṇāpekṣitā bhavet|
labdhātmanāṃ svakāryeṣu pravṛttiḥ svayam eva tu||

‘One should understand that all means of cognition are valid by themselves, for a capacity which is not inherently present [in a thing such as a *pramāṇa*] cannot be brought about by another [thing such as another *pramāṇa*]. For things may depend on some cause for their coming into being, but once they have come into being they operate independently with respect to [the production of] their own effects.’

3.208 dependent on a person Cf. *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatīkā*) *citrākṣe-
pa* 60–61:

puruṣādḥīnavijñānas tebhyaḥ prāg anirūpitaḥ|
yaḥ saṃjñāsaṃjñīsambandhaḥ sa ceṣṭas ced dhruvaṃ kṛtaḥ||
bhinnadeśādyadhiṣṭhānād yathā rajjughatādiṣu|
samaṃ nāsty anayoḥ kiñcit tenāsaṅgatatā svataḥ||

‘The connection between the sign / name and the signified / named [object], the ascertainment of which depends on men [and which] has not been seen [to exist] before those [men]—if you accept that [connection], it must be artificial [and not inherent]. These two [i.e. the sign and the signified object] have nothing in common, just as a rope and a jar for example, since they occupy different places and [time periods]; therefore they are not joined by themselves.’

See also *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) pp. 36–38.

3.210 the word’s power Cf. *Ślokavārttika* (with *Nyāyaratnākara*) *sambandhā-
kṣepaparihāra* 28a: *śaktir eva hi sambandho*.

3.210 innate Cf. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.5: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sam-
bandhas tasya jñānam upadeśo 'vyatirekaś cārthe anupalabdhe, tat pramā-
ṇam bādarāyaṇasya, anapekṣatvāt|* ‘Rather it is the innate connection of the word with its referent which is [the means of] its [i.e. *dharma*’s] cognising, [in as much as] it is instruction and not error, with regard to an object which is not ascertained [with the help of other *pramāṇas*]; it is a means of valid cognition according to Bādarāyaṇa, since it is independent.’ *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) *ad loc.* (p. 24): *autpattika iti nityaṃ brūmaḥ| (. . .) aut-
pattikaḥ śabdasyārthena sambandhas tasya agnihotrādīlakṣaṇasya dhar-
masya nimittaṃ pratyakṣādibhir anavagatasya| katham? upadeśo hi bhava-
ti| upadeśa iti viśiṣṭasya śabdasya uccāraṇam| avyatirekaś ca bhavati tasya
jñānasya| na hi tad utpannaṃ jñānaṃ viparyeti| yac ca nāma jñānam
utpannaṃ na viparyeti, na tac chakyate vaktuṃ 'naitad evam' iti, 'yathā
vijñāyate, na tathā bhavati; yathaitan na vijñāyate, tathaitad' iti| anyad
asya hṛdaye anyad vāci syāt| evaṃ vadato viruddham idam avagamyate
'asti nāsti ca' iti| tasmāt tat pramāṇam, anapekṣatvāt| na hy evaṃ sati
pratyayāntaram apekṣitavyaṃ puruṣāntaram vā| svayampratyayo hy asau|*
‘With [the word] “innate” we mean eternal. (. . .) The innate connection

of the word with its referent is the cause of *dharma* characterised as *agnihotra* and the like, which [*dharma*] is not known through sense perception and other [means of cognition]. Why? Since it is instruction. “Instruction” means uttering a particular word. And that cognition cannot go wrong, since that cognition, when arisen, does not change into its opposite. And indeed one cannot say about a cognition which, having arisen, does not change into its opposite that “this is not thus”, [or] “this is not thus as it is cognised”, [or] “this is thus as it is not cognised”. [If one were to speak in this way then] he would have one thing in his heart and speak something else. We find that the person who speaks thus makes this contradictory [statement]: “it is and it is not”. Therefore it is a means of valid cognition, since it is independent. For in this case one should not wait for another cognition or another person, since it is a [valid] cognition in itself.’

Cf. also *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyatikā*) *citrākṣepa* 19cd–20ab
sambandho 'sti ca nityaś cety uktam autpattikādīnā|
mithyātvasya nirāsārthaṃ tat paraīr neṣyate dvayam|

‘There is a connection [between the word and its referent], and [this connection] is eternal: this is taught in [the sūtra] beginning with “*autpattikas...*”, in order to refute the falsity [of *śabda*]. Others do not accept either of these two [facts].’

3.211 Maṇḍanamīśra in his *Vidhiviveka* (p. 35) gives a summary of the Prābhākara view on the nature of *vidhī*, ‘Vedic injunction’, which is remarkably similar to the Graduate’s position: *pramāṇāntarāgocaraḥ śabdamaṭrālabano 'niyukto 'smi' iti pratyātmavedanīyaḥ sukhādivad aparāmṛṣṭakālatrayo līnādīnām artho vidhīr' iti* ‘Vedic injunction is not accessible to any other means of cognition; it depends only on the Word [of the Vedas]; everyone experiences it in its own self, [realising that] “I have been enjoined”, just as [one feels] pleasure and the like; it is not connected with any of the three times; and it is the referent of the optative and other [verbal suffixes, e.g. the imperative].’

3.213 Cf. Vācaspati Mīśra’s *Nyāyakaṇikā* on the Prābhākara theory of *niyoga* as presented in the *Vidhiviveka*: (p. 35) *yato līnādīyuktavākyaśravaṇasa-manantaram svargakāmādīnā nīyojyena 'niyukto 'smi' iti pratyātmavedanīyaḥ sukhādivat| yathā hi santāpadūnaś candanānulepanānantaram āntaram api manomātrapavedanīyam āmilitalocanaḥ sukhabhedam ananya-pramāṇakam anubhavati, evaṃ nīyogam api līnādīvākyaśravaṇānantaram ity arthaḥ| (...)* (p. 38) *kāryābhīdhāyitā tāval līnādīnām avagatācāryavākyaḥ 'māṇavaka, samīdham āhara' ityādiṣu| tathā hy etadvākyaśravaṇānantaram pravartamānam samīdāharaṇe māṇavakam upalabhya pārśvastho vyutpītsur evam avadhārayati—'buddhipūrveyam asya pravṛtīḥ, svatantrapravṛtītvāt, madīyapravṛtīvat| yac cāhaṃ buddhvā pravṛttas tad evāyaṃ madaviśeṣāt| ahaṃ ca na kriyāmātrāvagamān nāpi phalamātrāvagamān nāpi phalasādhanatāvagamāt, kintu kāryatāvagamāt| na khalv antato 'rbhakaḥ stanapānādīkām api kriyāṃ kāryatayā yāvan nāvagatavān *asti* (conj).

: *asmi* ed.) *na tāvat tasyām api pravṛtṭih* (...) *ataḥ phalasāadhanatātirik-
ktakāryatābodhāt pravṛtṭir mameti māṇavako 'pi tadavabodhād eva pravṛtta'
iti niścīnoti* *tadavabodhaś cāsyācāryavacanānantaram upajāyamānas tan-
nibandhana eveti kāryābhīdhāyitām śabdasya kalpayati* ‘Since immediately
after hearing a sentence which contains a verbal suffix such as the optative,
everyone who, for example, desires heaven and who is to be enjoined
can feel [*vidhi*] in himself [realising]: “I have been enjoined [to perform
the sacrifice]”, just as [one feels] pleasure and the like. For just as some-
one who is afflicted by heat, immediately after smearing sandal-paste [on
his or her own body], also experiences, with eyes closed, a kind of internal
pleasure, which can only be felt by [one’s own] mind, and for which there is
no other means of valid cognition [to ascertain it]—[one] also [experiences]
the enjoinder in the same way, immediately after hearing a sentence
[containing] a verbal suffix such as the optative: this is the meaning [of
Maṇḍana’s words]. (...) First of all one understands that such verbal
suffixes as the optative express duty in such sentences of the teacher as
“Boy, fetch the firewood”. To explain, having seen that the boy becomes
engaged in fetching the firewood immediately after hearing this sentence,
the observer, who wants to learn, reasons in the following way: “This en-
gagement of his is intentional, because he has acted at will, in the same
way as I act. And he must have cognised the same thing that I cognise
before I engage in something, since he is not different from me. And I [set
about doing something] neither because I understand the action alone, nor
because I understand the result alone, nor because I understand that [the
action] is the means of accomplishing the result, but because I understand
that it is something that must be done. Clearly, until the infant finally
understands that even such actions as sucking are things that must be
done, it will not set about doing even that. (...) Therefore, since I set
about [doing something] because I know that it must be done, which is
different from [knowing] that it is a means of accomplishing the result,
the boy has also become engaged precisely because he had understood
that [i.e. *kāryatā*]” — this is the conclusion [that the observer] reaches.
And inasmuch as his [i.e. the boy’s] understanding of that [*kāryatā*] arises
immediately after the speaking of the teacher, it is caused by that [i.e. by
the words of the teacher] alone: therefore he [i.e. the observer] postulates
that the word has the function of expressing duty.’

On the two possible functions of *nīyoga*, namely *preraṇa* (instigating) and
bodhana (creating awareness) see the article of YOSHIMIZU (cited in note
ad 3.204), who also deals with the interpretation of these two functions in
Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa literature.

3.217 tying a rope around its neck Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) (p.38) and *Ślo-
kavārttika* (with *Tātparyatīkā*) *citrākṣepa* 60–61, where fastening a rope
on a pot is mentioned as an example of an artificial (*kr̥taka*) connection
of two separate entities.

3.218 Cf. *Ślokavārttika* (with *Kāśīkā*) *codanā* 49–51:

*jāte 'pi yadi vijñāne tāvan nārtho 'vadhāryate|
yāvat kāraṇaśuddhatvaṃ na pramāṇāntarād bhavet||
tatra jñānāntarotpādaḥ pratikṣyaḥ kāraṇāntarāt|
yāvad dhi na paricchinnā śuddhis tāvad asatsamā|
tasyāpi kāraṇe śuddhe tajjñāne syāt pramāṇatā|*
(The reading of *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) is
*tasyāpi kāraṇe 'śuddhe tajjñānasyāpramāṇatā|
tasyāpy evam itīthaṃ tu na kiñcid vyavatiṣṭhate||*

‘If an object is not ascertained, even if [its] cognition has arisen, until the correctness of the cause [of this cognition] is [established] from another cognition then, with respect to [the correctness of this cause] one should wait for the arising of another cognition from another cause. For correctness is as good as non-existent as long as it is not well established. And that [second cognition of the correctness of the cause of the first cognition] can be valid [only] if [its own] cause is correct [and] if there is a cognition of that [i.e. of the correctness of the cause of the second cognition]. (cf. *Kāśīkā ad loc.*: *tasyāḥ śuddher aparicchinnāyā asatsamatvāt tasyāpi śuddhijñānasya kāraṇaśuddhau satyāṃ tasyāḥ śuddher jñāne ca sati pramāṇatā bhavati|* The reading of *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) might be interpreted as follows: ‘And that [cognition] will also be invalid if the cause of its cognition is not pure.’) And the same [can be said about the validity] of that [third cognition], so in this way one could never reach the end [of subsequent cognitions].’

3.219 two reasons Cf. *Śābarabhāṣya*(F) (quoting the *Vṛttikāra*) *ad* 1.1.4a (p.26): *yasya ca duṣṭaṃ karaṇaṃ yatra ca mithyeti pratyayaḥ, sa eva asamīcīnaḥ pratyayo nānya iti* ‘That, and only that cognition is erroneous the instrumental cause of which is defective, or with regard to which [another] cognition [has arisen which establishes that] “it is false”.’ See also *Ślokavārttika* (with *Tātparyāṭikā*) *codanā* 53 seqq.

3.221 we should rely on *ex conj.* GOODALL. Another possible conjecture, suggested by Dr. Isaacson, is *saiva jyeṣṭhā*.

3.221 “the sacred tradition. . .” = *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.3. Candrānanda’s commentary *ad loc.*: *tad iti hiraṇyagarbhaparāmarśaḥ, hiraṇyaṃ reto 'syeti kṛtvā bhagavān maheśvara evocyate| āptenoktatvasya satyatāvvyāptatvād ihāptena hiraṇyagarbheṇoktatvād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyaṃ sādhyate| īśvaraś ca sādhitas tanubhuvanādīnāṃ kāryatayā ghaṭādīvad buddhīmatkartṛkātvanumānena|* ‘[The word] “His” relates to Hiraṇyagarbha. Interpreting it as “his seed is golden” it is the blessed Śiva who is being referred to. Since [a statement] must invariably be true if it has been said by a trustworthy person, the validity of scripture becomes established since it was enunciated by Hiraṇyagarbha. As for the Lord, he has been proved [to exist] from the fact that such things as bodies and worlds are products, like pots and the like, with the help of inferring the fact that they have an intelligent maker.’

The sūtra is repeated as 10.21; Candrānanda's commentary ad loc.: *tanubhuvanādikāryatayā vijñāto bhagavān īśvaraḥ, tatpraṇayanāc cāmnāyasya siddhaṃ prāmāṇyam* | '[The existence of] God has been realised due to the fact that such things as bodies and worlds are products; and the authoritativeness of scripture is established because He composed it.'

3.221 "it is valid because..." = *Nyāyasūtra* 2.1.68.

3.229 As Prof. Sanderson pointed out ("Hinduism", Handout 3, 22.ii.1999) the same fourfold division of *śaivas* (Pāśupatas / Pāñcārthikas, Lākulas / Kālamukhas, Somasiddhāntins / Kāpālikas / Mahāvratins, Śaivas) also appears in Yāmuna's *Āgamaprāmāṇya* (p. 46.), in the *Śrībhāṣya* (ad 2.2.35), in the *Bhairavaṅgalākalpa* (fol. 4v3-5), and in the *Kāraṇāgama* (I, 26.58c-59).

3.230 to which it is justly established *ex conj.* A similar idea occurs at the end of the play, when the Graduate warns against the confusion of various religious traditions.

4.9 Quite right. *ex em.* ISAACSON. *evam evam* usually occurs after stage directions such as *karṇe* and stands for ‘whisper whisper’.

4.11 adopt brahminical manners Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p.11: *nanu tatrāpi śrutismṛtiprāptaśikhāyajñopavitādi dhārayadbhir bhāgavatabrahmaṇair aharaharanuṣṭhīyamānārthatvena codanāmūlatve sambhāvīyamāne katham iva prāmāṇyapratyanīkabhūtā bhramavipralambhādayaḥ smaraṇakāraṇatayā kalpyante?* ‘But surely, when Vedic injunction is considered as the source of that [i.e. the Pañcarātra], too, due to the fact that Bhāgavata brahmins, who wear the lock of hair, the sacred thread, and other [attributes of brahmins] prescribed in the Veda and the Smṛtis, perform daily the rituals [enjoined in the scriptures of the Pañcarātra], how, I ask, can you postulate error, deception and the like, the enemies of validity, as the cause of [this] Smṛti [i.e. Pañcarātra]?’

The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer (*ibid.*): *śikhāyajñopavitādayas tu brāhmaṇādīnām vidhīyamānā na tadbhāvam āpādayitum kṣamante, nāpy avagamayanti, duṣṭasūdrādiṣu vyabhicāradarśanāt* ‘The lock of hair, the sacred thread and other [such attributes] that are prescribed for brahmins and others are unable to bring about the condition of that [brahmin, etc.], nor do they help us recognising it, since we see that delinquent Śūdras transgress [the rules concerning these attributes].’ (Cf. *Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.2.2.)

In his reply Yāmuna argues against the negative discrimination of the Bhāgavata brahmins (*Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 141): *iha vā kim aharaharadhīyamānavājasaneyaikāyanaśākhān vilasadupavitottariyāśikhāśālino ’dhyāpayataḥ, yājayataḥ, pratigrhṇato viduṣaḥ paśyanto brāhmaṇā iti nāvayanti? atha yājanapravacanapālāśadaṇḍādīnām duṣṭasūdrādiṣu vyabhicārasambhāvād brāhmaṇyasiddhavatkāreṇa pravṛtteś ca na tebhyo brāhmaṇyanirṇayaḥ, tad bhāgavatetaraviprāṇām api samānam* ‘And in this case, when people see learned people who recite daily the Vājasaneyā and the Ekāyana recensions [of the *Yajurveda*], wear clearly visible sacred threads, upper garments, and locks of hair, teach, officiate at sacrifices, and receive [fees due to priests]—don’t they consider them as brahmins? If you say that since the transgressive occurrence of officiating, teaching, [carrying] a staff made of *palāśa*-wood, etc. is possible among delinquent Śūdras and other [criminals], and since [these attributes and activities] are displayed as if the brahmin status [of those who display them] were as good as proved, one’s Brahman status cannot be determined on their basis—then the same applies to priests other than the Bhāgavatas, too.’

4.11 Veda as their example This might be a reference to the (now “lost”) *Ekāyanaśākhā* (belonging allegedly to the White *Yajurveda*) which was regarded by the Pañcarātrikas as the Vedic foundation of their religion, and which they found mentioned in the following passage of the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (7.1.2): *ṛgvedaṃ bhagavo ’dhyemi yajurvedaṃ sāmavedam ātharvaṇaṃ caturtham itihāsapurāṇaṃ pañcamaṃ vedānāṃ vedaṃ pitryaṃ rāśīm daivam nidhiṃ vākovākyaṃ ekāyanaṃ ...* ‘I have studied the

R̥gveda, sir, as also the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, the Ātharvaṇa as the fourth, the corpus of histories and ancient tales as the fifth Veda among the Vedas, ancestral rites, mathematics, soothsaying, the art of locating treasures, the dialogues, the monologues ...’ (tr. OLIVELLE). As Olivelle points out (p.563), ‘[t]he original meaning of some of these entries is clearly uncertain, and the interpretations of later commentators are often anachronistic. (...) The meaning of *ekāyana* (lit., “point of convergence,” see C[hāndogya] U[paniṣad] 7.5.2) is uncertain. (Horsch [P.] 1966 [Die vedische Gāthā- und Śloka-Literatur. Bern: Francke Verlag.], 37). The commentator Śaṅkara’s interpretation as “statecraft” (*nītiśāstra*) is clearly anachronistic. I follow Faddegon [B.] ([“The catalogue of Sciences in the Chāndogya-Upaniṣad.” *Acta Orientalia* 4] 1926, 52) in taking the term as the opposite of *vākovākya* (“speech and reply” or “dialogue”); it would then mean an uninterrupted speech.’

4.11 they set themselves apart Yāmuna emphasises that one should not judge Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava tantras by the same standard, just because they happen to share the name “tantra” (likewise we do not put an equals sign between killing a brahmin and performing a Horse Sacrifice just because both are “actions” (see *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p.101). The Śaiva scriptures—and on this point Yāmuna shares the view of the Mīmāṃsakas—are indeed heretical (*Āgamaprāmāṇya* p.91):

na ca tantrāntareṣv eṣa nyāyah prasaram arhatī|
yatas tattannibandhṛṇām vibhramādy api sambhavī|| (...) *yathā māheśvare tantrē viruddham bahu jalpitam|*

‘But this argument [about validity] cannot extend to other tantras, since error and other [defects] are possible with regard to their respective authors. (...) For instance, lots of contradictory prattles are found in the Śaiva Tantras.

(... p.96)

kiṃ ca śaivādayo vedasiddhavarṇāśramād bahiḥ|
kalpayanty āśramādīni tato ’pi śrutibāhyatā||

‘Furthermore, the Śaivas and [Kāpālikas, Pāsupatas, etc.] posit life-periods and other [constituents of Dharma] outside the system of social estates and life-periods established in the Veda, and for this reason, too, they are excluded from Vedic religion.’

(... p.97)

pramādo ’pi na cātyantaṃ rudrādīṣu na sambhavī||
yad vā mohaśāstrapraṇetṛtayāvagatatvād vyāmohayitum apīdr̥śaśāstrapra-
ṇayanam upapadyata iti nāvaśyaṃ pramāda evāśrayitavyaḥ| ‘The possibility of inadvertence, too, cannot be completely precluded in the case of Rudra, etc. Alternatively, from the fact that [Rudra, etc.] are known to be the authors of delusory scriptures, it is also possible that they composed such scriptures [i.e. Śaiva Tantras] in order to delude people. Thus it is not necessary to chose inadvertence of all [factors].’

4.11 “We have been truly brahmins...” Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p.142: *atha*

matam—“*anyeṣāṃ brāhmaṇyaṃ tadasādhāraṇagotrasmaraṇād*” *iti, tad bhāgavatānām api samānam*| *smaranti hi bhāgavatāḥ*—“*vayaṃ bhāradvājāḥ, vayaṃ kāśyapāḥ, vayaṃ gautamāḥ, vayaṃ aupagavāḥ*” *iti*| *na cedam gotrasmaraṇam nirmūlam sāmāyikam vā, sarvagotrasmaraṇānām tathābhāvaprasaṅgāt*|

sambhāvyamānadoṣatvād vaṃsānām yadi saṃśayaḥ|
tadbrāhmaṇye, tato lokam sarvaṃ vyākulayed ayam||

jananījārasandehajātacaṇḍālasaṃśayaḥ|

nirviśaṅkaḥ katham vedān adhīṣe sādhusattama||

tena bhāgavatānām api avicchinnaparamparāprāptavicitragotrasmaraṇaparyavasthāpitam brāhmaṇyam anapoditam āsta iti na bhāgavatānām anyeṣāṃ ca brāhmaṇye kaścīd viśeṣaḥ| *yadi paraṃ, te paramapurusaṃ evāśritā ekāntinaḥ, anye kṣudradaivatakāḥ sādharmaṇā iti*|

‘If you hold that others are brahmins since they remember their specific *gotras*, the same applies to the Bhāgavatas as well. For the Bhāgavatas remember that they belong to the Bhāradvāja *gotra*, or to the Kāśyapa, or to the Gautama, or to the Aupagava. And this recollection of the *gotras* is neither without any basis nor is it based on convention [alone], since then everybody’s recollection of his own *gotra* would follow to be in the same way. If you had doubts in their brahmin status because it may be presumed that defects occur in the lineages, then this [sceptical view] would confuse the whole world. How can you study the Vedas without scruples, o best of the pious, when the uncertainty whether your mother had a lover or not raises the suspicion that you might be an outcast? Therefore the brahmin status of the Bhāgavatas, which is firmly established by the recollection of the various *gotras* received through an unbroken tradition, also remains undisputed, and thus there is no difference between the brahmin status of the Bhāgavatas and of others, unless the fact that they are devoted to a single [deity] only inasmuch as they worship the Supreme Person, while others are ordinary [brahmins] inasmuch as they have their own petty godlings.’

4.13 Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 15 (*mīmāṃsakaapakṣa*): *api ca yadavalokanādāv api viśiṣṭāś cāndrāyaṇādiprāyaścittāni vidadhati, katham tatparigrahaḥ śrutimūlatvam avagamayatīti sambhāvayāmaḥ? smaranti hi devalakāvalokane prāyaścittam*| *devalakāś cāmī*—‘*devakośopajīvitvād vṛttyarthaṃ devapūjanāt*’ ‘Furthermore, when the élite perform such expiatory rituals as the *cāndrāyaṇa* even when they set eyes on them etc., how could we assume that the [Pāñcarātra’s] acceptance by such people gives us to understand that it is based on the Veda? For the Smṛtis prescribe expiation if one catches sight of a *devalaka*. And these [Pāñcarātrikas] are *devalakas*, “since they live on the wealth of God[’s temple] and since they worship God in order to earn a livelihood”.’

4.14 Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 12 (*mīmāṃsakaapakṣa*): *na ca bhāgavateṣu brāhmaṇapadam aviśaṅkam laukikāḥ prayujjate*| *bhavati ca bhedena vyapadeśaḥ*—‘*ito brāhmaṇā ito bhāgavatā*’ *iti*| ‘And common people do not apply the

word “*brāhmaṇa*” to the Bhāgavatas without hesitation. And naming takes place with a differentiation: “these are brahmins, those are Bhāgavatas”.’

4.16 They will never get to study the Veda... Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 14f.

(*mīmāṃsakapakṣa*):

api cācāratas teṣāṃ abrāhmaṇyaṃ pratīyate|
vṛttito devatāpūjā dīkṣā naivedyabhakṣaṇam||
garbhādhānādidāhāntasaṃskārāntarasevanam|
śrautakriyānanuṣṭhānaṃ dvijais sambandhavarjanam|
ityādibhir anācārair abrāhmaṇyaṃ sunirṇayam||
smaranti hi vṛttito devapūjāyā brahmakarmasv anadhikārahetutvam, ya-
thā—

‘yeṣāṃ vaṃśakramād eva devārcā vṛttito bhavet|
teṣāṃ adhyayane yajñe yājane nāsti yogyatā||’ iti|

(... p. 16.)

‘vṛttyarthaṃ pūjayed devaṃ trīṇi varṣāṇi yo dvijaḥ|
sa vai devalako nāma sarvakarmasu garhitah||’

‘Furthermore, we also know from their conduct that they are not brahmins. Worshiping God to make a living, [Tantric] consecration, eating from the offering presented to the deity, observing abnormal sacraments from the rite before conception to cremation, neglecting the performance of solemn Vedic rituals, avoiding contact with the twice-born: with the help such and similar aberrant customs we can easily determine that they are not brahmins. For the Smṛtis teach that worshiping the deity in order to earn a livelihood is a cause of disqualification for Vedic rituals. For example, “Those who have been worshiping a deity to make a living for several generations are not entitled to study the Veda or to sacrifice for themselves or for others.” (...) “A twice-born who worships a deity for three years is truly a *devalaka*, excluded from all [Vedic] rituals.” ’

4.16 married “against the grain” I.e. having married a woman from a

higher caste. Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 11 (*mīmāṃsakapakṣa*): *teṣāṃ traivarṇikatvam eva nāsti, dūre brāhmaṇabhāvaḥ|* (... p. 13.) *santi ca sāttvatā nāma upanayanādisaṃskārahīnā vaiśyavrātyānvayinaḥ avarajanmānaḥ ke cit| yathāha manuḥ—*

‘vaiśyāt tu jāyate vrātyāt sudhanvācārya eva ca|
bhāruṣaś ca nijaṅgaś ca maitras sāttvata eva ca||’ iti| (*Manusmṛti* 10.23)

‘They do not even belong to any of the three higher estates, and far less to the brahmins. (...) And there are certain people called Sāttvatas, devoid of such sacraments as the *upanayana*, descendants of Vaiśya *vrātyas*, of the lowest birth. As Manu teaches: “From a *vrātya* [of the] Vaiśya [estate] are born a Sudhanvan, an Ācārya, a Bhāruṣa, a Nijaṅga, a Maitra, and a Sāttvata.” ’

4.18 Brahmadvipa As Kalhaṇa relates (*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 3.439ff.) the Raṇasvāmin-temple was built by king Raṇāditya. According to a legend the

queen made a certain *siddha* called Brahman consecrate the images of the Raṇasvāmin and the Raṇeśvara temples. Having consecrated the *liṅga*, Brahman placed himself on the *pīṭha* of the Raṇasvāmin temple (*Rājatarāṅgiṇī* 3.458: *sa svayaṃ pīṭham avātarat*). In honour of this *siddha* the queen built the splendid Brahmamaṇḍapa (ibid. 3.459), which might be connected with the Brahmadvīpa mentioned in our text.

4.25 Nevertheless According to PISCHEL §113, the Śaurasenī form of Sanskrit *tathā*, *yathā* should be *tadhā*, *jadhā*, while *taha*, *jaha* are the corresponding forms in Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, and Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī.

4.25 thronged *ex conj.*

4.25 hundreds According to PISCHEL §448, the Śaurasenī form of Sanskrit *śata* should be *sada*, while *saa* or *saṅga* are the corresponding forms in Māhārāṣṭrī, Ardhamāgadhī, and Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī.

4.30 Ranasvamin See note ad 4.18.

4.35 discuss *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

4.35 illuminates *ex conj.*

4.35 beatitude *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

4.36 ... *ex conj.* It seems likely that *pādas* cd of this verse have been lost (they might have begun with *rāhu°*).

4.37 she told *ex conj.*

4.37 please do not leave *ex conj.*

4.37 without adducing your view *ex conj.*

4.42 every *ex conj.*

4.44 Your Honor's favor *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

4.58 according to your inspiration *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

4.66 First of all *ex conj.* KATAOKA.

4.66 The *darbha* grass *ex conj.* Cf. *Baudhāyana-dharmasūtra* 1.13.30 (prescribing purification with *darbha* grass and water, *darbhair adbhiḥ prakṣālanam*, at the Agnihotra and other rituals); also *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* 5.5.4.22.

4.66 has swept away its author and the dust of both challenges to its validity *ex conj.* ISAACSON. Another possible interpretation has been suggested by Dr. Kataoka: 'The *darbha* grass of beginninglessness has swept away the dust-fall of both its author and its invalidation by another *pramāṇa*.'

4.69 imperceptible object *ex conj.*, i. e. heaven.

4.71 Where can we see a non-human arrangement... *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 6.

1.1: *buddhīpūrvā vākyaḥ kartir vede* | ‘The composition of sentences in the Veda is preceded by cognition.’

Candrānanda’s commentary ad loc.: ‘*agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāma*’ *ity evambhūtā racanā bhagavato maheśvarasya buddhīpūrvā, sā tataḥ pramāṇam, āptapraṇītavasya satyatāvyaḥ* | ‘The Blessed Great Lord’s knowledge is a prerequisite of an arrangement [of words in] such [sentences] as “one who desires heaven should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice”. That is why it is a means of valid cognition, since if A has been composed by a trustworthy person then A is invariably true.’

Vādindra’s commentary ad loc.: *vākyaḥ kartir vākya-racana-krama ity yāvāt buddhīpūrvā puruṣabuddhijanyā vedavākya-kramah puruṣabuddhijanyaḥ, vākya-kramatvāt, kālidāsa-vākya-kramatvāt* | ‘“A composition of sentences” is as much as [to say] “a sequence of composing of sentences”. “Preceded by cognition” [means] produced from the cognition of a soul. [Expressed as a formal syllogism, the point made by the sūtra is that] the sequence of sentences in the Veda is one which was produced from the cognition of a soul, because it is a sequence of sentences [and all orders of sentences are produced from the cognition of souls], like the sequence(s) of sentences [produced by] Kālidāsa.’ (tr. ISAACSON)

Vaiśeṣikasūtra 6.1.2: *na cāsmadbuddhibhyo liṅgam ṛṣeḥ* | ‘And [the composition of sentences in the Veda can] not [have been produced] from the cognitions of [ordinary] people like us; [this fact is] the inferential mark of the ṛṣi.’

Candrānanda’s commentary ad loc.: *liṅgyate ’nenārtha ity liṅgaṃ vijñānam na hi yādṛśam asmadvijñānam vartamānāvya-vahitasambaddhārthaviśayaṃ tādṛśam eva bhagavato vijñānam ataḥ sambhavati bhagavato ’tīndriyārthaviśayaṃ vijñānam* | ‘“Mark” [means] “the object is marked by it”, [i.e.] “cognition”. For the Lord’s cognition is not simply like our cognition which has as its objects existing, not hidden, and related things. Thus the Lord can have a cognition which has as its objects things that are beyond sense perception.’

Vādindra’s commentary ad loc.: *asmadādibuddhivākya-ajanakatvasya bādhitatvāt tadatīriktapuruṣabuddhau vedavākyaṃ (liṅgam) sa ca bhagavān ṛṣir īśvaraḥ* | ‘Since it is denied that cognitions of [ordinary] people [like us] can have produced the sentences [of the Veda] the sentences of the Veda are an inferential mark for [the existence of] a cognition belonging to a person different from [and superior to] such [ordinary people like us]. And this [different person] is the blessed ṛṣi [who in this case must be taken to be] God.’ (tr. ISAACSON)

Praśastapādabhāṣya p. 519ff: *śrutismṛtilakṣaṇo ’py āmnāyo vaktṛprāmāṇyāpekṣaḥ, ’tadvacanād āmnāyaprāmāṇyam’, ’liṅgāc cānityaḥ’, ’buddhīpūrvā vākyaḥ kartir vede’, ’buddhīpūrvā dadātīḥ’ ityuktatvāt* | ‘[The validity of] scriptures called Śruti and Smṛti also depends on the authority of the person

who enunciated [them], since it has been taught that “the validity of scriptures is [established] because they are His [i.e. God’s] words” (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.3, 10.21), “from logical reason [we know that] it [i.e. scripture] is not eternal” (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 2.2.37), “the composition of sentences in the Veda is preceded by cognition” (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 6.1.1), “[the word] “gives” is preceded by cognition’ (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 6.1.3).”

Vyomavatī ad loc. (p. 168): *atha śabdasyānityatve saty āptoktatvena prāmāṇyaṃ syāt, tat tu nāstīty āśankyāha, ‘liṅgāc cānityaḥ’* iti paraṃ pratyakṣeṇoccāraṇāt prāg ūrdhvaṃ cānupalambhād anityaḥ śabda iti pratīyate, liṅgāc ceti, tat tu vaksyāmaḥ śabdaparīkṣāyām| vedānāṃ cānityatve ‘numānam, anityāni vedavākyaṇi vākyatvād ubhayābhimatavākyaavat| tathā ‘buddhipūrvā vākyakṛtir’ vākyaracanā ‘vede’† vākyaracanātvād ubhayābhimatavākyaaracanāvat| (...) evaṃ vede‡ ‘buddhipūrvō dadātiḥ’§ dadātīśabdaḥ dadātītyuktatvād ubhayābhimatadadātīśabdavat|*

* ed. adds [*śabdaḥ*]

† ed. adds [*buddhipūrvā*]

‡ ed. (*vede?*)

§ ed. adds [*vede buddhipūrvō (sic)*]

‘Now, if the Veda (*Śabda*) were not eternal, it would be authoritative because it has been pronounced by a trustworthy person; this, however, does not hold true”—anticipating this objection [the Sūtrakāra] says: “from logical reason [we know that] it [i.e. scripture] is not eternal”. It is plainly recognised by sense perception that words (*śabda*) are not eternal, since we do not perceive them before and after their pronunciation, and [the same can] also [be proved] by means of a logical reason, but that we shall explain in the examination of *śabda*. Concerning the non-eternity of the Vedas [we set forth the following] inference: “the propositions of the Veda are not eternal, since they are propositions, just as propositions which both [disputants] hold [to be propositions and to be non-eternal].” Likewise “the composition of sentences”, [i.e.] the construction of sentences, “in the Veda is preceded by cognition”, since it is a construction of sentences, just as those constructions of sentences which both [disputants] hold [to be sentences and to be non-eternal]. (...) Thus in the Veda “gives”, [i.e.] the word “gives”, “is preceded by cognition”, since it is a statement saying “gives”, just as the word “gives” [in ordinary contexts], which is accepted by both [disputants to be such].’

4.72 Kumārila’s answer (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.12, TV(A) p. 237, TV^P p. 469):

*vedeṣu hi tāvad eva padavākyaśaṃghātātmakatvādihetvābhāsaiḥ kṛtakatvabhṛāntir bhavati, *yāvad (ms^B : yā tad eds.) bahiravasthānād vedarūpaṃ na drśyate|*

ṛksāmādisvarūpe tu dr̥ṣṭe bhrāntir nivartate|

ādīmātram api śrutvā vedānāṃ pauruseyatā|

na śakyādhyavasātuṃ hi manāg api sacetanaiḥ|

dr̥ṣṭārthavyavahāreṣu vākyaḥ lokānusāribhiḥ|

*padaiś ca tadvidhair eva narāḥ kāvyāni kurvate||
 prapāṭhakacatuḥṣaṣṭīniyatavarakaiḥ padaiḥ||
 lokeṣv apy aśrutaprāyair ṛgvedaṃ kaḥ kariṣyati||*

‘For, it is only as long as one does not realise the true nature of the Veda because of being an outsider that one erroneously regards the Vedas as products, due to such false logical reasons as the fact that they consist in the combination of words and sentences. But when the nature of Ṛgvedic verses, Sāmavedic hymns, and other [Vedic texts] has been realised, the [above mentioned] mistake ceases. No sensible person can believe in the slightest degree that the Vedas have an author as soon as he has listened just to their beginning. When people make poems about transactions with visible goals they only employ sentences that follow ordinary usage and words of the same kind. Who could make a Ṛgveda with words which have practically never been heard among ordinary people and whose accents are prescribed in sixty-four *prapāṭhakaś*?’

4.74 Hirānyagarbha was the author Cf. *Nyāyakandalī*, p.522: *yac cedam ‘asmaryamāṇakartṛkatvād’ iti, tad asidddham, ‘prajāpatir vā idam eka āsīn nāhar āsīn na rātrir āsīt, sa tapo ‘tapyata, tasmāt tapasaś catvāro vedā ajāyanta’ ity āmnāyenaiva kartṛsmaraṇāt* ‘As for this [argument] saying “[the Veda is eternal] because no author of it is being held in our memory”, it is not established, since the Veda itself mentions the author in such passages as “This [universe] was Prajāpati alone, there was no day, there was no night. He practiced austerities, from those austerities the four Vedas were born.” ’

4.74 you cannot adduce... *ex conj.* The tradition that Vyāsa was the author of the *Mahābhārata* might also have been created by *arthavāda*.

4.76 Aṣṭakā For a description of the Aṣṭakā (a domestic ritual honouring the ancestors), see e.g. *Āśvalāyana-gr̥hyasūtra* 2.4, cf. *Manusmṛti* 4.119, 4.150. Śābara and Kumārila in their commentary to *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.1 refer to the Aṣṭakā as an example of a ritual which is prescribed in Smṛti texts but which is not enjoined in the Vedas themselves. According to the view of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, the Vedic texts from which such prescriptions derive had never actually been perceptible to the compilers of these Smṛti texts, but only always inferable (*nityānumeya*) on the basis of the acceptance of these Smṛtis by the moral majority (*mahājana*; see POLLOCK 1997, pp. 409f, quoting the *Prakaraṇapañcikā*). Kumārila disagrees and points out that if a Vedic injunction had never been pronounced then it would be impossible to ascertain its existence since no one could ever perceive it, and therefore Manu’s recollection (*smṛti*) of the Aṣṭakā would be as mistaken as a barren woman talking about her grandson (the missing son or daughter corresponding to the missing cognition of the Vedic proposition; see TV^P, p. 265, TV^A, p. 164).

4.82 “The regular study...” *Ślokaṅvārttika, vākyādhikaraṇa* 366.

- 4.83 You yourself say...** Cf. *Ślokavārttika*, *anumāna* 13cd ff.
- 4.84 whose source is not error** *ex conj.*
- 4.88 All-conquering sacrifice** The Viśvajit is a one-day Soma-sacrifice (*ekāha*), which requires the sacrificer to pay extensive fees to the officiants (see MYLIUS, Glossar s.v., *ibid.* pp. 301, 357). As the name of this sacrifice suggests, it is performed ‘in order to conquer everything’ (*Taittirīya-saṃhitā* 7.1.10.4: *sarvasyābhijityai*).
- 4.91 as the reason** *ex em.* ISAACSON.
- 4.91 postulated** *ex conj.*
- 4.92 is possible** *ex conj.* ISAACSON.
- 4.100** Quoting *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, p. 636.8–11 (v.l. *pratītiḥ* for *prasiddhiḥ*).
- 4.108 who wishes for a long life** Cf. *Kāṭhaka-saṃhitā* 11.4: *prājāpatyaṃ caruṃ nirvapec chatakr̥ṣṇalam ghr̥ta āyuṣkāmah*; *Maitrāyaṇī-saṃhitā* 2.2.2: *prājāpatyaṃ ghr̥te caruṃ nirvapec śatakr̥ṣṇalam āyuṣkāmah*
- 4.108 who wants to die** Cf. *Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa* 17.12.1: *trivṛdagnīṣṭomaḥ sa sarvasvāro, yaḥ kāmayetānāmayatāmum lokam iyām iti sa etena yajeta* (commentary ad loc.: *anāmayatā āmayarahitenaiva dehena vyādhyādīrahityena*); *Sāṅkhāyana-śrautasūtra* 15.10.1: *sarvasvāro nāmaikāhaḥ sa sarvagāyatro maraṇakāmasya yajamānasya bhavati* | *prayogāntare ca svargakāmasya* |
- 4.109 there is no more fault** *ex em.* SANDERSON.
- 4.111 beings to be favored** *ex em.* ISAACSON.
- 4.115** Quoting *Nyāyamañjarī* vol. I, p. 640.17–18, cf. *Mahābhārata* 12.336.77.
- 4.121 clearly** *ex conj.* SANDERSON.
- 4.122** *Bhagavadgītā* 10.41.
- 4.123 meditation on the All-holy** See *Yogasūtra* 1.23, 1.28–29, 2.1, 2.32, 2.45.
- 4.126 do not lose** *ex conj.* ISAACSON.
- 4.126** According to the Mīmāṃsaka position, when the heterodox proclaim that their scriptures have authors they necessarily admit that these scriptures cannot be authoritative. Says Kumārila (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4, *TV^P*, p. 329; *TV^A*, p. 195): *pāratantryaṃ tāvad eṣāṃ smaryamāṇapuruṣaviśeṣapraṇītātāt tair eva pratipannam, śabdakṛtakatvādipratipādanādarāc ca pārśvasthair api jñāyate* | (...) *svadharmātikrameṇa ca yena kṣatriyeṇa satā pravakṛtvapratigrahaḥ pratipannau, sa*

dharmam aviplitam upadekṣyatīti kaḥ samāśvāsaḥ | ‘First of all, the fact that these [scriptures] are not autonomous [i.e. that their validity depends on their author] because they were composed by particular persons whose memory is alive is admitted by [their followers] themselves, and it is also learnt by those who get close to them from the acceptance of the proving of such [theories] as the artificial nature of words. (...) And how could we believe that someone [i.e. the Buddha] who has transgressed the duties of his own estate and thus, while being a *kṣatriya*, vindicated the role of a teacher and the right of receiving gifts, is going to teach the undefiled Dharma?’

4.127 in the same way *ex conj.* SANDERSON. See *Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.11 (*pūrvapakṣa*, TV^P, p. 459; TV^A, p. 234f):

yenavivākrītatvaṃ hi vedasya pratipādyate
nyāyena tena śākyādīgranthasyāpi bhaviṣyati ||
bodhakatvāt pramāṇatvaṃ svatas tasyāpi labhyate
na ca samdīhyate buddhir na viparyayate kvacit ||
akartṛkatayā nāpi kartṛdoṣeṇa duṣyati
vedavad buddhavākyādīkartṛsmaraṇavarjanāt ||
buddhavākyasamākhyāpi pravakṛtvanibandhanā
tadṛṣṭatvanimittā vā kāṭhakāṅgirasādivat ||

‘With the help of the same argumentation which proves that the Veda is not a product [the same nature] of Buddhist and other scriptures can also be [established]. They are also found to be means of valid knowledge by themselves due to the fact that they create awareness, and the cognition [they create] is neither questioned nor ever refuted. Furthermore, inasmuch as they have no author, they are not impaired by the faults of the author either, since, similarly to the Veda, the memory of the author of the Buddha’s propositions and other [sacred texts] has been excluded. The origin of the label ‘the Buddha’s proposition’ is the fact that [the Buddha was] the teacher [of these scriptures], or it is based on the fact that [these scriptures] were seen by him, by analogy with such [Vedic texts] as the *Kāṭhaka* and the *Āṅgīrasa* [which were taught / seen by Kāṭha and Āṅgīras].’

Kumārila’s reply (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.12, TV^P p. 467ff, TV(A) p. 235ff):

pareṇa saha keṣāṃcid vākovākyāni jalpatām
yuktayaḥ prātibhāsikyo jāyante paravākyataḥ ||
(yuktayaḥ TV^{Apc} : uktayaḥ TV^{Ac}TV^Pms^B)
svasaṃvedyaṃ ca siddhāntam ātmīyam api jānatām
chāyāṃ tathāpi rakṣanto jalpanti pratiśabdakaiḥ ||
yathā mīmāṃsakatrastāḥ śākyavaiśeṣikādayaḥ
nitya evāgamo ’smākam ity āhuḥ śūnyacetasaḥ ||
(°cetasah ms^B : °cetanam eds.)
pradveṣād vedapūrvatvam anicchantaḥ kathaṃcana
tanmātre ’pi ca bhūyiṣṭhām icchantāḥ satyavāditām ||

bhūyasām vedabāhyatvād buddhādivacasām amī|
ahiṃsādy apy atatpūrvam ity āhus tarkamāninaḥ||
tataś ca pauruṣeyatvād aprāmāṇyam atīndriye|
prāguktair vedanīyatvavāgābhāsair vimohyate||
(°nīyatva° TV^Ams^B : °nīyatvaṃ TV^P)
yādṛśatādṛśamīmāṃsakair apy atīndriyaviṣayapurūṣavacanaprāmāṇyanir-
*ākaraṇād apauruṣeyatvādhyavasāyanirākṛtakāraṇadoṣā*śaṅka(eds. : °śaṅ-*
kā° ms^B)nirapavādapramāṇyasiddhiṃ pratihantuṃ aśakyāṃ manyamānā
*niruttarībhūtā bālānukaraṇavākyaśāḍṣaiḥ svavākyaair vyava*līya(conj. : °*
likhya° eds. : °lipsa° ms^Bac : °listha° ms^Bpc)mānahṛdayāḥ santo 'pi
prakṣīnakuhetuvacanajālāḥ kanyāvaraṇārthāgatamūrkhavaragotrāpraśnotta-
ravat|
yad eva bhavatām gotraṃ tad asmākam apītvat|
āhuḥ svāgamanīyatvaṃ paravākyaṇukārīṇaḥ||
asmadīyam idaṃ vākyaṃ bhavatām iti coditāḥ|
jalpanty asmākam evaitac chrutvā mīmāṃsakair hṛtam||
tyaktalajjaṃ bruvāṇo hi vācoyuktīm anarthikām|
kurvan parātisandhānaṃ aśrāntaḥ ko 'vasīdati||
tatra śākyaiḥ prasiddhāpi sarvakṣaṇīkavādītā|
tyajyate vedasiddhāntāḥ jalpadbhir nītyam āgamam||
*(...) *sarva(ms^B : sarvadā eds.)padārthasambandhānīyatvapratipādanāt*
tadviparītam āgamanīyatvam abhyupagamyamānaṃ lokopahāsāspadamā-
tram eva bhavet|

‘For some people, when they are having a debate with someone else, “reflex arguments” are born from the assertions of the opponent, and they prattle with echoed words while nevertheless they also keep up the appearance of someone who considers his own doctrine as self-evident. As, for example, the Buddhists, Vaiśeṣikas (?) and others, afraid of the Mīmāṃsakas, mindlessly say: “Our scripture is in fact eternal”, admitting in no way, because of hatred, the precedence of the Veda, and holding that, even if that much is the case, [their scripture] still has the greatest truthfulness. Conceited with reasoning they say that, since most of the Buddha’s propositions are outside the Veda, even non-violence and other [precepts] are not dependent upon it. And thus the fact that [non-Vedic scriptures] are not authoritative with regard to imperceptible matters since they have authors is effaced with the above mentioned replicas of the statements about the Veda’s eternity. Since even an average Mīmāṃsaka can refute the validity of human assertions with regard to imperceptible matters, [the heterodox] think that it is impossible to counteract the establishing of validity if it is unobjectionable inasmuch as it has been freed from the suspicion of faults in the causes [which produce the cognition] through the determination of its independence from any person, and, dumbfounded, with their own assertions that resemble the imitative talk of children and using a tattered net of reasoning though their hearts sink with fear, they claim, imitating the statements of their opponents, that their own scripture is eternal, just as a foolish suitor, who has come to ask the girl’s hand,

answers the question about his *gotra* like this: “My *gotra* is the same as yours” [which actually makes the marriage impossible]. And when they are told: “This statement of yours is [in fact] ours”, they prattle: “It is ours alone! The Mīmāṃsakas have overheard and then stolen it.” For why would someone give way who shamelessly speaks meaningless sophistries and spares no effort to deceive others? At that stage the Buddhists give up even their well-known adherence to the doctrine of the momentariness of all things when they prattle that their scripture is [also] eternal on the basis of the established truth of the Veda[’s eternal nature]. (...) Since [the Buddhist] have demonstrated the non-permanent nature of the connection of all words with their referents, the world would only laugh if they were to accept the eternal nature of scripture, which is contrary to that [doctrine of momentariness].’

When the language of non-Vedic scriptures is itself debased, how could their content be eternal and authoritative? Says Kumāriḷa (*Tantravārttika*, *ibid.*):

asādhūśabdabhūyiṣṭhāḥ śākyajaināgamādayaḥ|
asannibandhanatvāc ca śāstratvaṃ na pratīyate|| (...)
tataś cāsatyaśabdeṣu kutaḥ teṣu arthasatyatā|
drṣṭāpabhraṣṭarūpeṣu kathaṃ vā syād anāditā|| (...)
 (TV^P p. 238f, TV^A p. 470f.) *śākyādiḡrantheṣu punar yad api kiṃcid sādhu-*
*śabdābhīprāyeṇāvīnaṣṭabuddhyā prayuktam, tatrāpi prajñapti*viññapti* (eds.
 : om. ms^B) **paśyatā* (eds. : °paśya° ms^{Bpc} : °paśyanā° ms^{Bac}) **tiṣṭhatā-*
di (eds. : °tiṣṭhamādi° ms^B) *prāyaprayogāt kiṃcid evāvīplutaṃ labhyate|*
kim uta yāni prasiddhāpabhraṣṭadeśabhāṣābhyo ’py apabhraṣṭatarāṇi bhī-
*kkhave ity evamādiṇi, dvitīyābahuvacanasthāne hy *ekārāntaṃ* (TV^Ams^B
 : *ekārā taṃ* TV^P) *prākṛtaṃ padaṃ drṣṭam, na prathamābahuvacane sam-*
bodhane ’pi| saṃskṛtaśabdasthāne ca kakāradvayasamnyogah, anusvāralopah,
ṛvarṇākārāpattimātram eva prākṛtāpabhraṣṭeṣu drṣṭam, na ḡakārāpattir-
api| so ’yaṃ saṃskṛtā dharmā ity asya sarvakālaṃ svayam eva pratiṣiddho
**’pi* (eds. : om. ms^B) *vināśah kṛtaḥ| (??)*

‘The Buddhist, Jaina and other [non-Vedic] scriptures mostly consist of solecistical words, and, since they are bad compositions, their *śāstric* nature is not recognised. (...) And thus how could their subject be correct / real when their words are incorrect / unreal? Or how could they be beginningless when their form is visibly corrupt? (...) In the works of Buddhists and other [heterodox people], however, whenever something is used with the intention of [using] correct words and with a clear mind, even in that case we hardly find anything that is not spoiled due to such frequent usages as “*prajñapti*”, “*viññapti*”, “*paśyatā*” (read “*paśyanā*” or *vipaśyanā*?”), “*tiṣṭhatā*” (? , read *tiṣṭhantika*?), etc. What shall we say about those [expressions] which are even more corrupt than the well-known corrupt vernaculars, such as “*bhikkhave*”? For a Prakrit word ending in *e* is seen to stand for the Accusative Plural, [but] not for the Nominative Plural, even in the case of a Vocative. And in the place of the word “*saṃskṛta*” we see the application of a double *k*, the elision of the

Anusvāra, and only the change of *r* into *a* in Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa languages [i.e. *saṃskṛta* becomes *sakkaa* / *sakkada*], but not the change [of *t*] into *d* as well. Thus [the Buddhists] themselves constantly destroy this [statement]: “*saṃskṛtā dharmāḥ*” [i.e. by the incorrect and therefore non-existent grammatical form: “*sakkaḍā*”], even if they deny its destruction [by asserting the eternity of the Buddha’s propositions].’

4.128 Kumāriḷa sets up strict criteria on the basis of which someone can be regarded as a real propagator of Dharma (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.6, TV^P, p. 360; TV^Ā, p. 202):

vedenaivābhyanuñātā yeṣāṃ eva pravakṛtā|
nityānām abhidheyānām manvantarayugādiṣu||
teṣāṃ viparivarteṣu kurvatām dharmasaṃhitāḥ|
vacanāni pramāṇāni nānyeṣāṃ iti niścayaḥ||

‘Whose [Veda-] propagator status is acknowledged by the Veda itself, and who are always to be named in the Manvantaras, Yugas and other [aeons]: the statements of these people alone, who compose compendiums on Dharma whenever they are reborn, and not of others, are authoritative: this is the settled view.’

4.129 **people know well** *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

4.130 Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 12, quoted in note ad 4.14.

4.131 **here** *ex em.* SANDERSON.

4.131 **one of their particular recensions** Cf. Kumāriḷa’s argument concerning the Vedic basis of Smṛti texts containing apparently non-Vedic regulations (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.2, TV^P, p. 265; TV^Ā, p. 164):
yad vā vidyamānaśākhāgataśrutiṃūlatvam evāstu| katham anupalabdhir iti cet, ucyate—

śākhānām viprakīṛṇatvāt puruṣāṇām pramādataḥ|
nānāprakaraṇasthatvāt smṛter mūlaṃ na dṛśyate||

‘Or rather let [their] source be nothing but a Vedic passage in the available recensions [of the Veda]. If you ask why don’t we find [this Vedic passage], my answer is as follows: The [Vedic] source of the Smṛti passage is not found since the recensions [of the Veda] are scattered, since people are negligent, and since it is contained in separate sections [of the Veda].’ Using the above argument Dhairyaśi could claim that the source of the Pañcarātra is a Vedic text which is hidden from us in the countless branches of the Veda. Actually he goes one step further and asserts that the Pañcarātra itself is one of these Vedic recensions.

Kumāriḷa also points out that, once the Smṛti status of the heterodox scriptures has been refuted, the *nāstika* dares to claim the same status for their own scriptures as the Veda has. The disastrous consequences are easy to foresee (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.11; TV^P, p. 455; TV^Ā, p. 230):

yad vā śakyādiśāstrāṇām smṛtiśāstratvavāraṇāt|

vedaśākhāsamānatvam āśankyeha nivāryate||

(...)

tataś ca vedavan nityās te 'pi ced āgamā matāḥ|

codanālakṣaṇo dharmas tadukto 'pi prasajyate||

kāmaṃ na praviśed grāmaṃ vārīto daṇḍapāṇibhiḥ|

spaṣṭaṃ mahāpathenaiva samprati pravivikṣati||

‘Or rather, having refuted that Buddhist and other [heterodox scriptures] are Smṛti texts, in this [part of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*] the [possible claim of their] equality to the recensions of the Veda is anticipated and set aside. (...) Therefore if those [heterodox] scriptures are also accepted to be eternal like the Veda, it will follow that the Dharma taught by them will also have scriptural proposition as its defining characteristic [similarly to Vedic Dharma]. Though [the heterodox scriptures] cannot enter the village [of authoritativeness] because the [Mīmāṃsaka] policemen have kept them off [by rejecting their Smṛti status], now they want to enter openly on the High Street [of Vedic status].’

Cf. also note ad 4.11.

4.136 cannot be interrogated by another doctrinal work

Similarly, as Yā-muna argues, just because the Pāñcarātrikas follow the prescriptions of a different, but equally valid Vedic school, i.e. the Ekāyanaśākhā, it does not follow that they are not brahmins at all. See *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 169: *ye punaḥ sāvitryanuvacanaprabhṛtitrayīdharmatyāgena ekāyanaśrutivihitān e-va catvāriṃśat saṃskārān kurvate, te 'pi svaśākhāgrhyoktam arthaṃ yathā- vad anuṣṭhamānā na śākhāntarīyakarmānanuṣṭhānād brāhmaṇyāt pra- cyavante, anyeṣāṃ api paraśākhāvihitakarmānanuṣṭhānanimittābrāhma- ṇyaprasaṅgāt* ‘Those who observe only the forty sacraments laid down in the Ekāyana Śruti while giving up the sacred duties found in the Three Vedas, such as the recitation of the Gāyatrī mantra etc., they too, inas- much as they properly observe the rituals taught in the *grhyasūtras* of their own recension, do not become excluded from the brahmin status, since it would follow that others too would become non-brahmin because they neglect the observance of rituals laid down in other people’s recen- sions.’

Ibid. p. 170: *vilakṣaṇās ca trayīvihitasvargaputrādiviṣayopabhogasādha- naindrāgneṃyādikarmādhikāribhyo dvijebhyaḥ trayyantaikāyanaśrutivihita- vijñānābhigamanopādānejyāprabhṛtibhagavatprāptyekopāyakarmādhikāriṇo mumukṣavo brāhmaṇā iti nobhayeṣāṃ apy anyonyaśākhāvihitakarmānanu- ṣṭhānam abrahmaṇyam āpādayati| yathā caikāyanaśākhāyā apauruṣeya- tvaṃ, tathā kāśmīrāgamaprāmāṇya eva prapañcitam iti neha prastūyate|* ‘And there are liberation-seeking brahmins who are entitled to rituals laid down in the the crowning of the Three Vedas: the Ekāyana Śruti, which rituals—[acquiring] knowledge [about God], cleansing [the way leading to the image of the deity], preparation [of flowers etc.], making offerings, etc.—are the only means of attaining the Lord. These brahmins are dif- ferent from the priests who are entitled to rituals laid down in the Three

Vedas (e.g. the *aindrāgneya*) which are the instruments of enjoying heaven or a son, or similar sensual objects. On this ground, the fact that they do not observe the rituals laid down in each other's [Vedic] recensions does not produce non-brahmin status for either of these two groups. And I have already expounded in [my work entitled] "The Validity of the Kashmirian Scripture(s)" in what way the Ekāyana recension [of the Veda] is not the work of a person, so I do not go into details now.'

4.136 Sautrāmaṇī The Sautrāmaṇī is an expiatory sacrifice that involves a *surā*-offering. (See MYLIUS, Glossar s.v., ibid. p. 144; *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa* 5.5.4.)

4.137 taught *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

4.138 This might be true, says Kumāriḷa, but in all other respects they are at variance with Vedic tradition (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4; TV^P, p. 329; TV^A, p. 195): *smṛtivākyam ekam ekena śrutivacanena virud-dhyeta| śākyādivacanāni tu katipayadamadānādivacanavarjaṃ sarvāṅy eva samastacaturdaśavidyāsthānaviruddhāni, trayīmārgavyutthitaviruddhācara-ṇaiś ca buddhādibhiḥ praṇītāni, trayībāhyebhyaś caturthavarṇaniravasita-prāyebhyo vyāmūdhebhyaḥ samarpitānīti* (eds. : *samarthitānīti* ms^B) *na vedamūlatvena sambhāvante|* 'One sentence in a Smṛti text might contradict one Vedic proposition. Every single one of Buddhist and other [heterodox] propositions, however, except for a few statements about self-control, munificence and the like, contradict all the fourteen sciences, and they were composed by the Buddha and others whose conduct deviates from and contradicts the doctrine of the Three Vedas, [and] they have been taught to deluded people most of whom are excluded from the fourth estate [i.e. to outcasts]: thus their source cannot be the Veda.'

4.139 to something else *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

4.141 of this teaching *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

4.141 more specific designation *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

4.141 Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p.12: *brāhmaṇeṣv eva kutaścid guṇayogāt sāt-tvatabhāgavatādivyapadeśo, yathā teṣv eva parivrājakādīśabdā itī|* 'Such names as *sāttvata*, *bhāgavata*, etc. refer precisely to brahmins in some way, through the application of the secondary sense, just as words such as *parivrājaka* refer to the very same people [i.e. to brahmins].

Ibid. p. 154: *yat punar uktaṃ, 'samāne brāhmaṇye kimiti sāt-tvatabhāgavataikāntikaśabdair eva eteṣāṃ niyamena vyapadeśa' itī, tat parivrājakani-gadādivad ity adoṣaḥ| yathāiva hi samāne brāhmaṇye *yajjuṣṭve* (corr., ed.: *yajjuṣṭve*) *ca kecid eva brāhmaṇāḥ kānicid eva yajjūṣi parivrājakanigadaśabdābhyām adhyante, 'tiṣṭhantu brāhmaṇāḥ, parivrājakā ānīyantām', 'ya-jjūṣi vartante na nigadāḥ, nigadā vartante na yajjūṣi' itī ca, tathehāpi bhaviṣyati|* 'As for the objection, "Why are these people standardly named

with the words *sāttvata* and *bhāgavata* alone, provided that their brahmin status is the same”, there is nothing wrong in this matter, just as [names like] *parivrājaka* and *nigada* [are unproblematic]. For just as some brahmins and some mantras of the Yajurveda are called *parivrājakas* and *nigadas* [respectively] even though they are equally brahmins and Yajurvedic mantras, in such expressions as “The brahmins should stay, the *parivrājakas* should be fetched”, and “The Yajurvedic mantras apply, not the *nigadas*”, or “The *nigadas* apply, not the Yajurvedic mantras”, the same goes for this case, too.’

4.144 “Are such caste universals. . .” See HALBFASS 1991, p. 363ff., referring to the discussion of this problem in the *Tantravārttika* (ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.1.2) and the *Nyāyamañjarī*.

4.147 Manus and other Smritis *ex em.* ISAACSON.

4.147 are valid because they are based on the Veda Jayanta observes in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (vol. I, p. 645) that all of Kumārila’s arguments proving that Smṛti texts are based on the Veda can be applied to other scriptures as well. Cf. *Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.2 (TV^P, p. 264f; TV^A, p. 163f): *manvādīnām cāpratyakṣatvāt tadvijñānamūlam adṛṣṭam kimcid avaśyam kalpanīyam| tatra ca—*
bhrānter anubhavād vāpi puṣṭvākyaḍ vipralambhanāt|
dṛṣṭānugūnyasādhyatvāc codanaiva laghīyasī|
*sarvatraiva cādrṣṭakalpanāyām *tādrṣam adṛṣṭam (ms^B : tādrṣam eds.)*
*kalpayitavyam, yad dṛṣṭam na viruṇaddhi na *cā(ms^B : vā^o eds.)dṛṣṭānta-*
ram āsanījayati| tatra bhrāntau tāvat samyānibaddhasāstradarśanaviro-
*dhāpattih, sarvalokābhyupagatadrḍhaprāmānya*bādhas (TV^A, ms^B : °vā-*
*das TV^P) ca| *tadā(ms^B : idā^o eds.)nīmtanais ca puruṣair api bhrāntir*
*manvādīnām anuvartitā, tatparihāropanyāsaś ca manvādīnām ity *anekā-*
*(TV^A, ms^B : ekā^o TV^P)dṛṣṭakalpanā| (...) puruṣavākya*paramparāpy*
(TV^P, ms^B : °parāpy TV^A) andhaparamparayā nīrākr̥tā, na hi niṣprati-
ṣṭhapramāṇātmalābho dṛṣyate| tathā vipralambhe ’pi tatkalanā, vipralipsā
prayojanam, lokasya ca tatra bhrāntih, tasyāś ceyantam kalam anuvrttir
ityādy āśrayanīyam| utpannasya ca dṛḍhasya pratyayasya prāmāṇyanirā-
**karaṇād dṛṣṭa(eds. : karaṇādṛṣṭa^o ms^B)virodhaḥ| tasmāt sarvebhyaś co-*
*danākalpanaiva jyāyasī, tatra hi *tanmātrādṛṣṭā(TV^A, ms^B : tanmātradr-*
ṣṭā^o TV^P)bhyupagamaḥ, śeṣas tu mahājanaparigrahādayaḥ sarve ’nuvidhī-
yante|

‘Since we cannot contact Manus and other [authors of Smṛti texts], we must necessarily postulate something imperceptible as the basis of their knowledge. And among [the various possible bases] it is the Veda which is simpler [to postulate] than error, or even experience, [other] people’s assertions, [or] the intention to deceive, since it can be established in accordance with what we see. And in all cases when we postulate something unseen, we must postulate such an unseen thing which does not contradict the observed [facts] and which does not entail another unseen thing.

Among [the above mentioned assumptions], first, if [we supposed that] error [was the basis], this would contradict the fact that we see [that the Smṛtis are] properly composed texts, and [their] firm authority, which everyone accepts, would also be set aside. We should also postulate many unseen facts, namely that people of that age also followed Manu's and other [Smṛti authors'] error, and that a refutations of that [error] of Manu and other [Smṛti authors] have been put forth. (...) [The supposition that Smṛti texts are based on] a series of human assertions has also been refuted with the help of [the analogy to] a series of blind men, since we do not see that valid cognition arises without any foundation [i.e. humans cannot transmit knowledge about Dharma without relying on the Veda, just as blind men cannot hand down information about colour without the help of a sighted person]. Likewise in the case of deception we must resort to the following: the postulation of that [deception], the intention to deceive as purpose, people's mistake about that, the continuation of that [mistake] for such a long time, etc. And since it would annul the validity of a firm belief, it would contradict the visible [facts]. Therefore the postulation of Vedic propositions [as the basis of Smṛti] is better than all the other [assumptions], since in this case we admit that unseen thing alone. As for such facts as the acceptance [of Smṛti] by the moral majority, they are all in harmony [with this postulation].'

Kumārila thinks that heretics are unlikely to lay a claim to the support of the Veda (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4, TV^P, p. 329, TV^Ā, p. 195): *vedamūlatvaṃ punas te tulyakakṣamūlatvākṣamayaiva lajjayā ca mātāpitṛdveṣiduşṭaputравan nābhyyupagacchanti* 'On the other hand, since they cannot stand having [a scripture] of the same rank as basis, and because they feel ashamed, they do not acknowledge that their source is the Veda, just as depraved sons who hate their parents.' But even if they tried to establish a Vedic foundation, the heterodox scriptures are so inconsistent with the Vedas that their claim would be clearly nonsensical (see note ad 4.138).

4.151 identity among the performers *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.2: *api vā karṣṭṣāmānyāt pramāṇam anumānaṃ syāt* 'Or rather, since the agents [who perform works prescribed in the Veda on the one hand and in Smṛti texts on the other] are the same, the inference [of now unavailable Vedic texts being the basis of Smṛti regulations that do not directly correspond to Vedic injunctions] is a means of valid cognition.' (On the interpretation of this sūtra see POLLOCK 1997, pp. 404ff.)

Cf. also Śabara ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.2 (TV^P, p. 258): *granthas tv anumāyeta, karṣṭṣāmānyāt smṛtividikāpadārthayoḥ| tenopapanno vedasamyogas traivarnikānām* 'But a [Vedic] text [which is the basis of a ritual that is prescribed only in a Smṛti text but not in the Veda itself] can be inferred [though it cannot actually be perceived] on the ground that the performers of a ritual act [laid down] in a Smṛti text and [of another one laid down] in a Vedic text are the same. Therefore it is appropriate that those who

belong to the three higher estates associate a Vedic text [with a purely Smṛti-based ritual].’

Cf. also *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 10 (*pūrvapakṣa*): *na caivam ācamanopanayanā-dīn iva śrutivihitāgnihoṭrādīpadārthānuṣṭhāyinaḥ tāntrikācārān upacarataḥ paśyāmaḥ*]

pratyutaitān vigarhante kurvāṇān vedavādinah]
tasmād yat ‘kartṛsāmānyāt prāmāṇyaṃ’ smṛtiśūditam||
naiva tat pañcarātrādibāhyasmarāṇam arhati]
na hi traivarṇikāś śiṣṭāḥ taduktārthān upāsate||

‘And we do not see that those who perform the Agnihotra and other rituals laid down in Śruti texts observe Tantric customs in the way they observe *ācamana*, *upanayana*, and other [orthodox customs]. On the contrary, the adherents of the Veda despise those who follow these [Tantric customs]. Therefore what is taught with respect to the Smṛtis, namely “Because of the identity of the performers [they have] validity”, does not apply to such heterodox Smṛtis as the Pañcarātra, for the educated members of the three higher estates do not recognise their teachings.’

The Pāñcarātrika certainly holds that the postulation of a Vedic basis is appropriate since the performers of these Tantric rituals are also brahmins. On the other hand, a Mīmāṃsaka would certainly never acknowledge even the twice-born status of the Bhāgavatas (see *Āgamaprāmāṇya* p. 11ff).

4.151 the inference of a Vedic text *ex em.* ISAACSON.

4.155 is only its cause *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

4.155 for any reason whatsoever As Kumāriḷa points out, although such Smṛti passages as the one prescribing the Aṣṭakā ritual can be inferred to be based on lost Vedic texts, this fact does not mean that any scripture can be nominated for having a Vedic basis. See *Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.2 (TV^P, p. 265; TV^A, p. 164): *na caivam sati yatkiṃcīt pramāṇam āpatsyate, śiṣṭatraivarṇikadr̥ḍhasmarāṇānyathānupapattīlabhyatvāc chrutyanumānasya*]. ‘And it is not the case that at this state of affairs anything can be a source of authoritative knowledge, since a Vedic text can [only] be inferred [as the basis of some other scripture] if the unbroken recollection of learned members of the three higher estates remains otherwise inexplicable.’

Though some heretic scriptures might contain Vedic elements, nevertheless their obvious anti-Vedic character must be emphatically declared. Says Kumāriḷa (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4, TV^P, p. 328, TV^A, p. 194): *yāny etāni trayīvidbhir na pariḡhītāni, kiṃcittanmiśradharmakāñcukacchāyāpatitāni lokopasaṃgrahalābhapūjākhyātiprayojanaparāṇi trayīviparītāsaṃbaddhadṛṣṭāśobhādīpratyakṣānumānopamānārthāpattīparāyayuktīmūlopanibaddhāni sām̐khyayogapāñcarātrapāśupataśākyagranthaparīḡhītadharmādharmānibandhanāni viśacikitsāvaśīkaraṇoccatānonmādanādisamarthakatipayamantrauṣadhikādācītkasiddhinīdarśanabalenaḥiṃsāsatyavacanadamādāyādīśrutismṛtisaṃvādistokārthagandhavāsitaḡvīkāprāyā-*

*rthāntaropa*deśīni* (eds. : °*deśāni* ms^B) *yāni ca bāhyatarāṇi mlecchācāramiśrakabhojanācaraṇanibandhanāni, teṣāṃ evaitac chrutivirodhahetudarśanābhyām anapekṣaṇīyatvaṃ pratipādyate| na caitat kva cid adhikaraṇāntare nirūpitam, na cāvaktavyam eva, gāvyādiśabdavācakatvabuddhivad atiprasiddhatvāt|*

*yadi hy anādareṇaiśāṃ na *kathyetā*(ms^B : *kalpyetā*° eds.)*pramāṇatā|*

aśakyaiveti matvānye bhaveyuh samadrṣṭayah|

śobhāsaukaryahetūktikalikālavaśena vā|

yajñoktapasuhiṃsādityāgabhrāntim avāpnuyuh|

‘This [sūtra, i.e. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4] teaches that the following [texts] should be discarded since they are opposed to the Veda and because we see [other] causes [of their coming into being]:

— texts on piety and impiety contained in Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra, Pāśupata, and Buddhist scriptures: they are not accepted by those who are learned in the Three Vedas, [though] they are placed in the shade of the gown of piety which is slightly blended with the [teaching of the Vedas], [but] their main concern is how to please the plebs, make profit, gain adoration and fame; they were put together on grounds that are contradictory to and unconnected with the Veda: sense perception such as visible splendour, and arguments consisting for the most part in inference, analogy, and presumption; and, while perfumed with the scent of a few things that are in accordance with Śruti and Smṛti, such as non-violence, truthfulness, self-control, munificence, and compassion, they teach other subjects which are mainly connected with making a living, using as corroboration the evidence of the random success of a few mantras and medical herbs that are able to cure poisoning, induce enchantment, ruin one’s enemy, causing madness, and the like;

— those completely alien texts which deal with the conduct of the barbarians, [such as?] dining in the company of others [who belong to the lower castes].

And this has not been taught in any other section [of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*], while it cannot be left unmentioned [just] because [the invalidity of such heterodox texts] is public knowledge, just as the [correct] view about the expressivity of such [ungrammatical] words as *gāvī* [should also be pronounced, even if it is well known]. For if they were disregarded and thus their invalidity was not asserted, thinking that [this assertion] cannot be made people would consider [these texts] equal [to the Manu- and other Smṛtis], or, because of the beauty, feasibility, or the argumentation [found in these texts], or due to the influence of the Iron Age, they would arrive at the erroneous conclusion that such acts as the killing of animals, which is taught in the context of Vedic sacrifice, should be given up.’

Kumārila also reckons with the possibility that any freshly established religion could derive itself from lost Vedic texts (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4, TV^P, p. 329, TV^Ā, p. 194f): *yaiś ca mānavādismṛtīnām *apy* (eds. : *adhy*° ms^B) *utsannavedaśākhāmūlatvam abhyupagatam, tān prati sutarāṃ śākyādibhir api śakyaṃ tanmūlatvam eva vaktum| ko hi*

śaknuyād utsannānām vākyaviśayeyattāniyamaṃ kartum| tatas ca yāvat kiṃ cit kiyantam api kālaṃ kaiś cid ādriyamāṇaṃ prasiddhiṃ gataṃ tat pratyakṣasākhāviśaṃvāde 'py utsannaśākhāmūlatvāvasthānam anubhavatulyakakṣatayā pratibhāyāt| ata āha—'virodhe tv anapekṣaṃ syād' (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.3) *iti* | ‘And those who hold that the Smṛti texts of Manu and other [authors] are based on lost recensions of the Veda can easily be told by the Buddhist and other [heterodox people] that [the Buddhist and other heretic scriptures] also have the very same basis. For who could impose a restriction on the limit of sentences and topics in lost [texts]? And thus anything whatsoever that has been cultivated by any people for any time and has become well-known, even if it were inconsistent with the available [Vedic] recensions, would appear as having a stable status inasmuch as it is based on a lost recension, since it would be looked upon in the same way [as the orthodox Smṛtis]. Therefore [the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*] says: “When there is a contradiction, [the text that contradicts the Veda] must be discarded.” (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.3)’

4.162 greed and the like are the visible source As Kumārila himself says (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4, TV^P, p. 330, TV^A, p. 195f):

*lobhādīkāraṇaṃ cātra bahv evānyat pratīyate|
yasmin saṃnihite dr̥ṣṭe nāsti mūlantarānumā||
śākyādayaś ca sarvatra kurvāṇā dharmadeśanām|
hetujālavinirmuktāṃ na kadācana kurvate||
na ca tair vedamūlatvam ucyate gautamādivat|
hetavaś cābhidyante ye dharmād dūrataḥ sthitāḥ||
(dharmād: conj., dharme: TV^{Apc},
dharmā: TV^P, TV^{Aac}, ms^B (or dharmād?))
eta eva ca te yeṣāṃ vānimātreṇāpi nārcanam|
pākhaṇḍīno vikarmasthā *haitu(eds. : hetu^o ms^B)kāś caita eva hi||*

‘In this case [i.e. in the case of heterodox scriptures] we recognise many other causes [of their creation], such as greed and the like, and when we see that these are present there is no [need for] inferring another source. And the Buddhists and other [heretics], whenever they give instructions about Dharma, they never give it without a network of motivations. On the other hand, those who stand far removed from Dharma do not say, unlike Gautama and other [authors of Smṛti texts], that [their scriptures] are based on the Veda, and they put forth arguments. It is they to whom one should not pay reverence even by mere words, for it is no-one but they who are [referred to as] heretics, sinners, and sophists.’

4.162 also *ex em.*

4.162 a means of livelihood Cf. Yāmuna’s answer to the same charge (*Āgama-prāmāṇya* pp. 155f.):

*na hi bhāgavatais sarvaiḥ vṛttaye 'bhyarcyate hariḥ|
dr̥ṣṭā hi bahavaḥ svārthaṃ pūjayanto 'pi sāttvatāḥ||
kecid yadi paraṃ santaḥ sāttvatā vṛttikarsitāḥ|*

pūjayanti mahābhāgā vaiṣṇavā vṛttikāraṇāt||
na tāvataiṣām brāhmaṇyaṃ śakyaṃ nāstīti bhāṣitum|
na khalv ādhvaryavaṃ kurvan jyotiṣṭome patiṣyati||
yadi na pratigrhṇīyuh pūjaiva viphalā bhavet|
pūjāsādguṇyasiddhyartham atas te pratigrhṇate||
‘arcanānte hiraṇyaṃ ca tasmai deyaṃ svasāktitaḥ|
anyathā pūjakasyaiva tatra pūjāphalaṃ bhavet||’ (Paramasaṃhitā 17.46–
47)
‘hantya alpadakṣiṇo yajña’ (Manusmṛti 11.40) ityādismṛtidarśanāt|
ṛtvijā dravyalubdhena svayaṃ yācñāpurassaram||
yad ārtvijyaṃ kṛtaṃ karma tad eva hi niṣidhyate|
(...)
śraddhāpūṭadakṣiṇādānaṃ tūbhayor api śreyaskaram eva|

‘Not all Bhāgavatas worship Hari to make a living, for many Sāttvatas are seen who also perform *pūjā* for their own sake. Even if some virtuous Sāttvatas, attracted to earn a livelihood, [but otherwise] being distinguished Vaiṣṇavas, perform *pūjā* because they want to make money, one cannot assert on the basis of this fact alone that they are not brahmins. [Likewise a priest] who acts as an *adhvaryu* at a *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice will certainly not be degraded. If they did not accept fees the *pūjā* itself would be fruitless: that is why they accept fees, so that the *pūjā* may be correct and [thus] successful. “And at the end of the worship one should give him gold to the best of one’s ability. Otherwise the priest who performs the *pūjā* may get the fruit of the *pūjā*”, since the Smṛti says among others: “[The organs of sense and action, honour, bliss in heaven, longevity, fame, offspring, and cattle] are destroyed by a sacrifice at which [too] small sacrificial fees are given.” (tr. BÜHLER) That officiating work alone is prohibited prior to which an officiant himself makes demands because of avarice. (...) A donation of fee, however, which is purified by reverence is certainly beneficial for both [the priest and the sacrificer].’

4.163 accepted by intelligent people Kumārila points out that every anti-Vedic scripture must be explicitly rejected. It is not enough to show that the adherents of Vedic religion have always been the learned and the respectable, since the heretics can assert the same about their own followers (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.4 TV^P, p. 329, TV^A, p. 194):
*mahājanagrḥītatvaṃ pitṛādyānugamādi *ca* (eds. : *vā* ms^B) |
te ‘pi dvīpāntarāpekṣaṃ vadantya eva svadarśane||
*tatra śraddhāmātram evaikam vyavasthānimittam sarveṣāṃ svapitṛ*pitā*(eds. : *mātā*^o ms^B)*mahādicaritānuyāyivāt|*
 ‘[The followers of heterodox scriptures] also say, referring to other continents, that their own doctrines are accepted by honorable people and have been followed and [handed down] by their fathers and [forefathers]. In this matter faith alone is the only basis of the settled order since everyone is disposed to follow the deeds of his own father, forefathers, and other [ancestors].’

According to the Vaiśeṣika commentator Śrīdhara, consentient acceptance by those who exercise correct judgement is a feature that sets apart the Veda from heterodox scriptures (*Nyāyakandalī*, p. 520): *atha puruṣaviśeṣa-praṇīto veda iti kuta eṣā pratītir iti, sarvair varṇāśramibhir avigānena tadarthaparigrahāt| yatkiṃcanapurūṣapraṇītatve tu vedasya buddhādivākya-
van na sarveṣāṃ parīkṣakānām avigānena tadarthānuṣṭhānaṃ syāt, kasya
cid aprāmāṇyāvabodhena viśaṃvādapratīter api sambhavāt|* ‘If [you ask] how we know that the Veda was composed by an extraordinary person, [the answer is that we know it] because its contents are unanimously accepted by all, belonging to any social estate or life-period. On the other hand, if the Veda had been composed by just any ordinary person, then not everybody who examines things carefully would unanimously put its contents into practice, as [not every discriminating person follows] the Buddha’s and other [heterodox teachers’] propositions, because someone might realise that it is not authoritative and therefore adopt a dissenting view.’

4.164 As the *pūrvapakṣin* says in *Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.11 (TV^P, p. 459; TV^A, p. 235):

*yāvād evoditaṃ kiṃcid vedaprāmāṇyasiddhaye|
tat sarvaṃ buddhavākyaṇām atideśena gamyate||*

‘Whatever has been put forth in order to prove the authority of the Veda, all of that can be applied by analogy to the Buddha’s propositions.’

4.165 have always existed *ex conj.* ISAACSON.

4.171 This would certainly be an unacceptably generous view for Kumāṛila, in whose interpretation *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.5–6 excludes such a liberal position (*Tantravārttika* ad *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.5–6, TV^P, p. 360–362, TV^A, p. 201–203): *yat tarhi vedavihitam na bādhte, śiṣṭān vā vedavido na kopayati, vihārārāmamaṇḍalakarāṇavairāgyadhyanābhyāsāhimsāsatyavacanadamadānadayādi, tad buddhādibhāṣitam *pramāṇatvenā* (conj. : *pramāṇenā* eds., *pramāṇatvaṇā* ms^B) *viruddham iti cet, ‘na| śāstraparimāṇatvāt|’ parimitāny eva hi caturdaś *āṣṭā* (eds. : ° *āṣṭāṣṭā*° ms^B) *daśa vā vidyāsthānāni dharmapramāṇatvena śiṣṭaiḥ pariḡhītāni, vedopavedāṅgopāṅgāṣṭādaśa-dharmasamhitāpurāṇaśāstraśikṣādaṇḍanītisaṃjñakāni| na ca teṣāṃ madhye bauddhārhatādiḡranthāḥ smṛtāḥ *pratigṛhītā* (em. : *pratigṛhīta* ms^B : *grhītā* eds.) *vā|*

*pratikañcukarūpeṇa pūrvaśāstrārthagocaram|
yad anyat kriyate tasya dharmam praty apramāṇatā||*

(...)

*tasmād yāny eva śāstrāṇi vedamūlānatikramāt|
avasthitāni tair eva jñāto dharmah phalapradah||
yathāivānyāyavijñātād vedāl lekhyādīpūrvakāt|
śūdreṇādhigatād vāpi dharmajñānaṃ na saṃmatam||
tathātīkrāntavedoktamaryādāvvyavahāriṇām|
saṃvādiṣv api vākyeṣu neṣyate dharmaheturā||*

smaryante ca purāṇeṣu dharmaviplavahetavaḥ|
kalau śākyādayas teṣāṃ ko vākyam śrotum arhati||
yathā kṛtakakarpūrasuvarṇādiṣu dīyate|
*yad bījaṃ tad api vyaktam agrāhyatvāt *pralīyate||*
 (TV^P, TV^{Ac}, ms^B : *pratīyate* TV^{Ac})
*tena karmānurūpyasāmānyatodṛṣṭārthāpatti*balāt* (eds. : °*vya/dyattvāt*
 ms^B) *tadabhiprāyakaḥpitadharmābhāsamadyapatitaṃ sanmūlam *apy a-*
hiṃsādi (eds. : *atha hiṃsādi* ms^B) *śvadṛtinikṣiptakṣīravād anupa*yogyā* (eds.
 : *bhogyā* ms^B) *viśrambhanīyaṃ ca| tanmātropalabdhaṃ bhavatīty avāśyaṃ*
yāvat pariṇatadharmasāstreḥbhyo nopalabhyate, tāvad agrāhyaṃ bhavati|
yadā śāstrāntareṇaiva so 'rthaḥ spaṣṭo 'vadhāryate|
*tadā tenaiva siddhatvād *itarat syād* (eds. : *itarasyād* ms^B) *anarthakam||*
 ‘One may have the following view: “Then those things mentioned by the
 Buddha and other [heterodox teachers] which are not at variance with
 what is enjoined in the Veda and do not incense the educated [brahmins]
 who are versed in the Veda—the construction of monasteries, gardens,
 and *maṇḍalas*, dispassion, meditation, exercise, non-violence, truthfulness,
 self-control, munificence, compassion and the like—are not at variance
 with authoritativeness.” [The answer of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (1.3.6) to this
 view is as follows:] “No, since the number of [authoritative] scriptures is
 limited.” For the only a limited number (14 or 18) of sciences is accepted
 by educated people as a source of valid knowledge about Dharma, namely
 the Vedas, the Upavedas [Āyurveda (Medicine), Dhanurveda (Military
 Science), Gandharvaveda (Music)], the [Veda-]Aṅgas [Śikṣā (Pronuncia-
 tion in the general sense, Chandas (Prosody), Vyākaraṇa (Grammar),
 Nirukta (Etymology), Jyotiṣa (Astronomy), Kalpa (Ritual)], the Upāṅgas
 [Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya], the eighteen Dharmasamhitās, the Purāṇasāstras,
 Śikṣā [with a special subject, e.g. the one written by Kātyāyana], and
 Daṇḍanīti [= Arthaśāstra].[‡] And Buddhist, Jain or other [heterodox] works
 are neither mentioned among them nor admitted [to this group]. If they do
 something different [from their real teachings] which belongs to the sphere
 of the above mentioned sciences, using it as a kind of armour / disguise
 [against the attacks of the orthodox], it does not have any validity with
 respect to Dharma. (...) Therefore only that Dharma yields fruit which
 has been mastered from scriptures which are well-established because they
 do not transgress their basis: the Veda. Just as knowledge about Dharma
 is not sanctioned if it derives from a Vedic text which has been mastered
 in an unauthorised way, which has previously been committed to writing
 and the like, or has been learnt by a Śūdra, likewise the propositions—
 may they be in accordance with [the Veda]—of those whose behaviour has
 transgressed the limits of propriety taught in the Vedas are not accepted
 as means of [learning] Dharma. And the Buddhists and other [heretics] are
 mentioned in the Purāṇas as those who bring about the ruin of Dharma
 in the Iron Age. Who could possibly listen to what they say? Just as a
 drop [of real camphor, gold, etc.], if put into fake camphor, gold, etc., will
 also dissolve, since it cannot be clearly grasped, thus such [virtuous princi-

ples] as non-violence, even though their basis is positive, are like milk put in the skin of a dog and being such they should not be neither adopted nor relied on, inasmuch as they have fallen into the middle of counterfeit Dharma that had been cooked up according to their [i.e. the heretics'] intentions by means of [analogy based on] the conformity of actions [“the fruit of a sacrificial action that causes pain to the victim will be pain for the sacrificer himself”], inference from a common property [“Vedic violence, just as everyday violence, is against Dharma”], and presumption [“since the experience of suffering is the result of sins formerly committed, the experience of various kinds of suffering brings about the destruction of sins”].[‡] These [principles] are known only from those [Buddhist and other such scriptures], so they will necessarily be unadaptable as long as they are not known from recognised works on Dharma. If the matter was clearly learnt from another doctrinal work alone, then, since it would be established by that alone, this other one [i.e. the Buddhist etc. scripture] would be useless.’

[‡] I follow the *Nyāyasudhā*’s interpretation (TV^P p. 379f.).

4.173 any contemptible duty *ex conj.* KATAOKA.

4.177 Or is there any virtue... *ex conj.*

4.180 that of brahmin sages *ex conj.* RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.

4.180 uniquely fluent *ex conj.* SANDERSON.

4.183 universal piety taught by Manu *ex conj.* Cf. *Manusmṛti* 10.63: *ahiṃsā satyam asteyaṃ śaucam indriyanigrahaḥ| etaṃ sāmāsikaṃ dharmam cāturvarṇye ’bravīn manuḥ||*